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BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION

BY THE

TRANSLATOR.



Attend my Author, from the Practice of his Civil Duties into the Shade of his Philoſophic Retirement: I have the Honour of doing by him what he did by the Greeks; *of introducing his* Ethics *to the Knowledge of my Countrymen, but with unequal Succeſs; ſince the* Greek *Philoſophy came from him with improv'd Ornament and Strength. The Genius of* Cicero *collected the diſpers'd Rays of Learning, and united them into* one ſtrong Point of Light and Heat, *whilſt every Reflection from him, like that of the Moon from the Sun, has been but a* pale ineffectual Ray; *not deſtitute indeed of Uſe in the* Republic of Letters, *but without Dignity or Force in the* Syſtem of Philoſophy.

THE great Utility of tranſlated Learning *has been, in one of the Treatiſes I now give the Reader, nobly recommended and vindicated by my Author, upon Principles which will hold in all Ages and Countries, where* the Deſire of Knowledge, *nay,* the Itch of Curioſity, *prevails: It was owing to his Attempts in this Way, that he was able to teach his Country the* Language *of Philoſophy. The* Latin *Tongue, before his Time, was almoſt confined to Terms which occurr'd only in Civil and Military Life. All Mankind are Judges of Appearances, and but a few ſearch farther. The* Arms of the Romans *had reduc'd the* Maſters of the Arts *to a State of* Slavery *and* Dependance; *the meaneſt and the rudeſt* Roman *found his Condition ſuperior to that of the moſt learned and polite of the* Greeks; *they therefore entertain'd too general a Contempt for thoſe Acquiſitions* which none but a Slave cou'd teach them: *Their greateſt Men, in the pureſt Ages of their Government, had been employ'd in thoſe Arts which ſerv'd beſt for the Purpoſes of Conqueſt abroad, and of Ambition at home: I mean thoſe of acquiring and ruling Empire. The Lawrel and the Oak ſeem'd too fair in their Eyes to leave them any Time for rearing thoſe Plants which* thrive in the Shade. *The Examples of* Scipio, Lælius. *and a few others of their great Men, who cultivated Philoſophy, were not ſufficient for introducing that Study to the general Acquaintance of their Country; they were* admir'd *but not* imitated; *and the Romans never began to* reaſon upon Virtue *till they had* left off practiſing it.

THIS

THIS Consideration will lead us to reflect, that our Author, when he came to write of Philosophy, was obliged to strike out, as it were, a new Creation of Terms in the Latin *Language. For this Purpose he either translated the* Greek Metaphors, *which had been adapted and familiarised into Philosophy, or invented new ones equally significant. But the Reader may consult his own Words upon this Head; what I am to infer from this is, that a Translator of* Cicero's *Ethic Works into* English *is, perhaps, under as great a Disadvantage as he himself was, in accommodating them to* Latin.

WHERE an Author writes upon a System of his own, he has a Right to invent his Terms, as well as to defend his Hypothesis; when he writes upon another's System, he has the Advantage of his Predecessor's Terms, if both wrote in the same Language. When we consider Cicero *as of the new Academy, we find him* explaining *every System of Philosophy, but* adopting *none; therefore he uses few or no arbitrary Terms; and as the Language from which he wrote was foreign to his own, he was obliged first to cast, as it were, the* Greek *into a* Latin *Mould, and then to apply the File, in order to render its new Formation smooth and agreeable. By this Practice he communicated to after Ages, a Language which has been current, and worn into Use ever since: But still it is equally difficult to do the same by his Language in* English, *which he did by that of the* Greeks. *It has never yet fallen under the Pro-*

vince of any Man of Genius *in* England *to follow our Author thro' all the Range of Philoſophy; and ſuch Men of* Learning *who have attempted it, have generally been contented, whether they wrote in* Engliſh *or in* Latin, *to keep cloſe to our Author's Expreſſions, without even varying the* Latin Idiom. *My Rule in this Caſe has been, to do the ſame by* Cicero *that he did by the* Greeks; *where it is poſſible to tranſlate his Words into an* Engliſh *Idiom I always do it: Where the* Latin *cannot be tranſlated, or if tranſlated becomes an* Ignotum per ignotius, *I retain the* Latin, *as* Cicero *does in like Caſes the* Greek.

THE Reader by this time, no Doubt, is ſenſible of the great Difference there is, betwixt tranſlating our Author's Oratorial *and* Philoſophical *Works.* Cæſar, *upon a certain Occaſion, ſaid, that in all his former Combats he fought for* Glory, *but that he* then *fought for* Safety: *In like manner, in the other Works of* Cicero, *a Tranſlator is at a Loſs how to* imitate his Beauties, *but in his Philoſophy he is puzzled* about finding his Meaning. *But this is not all; his Ethic Works reſemble, in another reſpect, the Character he gives us of* Roſcius: *Tho' they were* void of Learning *their* Elegance *would* recommend them; *and were they deſtitute of* Elegance, *yet would they be* ineſtimable for their Learning.

BUT there is another Recommendation, which comes along with my Author's Philoſophical Works, which is uncommon with the Sectaries of Philoſophy, and that is Sincerity.

The

The Doctrine he embrac'd render'd Sincerity a part of his Character, as a Philoſopher, ſince it was by Sincerity alone that the New Academy *could hope to recommend that* Moderation *which was their peculiar Diſtinction. This aroſe from their profeſſing their Unwillingneſs to give their poſitive Aſſent to any Propoſition; becauſe of the great Difficulty in diſcerning the Truth, thro'* the Arguments which might be offer'd on contrary Sides. *This was a Doctrine in common with the* Academics *both new and old, and the* Sceptics; *but with the following Difference: A* Sceptic, *who was a kind of an* intellectual Prize-fighter, *laid himſelf out to invent Arguments, which might balance the Aſſent ſo equally on both Sides, that it ſhould preponderate to neither. Hence it is, that* Cicero's * *Character of* Arceſilas, *agrees with a* Sceptic *rather than an* Academic, *who allow'd, that the Arguments on one Side might admit of* †*Probability. Thus, The* New Academic, *by admitting a Degree of* Comprehenſion, *preſerv'd a* Principle of Agency, *whereas the* Sceptic, *by the equal Balance he affected, took away both* Comprehenſion *and* Probability; *by which Means he render'd Volition* inert, *and thereby deſtroy'd every Principle of* moral Agency. *Thus far I have thought proper to premiſe, with Regard to the Eſſential Difference between a* Scep-

* Paria contrariis in partibus momenta Rationum invenirentur. *Cic.*

Παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικεῖσθαι. *Laer. in Arcef.*

† Præclare agi ſecum putet, ſi in ejuſmodi rebus veri ſimile quod ſit, invenerit. *Cic.*

tic *and an* Academic, *a Difference which the ſhallow Smatterers in Free-thinking have never attended to, and proves, with how little Reaſon they affect to tread in the Steps of our Author.*

BUT, at the ſame Time, it cannot be diſſembled, that the Contiguity of Doctrines, with Regard to the Criterion of Truth, which aroſe among the Followers of Socrates, *is ſo great as to create Confuſion, and it requires the niceſt Acquaintance with our Author's Manner, and the Philoſophy of the Antients, to ſeparate them. In this Introduction I ſhall endeavour to communicate to the Reader, what I can recollect of my Academical Studies upon this Head; and the Faintneſs of the Eſſay will, I hope, be pardon'd, and attributed to a long Purſuit in Studies of a very different Nature from philoſophical Diſquiſitions.*

THE Original of Religious Rites among the Greeks, *was owing to the Politics of their ſeveral Leaders: They found it impoſſible to bring an* uninformed, unprincipled *People into Civil Diſcipline, by* abſtracted Reaſoning *or* magiſterial Dictates; *they knew they muſt operate upon their Senſes, which, if once touch'd with Terror, would ſoon ſubmit to Reaſon; hence aroſe the rude Inſtitutions of their Religion, the only Cement of Civil Polity, and the ſtrongeſt Engine of that neceſſary Subordination, which connects all the public Duties of Life, and finiſhes the whole Oeconomy of a State. But this Province was too important for Power to ſuffer it to depart from itſelf; and hence the*

King

King and the Priest were the same. The monstrous Engraftments which this original System afterwards admitted of, were so far from being check'd, that they were encourag'd by the Succession of this Political Priesthood, and either thro' real or affected Ignorance, they lost Sight of its primary Design.

THE simple Manners of the first Legislators, who had instituted the plain Rites of their Religion, gave way to the Ambition of their Successors: These last, arm'd with the double Reverence due to Religion and Government, instead of improving it for the Good of the People, employ'd it to the Purposes of Tyranny; nor did they stop, till Superstition had render'd those People Slaves, whom Religion had render'd obedient: Their Lust of extending their Dominion left them no Leisure for attending the Duties of their Priesthood, which devolv'd upon a Set of Slaves, whose Trade it was to keep the People in the Dark, and whose Revenue swelled, in Proportion as the Senses of their Votaries were abused.

IT was impracticable to render this Delusion total, amongst so sensible a People as the Greeks: *A few enquiring Spirits began to shake off the Prejudices to which they had been born, but with these, they shoke off the Principles in which they ought to have died. Reason is of itself, in most Men, too impatent to continue in the just Mean betwixt Infidelity and Credulity. This new Sect arguing against the Use of Religion from its Abuse, ran into a no less criminal Extream than that which they wanted to a-*

void: They confin'd their Studies to phyſical Diſquiſitions, and, proud of the Diſcoveries they had made, reſolv'd all Knowledge into that of material *Principles; and are every where mark'd by our Author under the Name of* PHYSICI, Naturaliſts.

SUCH was the State of Greece, *betwixt* undifying Learning *and* impious Superſtition, *when* Socrates, *from whom we are to date our Philoſophic Æra, appear'd; and aſſum'd a Province long neglected, which was that of* mending the Heart.

IT is in this Light alone that we are to conſider this almoſt divine Perſon: To this all his Cares, all his Toils, every Faculty of his penetrating Mind, and every Virtue of his generous Soul, were directed. He ſet himſelf equally to combat the Pride of Learning and the Errors of Superſtition; but dealt with each in very different Manners: He conſider'd all Learning *which had not* Virtue *for its Purpoſe, as being* uſeleſs, *and all* Religion *which had not* Piety *for its End, as* dangerous. *For the firſt he profeſſed an open Contempt, as no Party which eſpouſed it was conſiderable enough to affect the Peace of his Country; but the laſt he found, with the deepeſt Regret, had gather'd Strength enough to become part of the Civil Government. The Quiet of this he was too good a Subject to endanger, and therefore proceeded in the moſt covert* artful *Manner, as being at the ſame time the moſt* dutiful *and the moſt* effectual, *for bringing about the great Work of Reformation: For this Purpoſe he ſet* a Guard upon his Lips, *in never*

never affirming aught. The Conviction his Doctrine carried with it aroſe from the Abſurdities into which he brought his Opponents from their own Premiſes. When any of them laid down a Propoſition, he proceeded gradually in the Queſtionary way, to worm them into Conceſſions which brought their whole Syſtem to appear ridiculous or falſe. I ſhall not enlarge farther upon the Character, or the Hiſtory of this great Man. His blameleſs Life and Converſation were a Reproach to his Enemies, and the Acuteneſs of his Genius ſuch, as left them no Handle but his Virtue for putting him to Death. I ſhall confine myſelf therefore to the Conſequences of this Method, which he introduced into Philoſophy.

HIS great Aim was, no doubt, to reduce the Pride of Man, which is the firſt and the great Preparative for Reformation, by inculcating that he knew nothing. *This was all that* Socrates *profeſſed. It required all the Depth of Underſtanding, all the Extent of Genius which he was Maſter of, to bring a Man at that time to learn this humiliating Leſſon. His Countrymen and Diſciples reverenced the Purity and Simplicity of his Manners, and were charmed by the Force and Clearneſs of his Reaſoning. The moſt penetrating were ſenſible that ſomewhat lurked under that invincible Diffidence he profeſſed; ſomewhat which he durſt not ſpeak out, and which could be no other than a Conviction that there was a ſuperior and immortal Principle, which, if Man did not know,* he knew nothing

nothing. *This came ſoon to be ſo generally underſtood, that he fell a Sacrifice* to the Gods of the Gentiles, *and cloſed an irreproachable Life by an edifying Death.*

HIS Diſciples and Succeſſors came far ſhort of his Virtues and Genius. That Pride of Heart which Socrates *had ſo much laboured to bring down, reſumed all it's Influence when he was gone. Each thought he could perceive the great End which his Maſter aimed at; each thought differently in this reſpect from another; and hence it was, that almoſt as many different Sects of Philoſophy ſprung from* Socrates, *after his Death, as he had Diſciples in his Life.*

THE Diſpute that concerns my preſent Undertaking, is that περι κριτηριυ της αληθειας, concerning the Rule of Truth. *This Diſpute is* Logical, *as that* περι αγαθων κ κακων *is* Ethic. *The laſt has already been exhauſted by* Cicero; *but much he wrote upon the firſt being loſt, it may be ſome Satisfaction to the Reader to ſee the Gleaning we have been enabled to make from the imperfect Fragments of Antiquity which remain upon this Subject.*

PLATO *is generally eſteemed the greateſt of the Diſciples of* Socrates; *as he lived in Courts, his Philoſophy took a more general Turn than that of* Socrates, *which endeavoured to reform the Whole by reforming Individuals.* Plato, *however, with regard to his Opinion upon the* Rule of Truth, *retained ſo much of his Maſter's Manner, that every Sect claimed him as their own. As he was undoubtedly the Maſter, perhaps the Founder*

of

of the Old Academy, *his Opinion was of the greateſt Weight amongſt the ſeveral Sects, who all ſet forth their Pretenſions, as being* the true and lawful Repreſentatives *of the firſt Academy. My Reader will find our Author's Account of this great Man's Opinion, with regard to this Queſtion, in the* * *ſubſequent Work; but as ſome have contended that he was a* Dogmatiſt, *and not an* Aporematic, *that is, one who* doubts, diſcuſſes and conſiders every thing, but without affirming or aſſenting, *I think it reaſonable to lay before the Reader his own Opinion of this Matter.*

THEY who have contended that Plato *was a* Dogmatiſt, *ſeem not to have conſidered that an* Aporematic *may be determined by Rules, as well as a* Dogmatiſt; *but with this Difference, that the latter aſſents to thoſe Rules upon the Principle of unerring Conviction, while the other conſiders them only in the Light of Probability. This ſeems to have been* Plato's *Caſe; and upon this cautious Footing it is that we find him venturing to pronounce upon the* Rule of Truth.

HIS Opinion then was, that all Judgment of Things was formed ὑπὸ τῦ ἀνθρωπινυ νυ, *that is,* by the human Mind joined with Reaſon. *But as all Objects, exerciſing the Judgment, fell partly under the Cognizance of* Intelligence, *and partly under that of the* Senſes; *that is, ſome* Things *are* νοητὰ, *or* intellectual, *and others* αἰσθητὰ, *or* ſenſible, *he thought that there are likewiſe two Principles or Faculties*

* P. 6. of the *Academical Treatiſes.*

in

in human Reaſon, *or in the* λογος. *That Principle by which* Senſibles *are judged, he called* δοξαστικου λογου, *or* opiniating Reaſon, *as he called all Matters falling under the Cognizance of the Senſes* δοξαστα. *As to Things which fall under the* Intelligence, *he called the Principle by which they are judged* ἐπιστημονικος λογος, *or* Scientific Reaſon.

THUS Plato *thought that* ſenſible Objects *are judged by the Senſes, joined to* opiniating Reaſon; *and that* Opinion *only* (*which is as it were the Subſtitute of Science*) *not* Science, *is the Reſult of this Judgment: But that thoſe Things which fall under the Intellectual Principle of the Mind are judged by the* Underſtanding, *together with* ſcientific Reaſon. *Thoſe laſt he termed* Ideas, *which have a real Exiſtence; or, to uſe his own Words,* They exiſt in that which really is. *Take the Explanation of this difficult Term from his own Words, in his* Timeus.

THERE is ſomewhat which exiſts without being generated; and ſomewhat alſo which is indeed generated, but has no real Exiſtence. The firſt is comprehenſible by Intelligence with Reaſon, which is always unvarying; the laſt, by Opinion with Senſe void of Reaſon, and is opinable, generated, periſhing, but never really exiſting, (*or really an* ENS).

THESE were the Sentiments of Plato *and the firſt Academy upon the Rule of Truth. Their Cotemporaries the* Peripatetics, *with* Ariſtotle *at their Head, differed very little from the Academy, upon this or any other Point of Ethics*

Ethics or Morals; for we find them, on all Occaſions, alotting the Judgment of ſenſible Things to the Senſes, without excluding Reaſon; and that of intelligible Things to the Underſtanding. Ariſtotle, *indeed, was not refined enough in his Perception to come up to* Plato's *Doctrine of Ideas. In their Room he ſubſtituted certain* univerſal Characters of Things, *exiſting no where but in the Things themſelves by them ſignified; and yet, by the Help of Intelligence, are* diſcerpable *from Matter: In the Intelligence becoming unvarying and uncomplex; whereas the* Things *ſignified are* mutable *and* manifold. *Theſe Characters afterwards were termed, by Schoolmen,* Univerſalia, *and have given Riſe to an endleſs Jargon of Sophiſtries.*

SPEUSIPPUS *and* Xenocrates, *who next made the greateſt Figures in the firſt Academy, differed little from the Opinion of their great Predeceſſor upon this Head. This is confirmed not only by our Author, but by* Sextus, *the famous* Pyrrhoniſt.

WE are now arrived at the middle Academy, the Founder of which was Arceſilas, *a Name invidious, perhaps unjuſtly ſo, in the Schools of the* Stoics. *This great Reformer is repreſented by them in Terms unbecoming Philoſophic Language. The Reader will ſee what were the Sentiments which our Author puts in the Mouth of his noble Interlocutor, with regard to the Character of* Arceſilas. *And in* Plutarch, *the* Stoics *repreſent him and his Followers with that Ferocity ſo peculiar to their Sect,*

Sect, as ζοφισ-ας καὶ λυμεωνας των εν φιλοσοφια καὶ δογμα-των ὁδω βαδιζοντων ἀναλροπειας, Quibblers, the Peſts of Philoſophy, the Overthrowers and Diſturbers of thoſe Rules which proceed in the direct Path.

BUT the Violence of a Charge ſometimes recoils upon it's Authors. Arceſilas *kept ſo well up to the Character he aſſumed, that Sects who agreed in nothing elſe, agreed in abuſing him, yet differed from one another in the ſeveral Charges brought againſt him. The clearing up this Point is of the utmoſt Conſequence to the Hiſtory of Philoſophy; I ſhall therefore endeavour to do it with all the Clearneſs and Candor I am capable of.*

ARCESILAS *was Cotemporary with* Zeno, *the Founder of* Stoicism. *The* Academic *and the* Peripatetic *Sects had obtained, ſince the Death of* Socrates, *which comprehended a Period of about 135 Years, to the time when* Zeno *made his Appearance* *. *In this Period we may fix the golden Age of Philoſophy. Then it was the* amicable Colliſion *of Opinions, taken notice of by a noble* † *Philoſopher of our own Nation, prevailed. The Diſputes among Philoſophers, till this time, were managed without Heat, or perſonal Animoſities; and, to ſpeak fairly, they were not of that Importance to raiſe any. They had all gone upon the broad Foundation laid down by* Socrates, *and improved by* Plato *and* Ariſtotle; *and though the Paths they trod might be a little devious from one another, yet they all terminated in the ſame End.*

Olymp. 128, A. 2.
A. M. 4447.
A. C. 265.
A. U. C. 486.

† Lord *Shaftſbury.*

THE

THE Character of Zeno, *that* Puritan *in Philoſophy, will be better gathered from our Author, in almoſt every Page of the following Treatiſe* de Finibus, *than from any thing I can add. It is ſufficient to ſay,* he refined Virtue ſo much, that he refined it from Common Senſe. *This I will venture to ſay is the true Character of his Philoſophy. But his Innovation did not reſt here; he introduced into Phyſics a Syſtem of* Materialiſm, *by which he excluded all Intelligence, all Providence, and all Spirit out of the Syſtem of Things; maintaining that God and the human Soul conſiſt of Matter. The Tendency which this Doctrine has, by eſtabliſhing an invincible Fatality, to deſtroy all that* Socrates *and his immediate Succeſſors wanted to eſtabliſh, is eaſily perceivable; and (which was more unaccountable than any thing) it retained the* * *groſſeſt Abſurdities of Superſtition.*

AS univerſal Matter therefore, according to him, was God, *and the different Modifications of it was all the Difference which exiſted in the* Nature of Things, *it is no Wonder if we find him terminating* all-Perfection *in the nobleſt Modification of Matter, which is the Mind of Man, and which, in his Syſtem, is, or may be, in every Man infallible, that is,* a God. *This led him to affirm, that Virtue, pure and abſtracted in itſelf, is the* only Good; *and that it being impoſſible for a wiſe Man to be miſtaken, he never can* entertain Opinions; *therefore he always* aſſents. *The Reader will find*

* See Page 420.

a very

a very full Account of the other Dogmas of Zeno's *Philoſophy in my Author; the two I have here ſet down are ſufficient for my preſent Purpoſe.*

WHEN we compare this Syſtem with that of Plato, *we find that it abſolutely overthrows it.* Arceſilas, *with great Intrepidity, attacked* Zeno *upon it; both had attended the Lectures of* Polemo; *and* Zeno's *Refinements had, by this time got him great Reputation. They ſeemed to exalt the Dignity of human Nature, to put Mankind above the Strokes of Fortune, and all Accidents of Life.* Arceſilas *found the Torrent run ſtrong upon the Side of* Zeno, *and wiſely endeavoured to break it's Force before he thought of ſtemming it. The Authority of the Academy was all he could oppoſe to it. He therefore ſet up upon the Strength of* Plato, *according to the Syſtem laid down by* Zeno: *He found that the latter had cut out of it all the* νοητα, *or* intellectual Subſtances, *the Judgment of which* Plato *aſſigns to the unvarying Principle of* ſcientific Reaſon; *and by reducing the Whole that can fall within the Compaſs of human Judgment, to* Senſibles, *or* αἰσθητα, *had thereby brought them under the Denomination of* δοξαστα, *or* Opinables. *This Preciſion gave* Arceſilas *great Advantages while he fought on* Plato's *Ground; and, by way of Gauntlet, he threw out the following Propoſition to his Adverſary.* The wiſe Man, *ſaid he,* never aſſents but to what he perceives, or comprehends; but nothing can be perceived, therefore the wiſe Man will withhold

hold his Aſſent from every thing. *A Concluſion which he would not have formed upon* Plato's *Principles, had not* Zeno *excluded from his Syſtem all* Immateriality.

ZENO, *probably not ſeeing the Drift of his Adverſary, immediately maintain'd, that ſomewhat might be* perceived, *viz.* φαντασια, *or* what appears. Then, *replied* Arceſilas, does every thing appear as it in Reality exiſts? By no means, *anſwered the other,* That Appearance which I maintain to be comprehenſible, is * Ἡ ἀπο τυ ὑπαρχονλος καλα αὐτο τὸ ὑπαρχον ἐναπομμαγμενη καὶ ἐναπολελυπωμενη οἱα ὐκ ἀν γενοιτο ἀπο τυ μη ὑπαρχονλος. Arceſilas *admitted this to be an unexceptionable Definition, but deny'd any Appearance could preſent in ſuch a manner as that another* ὁμοιοπαθη καὶ ἀδιακριτος, *might not impoſe upon us. Thus ſtands the Controverſy betwixt* Zeno, *the Founder of* Stoiciſm, *and* Arceſilas, *the Father of the* Middle Academy, *upon the Rule of Judging.*

* See p. 336.

LET us now examine a little into certain Charges I before hinted at, which were brought againſt Arceſilas, *whom, with St.* Auguſtine, *I own I cannot help having a favourable Opinion of. He was accuſed, by the* Sophiſts *of his own time, and by the* Stoics, *of impoſing upon the World, as his own, the Sentiments of* Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, *and* Democritus; ſub antiquorum Auctoritate deliteſcere voluit, *ſays* Lucullus, *in my Author. On the other hand, the* Epicureans, *after* Epicurus *himſelf, affirmed, that he vented the Opinions and Doctrine of*

the Antients for his own, and thereby pilfered a Praiſe which no way belonged to him *. Plutarch, *in refuting this Imputation, ſays, that he would be mightily obliged to any* Epicurean *who would prove that the old* Academic *Syſtem was handed down to* Arceſilas. *Therefore the Followers of* Arceſilas *obſtinately maintain, that their Maſter made no Engraftments of his own upon the old Philoſophy of the* Academy; *but preſerved it pure and undefiled from the Innovations which had been made by others.*

THE only Exception was, that he agreed with Zeno *in holding*, that a wiſe Man never ought to entertain Opinions; *but this Dogm they maintained upon very different Principles; the* Stoic, *becauſe* every thing might be perceived, *and the* Academic, *becauſe* nothing could be perceived, by a wiſe Man. *From this laſt Principle, joined to the Dogm already mentioned, aroſe the famous* ἐποχή, *or* the Retention of the Aſſent, *which the Reader will find elegantly deſcribed and defended by my Author.*

THIS diſtinguiſhing Mark of the ſecond Academy, *if we rightly conſider, was not in Reality an* Innovation *introduced by* Arceſilas, *but a neceſſary Conſequence of the* Academic *Doctrine, with regard to the* Difficulty, *if not* Impoſſibility *of Perception, and might never have been broached, had it not been for the imperious Dictates of* Zeno. Philo *therefore ſaid nothing but what he was able to defend,*

* Adver. Colot.

when

when he maintained that there never was more than one Academy, *and that it was an Error to ſuppoſe any more.*

BUT, after all the Labour I have taken to ſet the Character and Principles of Arceſilas *in their true Light, it muſt be acknowledged that he has been generally and ſtrongly charged with* Sceptiſm. *The Foundation of this Charge lies in the Words of* Cicero, *who, in giving an Account of his Method of Diſputation, ſays,* In utramque Partem diſſerere ſolitum, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in Partibus Momenta Rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque Parte aſſenſio ſuſtineretur. *But when we reflect upon the Situation of* Arceſilas, *and the dogmatical Character of his Antagoniſt, we may well believe that this Method of Diſputation was rather* occaſional *than* perpetual. Arceſilas *had no other way of confuting* Zeno's *Dogm,* that it is impoſſible for a wiſe Man ever to miſtake, or be in any Heſitation about a Principle of Aſſent, *without ſometimes ſhewing that the Principle of Aſſent may be ſo equally balanced by oppoſing Arguments, as to remain in Suſpenſe. But then the Doctrine of Probability, which was admitted by* Arceſilas *and his Followers, was a ſufficient Principle of Action, and had the ſame Effect in determining the Volition as Aſſent itſelf. We are therefore to conſider this Character of the* new Academic *Diſputation as* * *a*

* Τον δε εν Ζηνωνι Αρκεσιλαος ανελλιχθην κ) αξιοπιστον υπαρχοντα θεωρων τους παρ εκεινω αποφερομενους λογους καθηρει κ) ουδεν ωκνει, &c paulo poſt.

Το δε δογμα τελος αυτω προλαβων ευρομενω κ) αυτο το ονομα βλεπων ευδοκιμουν εν ταις Αθηναις κ) καταληπτικην φαντασιαν πασαν μαχαν εχρηλο εν αυτη. Euſeb. Præp. l. 14.

kind of Reaſoning per abſurdius, *and not a Manner adopted by the Sect.*

BUT, to clear Arceſilas *from the Imputation of* Sceptiſm, *we need but to compare the Character given him by* Sextus, *who expreſly tells us,* That *Arceſilas* made it a Rule in Life to follow what is judged to be moſt probable; and that a Perſon who acts himſelf according to the Dictates of Prudence (or ſound Judgment) attains Happineſs in Life. That this Prudence conſiſts in the *moral Fitneſs* of things, and that *moral Fitneſs* is agreeable to Probability and Reaſon. That, therefore, whoever follows Probability, acts according to *moral Fitneſs*, and arrives at Happineſs.

THESE are Sentiments worthy of ſenſible modeſt Philoſophy; they were the Sentiments of the Academics; of Men who knew that their Meaſure of Knowledge was limited, and that ſome Principle higher than any implanted by Nature was wanting, to bring Mankind to that Degree of Perfection claimed by the Stoics.

THIS, perhaps, is the proper Place to throw in ſome Account of the Sceptics, *or* Pyrrhoniſts, *which I juſt touched upon towards the Beginning of this Introduction.* Sextus *has been very full upon this Head, and explained his own Definition of this Sect ſo as to admit of no Addition. The Definition itſelf will be perhaps ſufficient for the Purpoſe of an* Engliſh *Reader.* Sceptiſm, *ſays he,* is a δυναμις, or Power or Faculty oppoſing thoſe Objects which are φαινομενα, or which fall under the

the Cognizance of the Senſes, to thoſe which are νοημενα, or perceptible by the Underſtanding. *The Reader, by comparing this Definition with that of* Plato's *Criterion, which I have already given, will eaſily perceive how oppoſite the one is to the other, and how little Claim the* Sceptics *have to be ranked with the Academics amongſt the Followers of the firſt Academy and the* Peripatetics. *But* Sextus *tells us, in ſeveral Places, that the* Sceptics *by no means diſclaim the* φαινομενα, *or* Appearances; *and that a* Sceptic *always gives way to the* coacta Paſſio, *as it has been elegantly termed; that is, if his Senſation gets the better of his mental Doubting, he argues for the Reality of that Senſation, in whatever Organ it is placed. For inſtance, when it is* bitter cold, *or* intenſly hot, *he does not diſpute that he is variouſly affected in Proportion to the ſeveral Degrees of the Heat or Cold. The Criterion therefore of the* Sceptics, *according to* Sextus, *was the* φαινομενον *which operated upon the Senſation, or produced the* coacta Paſſio; *and they never entertained the leaſt Doubt as to this* φαινομενον. *Thus all their Doubt aroſe with regard to the Qualities which reſted in this Appearance; and they never ventured to pronounce any thing upon that Head.*

BUT let us now take a ſhort Survey of the Sceptic, *and the* Academic *Doctrines, in order to eſtabliſh the real and eſſential Difference betwixt them. The* Academics *were far from denying that Truth exiſts, nay, that it may*

be found; they only were doubtful whether the Appearance preſenting *can warrant their pronouncing dogmatically upon any Object or Propoſition. They thought that a conſiderable Progreſs might be made in inveſtigating the Truth; and this Progreſs they termed* Probability, *in which they admitted various Degrees. They, however, never ventured to ſcrew this* Probability *up to a* Certainty; *and therefore, as* Lucilius *ſays,*

Suſtineat Currum ut bonu' ſæpe agitator equoſque.

They kept up their Aſſent, or they made uſe of the ἐποχὴ; *at the ſame time they admitted ſome* φαντασιαι, *or* Appearances, *to be* true; *that is, to be true outward Signs of the Thing ſignified; and others they held to be* falſe.

THE Sceptics, *on the other Hand, though they admitted of no Criterion but the* φαντασιαι, *maintained that there was no manner of Difference betwixt the true and the falſe; and that all Objects, all Propoſitions, might be eſtabliſhed, either as true or falſe, by the Force of equally preponderating Reaſons.* * Agellius *therefore is right, as to his Definition of the* Sceptics, *though wrong in the ſame Paſſage, with regard to the* Academics. The *Academics, ſays he,* as it were, comprehend the Propoſition that nothing can be comprehended,

* Noct. Att. c. 5. l. 11. Quos Academici quidem ipſum illud nihil poſſe comprehendi, quaſi comprehendunt & nihil poſſe diſcerni quaſi diſcernunt Pyrrhonii ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt; quod nihil eſſe verum videtur.

and

and perceive that nothing can be perceived; but the *Pyrrhoniſts* will by no means admit even this to be Truth; becauſe they think that no Propoſition can appear to be true. *I ſay* Agellius *was miſtaken here in what regards the* Academics; *for the moſt to which they roſe in thoſe two Propoſitions was*, that they are probable.

UPON the Whole, the Academics *eſtabliſh a Principle of* Moral, *and the* Pyrrhoniſts *of* Phyſical, Agency. *The* Probability *admitted of by the former was a ſufficient Motive of Action for all the Purpoſes of Civil Life; and the* coacta Paſſio *of the latter, was, in Reality, no more than the low ſenſual Part of the* Epicurean *Philoſophy, without any thing of the generous ennobling Principle that runs through the other Branches of that Syſtem, and which are ſo well deſcribed in the firſt Book of our Author's Treatiſe* De Finibus. *The* Pyrrhoniſts *indeed, like the other Sects, made uſe of certain* Intermediates *for reconciling the apparent Abſurdities of their Doctrine to the Uſages of Life; but when I come to examine thoſe* Intermediates, *as I ſhall do before I finiſh this Introduction, you will find them not like thoſe of the other Sects (for each Sect was obliged to call them in to it's Aid) growing from, but grafted upon, their Doctrine.*

I SHALL now purſue the Hiſtorical Detail I propoſed, and return to the Academy. Arceſilas, *by all Accounts, had greatly the better of his Antagoniſts in the Diſpute, ſince he had all the Dogms of* Zeno *at his Mercy, and employed*

played againſt them the whole Artillery of the old Academics *and* Peripatetics, *while* Zeno *could lay hold of no Propoſition of his, as his Maxim was never to affirm any thing. The firſt great Champion who ſtept forth to combat this Hero of the Academy, was* Chryſippus, *the faireſt Pillar of the Portico, which gave the* Stoics *their Name.* Ει μη γαρ ην Χρυσιππος ουκ αν ην στοα. Had there been no *Chryſippus*, there would have been no Portico. Plutarch *thinks that he was placed by the Providence of the Gods betwixt the Times of* Arceſilas *and* Carneades, *the latter of whom gave riſe to what is generally called the* Third Academy, *and is looked upon as the moſt ſubtile Diſputant of all the* Academics. *We are told by the* Stoics, *that his Writings againſt* Arceſilas *ſerved as a Bulwark againſt all the Force of Genius that was ſo ſtrong in* Carneades; *that he alotted their proper Functions to all the Senſes, and regulated the Credit that is due to Cuſtom and Uſage; that he ſettled all the Characters, both of moral and ſenſible Objects, ranking each under it's proper Denomination; and correcting or aboliſhing all the Innovations introduced either by his own, or the* Academic *Sect.*

THE Academics, *on the other Hand, have very different Sentiments of this Hero of* Stoiciſm; *they tell us, that he was ſo far from aſſiſting the Senſes, or enforcing the Credit due to the Influence of Cuſtom and Practice, that, like an ignorant Quack, he fed the Diſeaſe, and rendered it more difficult to be cured. I*

am

am apt to believe a great Part of this Charge to be true. He appears to have been ambitious of rivaling the Subtilty of Arceſilas, *in diſputing on every Side of a Queſtion. This led him to ſtate the Objections which had been brought againſt the Credit due to our Senſes in the ſtrongeſt Light. He gave them even greater Force than* Arceſilas *had given them, as he was more at Liberty to affirm and dogmatiſe. All this he did for the Glory of deſtroying a Fabric, which, becauſe it was of his own erecting, he thought it was impregnable by all but himſelf; but he was unable to batter down what he had thus wantonly reared. The* Stoics *afterwards ſeem to have been ſecretly ſenſible of this, when they ſaid,* That *Carneades* was armed from the Magazine of *Chryſippus.* Carneades *himſelf made no Secret of this; for when he had read the Works of* Chryſippus *againſt the* Academics, *he wittily applied to him that Diſtich out of* Andromache's *Speech to* Hector, *in* Homer,

Δαιμονιε φθισει τε το του μενος.

Wretch, thy own Force undoes thee.

He likewiſe applied a Paſſage of the ſame Speech, by way of Parody, to himſelf and Chryſippus, ει μη γαρ ην Χρυσιππος ουκ αν ην εγω, Had there been no *Chryſippus*, there would have been no *Carneades.*

BUT it may now be proper to review the Syſtem of the Stoics, *as it went out of the Hands of* Chryſippus, *and was improved by his Followers,*

and

and in what manner it was impugn'd by the Academics.

I HAVE already obſerved, that the Stoics *excluded from their Doctrine all immaterial Beings. They defined the Soul* to be a warm Breath generated within the Body, and pervading it. Το γαρ ζυμφυες πνευμα ἡμιν ἐνθερμον ὀν ψυχην ἠγνηλαι, *ſays* Stobæus, *ſpeaking of the* Stoics. *The Soul, according to them, was divided into eight Parts: The firſt was the* Hegemonicon, *or the directing Principle, which they likewiſe termed the* λογισμος, *or* the Reaſoning Faculty, *and was the chief and nobleſt Part of the Whole, being what we may call the* Senſorium *of all Perfection, Affection, and Diſcernment. This Senſorium they placed in the Center, and imagined the other ſeveral Parts to unite there, as Lines drawn from it's Circumference. Theſe Parts were no other than the five Senſes,* viz. *thoſe of* Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Taſting *and* Touching. *The other two Parts were that Senſation which is peculiar to the Delights of Love* (SEMEN dicitur, quæ etiam eſt Spiritus pertingens ab *Hegemonico* ad *Paraſtatas*) *and the* Phone, *or the Sympathy of the* Voice.

THEY held that the principal Part of the Human Soul, when a Man is born, reſembles a Sheet of fine Paper, upon which the Marks or Characters of Things are wrote; that the firſt Impreſſions muſt be made by means of the Senſes; this Impreſſion being made, they term'd it καταληψις, *or* Comprehenſion; *and that the* Phantaſiæ, *or Appearances of Things, ſerve inſtead*

ſtead of Letters or Characters. A Phantaſia *is thus defined by* Chryſippus *in* Plutarch, παθος εν τη ψυχη γινομενον ενδεικνυμενον εαυτο και το ποιητικος. An Affection in the Mind, which characteriſes itſelf, and that by which it is moved. *The Mind is paſſive to thoſe* Phantaſiæ, *in the ſame manner as the Eyes, when open, are to Light. But* Chryſippus *improved a little upon* Zeno's *general Definition of a* Phantaſia. *The latter had called it* τυποσις εν ψυχη, an Impreſſion on the Mind, *but* Chryſippus *interpreted the Word* τυποσις, (*as ſignifying* Impreſſion) αλλοιωσις, *or* Immutation; *for*, ſaid he, *ſeveral Impreſſions cannot be made upon the ſame Subſtance. Now, when they ſpoke of the Mind in this Senſe, they* * *meant only the principal Part of the Mind*, viz. Hegemonicum, *which they conceived to be the only Seat of* Phantaſiæ, Aſſent, *and* Affection. *This laſt Obſervation reſolves the greateſt Difficulty, which other* Stoics *had ſtarted, with regard to this Improvement of* Chryſippus. *They objected, that tho' every Phantaſy is an Impreſſion or Alteration; yet that the Inverſion of the Propoſition did not hold; for every Impreſſion or Alteration was not Phantaſy. For Inſtance, Pain in the Finger, or any exterior Member, is an Impreſſion or Alteration, but not Phantaſy; but this Objection was removed, as I have already hinted, by their aſſigning their Senſations to the inferior, and the* Phantaſiæ *to the ſupreme Part of the Soul.*

* *Vide* Plutarchum & Stobæum. See *Stanley*'s Lives of the Philoſophers in *Zeno*.

I SHALL

I SHALL not lead my Reader through all the bewildering barren Paths of Philoſophic Ground, with regard to the different Kinds of Phantaſiæ; *what I have already laid down will be ſufficient towards his underſtanding whether the true Streſs of the Diſpute lay betwixt the* Arceſilean Academics *and the* Chryſippean Stoics. *By a diligent Study of my Author's* Academics, *he will there ſee the Whole unfolded in Terms becoming both a Philoſopher and a Gentleman. It may, however, be neceſſary to premiſe, that their general Diviſion of the* Phantaſiæ *were as follows.*

1. ΛΟΓΙΚΑ, *or* Rational; *and* Irrational, *for which laſt I find no Philoſophic Term appropriated; but the* rational Phantaſiæ *are defined to be* νοησεις, *or Conceptions of the Mind.* 2. Αισθητικας, *that is,* Senſitive, *or ſuch as are perceived through the Organs of the Senſes; and* ἀν αισθητικας, not perceived by *Senſe,* but by *Intellect.* 3. Phantaſiæ *were either* τεχνικαι, Artificial, *as the Senſation which a Muſician receives from* Harmony, *or a Painter from the* Diſpoſition of Colours; *or* ἀτεχνοι, without Art, *Thus, as* Lucullus *ſays, in one of the following Treatiſes, the* Stoics *made the Arts to be as it were ſupplemental Senſes.* 4. * True *and* Falſe, *which Diviſion requires no Elucidation. But the* 5th, *and moſt important Diviſion was*

* Mr. *Stanley*, in the Life of *Zeno*, has, from *Sextus*, made this only a Subdiviſion of another Diviſion, *viz.* of *Probable* and *Improbable*; but when we conſider the Words of *Sextus*, and the Senſe in which the *Stoics* held the Words *Probability* and *Improbability*, the latter ought rather to be conſider'd as a Subdiviſion of the former.

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the καταληπτικη, *the* Comprehenſive, *or* Comprehending; *and the* ἀκαταληπτος Non-comprehenſive, *or* Non-comprehending.

BY this Gradation the Stoics *aimed to eſtabliſh their great and favourite Principle, upon which the whole of their Ethic and Moral Philoſophy either immediately or remotely depends; for, notwithſtanding they admit the* Truth *and* Falſhood, *the* Comprehenſibility *and* Noncomprehenſibility *of certain* Phantaſiæ, *yet they eſtabliſh the Infallibility of the Senſes, which is the Recipient of thoſe* Phantaſiæ, *and* Comprehenſion *itſelf; and not only* Comprehenſion, *but* Aſſent *by* Neceſſity, *inaſmuch as I have already taken notice the Senſes are paſſive, with regard to the Recipiency of the* Phantaſiæ. *Thus, by making* Comprehenſion *the neceſſary Conſequence of* Senſation, *and* Aſſent *the neceſſary Conſequence of* Comprehenſion, Aſſent *becomes involuntary,* Opinion *is deſtroyed, and the Foundation is laid for the unbounded, infallible Empire of* independent Virtue *and* all-ſufficient Science.

HAVING given this plain Detail of the Stoic *Doctrine, I now come to give the Sum of what was offered by the* Academics *in anſwer to it. This is contained in a very ſimple Propoſition, which ſtands upon it's own Baſis, without any of the* Dialectical, *if not* Sophiſtical *Buttreſſes, ſo commonly applied by the* Stoics *to uphold their general Propoſitions. For the* Academics *maintained, that it is abſurd for us to imagine that Aſſent is not a thing within a Man's own Power, which muſt neceſſarily*

neceſſarily be the Conſequence, if Senſe is any other than a bare Affection ariſing from the Phantaſiæ; *but no way connected with any neceſſary Aſſent or Approbation. All the numerous Engines of Logic, Sophiſtry, Phyſics, and Rhetoric, which the* Stoics *employed, were too weak to batter down this Fort of the* Academics. *The* Epoche *of* Arceſilas *remained ſtill undemoliſhed, and the Admiſſion of Probability proved a ſufficient Anſwer to the* ἀπραξια, *or the* Non-efficacy *introduced, as the* Gorgon's *Head, which was to bring the whole Syſtem of this Philoſophy* to an Abſurdum. *I have quoted, in the Margin, the excellent Words of* * Plutarch, *which come fully up to my Purpoſe.*

BUT, that my Reader may more clearly comprehend the Progreſs of this Diſpute concerning the Criterion of Truth before the Days of Cicero, *it is neceſſary that I ſhould now give ſome Account of* Carneades, *the Founder of what commonly goes by the Name of the* third Academy. *This celebrated Philoſopher was the fourth Maſter of the Academy from* Arceſilas, *being the Succeſſor of* Hegeſinus *the* Pergamenian, *who ſucceeded* Telecles *and* Evander *the* Phocians, *to whom* Lacydes, *the immediate Suc-*

Carneades the Founder of the third Academy.

* Την δε περι παντων ἐποχην ὐδ οἱ πολλα πραγματευσαμενοι κ) παλαιοταντες εἰς τελο ζυγραμματα κ) λογες, ἐκινησαν, ἀλλα ἐκ της σοας αὐτης τελευτωντες, ὡσπερ Γοργονα την Ἀπραξιαν ἐπαγοντες ἀπηχορυνσαν, ὡς παντα πειρωσι, κ) τρεφυσιν αὐτοις ὐχ ἁπτκυσιν, ἡ ὁρμη γινεσθαι ζυγκαταθεσις, ὐδε της ροπης ἀρχην ἐδεξατο την αἰσθησιν, ἀλλα ἐξ ἑαυτης ἀγωγος ἐπι τας πραξεις ἐφανη, μη δεομενη τυ προστιθεσθαι. Adverſ. Colot.

ceſſor

ceſſor of Arceſilas, *had bequeathed the Direction of the Academy.* Carneades *was, without Diſpute, the moſt vehement, but, at the ſame time, the moſt artful Diſputant that had ever appeared; like a cunning Wreſtler, he intertwiſted himſelf with his Antagoniſt, but ſtill knew how to diſengage himſelf to great Advantage; and by ſeeming to retreat, or to yield, returned to the Charge with renewed Vigour and Keenneſs. But when, laying aſide all the Spirit of Philoſophic Diſputations, we really conſider his Merits as an* Academic, *it can ſcarcely be proved that he was the Founder of any particular Sect, though the great Reſtorer and Improver of the Sect he found already formed. He was the profeſt Enemy of all* Dogmatiſts, *but eſpecially of the* Stoics. *He laid it down as the Foundation of all his Doctrine, that all things are* ἀκαταληψία, incomprehenſible; *but, without denying the Exiſtence of Truth, all he did was, to remove that* Falſhood *which* Arceſilas *had placed in the* Thing itſelf, *and which he ſaid was the great Impediment of our Comprehenſion and Aſſent,* to our Senſes. *He even did not deny Truth to our Senſes; but then he contended that all Objects emit Appearances which are equivocal, and may be falſe as well as true; but that we have no certain Criterion to diſtinguiſh the true from the falſe. The Defect therefore of this Criterion in the Senſes, he ſaid is the ſame as a Defect of Truth in the Things; becauſe as Things are to be judged by the Senſes, if the Rule of Truth cannot be aſcertained in the Senſes, neither can*

it

it be in the Things; therefore there can be no such thing as Aſſent, *becauſe there can be no such thing as* Certainty: *However he enlarged the Bounds of* Probability *and* Improbability, *so as that they ſerved for ſufficient Motives to Agency, both* Moral *ond* Phyſical. *As to the* Epoche, *which was the great Character of the* Arceſilian Academics, *there is ſome Difference in Opinions, though I think without any manner of Foundation on one Side, whether* Carneades *maintained it or not. In my own Opinion he did: His Pride which was unbounded and unſufferable, as well as his Principles, led him to ſupport it; for it was the chief Object of the united Efforts of all the other Sects of Philoſophy; and, had* Carneades *given it up, he gave up the Cauſe in which he ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed himſelf. The Opinion of* Euſebius *therefore, who is ſingle in affirming that* Carneades *gave up the Epoche of* Arceſilas, *excepting in Things uncertain ought not to weigh againſt thoſe of all the other Philoſophers, and the Reaſon of the Thing itſelf.*

UPON the Whole, I cannot think the Academy received any material Alteration either from Arceſilas, *or* Carneades; *nor that the latter ſtruck out any Principles different from, or unknown to, the former. The placing Deception in the* Senſes, *and not in the* Things, *if we conſider the Matter philoſophically, is the ſame; only* Carneades *being better verſed in Phyſical and Mathematical Learning, plaid it more properly than the other had done. The Refinements, however, of* Carneades,

heades, *and the Oratorial Manner in which he treated his Subjects, without that Dryneſs ſo peculiar to the other Schools, has gained him the Title of being Maſter of the* Third, *or the* New Academy. *It is upon his Principles that we find* Cicero *reaſoning in the following Academic Treatiſe, and, by them, reconciling the Doctrine of the* New Academy *to that* moral Agency, *which his Antagoniſt had ſo copiouſly aſſerted to be excluded by the Incertainties of the* Academics. *I ſhall therefore refer all that can be ſaid, with regard to this great Philoſopher, to my Author, who takes up the Controverſy juſt where I leave it. As to the Opinions of the other Sects,* viz. *the* Cyreniacs *and* Epicureans, *with regard to this great Queſtion of the Criterion of Truth, whatever is worthy of Confutation we have already ſeen in the* Stoical *Schemes; whatever is below it, is matter of Curioſity, and not of Inſtruction.*

I CANNOT, *however, diſmiſs this Subject without putting my Reader on his Guard, as to the Weakneſs of the* Logical *Reaſoning he will find advanced by my Author, in Defence of his Syſtem. The Mixture of Childiſhneſs and Impertinence it contains, leaves no room for us to doubt that he intended them as a Banter upon all* Logic; *the Part of* Stoiciſm *on which it's Profeſſors thought it to be impregnable. Whoever conſiders the good Senſe of* Cicero, *can view all the Arguments he has brought from the* Sorites, *and his alternative Syllogiſms in no other Light than that of Ridicule.*

I SHALL now close this short Review of this Controversy with a general Remark upon the manner in which the different Sects of Philosophy amongst the Antients managed their Disputations, viz. *the* Epicureans, *the* Stoics, *and the* Academics.

THE great Argument that lay against the first, who adopted Pleasure as the Primary Good, *was their introducing into Life an ignoble Motive of Action, and in the Consequence, banishing or betraying all Relations of Duty or Blood, and every Sentiment of Public Spirit. This Objection was too strong not to be perceived, nay* felt *by every Man of Sense and Honour; and they were sensible, that, without some* intermediate *Principle, their Doctrine must become the Object of universal Hatred and Contempt. This led them to call in the* mental *Pleasures to their Aid; which, in effect, destroys the very Foundation of their original Doctrine of* sensual, *or rather* corporal Pleasure, *and reconciles it to the strictest and the purest Sentiments of disinterested Virtue. This will appear evident to the Reader, in the first Book of the following Dialogue* de Finibus, *where our Author has met with the Fate of* Chrysippus, *in putting in the Mouth of his Advocate for* Epicureanism *so strong a Deduction of Reasoning, founded upon almost* Christian *Sentiments, that* Cicero *is unable to destroy the Fabric which he has thus raised for the Pleasure of demolishing it. Thus the Doctrine of* Epicurus, *instead of serving as Ruins for a Vista (as he designed it should) to his*

his own Philoſophy, ſtands undiminiſhed and undecayed.

THE Stoics *had, in the Fundamentals of their Syſtem, a Ferocity which tended to aboliſh all the Civil Duties in Life, by making the Practice of them a Matter of Indifference to Mankind. Their Enthuſiaſm for Virtue left out of their Syſtem all the leſſer Chains, which link* Order *to* Society, *and* Humanity *to* Virtue. *Upon ſuch Principles as theſe, where the* whole *was ſuppoſed to be exempted from* human Weakneſs, *if any* human Weakneſs *interpoſed, the* whole *fell to the Ground, and there was a Ceſſation, nay an Inverſion of all Civil and Social Duties. This was an unavoidable Conſequence of their* original *Doctrine, and the Objection was too ſtrong for them to withſtand. They were therefore obliged to bring in their* Preferables *and* Rejectibles; *their* Eligibles *and* Non-eligibles, *as* Intermediates, *or* Expedients, *for reconciling their Doctrine to the Practice of Life; and to give them the very ſame Force with regard to determining the Volition, as other Sects allowed to* Virtue, *or to* Pleaſure, rightly underſtood.

THE Apraxia *or Principle of* Non-agency, *which unavoidably attends the* Suſpenſion of Aſſent, *muſt inextricably have embarraſs'd the* Academics *themſelves, had they not admitted* Probability, *nay* Degrees of it, *and given this* Probability *the ſame Force in impelling our* Agency, *as other Sects allowed to* Certainty.

THUS we find the moſt laboured Syſtems, which the Wit of Man could contrive for Human

man Happineſs, the Ultimate of all Philoſophy, gave but little Satisfaction even to the Inventors and Profeſſors themſelves. A Principle was ſtill wanting, which no human Penetration could diſcover; and they who ſeemed to come the neareſt to this Diſcovery, were the moſt diffident of their own Strength, and the moſt convinced of the Impoſſibility of their ſucceeding. The Conſideration of this is a noble Recommendation of that Syſtem, which Revelation alone could have brought to light; and which unites every Excellency of every Sect, without any of their Defects, or Abſurdities. Perhaps no Scheme for recommending Chriſtianity to the Belief *and* Practice *of the* Wiſe of this World, *could be more effectual than the recommending the Reading the antient Philoſophers; and the Inſufficiency of the moſt complete Syſtem for the Attainment of that Happineſs, which is beſt accommodated to human Nature, even in this Life, is a certain Proof that Happineſs lies out of the Reach of human Diſcovery.*

IT now remains I ſhould ſay ſomewhat with regard to the following Performance. The Treatiſe de Finibus *has been already tranſlated by one Mr.* Parker, *Son to the Biſhop of* Oxford *of that Name; and the Tranſlation itſelf contains, in the Title-page, two Names, then conſiderable in Learning,* viz. *Mr.* Dodwel *and Mr.* Collier. *But the Tranſlation itſelf is a Diſgrace to the* Engliſh *Language, both for the manner in which it is executed, and the groſs Ignorance of the Author, I will not*

not ſay; in every Page, but in almoſt every Period of his Work. I ſhall not therefore attempt to give it any other Character, than that it is a poor Imitation of the worſt manner of a very bad Writer, viz. Leſtrange.

WHETHER there are any other Tranſlations of the two Pieces contained in this Volume, I know not; but the Method in which I have tranſlated them being entirely new, I hope my Performance will have ſomewhat of the Merit of Novelty too: For I have kept almoſt literally to my Original; I have truſted entirely to the good Senſe of Cicero *for keeping the Tranſlation above Flatneſs. I have, by Experience, in the other Parts of his Works, found this a ſucceſsful Expedient; and, in the following Tranſlation, if there is any Life, if there is any thing of the original Spirit of my Author, it is owing to that which damps and enfeebles other Tranſlations; I mean, a ſtrict Adherence to the Letters, as well as the Meaning of my Author. The* Dilectus Verborum, *the* Choice of Words, *is all I ſhall be curious about, in any future Performance of this kind upon my Author's Philoſophical Works; and whoever makes the Experiment, will find it the moſt difficult, as well as the beſt Method of tranſlating.*

WILLLIAM GUTHRIE.

M. TUL-

BRITISH
6 AU 85
MUSEUM

M. TULLIUS CICERO

Concerning the

ENDS *of* THINGS *GOOD* and *EVIL.*

CHAP. I.

WHEN * we first committed to the *Latin* Language that Learning, which Philosophers had treated of in the *Greek* with so much Extent of Genius, and Beauty of Argument, I was not insensible, my *Brutus*, that our Attempt wou'd be liable to various Censures. For there are some, and they too not quite illiterate, who are disgusted

* *When we first*] Other Translators have rendered *mandaremus* in the Singular Number, but I think it much safer to translate it in the Plural; because *Brutus* appears both from *Cicero*'s own Words in the next Page, and from other Ancients, to have wrote Philosophical Treatises himself: Besides, the varying the Person in the same Sentence, seems to point out that our Author includes *Brutus*; *Non* ERAM *nescius*, says he, *Brute, cum mandaremus, &c.* Now the Propriety of Address and Language which distinguishes our Author, wou'd not have admitted such a Variation, had the same Person been meant.

with all this Buſineſs of Philoſophiſing; while others don't ſo much blame the Thing in general, provided it be purſued by way of Amuſement, but are of Opinion, that it ought not to engroſs too much of one's Study and Labour. We ſhall likewiſe find ſome, and thoſe too, converſant in *Greek* Learning, but deſpiſing the *Latin*, who will tell us, that they chooſe rather to read *Greek* Authors in the Original. To conclude, I ſuſpect ſome will call upon me to apply to other kind of Writings, and tell me, that this ſort, tho' it is pretty, is by no means ſuitable to *my* Perſon and Character.

I THINK myſelf obliged to throw out ſome ſhort Hints, in anſwer to all thoſe Objections; tho' a ſufficient Anſwer has been given to the Revilers of Philoſophy, in that Treatiſe in which I defended and recommended Philoſophy, againſt the Charge and Slanders brought againſt it by *Hortenſius*. As that Treatiſe met with your Approbation, and that of Men whom I imagin'd to be Judges, I undertook other Works, being afraid leſt it ſhou'd ſeem as if I only *prompted*, without being able to *ſatisfy*, the Curioſity of Mankind. But if ſome, tho' fond of the Attempt, wou'd have it purſued with Moderation, they require an almoſt impracticable Self-denial in a Study which, once ſet agoing, can never be check'd or reſtrain'd. So that I wou'd rather chooſe to deal with thoſe who abſolutely diſſuade from Philoſophy, than with Men who appoint Bounds to Things infinite in their own Nature, and demand Mediocrity in an Affair, the Excellency of which riſes in proportion to it's Extent.

FOR

FOR ſuppoſing it practicable to arrive at *true* Wiſdom, we are then not only to *procure*, but to *enjoy* that Wiſdom. Suppoſing it to be a difficult Matter: But then there can be no Bounds ſet to the Search of Truth, without finding her; and it is ſhameful to tire in a Purſuit, when it's Object is the moſt lovely in Nature. Thus, if Writing gives me Pleaſure, who will be ſo malicious as to interrupt me? if Toil, then what Right have you to check my Induſtry? For when * the good-natur'd *Chremes* in *Terence*, wou'd not have his new Neighbour *to dig, to plough, or in ſhort to bear any Burthens*; he does not diſſuade him from Induſtry, but from that Labour which is unbecoming a Gentleman; whereas thoſe obliging Gentlemen are diſguſted at our applying to Studies in which, to us, *Labour* is unattended with *Fatigue*.

IT is harder to deal with thoſe who profeſs a Contempt for *Latin* Writings; and, I own, I am ſurprized chiefly at their receiving no Delight from the moſt ſerious Matters, when conveyed in their native Tongue; and yet are well enough pleaſed to read Plays, when literally tranſlated from the *Greek*. For is there ſo irreconcileable a Foe to almoſt the very Name of *Roman*, as to deſpiſe and throw aſide the *Medea* of *Ennius*, or the *Antiope* of *Pacuvius*? as to admit that he receives Pleaſure from the Plays of *Euripides*, yet nauſeates thoſe very Plays when tranſlated into *Latin*? So, *ſays one of thoſe* Greek *Admirers*, it ſeems then that I am to

* See *Terence's Heautontimorumenos*, Act. 1. Scene 1.

read the * *Fellow Pupils*, or the *Andrian* in *Cæcilius* and *Terence*, rather than in *Menander*.

THERE is this Difference betwixt thoſe Gentlemen and me; that I think, even ſuppoſing the *Electra* of *Sophocles* to be inimitable, yet ſtill we ought to read the Tranſlation of it, though wretched, in *Attilius*. *Licinius* indeed calls him a † *crabbed* Writer; but ſtill he is ſuch a Writer as, in my opinion, ought to be read; for to be entirely ignorant of our own Poets, muſt proceed either from ſhameful Indolence, or foppiſh Affectation. For my own part, I think no Man can be ſaid to be competently learned, if he is unacquainted with our Writers. But

‡ *Ne'er in the* Pelian *Wood had* ——

this we read, the ſame as in *Greek*; yet are we not to venture upon a *Latin* Explanation of *Plato's* Doctrine of a good and happy Life.

BUT if we decline the Province of meer Tranſlation, and ſticking to the Sentiments of ſuch Philoſophers as we approve of, diſpoſe of and introduce them as we think proper, why ſhould *Greek* Writings be preferr'd to Writings which, without being tranſlated from the *Greek*, come recommended by the Beauty of Language? For if they ſhould object, that the ſame Points have been handled by them: *That* will ſerve as a Reaſon why *they* ſhould not read ſo many *Greek*

* *Fellow Pupils*,] Orig. *Synephebi*, a Comedy of *Menander*, tranſlated by *Cæcilius* the Cotemporary of *Ennius*.

† *Crabbed*] Orig. *Ferræum*.

‡ This appears to have been a very common Paſſage in the Mouths of *Cicero* and his Acquaintance in *Rome*, and is a Tranſlation of part of the firſt Line of *Euripides' Medea*.

Authors

Authors as they do. For what has *Chryſippus* omitted of the Syſtem of the *Stoics?* Yet we read * *Diogenes*, *Antipater*, *Mneſarchus*, *Panætius*, with many other Authors, eſpecially our good Friend *Poſodonius*. What ſhall we ſay as to *Theophraſtus?* does he impart a ſmall Share of Delight when he handles thoſe Topics that *Ariſtotle* has treated of before him? As to the *Epicureans*, do they ever give over writing, with the greateſt Freedom, upon Points that have already been diſcuſs'd by *Epicurus* and the Ancients? If then the *Greeks* read *Greek* Authors that treat of the ſame Things, but are introduc'd in a different manner, why may not our Labours be read by our own Countrymen?

BUT indeed, ſhould I make ſuch a Tranſlation of *Plato* or *Ariſtotle*, as our Poets do of the

* Diogenes, *&c.*] As theſe Names will occur pretty frequently in our Author's Philoſophical Works, it may be here proper to give ſome Account of the Perſons who bore them.

Diogenes the Stoic, was Diſciple to *Chryſippus*; he liv'd at the Time of the ſecond *Punic* War, and was ſent along with *Carneades* and *Critolaus* to *Rome*, by the *Athenians*.

Antipater was Diſciple to *Diogenes*; ſome ſay that he was Teacher, ſome, the Friend of the Elder *Cato*.

We are much at a loſs for any Particulars relating to *Mneſarchus*, but we muſt not confound him with one of the ſame Name, Father to *Pythagoras*.

Panætius was of *Rhodes*, the Diſciple of *Antipater*; and was Preceptor, Companion, and Friend to the Younger *Scipio*, who took him with him to *Egypt*.

Poſodonius was his Scholar, and very intimate with our Author; who frequently attended his Leſſons in *Rhodes*, where he taught, and was therefore call'd the *Rhodean*, though born at *Apamea*.

Theophraſtus was a *Leſbian*, the Scholar firſt of *Plato*, and then of *Ariſtotle*, who gave him the Name of *Theophraſtus*, becauſe of his Divine Eloquence; he taught at *Athens*, and is famous for his *Characters*, and his being the Maſter of *Menander* the Prince and Author of the New Comedy.

Greek Plays, would I deſerve no Thanks from my Country, for introducing my Fellow-Citizens to an Acquaintance with their amazing Genius? But tho' this is what I have never hitherto done, yet I don't imagine that I am debarr'd from doing it: At leaſt, I ſhall reſerve the Liberty of quoting ſome Paſſages, eſpecially from the Authors I have juſt mention'd, when they can be properly introduc'd; in the ſame manner as *Ennius* did from *Homer*, and * *Affranius* from *Menander*. Nor will I, as our Countryman † *Lucilius* did, except againſt any Sett of Men as my Readers: I will even wiſh for a *Perſius*, much more for a *Scipio*; and a *Rutilius*, whoſe Judgment was ſo terrible to that Author, as to make him ſay, that he wrote for *Tarentines*, *Conſentines*, and *Sicilians*. This he ſays in his uſual Vein of Humour. But the World was not then ſo critically diſtinguiſhing, as that he ſhould give himſelf Pain about correct Compoſition; and his Works are of ſo ſlight a Texture, that there appears in them a great deal of the genteeleſt Humour, but very little Learning.

BUT as to me, what Reader need I to dread, after preſuming to addreſs myſelf to you, who rival the *Greeks* themſelves in Philoſophy. But this Preſumption ariſes from yourſelf, becauſe I was ſtimulated to it by that moſt agreeable Trea-

* Affranius] He was Cotemporary with *Terence*; is much recommended by *Quintilian*, for the Purity of his Diction; and *Horace* mentioning him in his Art of Poetry, ſays,

Dicitur Affrani toga conveniſſe Menandro.

† Lucilius] For an Explanation of what is ſaid here about *Lucilius*, ſee Book 2. *de Oratore*.

tiſe

tiſe you ſent me *upon Virtue.* Yet I believe, the Reaſon of ſome People's Averſion to *Latin* Writings, has proceeded from their meeting with certain uncouth, monſtrous Compoſitions, in wretched Tranſlations from almoſt as wretched Originals. I am a good deal of their way of thinking, provided they are of opinion, that even *Greek* Authors are not to be read, when they treat of the ſame Subjects. But who will refuſe to read good Senſe, conveyed in all the Force and Ornament of refined Diction, unleſs one who affects to be call'd a *Greek.* Thus * *Albutius* was ſaluted at *Athens,* by the Prætor † *Scævola.* The ſame *Lucilius,* with a great deal of Beauty and Humour, has touched upon this Head, when he brings in *Scævola* very prettily ſaying:

As thou Albutius *chooſes to be call'd*
A Greek, *and Standard-bearer, rather than*
A Roman, Sabine, *or Inhabitant*
Of Pontius *or* Tritannum, *or be ranked*
Amongſt the firſt and braveſt of our Heroes.
At Athens *I, a Prætor, meet your Wiſh,*
And give you Joy in Greek *at your Approach,*
Χαῖρε, *Good* Titus.
Now all the Lictors, and the aſſembled
Crowds,
Re-echo'd to the Softneſs of the Sound,
Hence ſprings Albutius' *Enmity to me.*

* Albutius] This *Albutius* was a young Man of Faſhion and Learning, but very much *Hellenis'd.* He was afterwards ſent to *Sardinia* as Prætor; and after quelling ſome Bands of Robbers, he demanded the Honour of a Supplication, which was denied him by the Senate.

† Scævola.] This is probably the ſame Perſon who is introduc'd as one of the Interlocutors in our Author's Dialogue *de Oratore,* which ſee.

But *Mutius* was in the right. For my part, I am not a bit at a Loſs to account from whence all this affected Squeamiſhneſs at Things of our own Growth, proceeds; but this is no proper Place for pointing it out. My Sentiments however are, and I have defended them, that the *Latin* Language is not a poor Language, as is generally thought; nay, that it is more copious than the *Greek* itſelf: For (I can appeal to our own Judgment) where have any Graces, either as to the Flow or the Elegance of Language, been wanting to our good Speakers or Poets, I mean, ever ſince they had proper Models to imitate?

For my part, ſince by my Toils and Dangers at the Forum, I ſeem ſtill to maintain the Poſt of Honour allotted me by the *Roman* People, ſure it is my Duty, as much as I can, to endeavour likewiſe that my Countrymen ſhould become more learned by my Endeavours, Studies, and Labours, without wrangling with thoſe who chooſe to read *Greek*; (let them read *Greek* in the Name of Heaven, but don't let them meerly pretend to read it;) and to be ſerviceable to thoſe who either chooſe to ſtudy both Languages, or after being Maſters of their own Authors, don't find themſelves in great want for others. As to thoſe who wiſh that I ſhould write upon other Subjects, they ought to be ſo far juſt as to own, that I have wrote a great deal, as much as any of my Countrymen; and, if I live, perhaps I may write more ſtill. And yet, whoever ſhall attentively apply to read what I have wrote upon Philoſophy, will think that none of my Writings

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are preferable to what I am now compoſing: For what in Life ought to be ſo much the Object of our Purſuit, as all the Branches of Philoſophy, eſpecially that Part which is the Subject of the whole of theſe Papers? I mean, to what *End*, to what *Extream*, to what *final Object*, all the Purpoſes of living well, and acting virtuouſly, ought to be directed? what Nature purſues, as the Summit of all that is deſirable in the Syſtem of Life? what ſhe avoids, as the Extream of all Evils? As this Subject begets great Altercations among the moſt learned Men, who can imagine that it is foreign to that Dignity which is univerſally allowed to me, to explore whatever is beſt and trueſt through all the Concerns of Living? * *Publius Scævola*, and *Manius Manilius*, kept up an Altercation, whether the Iſſue of a Servant Maid was to be accounted part of a Stock? And *M. Brutus* differs from them both, as being a very difficult Point, and conducive to the Happineſs of Society. And when we read, and continue to read with Pleaſure, thoſe and ſuch-like Writings, ſhall thoſe other Writings, which contain the whole Syſtem of Life, be neglected? The former may be indeed more ſaleable, but the latter are ſurely more inſtructive. But this I ſhall leave to the Conſideration of the Readers. As for my own part, I am of opinion, that the whole Queſtion, with regard to the Object of Good and Evil, is almoſt explained in thoſe Pages wherein, to the beſt of my Abilities, I have examin'd not only what I

* This very Queſtion is taken notice of in *de Oratore*.

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approve of myſelf, but all that has been advanced by the ſeveral Sects of Philoſophers.

But to begin with the moſt eaſy, let us firſt produce the Syſtem of *Epicurus*, which is moſt generally underſtood; a Syſtem which you will own I have explained ſo, that it has not been more accurately handled even by the very Followers of that Sect: For my Aim is to find out Truth, and not to convince an Opponent. The Doctrine, then, of *Epicurus*, with regard to Pleaſure, was once very accurately maintain'd by * *Lucius Torquatus*, a Man of univerſal Learning; and I myſelf was his Opponent; while † *L. Triarius*, a young Man remarkable for Letters and Modeſty, was preſent at our Diſputation. When both of them came to *Cumanum*, to pay their Compliments to me, our Diſcourſe at firſt turn'd a little upon Matters of Learning, for which both of them had a great Paſſion. Then, *ſays* Torquatus, ſince we have for once found you at leiſure, I muſt know from yourſelf the Reaſon why, though you don't hate our Maſter *Epicurus*, as moſt People who differ from him do, yet ſurely you don't approve of his Doctrine; though, in my opinion, he is the only Man who has diſcover'd Truth, who has deliver'd Mankind

* Lucius Torquatus,] This Gentleman is the ſame whom our Author, in other Parts of his Works, has beſtow'd great Encomiums upon. He was the Impeacher of *P. Cornelius Sylla*, for being concern'd in the Conſpiracy of *Catiline*; and who was defended by our Author, in a beautiful Oration which is now extant. He join'd with *Pompey* in the Civil Wars, and died in *Afric*.

† L. Triarius,] He afterwards had the Command of the *Aſiatic* Fleet, on the Side of *Pompey*; and is celebrated by our Author in his *Brutus*, for his ſtay'd Demeanour, and great Weight in ſpeaking.

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from the groſſeſt Miſtakes, and taught the whole Syſtem that regards a good and happy Life? But I believe, like our Friend *Triarius* here, you don't take ſo much Pleaſure in him, becauſe he has neglected the Ornaments of Speech uſed by *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and *Theophraſtus:* For I own, that I can ſcarcely be brought to conceive, how any thing that *he* was convinc'd of, can appear abſurd to *you*. To let you ſee your Miſtake, *Torquatus*, *anſwer'd I*, know that the Stile of *Epicurus* does not in the leaſt diſpleaſe me; for his Expreſſions convey his Meaning, and he ſpeaks ſo that I perfectly underſtand him; though I ſhould not diſlike a Philoſopher, who could join Eloquence to Philoſophy; but if he has it not, I ſhall not be uneaſy about it: I am not, however, ſo well ſatisfy'd with his Principles in many Reſpects; but ſo many Men, ſo many Minds; we are all of us liable to Miſtakes. But prithee let me know, without more to do, *anſwers he*, in what Point you are diſſatisfy'd with him: For I am ſenſible you are a fair Judge, provided you perfectly comprehend the Meaning of what he advances. Unleſs, *reply'd I*, you ſhould think that * *Phædrus* and *Zeno* diſguis'd the Truth to me (I have heard them both, when they prov'd nothing to my Satisfaction, but that they were indefatigable) I am perfectly acquainted with all the Notions of *Epicurus*; and I frequently heard them along with our Friend † *Atticus*, who ad-

* Phædrus *and* Zeno] Theſe were two *Epicurean* Philoſophers, who taught at *Athens*.

† Atticus] This was the celebrated Companion and Friend of our Author, to whom the largeſt Collection of his Letters is addreſs'd.

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mir'd them both, nay, had a perſonal liking for *Phædrus*; every Day we talk'd over, amongſt ourſelves, what we had heard; and there never was any Diſpute, whether I underſtood any Point, but whether I agreed to it.

CHAP. II.

THEN, *reply'd* Torquatus, what can be the matter? for I would willingly know what the Point is in which you diſagree. In the firſt place, *ſays I*, with regard to Phyſics, where he places his greateſt Boaſt, he is entirely wide of the Truth. He agrees in the main with *Democritus*; he makes a few Alterations, which he means as Corrections, but in my opinion they are all of them for the worſe. What he calls *Atoms*, that is, *indiſcerpable* Bodies becauſe of their Solidity, he imagines to be carry'd about in an infinite Vacuum, which has neither Head, nor Bottom, nor Middle, nor End, nor Extremity, ſo as to adhere to one another in their mutual Concuſſions; from this Concourſe all that exiſts, and all we ſee, has been form'd; and that this Motion of Atoms can be underſtood to have had no Beginning, but to have exiſted from all Eternity. But though he ſeldom ſlips in thoſe Points where he follows *Democritus*, yet I diſagree with them both in many Reſpects; and eſpecially becauſe, as two principal Queſtions ariſe in natural Diſquiſitions; firſt, what that Matter is of which Things are created? ſecondly, what the Power is which creates them? they have deſcanted upon Matter itſelf, but have left us in the dark as to the efficient

cient Power and Cauſe. But this Nonſenſe is in common to both, whereas the Deſcent of the Corpuſcles is peculiar to *Epicurus* himſelf; for he thinks that thoſe very indiſcerpable ſolid Bodies have a direct Tendency downwards, and that this is the natural Direction of all Bodies. But when it ſuggeſted to him, that if all Bodies had a natural, and, as I ſaid, a direct Tendency downwards, it never could happen that one Atom ſhould touch another; he then had the Cunning to bring in a Fiction of his own: He ſaid, that every Atom had a ſmall Declination in it's Direction, but the ſmalleſt that could be poſſibly conceived; that by means of this Property, the Complications, Junctions, and mutual Adheſions of Atoms were effected; from whence the World, with all it's Parts and all it's Contents, is produced. All theſe Contents are but childiſh Fictions of his own, and are very far from accounting for the Abſurdity he wants to ſolve: For, by introducing one of the greateſt Abſurdities that can be in Phyſical Reaſoning, that is, ſaying that there can be an *Effect* without a *Cauſe*, or, what is the ſame thing, ſaying that Atoms have an oblique Direction without any Cauſe; he forges this Direction in his own Brain, and without any Reaſon takes from his Atoms the natural Direction which he himſelf has aſſigned to all heavy Bodies, of falling downwards in a perpendicular Line from their own Region. And yet he has not compaſs'd the End for which he invented all this.

For, if all Atoms ſhall have this Declenſion, none of them can ever cohere; but if ſome of them

them have this Declenſion, and others of them have an inherent Property of a direct Tendency downwards; in the firſt place, this is giving different Provinces to Atoms; aſſigning to ſome a direct, and to others an oblique Tendency. In the next place, this confus'd Concourſe of Atoms, in which *Democritus* ſticks, could never have produc'd this beautiful Syſtem of the World; it is not even agreeable to Phyſics, to ſuppoſe an Indiviſibility of Parts: And he himſelf would never have been brought to believe this, had he choſen to have learned Geometry of his Friend * *Polynæus*, rather than have been at pains to have him to unlearn it. *Democritus*, who was a Man of Learning, and a complete Geometrician, thought that the Sun was of a vaſt Largeneſs. *Epicurus* perhaps thought it above two Feet in Diameter; for he imagin'd it was neither bigger nor leſs, or at leaſt but a trifle either way, than it appears.

THUS, what he alters he ſpoils; and he owes to *Democritus* every thing he does not alter. Atoms, a Vacuum, Images, which he names, *Idols*, by whoſe Obtruſion we not only *perceive*, but *think*. Infinity itſelf, which they call ἀπειρια, is wholly his; as are the innumerable Worlds, which daily exiſt and are deſtroy'd. All which, though I can by no means approve of, yet I don't think that *Democritus* ſhould be vilify'd by the very Perſon who has follow'd no other Guide but *his* Philoſophy.

* Polyænus,] He was a Native of *Lampſacum* in *Aſia*.

As to the other part of Philoſophy, which relates to ſearching after and diſcourſing *upon Truth*, and call'd λογικη, our Friend *Epicurus* is, in my opinion, extremely weak and defenceleſs. He takes away all Definitions; he admits of no Diviſions or Subdiviſions; he gives no Directions as to the manner of forming or concluding Reaſoning; nor in what manner captious Arguments are to be reſolv'd, or ambiguous ones diſtinguiſh'd. He places all Judgment of Things in the Senſes, which, if they ſhould once miſtake *wrong* for *right*, he thinks that there can be no Criterion of *Truth* and *Falſhood*.

But now, that we come to the third Part, relating to Living and Morals, he forms nothing that is great or generous as the End of Human Actions. This is ſtrongly confirm'd by his making *Pleaſure* and *Pain* to be the two Principles which Nature alone deſires and reſpects; and then referring to them all the Paſſions, either of Deſire or Averſion, in Mankind. Though this be the Doctrine of * *Ariſtippus*, and is defended with greater Freedom and Erudition by the *Cyrenaic* Sect, yet I think it is a Doctrine of ſuch a nature, as nothing can be more unworthy of a Man; for, in my opinion, Nature form'd and moulded us to more noble Purpoſes. And perhaps I may be miſtaken; but I am of opinion, that † the Great Anceſtor of the *Torquati*, nei-

* Ariſtippus,] This Philoſopher was born at *Cyrene* in *Afric*, the Cotemporary of *Plato*, and Founder of the *Cyrenaic* Sect of Philoſophers.

† *The Great Anceſtor of the* Torquati,] Theſe and the following Inſtances of Heroiſm, are ſo well known to thoſe who are acquainted with the *Roman* Hiſtory, that we ſhall add no Remark upon them.

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ther pluck'd the Chain from his Enemy, that he might enjoy the Senſation of bodily Pleaſure; nor would he, in his third Conſulſhip, have encounter'd the *Latins* near *Veſeris*, for *meer Pleaſure*. As to his ſtriking off his Son's Head, he ſeems to have depriv'd himſelf of many Pleaſures; ſince the Emotions of Nature and Paternal Affection within his Breaſt, gave way to his Regard for the Conſtitution and Majeſty of his Country.

WHAT ſhall we ſay of that *L. Torquatus*, who was Joint-Conſul with *Cn. Octavius*, when he treated his Son, whom he had emancipated into the Adoption of *D. Sillanus*, ſo ſeverely, as to order him to anſwer, before himſelf, the Charge brought againſt him by the *Macedonian* Deputies, who accus'd him of Corruption in his Province when Prætor; and after hearing both Parties, his Sentence was, that his Son had degenerated from the Virtues of his Anceſtors when in Command, and therefore forbad him to appear in his Preſence? Can it be imagin'd that ſuch a Man had the leaſt Thought of gratifying the Senſations of Pleaſure? But omitting the Dangers, the Toils, and even the Pains which every worthy Man undertakes for his Country and his Friends, when he not only has no hankering after Pleaſures, but even avoids them; and the Pangs of all kinds, which he will chooſe to endure, rather than deſert any Part of his Duty; let us proceed to thoſe Points which, though they appear leſs conſiderable in themſelves, are equally ſtrong Evidences to eſtabliſh this Doctrine.

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WHAT Pleaſure do you, *Torquatus*, or *Triarius* here, take in Letters, in your Knowledge of Men and Things, in your Peruſal of the Poets, and in your getting by heart ſo many of their Compoſitions? You are not to anſwer me, *I have Pleaſure in thoſe Exerciſes, and the* Torquati *had Pleaſure in what they did.* This is not the Argument made uſe of by *Epicurus:* Nor do you yourſelf, *Triarius*, nor any Man of the leaſt Senſe, or who has imbib'd this Doctrine, make uſe of this Defence. As to the common Queſtion, whence comes it that ſo many are *Epicureans?* There are likewiſe other Cauſes, but the following is a ſtrong Motive to a great many; I mean, becauſe they imagine *Epicurus* to have taught, that Things which were fit and honeſt in themſelves, created Joy, that is, *Pleaſure.* Theſe excellent Fellows do not underſtand, that the whole Syſtem is overturn'd if this is the Caſe. For if it ſhould be granted, that ſuch Things, eſſentially and independantly of all bodily Senſations, are agreeable; then it muſt follow, that Virtue, and the Exerciſe of the intellectual Faculties, are equally and independantly deſirable; a Concluſion abſolutely contrary to the Doctrine of *Epicurus.* Therefore, I ſay, that I cannot approve of theſe Doctrines. Beſides, I could wiſh that he himſelf had been either better furniſh'd with Arguments (for you muſt be of opinion, that he is not ſufficiently accompliſh'd in thoſe Arts which are requiſite to form what we generally call a Man of Learning) or that he had not deterr'd others from Study;

though at the ſame time I am ſenſible, that his Dictates have had no ſuch Effect upon you.

HAVING ſaid thus much, which I did rather to draw an Anſwer from him, than from any Fondneſs to ſpeak myſelf; *ſays* Triarius, *with an indulgent Smile*, Why, you have almoſt driven *Epicurus* from the Company of Philoſophers; for what Merit have you left him other, than that you underſtand him in whatever Strain he ſpeaks? He is a meer Plagiary in Phyſics, nor does he teach the very Things that you approve of. If he means to correct any thing here, he ſpoils it. He has no manner of Skill in Eloquence. When he call'd Pleaſure the Chief Good; in the firſt place, he underſtood very little of what he was ſaying; and, in the next place, all he did ſay was borrowed: For *Ariſtippus* had ſaid it all before him, and to much better Purpoſe. At laſt you added, that he was a meer Dunce. *Triarius, replies I*, you would ſurely never hinder a Man from ſaying, that he does not approve of what he cannot aſſent to: For what ſhould hinder me from being an *Epicurean*, if I approved of his Doctrine, eſpecially as it is but a Piece of Paſtime to make one's ſelf Maſter of it. Therefore, an amicable Difference of Opinion, ought never to give riſe to hard Language. Railings, Scolding, Paſſion, with obſtinate Heats, and wrangling in Diſputation, to me ſeem unworthy of Philoſophers.

I AM entirely, *ſays* Torquatus, of your Opinion: For it is as impoſſible to diſpute without differing, as to diſpute to any Purpoſe with Heat and

and Wrangling: But, by your leave, I have ſome Things to offer, in anſwer to what you have ſaid. Sure, *replies I*, you could never have imagin'd, that I would have thrown out what I have done, had I not been fond of hearing your Sentiments. Give me leave then to ask, *anſwers he*, whether you have a mind to review the whole Syſtem of *Epicurus*, or to confine the Diſpute to the ſingle Point of *Pleaſure*, which has given Riſe to all our Debate? That, *reply'd I*, ſhall be as you pleaſe to determine. Then, *ſays he*, my Method ſhall be to keep cloſe to one Point, and that too of the greateſt Conſequence. We will reſerve Phyſics for another Opportunity; and I will undertake to prove to you, both the Declination of Atoms you have taken notice of, and his Opinion as to the Largeneſs of the Sun; and that he found Fault with, and corrected a great many Errors in *Democritus*. At preſent I will confine what I have to ſay to *Pleaſure* only. I own I may ſay nothing that is new; but it will be ſuch as, I dare ſay, will bring you to my way of thinking. Nay, *anſwers I*, I never ſhall be irreclaimable; and if you once convince my Underſtanding, my Heart ſhall go along with it. That, *reply'd he*, is what I make no doubt of doing, provided you are as candid as you appear to be: But I chuſe rather to make uſe of a continued Thread of Diſcourſe, than to queſtion or be queſtion'd. What you pleaſe as to that, *ſaid I*. And then he begun in this manner:

In the firſt place, *ſays he*, my Method ſhall be the ſame with that of *Epicurus*. I will define the Eſſence and Quality of this Subject of

our Diſpute; not that I think I can inform you better, but that I may proceed methodically and conſiſtently in my Diſcourſe. The Diſpute then is, what is the Extream, what is the Ultimate Good? Now all Philoſophers agree, it is *that* towards which every other Good has a Reference, while itſelf is independant. *Epicurus* makes this to conſiſt in *Pleaſure*, which he calls the *Chief Good*, as he does *Pain* the *Chief Evil*; and he propoſed to prove it thus:

He ſaid, that every living Creature no ſooner comes into the World, than it hankers after Pleaſure, and ſeeks the Enjoyment of it as the Chief Good; that it avoids Pain as the Chief Evil, and, ſo far as it can, repells it from itſelf. That all Creatures do this before they receive any Impreſſions of Prejudice, and while Nature is uninfluenc'd and uncorrupted in it's Judgment; from this he denies that there is any Occaſion for Reaſoning or Diſputation to account for the Cauſes, why Pleaſure is deſired, and Pain is avoided? He thinks our Senſes are competent Judges of that, in the ſame manner as they are, that there is Heat in Fire, Whiteneſs in Snow, or Sweetneſs in Honey; none of which are Propoſitions that require any Subtilty of Reaſoning to eſtabliſh; it is ſufficient that they are ſelf-evident from a Hint. For, that there was a Difference betwixt an Argument with a Series of Reaſoning, and intermediate Obſervation with Self-evidence: That the firſt was hid, and as it were wrapt up, and therefore required to be diſcloſed; whereas a Judgment might be formed of the other, *inſtantaneouſly* and *eaſily*. To

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prove this we are to conſider, that deprive a Man of his Senſes, you leave him nothing behind; hence it neceſſarily follows, that Nature herſelf can be the only Judge of what ſhe affects or abhors. And what is there that ſhe is to perceive or to judge of, that ſhe is to deſire or avoid, beſides *Pleaſure* and *Pain?*

SOME of that Sect, indeed, want to handle this Matter with more Delicacy: And they deny that it is ſufficient to judge of Good and Evil by the Senſes; but that it may be proved by Intelligence and Reaſoning, that Pleaſure is deſirable, and Pain deteſtable in their own Natures. Therefore they tell us, that Nature has as it were implanted this Notion in our Minds, that the one is to be courted, and the other avoided. But there are others, and I am with them, of opinion, who after hearing a great many Philoſophical Diſquiſitions, why Pleaſure is not to be reckon'd a Good, and Pain an Evil, think that we ought not to be ſo very confident of the Merits of our Doctrine, as not to diſpute and define, with great Accuracy and the pureſt Reaſoning, upon the Nature of Pleaſure and Pain.

BUT that you may perceive the Source of all the Miſtakes of thoſe who impeach Pleaſure, and recommend Pain, I will lay open the whole Affair, and explain the Dictates of *Epicurus* himſelf, that Diſcoverer of Truth, that Contriver as it were of all human Felicity: For there is no Man in the World who rejects, hates, or avoids Pleaſure, meerly becauſe it is Pleaſure; but becauſe they who are ignorant of the manner in which Pleaſure ought to be purſued, intail ex-

excruciating Pain upon themſelves. On the other hand, there is not a Man alive who loves, follows, and woes Pain, meerly becauſe it is Pain; but becauſe it ſometimes happens, that Labour and Pain are attended with ſome exquiſite Pleaſure. That I may prove this by an Example drawn from common Life, is there a Man amongſt us, who undertakes any painful bodily Exerciſe, but with a View of receiving ſome Benefit from it? Then with what colour of Juſtice can a Man be blamed, who pants after that Pleaſure that is unattended by Pain, or avoids that Pain which can produce no Pleaſure?

But we go ſo far as to impeach and hold thoſe worthy of juſt Deteſtation, who are ſo immers'd and debauch'd in the Enjoyment of momentary Pleaſures, as, from the Blindneſs of their Paſſion, not to foreſee the Pains that are conſequential to that Enjoyment. In the ſame Claſs of Delinquents we rank thoſe, who from a Softneſs of Mind, that is, from an Averſion to Toil and Pain, deſert their Duties. And the Diſtinction of thoſe Circumſtances, at leaſt, is obvious and practicable. For in an eaſy Hour, when we are quite at Freedom to chuſe, and free of all Reſtraint to do what is moſt agreeable to ourſelves, then it is that we are to indulge the full Enjoyment of *Pleaſure*, and repel every Species of *Pain*. But at certain Conjunctures, which often happen from our ſtated Duties, or the Exigencies of our Affairs, we are then oblig'd not only to divorce Pleaſure, but to admit of Pain. Therefore, the Rule which a wiſe Man obſerves in ſuch Caſes is, either to reject Pleaſures, in order

der to obtain greater ones in reverſion; or, by enduring Pain to a certain Degree, prevent his being oblig'd to endure it in a greater.

WHILE I ſtick by this Opinion, why ſhould I be afraid of being able to account by it, for the Conduct of our *Torquati*, whom a little while ago you mention'd, with great Regard for them, as well as with great Friendſhip and Kindneſs for me? But don't imagine that by praiſing them you have brib'd me, or that I will be the leſs backward in the Debate. Give me leave to ask you, what Conſtruction *you* put upon their Conduct? Do you imagine that when they ruſh'd upon an armed Enemy, that when they were ſo unrelenting towards their Children and their Blood, they were quite unconcern'd as to their own Benefit and Advantage? But this is not the Caſe even with Brutes; for they never ruſh on, or make a Noiſe, ſo as that we don't comprehend the Purpoſe to which all their Motions and Efforts are directed.

CAN you imagine that thoſe great Men acted ſo glorioufly, without any Motive? That Motive I ſhall explain by and by. In the mean time I ſhall maintain this Maxim; that if they acted, as they doubtleſs did, all thoſe glorious Deeds from ſome Motive or other, Virtue, *abſtractedly* conſider'd, was not that Motive. He pluck'd a Chain from his Enemy. But * he cover'd himſelf to avoid being kill'd. Yes; but his Undertaking was

* *He cover'd himſelf to avoid being kill'd.*] *Cicero*'s Words here are very clear, but ſome may think his Meaning not quite ſo applicable to the Argument. The Original has it, *Et quidem ſe texit ne interiret.* The Reaſoning which *Torquatus* would bring from this

was very hazardous. But then you are to obſerve, that all the Army had their Eyes upon him. What did he gain by that? Why, Glory and Endearment; the ſtrongeſt Securities for the fearleſs Tranquility of Life. He puniſh'd his Son with Death. If without a Cauſe, I ſhould be unwilling to be the Deſcendant of ſo barbarous a Monſter. But as, by his own Pain, he aſſerted the Diſcipline of Military Command, and reſtrain'd, by the Fear of Puniſhment, his Army during a moſt bloody War; in ſo doing he regarded the Welfare of his Country, in which he knew his own to be included.

AND indeed this Reaſoning is very extenſive; for the uſual Grace and Embelliſhment of Eloquence, eſpecially yours, when you ſo carefully retrace Inſtances of antient Worth, by celebrating illuſtrious and brave Men, and ſhewing that their glorious Actions were not effected thro' any Luſt of Lucre, but from the Beauty of intrinſic Virtue; *I ſay, all this Eloquence* is overthrown by the Alternative I juſt now mention'd; when I laid it down, that Pleaſures are either rejected, in order to attain to Pleaſures of a higher Degree; or Pain is undertaken, in order to avoid a greater Degree of Pain.

CHAP. III.

BUT enough, in this place, of the ſhining and vaunted Actions of celebrated Perſonages; for I ſhall by and by have a proper Field

Expreſſion ſeems to be, that notwithſtanding the heroic Exploit of his Anceſtor, yet ſtill he acted upon the *Epicurean* Principle, ſince this Act of Self-Preſervation implied a Motive of Self-Love.

for

for pointing out the Tendency of all Virtues to Pleaſure. I ſhall *now* explain the Eſſence and Qualities of Pleaſure, that I may remove all Miſtakes of the Ignorant; and that we may have a clear Conception what is to be accounted a *voluptuous*, a *delicate*, a *ſoft*, an *auſtere*, a *modeſt*, and a *rigid* manner of Living. For we don't purſue *only* that which, by it's enchanting Joy, affects Nature itſelf, and touches the Organs of Senſation with a certain Degree of Delight; but account that State which we experience when all Pain is remov'd, to be *the Perfection of Pleaſure:* Becauſe, when we are free of Pain, we are happy in that Freedom, and in the Abſence of all Uneaſineſs. Now, every thing that makes us happy being *Pleaſure*, and whatever hurts us *Pain*, the Abſence of all *Pain* is properly term'd *Pleaſure:* For, as when Hunger and Thirſt is remov'd by eating and drinking, *Pleaſure* follows the very Removal of the *Uneaſineſs*; thus, in all Caſes, the Abſence of *Pain* creates a Succeſſion of *Pleaſure.*

EPICURUS therefore rejected any *intermediate* State betwixt Pleaſure and Pain; for as to that State which ſome imagine to be *intermediate*, as when one is void of all Pain, he maintain'd it to be Pleaſure, nay, of the higheſt kind. For every Perſon who perceives himſelf to be affected, be it in what manner it will, muſt neceſſarily be in a State of Pleaſure or of Pain. Now *Epicurus* is of opinion, that the higheſt Pleaſure terminates in a *Privation* of Pain; and though Pleaſure may be afterwards *varied* and *diver-*

diverſify'd, yet it is impoſſible for it in any degree to be *augmented* or *amplify'd*.

At *Athens*, as I have heard from my Father, who ridiculed the *Stoics* with great Wit and Humour, there was a Statue erected, in the * *Ceramicus*, of *Chryſippus* repreſented ſitting, and holding out his Hand, as ſignifying his being pleas'd with the following little Queſtion: Whether, or not, does your Hand, in the Poſture it is now in, deſire any thing? Nothing to be ſure. But if Pleaſure were a Good, it would deſire it. No doubt on't. Then Pleaſure is not a Good. Had the Statue, *continu'd my Father*, been endow'd with Speech, it would not have ſpoken in this manner; becauſe it forms a pretty ſtrong Concluſion againſt the *Cyrenaic* Sect, but not againſt *Epicurus*. For if that alone is *Pleaſure*, which as it were tickles, thrills, and glides through the Senſes with Delight; it is abſurd to think, that the Hand can be ſatisfy'd by any Abſence of Pain, unleſs at the ſame time it feels ſome delightful Senſation of Joy. But if *Epicurus* rightly maintains, that the Perfection of Pleaſure is not to feel Pain: In the firſt place, *Chryſippus*, you juſtly obſerve, that the Hand deſires nothing while it is in that Attitude: In the ſecond place, your Concluſion is falſe when you ſay, that if Pleaſure were a Good, the Hand would have

* *The* Ceramicus] There were two *Ceramici* at *Athens*; one of them appears to have been a kind of Square, ſurrounded with Houſes of Pleaſure for Courtezans, and ſtood within the Walls of the City; the other, where the Statue here mention'd was erected, was without the Walls, and ſerved as a Burying-place of thoſe who dying in their Country Service, were buried at the public Expence.

deſired

deſired it; becauſe, if *Pleaſure* conſiſts in the Abſence of *Pain*, then it is an Abſurdity to ſay, that the Hand would deſire that which it already poſſeſſes.

But it is eaſily prov'd, from the following Conſideration, that *Pleaſure* is the Perfection of good Things. Let us ſuppoſe a Perſon who enjoys great, manifold, and uninterrupted *Pleaſures*, both *intellectual* and *ſenſual*, without any Obſtruction, either from the Influence or the Dread of *Pain*; can you mention any State more bliſsful or deſirable than this? For a Perſon thus affected, muſt needs poſſeſs that Firmneſs of Mind, which fears neither Death nor Pain; becauſe Death is a Privation of Senſe. Pain, when *continued*, generally becomes *light*; when *intenſe*, *ſhort*: Thus the *Quickneſs* of it alleviates it's *Sharpneſs*, and the *Gentleneſs* of it it's *Duration*. Add to the Character of ſuch a Perſon, that he is under no Horrors from the Contemplation of a Divine Being, nor ſuffers his paſt Pleaſures to ſlip away, and that he daily enjoys them in remembering them; then what Circumſtance farther can we imagine to improve his Condition.

CHAP. IV.

As a Contraſt to this Character, let us ſuppoſe a Perſon oppreſs'd with all the moſt bitter Pains, both of Body and Mind, that human Nature can poſſibly labour under, without the ſmalleſt Hope of their ever becoming lighter, or of his enjoying Pleaſure either now

or

or hereafter; what can we expreſs or imagine to be more miſerable than ſuch a Perſon? Now, if a Life full of Torments is chiefly to be avoided, then ſurely the higheſt Evil is to live in Pain. With this Sentiment this Maxim correſponds, *That the Perfection of Good is to live in Pleaſure.* Nor has the Soul any other Spot where ſhe can, as it were, at the laſt Stage reſt, beſides *Pleaſure.* In like manner all our Fears and Anxieties terminate in *Pain.* Neither is there any other thing in Life that, in it's own Nature, can diſturb and excruciate. Beſides, Deſire, Averſion, and all the Occurrences in Life, originally proceed either from Pleaſure or Pain. This being undeniable, it is plain, that all the honeſt and glorious Actions that are perform'd, have this Tendency, that the Authors of them may live in Pleaſure. Now, as that is the *higheſt*, the *laſt*, or the *extream* Good, by the *Greeks* call'd τελος, which in itſelf is independant, and in which every thing elſe terminates, we muſt allow that the higheſt Good is to live in Pleaſure.

THEY who place this Perfection of Bliſs in Virtue alone, and are entrapp'd by the Speciouſneſs of the Sound, are very ignorant of the Properties of human Nature; whereas the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, if they minded it, would free them from their great Miſtake. For, unleſs thoſe ſhining beautiful Virtues produc'd Pleaſure, who would account them either *meritorious* or *deſirable?* For, as we value the Profeſſion of Phyſic, not on account of the Art conſider'd abſtractedly, but as it is conducive to the Recovery or Preſervation of Health; and praiſe the Dexterity

terity of a skilful Pilot, nor becauſe of the Art itſelf, but becauſe of the Utility attending it: So Wiſdom, which we are to look upon as the *Art of Living*, would not be courted as ſhe is, were ſhe not the *efficient* Cauſe, and as it were the Artiſt, that procures and prepares Pleaſure.

I HAVE explain'd my Senſe of the Word *Pleaſure*, as I intend to treat of it, leſt the Chain of my Diſcourſe ſhould be weaken'd thro' Prejudice againſt the Word. For, as the Life of Mankind is chiefly diſtreſs'd by their Ignorance of Things Good and Evil; and as, by miſtaking them, they are often both depriv'd of the moſt *exquiſite* Pleaſures, and tormented by the moſt *excruciating* Pains; we muſt call in Wiſdom to our Aid, which by ſtripping us of Terrors and Deſires, and rooting out of our Minds the Temerity of our falſe Opinions, offers herſelf as our ſureſt Guide to Pleaſure. For it is Wiſdom alone that diſpels the Gloom of Thought, and prevents our being ſhock'd with Fear; under this *Directreſs* it is that we can live with Tranquility, after extinguiſhing all the Heat of Paſſions. For theſe are inſatiable; they ruin not only Individuals, but whole Families at once; and oftentimes even ſhake the very Conſtitution of a Country.

PASSIONS give birth to Hatred, Diſſentions, Diſcords, Seditions, and Wars; not only do they trouble exterior Objects; not only with blind Fury do they attack others, but while they are confin'd within our own Minds, even there they create mutual Jarrings and Diſſentions. Hence we muſt taſte the very Bitterneſs of Life. Therefore

fore it is that the wiſe Man, after lopping and pruning every Luxuriance of Vanity and Deceit, and confining himſelf to the End which Nature preſcribes, is the only Perſon who can live without Dread or Vexation of Spirit.

For what can be more uſeful, what more fitted to the Purpoſes of happy Life, than the Partition which *Epicurus* has made? He tells us, that there is one kind of Paſſions, which is both natural and neceſſary; another, which is natural, but not neceſſary; and a third, which is neither. And that they are diſpoſed of in ſuch a manner, as that ſuch as are neceſſary may be gratify'd with very little Pains and very little Expence. Even thoſe which are natural, require not a great deal, becauſe the Riches which ſuffice Nature herſelf, are both *attainable* and *determin'd*. But as to ſuperfluous Pleaſures, which form the laſt Claſs, theſe know neither Meaſure nor End.

As then we perceive the Whole of Life is thrown into Confuſion by Error and Ignorance, and that Wiſdom alone can free us from the Force of Paſſions and the Terror of Fears; that it is ſhe who both teaches us to bear the Blows of Fortune with Moderation, and points out to us every Avenue which leads to Quiet and Tranquility; Why ſhould we be under any Difficulty in ſaying, that Wiſdom is to be deſired, becauſe it leads to *Pleaſure*; and Folly ſhunn'd, becauſe it plagues with *Vexation?*

For the ſame Reaſon we maintain, that even Temperance itſelf, abſtractedly conſider'd, is not deſirable; but as it is attended with Tranquility of Mind, and, as it were, calms and ſooths it with

with it's healing Balm: For Temperance is that Quality which directs us to follow a Mean in every thing we either purſue or avoid. For it is not enough, that we judge what we ſhould do, and what we ought not to do, but we muſt abide by the Judgment we have form'd. Yet a great many are unable to ſtick by, and perſevere, in what they had before determin'd; and, over-power'd or ſtagger'd by an intervening Appearance of Pleaſure, deliver themſelves up as Slaves to their Paſſions, without foreſeeing the Conſequences. Thus it is that People, for a ſmall and an unneceſſary *Pleaſure* (a Pleaſure that they might attain by other means, a *Pleaſure* with which they might even diſpenſe without putting themſelves to the leaſt Pain) ruſh upon excruciating Diſtempers, Loſſes, and Infamy; and very often fall under the Penalties of Law and Juſtice.

But they who want to enjoy their *Pleaſures*, ſo as that they may be attended with no *Pain*; and are ſo far Maſters of their Reaſon, as never to do what they are conſcious they ought not to do: Such Men, I ſay, purchaſe the higheſt *Pleaſure*, by their *Self-denial* to *Pleaſure*; ſuch Men frequently endure *Pain*, by that ſuffering to avoid a greater. From this we may conclude, that *Intemperance*, abſtractedly conſider'd, is not to be ſhunn'd, nor Temperance purſu'd, becauſe it avoids Pleaſures, but as it is productive of greater.

The ſame way of Reaſoning holds good as to *Courage:* For neither the Exerciſe of Toil, nor the enduring of *Pain*, charms us in themſelves; no more than Patience, Aſſiduity, or Induſtry

Induſtry itſelf, which is ſo much cried up; or even Firmneſs of Mind; but we purſue them in order to live without Anxiety and Dread, and to do all we can to free both Soul and Body from Vexation. For, as every State of quiet Life is diſturb'd by the Fear of Death; and as it is wretched in us to ſink under Afflictions, or to bear them with a Poverty or Weakneſs of Spirit; and as, thro' that ſame Infirmity of Mind, many have abſolutely abandon'd their Parents, many their Friends, ſome their Country, but moſt *themſelves:* So, a firm and exalted Mind is free from all Anxiety and Torment, as it both deſpiſes Death, which puts us in the ſame State as before we were born; and prepares againſt Afflictions, by remembering that Afflictions, if *great*, are ended by Death; if *little*, they admit of many Intervals of Reſt; and, if *middling*, they are always in our own Power: And at the worſt, whenever Life becomes diſagreeable, like Actors on the Stage, we may ſhift the Scene from Life to Death. From all thoſe Circumſtances it appears, that in their own Natures *Cowardice* and *Indolence* neither are *ignominious*, nor *Firmneſs* and *Perſeverance laudable*. But the former are rejected, as producing *Pain*; and the latter courted, as the Parents of *Pleaſure*.

THAT I may complete the Round of Virtues, I will now touch upon *Juſtice*; but here almoſt the very ſame Chain of Reaſoning holds. For, as I have proved the Connection of Wiſdom, Temperance, and Courage, with Pleaſure to be ſo ſtrong, that they are abſolutely inſeparable and

and indiſcerpable from it; ſo we are to form the ſame Judgment with regard to Juſtice, which is not only innoxious, but by it's own Energy and Nature, as well as by the Hopes it ſuggeſts that nothing ſhall be wanting which uncorrupted Nature can require, is always cheriſhing ſome Principle which calms the Paſſions; in the ſame Proportion as Raſhneſs, Luſt, and Indolence, always diſquiet and torment the Mind. So it is impoſſible that the Man, in whoſe Breaſt * *Juſtice* is inthron'd, can ever be diſturb'd. And if at any time he lays any Schemes, however † cloſe he may be, yet he does not lay them with a Preſumption of their never coming to light. As to the Actions of the Profligate, they at firſt are trac'd by Suſpicion, next by Talk and Rumour, then by an Impeachment, and then by a Proof; and many even diſcover themſelves, as happen'd under your Conſulſhip.

But if there are Men, who imagine themſelves ſufficiently provided and fortify'd againſt the Diſcoveries of Mankind, yet theſe very Men dread the Power of Heaven, and think that the Diſquietudes which Day and Night prey upon

* *Juſtice*] This Paſſage is very perplex'd, becauſe of a Hiatus, which I have ſupplied with the Word Juſtice. The Critics call it a *Locus deſperatus*. I have reſtor'd it according to my own Conjecture, which I hope the Reader will find to be a natural one; and perhaps it is for that very Reaſon that the Critics never thought of it.

† *Cloſe he may be,*] It is incredible what Trouble this Paſſage, as well as the foregoing, has given to Critics, Tranſlators, and Commentators; which, if they had conſulted the naked Senſe of our Author, they might have ſpared themſelves; for he ſays no more than, *that a Man of juſt Principles will never hatch any thing, which he would be aſham'd or afraid ſhould come to light.*

their Spirits, are ſent as avenging Puniſhments from the immortal Gods for their Crimes. Then what Abatement can Life receive in it's Miſeries, proportionable to their Increaſe from the Stings of Guilt, the Penalties of Law, and the Deteſtation of their Fellow-Citizens? Yet ſome there are who are inſatiable in their Paſſion for Money, for Honours, for Power, high Living, and other ſenſual Gratifications; which the ſhameful manner of purchaſing the Food for their Luſts, is ſo far from abating, that it rather inflames them: Theſe therefore have more need to be ſent to a Houſe of Correction, than to a School of Philoſophy.

UPON the whole, true Reaſon invites the Sound in Judgment to the Paths of Juſtice, Equity, and Honour; nor indeed does Injuſtice ſuit either with the Inability or the Weakneſs of Human Underſtanding; as it is difficult for them either to ſucceed in what they aim at, or to ſupport it if they do ſucceed; and the means of doing a bad Action, are more readily in the Hands of Men of great Abilities, either in Fortune or Genius: If they uſe them properly, they procure them Popularity and Endearment, the moſt powerful Means of acquiring the Tranquility of Life; and eſpecially, where they have no manner of Motive in making a bad Uſe of their Power.

THE Paſſions implanted in us by Nature, are eaſily ſatisfy'd, without hurting any one. As to thoſe which are ſuperfluous, they ought not to be indulged. Such Paſſions have no Tendency to any Object that Nature craves; and the Injuſtice

juſtice of an Action is attended with more Loſs, than the Product of ſuch Injuſtice can bring Gain. Therefore, to ſpeak properly, we cannot ſay that, abſtractedly conſider'd, *Juſtice* is lovely in itſelf; it is only ſo, by producing even the higheſt Degree of Satisfaction. For Popularity and Endearment are joyful, becauſe they ſtrengthen the Security of Life, and enhance the Fullneſs of Pleaſure. Therefore we think, that Wickedneſs ought to be ſhunn'd, not only for the Inconveniences which happen to the Profligate, but much rather becauſe they who harbour it in their Minds, know no Intermiſſion, no Reſpite from Diſquietudes.

But if even the Merit of thoſe very Virtues, ſo much cried up by other Philoſophers, can have no Tendency but to Pleaſure; and if Pleaſure is the only Object that invites and charms us to her by her own Nature, then there can be no doubt but that ſhe is the higheſt and the laſt of all Goods, and to live in Happineſs is nothing but to live in *Pleaſure.*

CHAP. IV.

I Will, in a few Words, explain whatever is connected with this infallible fix'd Maxim. *There is no Miſtake lies in placing the* Ends of Things Good and Evil, *in Pleaſure or in Pain:* No! The Miſtake lies in our Ignorance of the efficient Cauſes of thoſe two Ends. But we acknowledge that the Pleaſure and Pain of the Mind ariſe from thoſe of the Body. Therefore I admit what you ſaid a little while ago, that if

any of us think otherwiſe, we muſt * give up the Point; and indeed, I own, I know a great many Dunces among us who do. But tho' the Pleaſure of the Mind gives us Joy, and it's Diſquietude, Pain, yet both theſe ariſe from, and relate to, the Body; yet, for all that, the Pleaſure and Pain of the Mind are much more exquiſite than thoſe of the Body; for the bodily Senſations are only of what is preſent and immediate, whereas the Mind feels what is paſt and to come. So that, even ſuppoſing the Senſations of Grief to be equal in the Mind as in the Body, yet they may receive a vaſt Acceſſion by our reflecting, that the Evils hanging over our Heads are infinite and eternal. The ſame may be ſaid of Pleaſure, which is always the greater if we are afraid of no ſuch Abatement.

FROM all this it is at leaſt plain, that extreme Pleaſure, or Diſquietude of the Mind, are more conducive either to the Happineſs or Miſery of Life, than either of them when ſeated in the Body. And yet I am far from ſaying, that, upon the Removal of Pleaſure, a State of Diſquietude inſtantly ſucceeds, unleſs perhaps that Pleaſure is inſtantaneouſly ſucceeded by Pain: So far from it, I maintain that the very Ceſſation of Pain gives us Joy, even tho' no Senſation of Pleaſure ſucceeds; and from thence we may underſtand, how exquiſite the Pleaſure is to be free from Pain. But as the Expectation of Good gives us Spirits, ſo the Remembrance of it gives us

* *Give up the Point*;] The Original has it, *cadere cauſa*. This does not properly ſignify, to be caſt in an Action, but to loſe the Right of being a Party.

Joy;

Joy: But as Fools are tormented by reflecting upon paſt Evils; ſo the renewing the agreeable Remembrance of the Happineſs they have enjoyed, gives Delight to the Wiſe. Now, it is in our own Power to bury what has been diſagreeable, in eternal Oblivion, and to revive the ſweet and pleaſing Remembrance of the Pleaſures we have enjoyed; but as we contemplate whatever is over, with the Intenſeneſs and the Stretch of Thought, then it happens that Diſquietude follows if they have been diſagreeable, and Gladneſs if otherwiſe.

How noble, how open, how plain, and how ſtraight a Road is this to the Happineſs of Life! Becauſe it is undoubted, that Man can poſſeſs no greater Bleſſing than to be free of all Pain and Diſquietude, and enjoy the moſt exquiſite Pleaſures both of Mind and Body. Are you not ſenſible, that nothing is omitted in this Syſtem, that can be aſſiſting to Life in her Purſuit after that Supreme Good which we have propoſed to treat of? Here that very over-ſenſual *Epicurus*, as you term him, calls aloud, that the only Means of living with Joy, is to live with Wiſdom, Honour, and Equity; and that we cannot live in Wiſdom, Honour, and Equity, but by living with Joy.

For, as it is impoſſible for a State to be happy amidſt Civil Broils, or a Houſe amidſt the Diſſentions of it's Maſters, far leſs can the Mind, if jarring and at Variance with itſelf, taſte the ſmalleſt Particle of pure, unconfined Pleaſure. Neither can a Man, whoſe Paſſions are always

inconſiſtent, and whoſe Views are irreconcileable with one another, ever ſee aught about him in a State of Quiet and Tranquility. But if the Joy of Living is interrupted by the afflicting Maladies of the Body, how much greater muſt it's Interruption be from the Diſeaſes of the Mind? Now, the Diſeaſes of the Mind conſiſt in inſatiable and ſuperfluous Appetites after Riches, Glory, Power, and even ſenſual Pleaſures; add to theſe Diſquiet, Uneaſineſs, and Melancholy; all which prey upon and conſume, with Anxiety, the Spirits of thoſe who are ignorant that the Mind ought to have no Senſation of Pain for any thing that is diſtinct from the Pain of the Body, either preſent or to come. And now I muſt obſerve, that there is not a Fool in the World, who is not ſick of ſome one or other of theſe Diſeaſes; and therefore there is not a Fool who is not unhappy.

To all theſe Vexations let us add *Death*, which is perpetually hanging over us, as the Stone over *Tantalus*; add to this, *Superſtition*, with which whoever is tinctured, muſt for ever live in Diſquietude; beſides, Fools can neither feaſt upon the Remembrance of paſt Bliſs, nor ſecure the Enjoyment of the preſent; they live in a meer State of Expectation of what is to come, and becauſe they are not infallibly ſure of it, they are conſumed with Dread and Agony: But the Completion of all their Misfortunes is, when they perceive, too late, that all their Purſuit after Money, Command, Power, or Glory, has been but a Bubble; for they taſte none of

thoſe Pleaſures, in the hopes of enjoying which they were ſanguine enough to undertake many and mighty Toils.

OTHERS are of ſcanty, narrow Diſpoſitions, either perpetually in Deſpair, or malignant, envious, fretful, gloomy, ſlanderous and ſullen. There is another Species of Fools who are taken up with the Fopperies of Gallantry; ſome of them are petulant and obſtinate, others froward, paſſionate and heedleſs, never continuing one inſtant in the ſame Mind: For theſe Reaſons their Life admits of no Intervals of Uneaſineſs. We may conclude, therefore, that no Fool can be happy, and no wiſe Man unhappy; and this upon much ſtronger and juſter Principles than thoſe laid down by the *Stoics:* For they deny Good to be any thing elſe but that Phantom to which they affix the rather ſpecious than ſolid Appellation of *honeſtum*; and, That Virtue, while ſupported by this Phantom, wants no Pleaſure, and in herſelf is ſufficient to make one happy.

BUT all theſe Maxims may in ſome Senſe be laid down, not only without Oppoſition from us, but even with our Approbation. For thus the wiſe Man is always repreſented by *Epicurus* as being happy: His Appetites are bounded; he is careleſs about Death; and he has juſt Sentiments of the immortal Beings, without any Mixture of ſlaviſh Fear; and can, without any manner of Concern, leave the Stage of Life when it is convenient for him. By theſe Circumſtances he is always furniſhed with the Means of Pleaſure: Nor can there a Juncture happen in which he has not a greater Share of Joy than of Pain. For he hath

an agreeable Remembrance of what is paſt, while he enjoys what is preſent in ſuch a manner, as to be fully ſenſible both of it's Extent and Quality: Nor does he depend upon, but expect future Joys, while he makes the beſt of thoſe he has. He is widely removed from the Vices I mention'd a little while ago; and it gives him exquiſite Pleaſure when he compares his Life with that of Fools: And when he is afflicted with Pains, they never leave ſuch an Impreſſion upon the wiſe Man, as that the Meaſure of his Joy does not exceed that of his Affliction.

As to *Epicurus*, he reaſons extremely well, when he ſays, that the wiſe Man can be but very little affected with Fortune: That his Courage is equal to the nobleſt Undertakings, and his Wiſdom and Reaſon to the moſt important: And that no greater Pleaſure can be felt in the infinite Progreſſion of Time, than may be felt in this Life, which we perceive to be finite. As for your Logic, he thought that it was of no manner of Efficacy, either to the Happineſs of Life, or the Clearneſs of Diſputation. As to Phyſics, he thought them of great Conſequence. By the firſt Science, both the Strength of Words, the Nature of a Diſcourſe, and the Proportions of agreeing or repugnant Qualities, are diſcoverable: But by a thorough Inſight into the Nature of Things, we are freed from Superſtition, unfetter'd from the Fears of Death, and undiſturbed by that Ignorance of natural Qualities which is always haunting the Brain with fantaſtic Horrors. In ſhort, it will greatly contribute to better our Morals, if we once can learn what Nature covets;

vets; then indeed, if we hold faſt by the permanent Knowledge of Things, by preſerving that Rule by which all the Judgment we form of Matters is regulated, and which is as it were let down from Heaven for the Inſtruction of the World, no Eloquence can ever beat us out of our Opinions.

But unleſs we clearly conceive the Nature of Things, we can by no manner of means defend the Judgment of our Senſes. Now all our Ideas ariſe from our Senſes; and if theſe are all of them infallible, as the Doctrine of *Epicurus* ſays they are, then indeed we may have ſomewhat of a clear and intelligent Perception. Whoever takes the Senſes out of the queſtion, and maintains that no clear Perception can be thro' them, by ſo doing would be unable even to explain what he himſelf would be at: Beſides, by taking away Intelligence and Perception, you take away at the ſame time every Rule both of Life and Action. Thus by Phyſics we are fortified againſt the Fears of Death, we make head againſt the Terrors of Superſtition, we aſſume a Tranquility of Spirit, by removing all our Ignorance of undiſcover'd Objects, we become modeſt by the Explanation of the Properties of Paſſions and their different Kinds: And as I juſt now proved, by a perfect Knowledge of the Rule laid down by Nature to direct our Judgment in every thing, we are enabled to diſtinguiſh betwixt Truth and Falſhood.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

I AM now to enter upon a Point that is extremely eſſential in this Diſputation, I mean *Friendſhip*, which you pretend would be annihilated if Pleaſure was the greateſt Good; whereas the Sentiments of *Epicurus* are, that of all the Helps which Wiſdom has provided for a happy Life, *none is more powerful, none more profitable, and none more delectable than Friendſhip:* And indeed this was a Maxim which he not only verified by his Diſcourſe, but moſt powerfully eſtabliſhed by his Life, his Actions and Manners. How powerful Friendſhip is, you may learn from the Fictions of the Ancients; in the Multiplicity and Variety of which, back to remoteſt Ages, ſcarcely can you find three Pair of Friends betwixt the Times of *Oreſtes* and *Theſeus*. And yet in one narrow Houſe, what a Number of Friends did *Epicurus* entertain, in what Strength and Harmony of Affections did they all live! In this he is even now imitated by his Followers.

BUT to return to our Subject, for particular Inſtances were both needleſs and endleſs. I perceive then, that our Sect has treated of Friendſhip in three different Ways; ſome have maintained, that the Pleaſures belonging to Friendſhip are not ſo intereſting as thoſe relating to our own Perſons, and here ſome imagine that this weakens the Firmneſs of Friendſhip; yet they make good their Poſition, and in my Opinion very eaſily get rid of the Difficulty: Becauſe,

as

as they deny that the Virtues I have already treated of can be diſtinct from Pleaſure, ſo they maintain the ſame Connection betwixt that and Friendſhip. For if a ſolitary Life, without Friends, is full of Trouble and Dread, then Reaſon herſelf points out that we ſhould procure Friends: When they are procured, the Mind is at reſt, and cannot be ſeparated from the Hope and the View of Pleaſure.

Now, as Maliciouſneſs, Envy and Diſregard are Enemies to Pleaſure; ſo Friendſhips are not only the moſt faithful Promoters but Finiſhers of Pleaſure both ſocial and perſonal, by which they enjoy the preſent, nay, are ſupported by the Hopes of following future Delights. Therefore, as it is impoſſible by any manner of means to maintain the Vigour and the Duration of human Happineſs without Friendſhip, or indeed Friendſhip itſelf, unleſs we love our Friends as ourſelves; this is the very Effect of Friendſhip, and Friendſhip is connected with Pleaſure: For all the Joys and all the Pangs of our Friends affect us equally as them.

Upon the whole, the wiſe Man will be concern'd about his Friend equally as if he was himſelf, and be ready to undertake the ſame Toils for his Friend's Pleaſure as he would for his own: And all that has been ſaid of the Virtues, as they are ſtill inherent to Pleaſures, are equally applicable to Friendſhip. It was therefore very finely ſaid by *Epicurus*, almoſt in the following Words: "The ſame way of Reaſoning that has fortified the "Mind againſt the Fear of continual or laſting Evil, "has pointed out to us Friendſhip, as being the

"ſtrongeſt

" ſtrongeſt Safeguard within the Limits of mortal " Life."

BUT there are ſome *Epicureans*, and thoſe too Men of Senſe, who, being a little more apprehenſive of the Force of your Invectives, are afraid, if they ſhould maintain that Friendſhip is amiable only for the Pleaſure that attends it, that Friendſhip itſelf would ſeem to be but a very lame Virtue. Therefore they tell us, that the firſt Advances, the firſt Interminglings, and mutual longing for a ſtricter Intercourſe, all proceed from a Motive of Pleaſure; but when this Intercourſe ſhall beget a Familiarity, that then their Love dilates, and ſpreads it's Sweets ſo wide, that were there no Utility attending Friendſhip, yet the mutual Paſſion betwixt Friends for their own ſakes, independant of all other Conſiderations, would ſtill take place: For if we are apt to be fond of particular Situations, of Temples, Cities, Towns, Academies, Exerciſes, Dogs, Horſes, or ſportive Amuſements and Recreations; how much more natural and juſtifiable is ſuch Fondneſs when the Object is *ſocial Endearment*.

BUT ſome there are who maintain, that there is a tacit Agreement amongſt all wiſe Men, that they ſhall love their Friends equally with themſelves. This we are ſenſible is very practicable, we have oft-times ſeen it experimentally true; and it is evident, that ſuch an Union of Affections is as much fitted for the Purpoſes of happy Life, as any thing we can conceive. From all which Conſiderations we may conclude, that the Courſe of Friendſhip is ſo far from being interrupted by placing our chief Good in Pleaſure, that were it not

not for Pleaſure, we never ſhould have been able to account for the Exiſtence of Friendſhip.

THEREFORE, if what I have ſaid is more clear and evident than the Sun at Noon-day; if it is wholly drawn from the Fountain of Nature; if all my Diſcourſe is ſtrengthened and confirmed by the moſt diſintereſted and unvarying of all Evidences, I mean our Senſes; if infant Children, if unſpeaking Brutes, by the Influence and Direction of Nature, almoſt proclaim that there is nothing *agreeable* but *Pleaſure*, and nothing *harſh* but *Pain*; of both which they are unprejudic'd and uninfluenc'd Judges: Are we not under the ſtrongeſt Obligations of Gratitude to the Man, who, upon hearing as it were the Voice of Nature, ſo ſoundly and ſo wiſely underſtood her Language, as to conduct all who have the Enjoyment of their Senſes into the Paths of calm, tranquil, quiet, and happy Life? One who to you appears to be unlearned, becauſe he diſregarded all Learning beſides that which is aſſiſting in the Attainment of human Felicity.

DID he, as *Triarius* and I have done, by your Perſuaſion, waſte his Time in turning over the Works of Poets, in which there is no ſolid Advantage, and nought but childiſh Amuſement? Or did he, like *Plato*, take up with only Muſic, Geometry, Calculations and Aſtronomy, which, as they are built upon wrong Principles, are all of them fallacious; and were they otherwiſe, yet no way contribute to the Pleaſure, that is, to the Excellency of Living? Should he have purſued ſuch Arts, and have abandon'd the great, the painful, and therefore advantagious Art of Living?

Living? *Epicurus* therefore was not illiterate; but they are Dunces who think, that when they are old they ought to be groping after that Learning which it is ſhameful even for a School-boy not to have acquir'd.

HERE I have now explain'd, *continued Torquatus*, my Sentiments, with the View of learning what your Judgment of them is; a Liberty I have often wiſh'd for, but never was before indulged with an Opportunity of having.

The End of the Firſt Book.

M. TULLIUS

M. TULLIUS CICERO

Concerning the

ENDS *of* THINGS *GOOD* and *EVIL.*

BOOK the SECOND.

CHAP. I.

BOTH of them now ſignifying by a Look, which they caſt at me, that they were ready to hear me; I muſt entreat of you, *ſaid I*, not to imagine that I am to lay before you a Courſe of Lectures, like a Philoſopher; a Practice which I never much approv'd of, even in profeſs'd Philoſophers: For when did *Socrates*, who juſtly claims the Appellation of the Founder of Philoſophy, ever obſerve any ſuch Method? That was indeed the Practice of the *Sophiſts*, as they are call'd; one of whom, *Leontinus Gorgias*, had firſt the Aſſurance in a School to call for

for a *Theſis*, that is, challeng'd any one to diſpute with him upon any Subject his Adverſary had a mind. This was a ſtrange Piece of Confidence; I would call it *Impudence*, were it not that the ſame Practice was afterwards adopted by our Philoſophers.

BUT we perceive, that both the *Sophiſt* I have nam'd, and his Brethren, were ridicul'd by *Socrates*; for he us'd to worm thoſe he diſputed with out of their Sentiments, by putting Queſtions to them, that he might adapt his Anſwer to them accordingly. This manner not having been preſerv'd by his Succeſſors, it was renew'd and refitted by *Arceſilas*; ſo that he oblig'd his Hearers not to ask his Sentiments, but to open theirs to him. After doing this, he oppugn'd them; but then they were at liberty to defend their Opinions in the beſt manner they were able. But in other Schools, whoever has propos'd a Queſtion, holds his Peace; and this is now the Practice in the Academies. There, when a Hearer lays down a Propoſition, for inſtance, *Pleaſure to me ſeems to be the higheſt Good*; it is oppugn'd in a continued Diſcourſe: So that we may eaſily conceive, that the Propoſer of any ſuch Queſtion might not really be of ſuch an Opinion, but that they wanted to hear what could be urg'd againſt it.

WE act with more Propriety; for *Torquatus* has told us his real Sentiments, nay, has given his Reaſons why he holds them. But I am of opinion, though I was highly entertain'd with the continued Thread of his Diſcourſe, that you much more clearly draw the Concluſions you want to form,

form, and come to iſſue, when you diſcuſs and underſtand, in every particular Propoſition, how much of it is admitted, and how much deny'd by your ſeveral Opponents. The Stream of a Diſcourſe, like that of a Torrent, though it may ſweep along with it many Particulars of every kind, yet never can you ſtop, never can you ſeize aught, never can you ſtem the Rapidity of it's Current. But in all Diſputations which roll upon Enquiry, and are regulated by a certain Form and Method, the firſt thing to be ſettled (in the ſame manner as with certain Law Forms, which ſay, *Keep to the Point*) is, that the Diſputants ſhould preciſely agree upon the Point they are to canvaſs.

EPICURUS approv'd of this Method of proceeding by *Plato* in his *Phædrus*; and he admitted, that it ought to take place in all Matters of Diſputation. But then he had wrong Notions of what ought immediately to follow; for he diſallow'd of any Definition, without which it is often impoſſible for the Diſputants to agree upon what is the Subject of their Debate, as happens in the very Argument now under our Conſideration. For we are upon an Enquiry into what is the *End of Good Things*. Now, how is it poſſible for us to ſucceed in ſuch an Enquiry, without agreeing amongſt ourſelves, what an *End* is, and likewiſe what *Good Things* imply?

THIS unfolding as it were of hidden Objects, wherein they are both illuſtrated and characteriſed, is what we call a Definition, which even you inadvertently ſometimes us'd. For you defin'd this End, this Extream, this Ultimation, to be

that to which all that is good refers, itſelf being abſolutely independant of any Object. And indeed this is a noble Definition of the Thing. Perhaps, had there been any Occaſion for it, you would have defin'd what *Good* itſelf implies, as being either *the Object which Nature covets*, or that it is what is moſt *beneficial*, or moſt * *aſſiſting*, or even moſt *agreeable* to us. And now, if it is not too much Trouble, as you appear to have no Averſion to Definitions, when it is for your Purpoſe to make them, I beg that you would define to us *what Pleaſure is*, ſince it is from it that all this Diſputation has ariſen?

As if, *reply'd the other*, there was a Man alive ignorant of what Pleaſure is, or who ſtood in need of any Definition for making it more intelligible to his Apprehenſion! I would give you an Inſtance, *anſwer'd I*, of ſuch a Man in my own Perſon, were it not that I think the Idea I have of Pleaſure is clear, ſettled, and comprehenſive. But now give me leave to ſay, that *Epicurus* himſelf was ignorant and inconſiſtent on this Head; and he who ſo frequently inculcates the Expediency of accurately defining the Meaning annex'd to Words, was ſometimes at a loſs for underſtanding the Import of this Word *Pleaſure*, and the Idea which the Term conveys.

That is pleaſant enough, *replies he with a Sneer*, that the very Perſon who maintains Pleaſure to be the Perfection of all that is deſirable, the Ultimation and Termination of all good Things, ſhould be ignorant both of it's Nature and Qualities. So then, *replies I*, it ſeems that either *Epicurus* underſtood, or that all Mankind beſides

* The Original here cannot be tranſlated.

beſides don't underſtand, *what Pleaſure is.* How do you make that appear? *ſays the other.* Becauſe, *reply'd I,* all the World take that to be Pleaſure which, by operating upon the Senſes, *touches and pervades them with a certain Degree of Delight.* And can you imagine, *anſwer'd he,* that *Epicurus* was ignorant of this kind of Pleaſure? Not always, *ſaid I;* he is ſometimes too ſenſible of it; for inſtance, where he declares that he has no Notion of either the Exiſtence or the Qualities of any *Good,* but that which conſiſts in eating, drinking, the Tickling of the Ears, and the Gratification of obſcene Luſts: Let me ask you, has he not maintain'd all this? And pray, *reply'd he,* do you imagine that I ſhall bluſh for him if he has, or that I ſhall not be able to prove to you in what Senſe he has maintain'd all this? That I have no manner of doubt about, *ſaid I;* I believe you will do it very eaſily; nor do I think you have the leaſt Occaſion for being aſham'd of aſſenting to the Doctrine of a *wiſe* Man, the only one, ſo far as I can find, who ever profeſs'd himſelf of that Order. For I can't agree, that *Metrodorus* profeſs'd himſelf to be a *wiſe* Man; but as he was complimented by *Epicurus* with that Appellation, he was unwilling to reject ſo valuable a Favour. As to the *Seven Sages,* they had that Appellation conferr'd upon them, not from their own Suffrage, but that of all Mankind.

But at preſent I am ſatisfied, that *Epicurus,* in theſe Words, had the very ſame Sentiments with others, as to Pleaſure: For every body underſtands it to be a certain delightful Operation,

that glads the Senſes; by the *Greeks* call'd ἡδονη, and by the *Latins voluptas.* Then, *anſwers my Friend,* what is it you require more? I will tell you, *replies I;* and, I own, it is rather that I myſelf may be edify'd, than from any Deſire I have to quarrel either with *Epicurus* or with you. As for my part, *anſwer'd he,* it will give me much greater Delight to be edify'd by what you communicate, than to quarrel with you. Do you then know, *ſays I,* what the Supreme Good is, to which *Hieronymus,* the *Rhodian,* thinks all Objects ought to be directed? I know, *reply'd he,* that he thought this great End was the being free of all Senſation of Pain. Well, and what was his Opinion as to Pleaſure? Why, he denied that it was deſirable in itſelf.

THEN he was of opinion, that Joy was one thing, and to be free from Pain another. And therefore his Opinion was very abſurd, *anſwer'd my Friend;* for, as I proved a little before, the higheſt Pitch of compleated Pleaſure, is the Removal of all Pain. I ſhall explain by and by, *anſwer'd I,* what is implied in the Removal of Pain: But unleſs you have a very ſtrong Spirit of Perverſeneſs in you, I will oblige you to admit, that there is a Difference betwixt being pleas'd, and not being pain'd. I am afraid you will find me very perverſe, at leaſt as to this Point, *anſwer'd he;* for I am clearly ſatisfied it is an indiſputable Truth. Then I put it to him, Has not a Perſon who is thirſty, *Pleaſure* in drinking? *Certainly.* Is this the ſame kind of Pleaſure he feels when his Thirſt is quenched? *Doubtleſs it is of another kind; for the Plea-*

ſure

ſure we feel in our Thirſt being quenched is permanent; whereas that of quenching Thirſt is operative: Then why do you confound Things ſo unlike to one another, under the ſame Term?

Pr'ythee, *replies he,* call to mind what I told you ſome time ago, that Pleaſure, after Pain is removed, may be varied, but cannot be heightened. I do, *ſays I;* but that is rather ſpeaking in ſpecious Language, than with good Senſe: For Variety in our Language is properly applied to different Colours, and from thence to a great many other Objects; a *varied* Poem, a *varied* Speech, *varied* Manners, a *varied* Fortune: We even ſay that Pleaſure is *varied,* when it reſults from many different Objects, creating many different Senſations of Pleaſure. Had you ſpoke of this kind of *Variety,* I ſhould have underſtood you (tho' I own I do underſtand you without your explaining yourſelf;) but I am not quite ſo clear as to that *Variety* you talk of, when you ſay, that the *Privation of Pain* is the *Perfection of Pleaſure;* no more than when you tell me, that when we taſte any thing that creates a delightful Senſation upon the Palate, that then the Pleaſure is *operative,* and therefore *varied;* but ſtill that the *Pleaſure* of *not feeling Pain* can never be heightened. Why you ſhould call that a *Pleaſure,* is what I cannot conceive.

CHAP. II.

CAN any thing, *anſwers he,* be more delightful than to be free of Pain? I'll admit all that, *reply'd I,* for I have not come to ex-

plain that Point yet; but will you therefore ſay, that what we may call *Indolence*, is the ſame thing with *Pleaſure?* But it certainly is, *anſwer'd he*, and the *higheſt Pleaſure* too that can poſſibly be effected. Then, *ſaid I*, as you have thus eſtabliſhed your *Supreme Good*, why ſhould you be under any Difficulties of maintaining, to the beſt of your Power, that it wholly conſiſts of being *free from Pain?* For where is the Neceſſity of introducing *Pleaſure* into the Aſſemby of Virtues, like a Whore into a Company of Matrons? Give me leave to tell you, that the very Word *Pleaſure* has ſomething about it that is invidious, infamous and ſuſpicious.

For this Reaſon, you very often tell us, that we don't underſtand what *Epicurus* means by *Pleaſure.* Why, this has been very often told to myſelf; and tho' I am pretty cool in debating, yet I could not help being ſometimes nettled at it: That I ſhould be ſuch a Dunce as not to underſtand what the *Greeks* mean by ἡδονη, and the *Latins* by *voluptas!* That I ſhould be ſo groſly ignorant in one of thoſe Languages, but which I cannot ſay; and that I ſhould be at a Loſs in a thing that every Man, who profeſſes himſelf an *Epicurean*, underſtands perfectly! With you, a Man who has a mind to be a Philoſopher has not occaſion ſo much as to learn his Alphabet, to turn out the beſt Diſputant in the World. Therefore, as our Anceſtors brought the famous *Cincinnatus* from the Plow to be Dictator, ſo you, from all the Vagabonds upon Earth, make a Collection

lection of * thoſe worthy, but ſurely very ignorant Fellows; and ſhall they for that Reaſon underſtand the Meaning of *Epicurus*, where I am at a loſs to do it.

But to ſhew that I do underſtand it, give me leave to ſay, that our Term *Pleaſure* is the very ſame with what he calls ἡδονη. We are very often at a loſs for an appoſite *Latin* Word to expreſs a *Greek* one, and convey the ſame Meaning. Here we are at no ſuch loſs. It was impoſſible to have found any thing more exactly deſcribed in both Languages than *Pleaſure* is. All the World who knows our Language annex two Properties to *Pleaſure*, Serenity of Mind, and a delightful operative Senſation in the Body. For the Perſon in † *Trabea* expreſſes the too great Pleaſure of the Mind by the Word *Lætitia*, or *Joy*; which is the ſame that the Fellow felt in *Cæcilius*, when he ſays, *that he is joyful with all manner of Joyfulneſs*. But there is this Difference, that the *Stoics* maintain Pleaſure, even in the Mind, to be a vitious Property; for they define it to be *the Rapture of the Mind without Reaſon, in the Imagination of it's enjoying great Good*. Neither *Joy* nor *Gladneſs* can be applied to the Body; but, in Propriety of Speech, the Word *Pleaſure* is uſed to expreſs that *Jucunditas* or *Delectation* which operates upon

* *Thoſe worthy,*] Orig. *Pelaſgi*, who were a People of *Greece*, very much diſperſed through all the Corners of the *Roman* Empire, and pretty much reſembling the *Savoyards* with us; ſo that their Name was uſed to ſignify a *Vagabond*.

† *Trabea*] This is an old Poet, whoſe Works are mention'd no where but by our Author. The two firſt Lines he quotes afterwards are from *Plautus*, and the third from *Terence*.

any Senſe. And if we pleaſe we may apply the ſame Delectation to the Mind, as it is equally ſuſceptible of *Comfort* as the Body. We are, however, to underſtand there's a great Difference betwixt the Man who ſays,

I'm ſo inwrapt with Joy, my Senſe is gone,

And the Man who ſays,

At length my Soul has catch'd the Fire.

THE firſt of whom exults with Gladneſs, while the other is excruciated with Pain. There is a Middle betwixt both, as he who ſays in *Terence*,

However late our Acquaintance may have been.

THIS Perſon feels neither *Joy* nor *Pain*; and the middle State betwixt him who enjoys the moſt exquiſite bodily Delights, and him who is tormented by the Extremity of Pain, is the Man who is free of both.

ARE you ſatisfied by this time, that I am quite Maſter of the Energy of Expreſſion, or that I am ſtill to begin to learn my *Greek* and *Latin*? Take care however, as I think I underſtand *Greek* tollerably well, if I am at a loſs for *Epicurus*'s Meaning, that it is not owing to his own want of Perſpicuity, and his talking unintelligibly. This is a Fault that may happen two Ways, and yet be excuſable: Firſt, When a Man does it on purpoſe, as *Heraclitus*, who was nicknamed the *Obſcure*, from his too dark manner of treating phyſical Subjects. Or when ſuch Obſcurity lies in the Subject, and not in the Words, that the diſcuſſing of it becomes unintelligible; which is

Plato's

Plato's Caſe in his *Timæus*. But in my opinion *Epicurus* ſpoke as plain and diſtinct as he could, as the Subjects he treats of are not obſcure like Phyſics, nor intricate as the Mathematics, and *common* even to *common* People. You cannot however ſay that I am ignorant of what *Pleaſure is*, but *of what he ſays*. From this it will follow, not that I don't comprehend the Force of that Word, but that he affects to ſpeak in Terms peculiar to himſelf, and therefore neglects thoſe that are common to us.

FOR if he ſhould teach the ſame as *Hieronymus*, who tells us, *that the ſupreme Good is to live without Uneaſineſs*; why ſhould he chuſe to call this *Pleaſure*, and not the *Abſence of Pain*, as *Hieronymus* does, who underſtands what he ſays? But if he really thinks that this is *Pleaſure*, let him join his *operative Pleaſure* to it; for thus he will give Terms both to that inchanting Pleaſure, which conſiſts in Operation, and to that which is ſtable, as conſiſting in an Abſence of all Pain. But why ſhould he make all this Noiſe, as he never can ſucceed in perſuading any Man who has *Conſciouſneſs*, that is, who is acquainted with the Nature of his own Senſations, that *not feeling Pain* and *enjoying Pleaſure* are the ſame Things. Indeed, *Torquatus*, this is torturing our very Senſes, it is wrenching from our Minds every familiar Idea that we have annexed to Words. For is there a Man who is not ſenſible there are three Conditions of Life: One when we are in *Pleaſure*, another when in *Pain*, and a third, the State in which *we* are now in. For I believe that you

you are ſenſible neither of *Pleaſure* nor of *Pain*, as you are not feaſting to give you Pleaſure, nor tormented to give you Pain. But don't you perceive what Multitudes are in the intermediate State of neither *Joy* nor *Pain?* By no Means, *replied he*; and I affirm, all who are without Pain to be in a State even of the moſt exquiſite *Pleaſure. Then the Perſon who mixes a Draught for another without being thirſty himſelf, experiences the ſame Degree of Pleaſure as he who drinks it in all the Rage of Thirſt.* A Truce, if you pleaſe, *continued he*, with your queſtioning, which I had much rather you had done from the very Beginning, having foreſeen thoſe very logical Snares. Then, *ſaid I*, you rather chuſe we ſhould diſpute *rhetorically* than *logically*. How, *anſwer'd he*, is not a continued Diſcourſe as proper for the *Philoſopher* as *Rhetorician? Zeno* the *Stoic*, *replied I*, after *Ariſtotle*, has told us, that all the Power of ſpeaking is divided into two Parts, that *Rhetoric* reſembles the *Palm* of the *Hand*, and *Logic* the *Fiſt*; becauſe *Rhetoricians* diſpute more at large, and *Logicians* more cloſely. I will therefore let you have your own way, and, if I can, I will treat this Subject *rhetorically*, but with the *Rhetoric* of a *Philoſopher*, and not that of a *Barriſter*; which ſometimes renders it neceſſary for us to ſink a little into Flatneſs, that we may riſe the more into Popularity.

But, my Friend, while *Epicurus* neglects *Logic*, which alone contains the whole Science both of apprehending and diſtinguiſhing the Qualities and the Properties of Things by it's Perſpicuity

cuity and Method of diſputing, in my Opinion he loſes himſelf in his Argument, by having no Rule to diſtinguiſh upon in what he wants to inculcate, as is his Caſe in the Subject we are now upon. You have told us, that Pleaſure is the *Supreme Good*. This put us under a Neceſſity of laying open the Nature of *Pleaſure*, for otherwiſe we could never have explain'd our own Propoſition: And had your Maſter explain'd it, he never would have flounder'd ſo much about it as he did; for he either would have ſtuck by that which *Ariſtippus* counts *Pleaſure*, the *ſoft*, the *gentle* Titillation of the Senſes; that Senſation which Brutes, had they a Language, would call *Pleaſure:* Or, if he was for a Language of his own, different from that which was uſed

By all the Youth of Athens *and* Mycæne,

and by all the *Greeks* mention'd in this Anapeſtic, he would have call'd this *meer Privation of Pain* Pleaſure, and have rejected the Pleaſure adopted by *Ariſtippus:* Or, if he had approved of both Definitions, as indeed he does, he would have join'd the *Privation of Pain* with *Pleaſure*, and from thence have formed two ultimate Goods.

For many great Philoſophers have join'd together two *Ultimations of Good*; for inſtance, *Ariſtotle*, who join'd the *Exerciſe of Virtue* to the *Perfection of Happineſs in Life*. *Callipho* join'd *Pleaſure* to *Honeſty*. *Diodorus* to the ſame *Honeſty* added *the Privation of Pain*. *Epicurus* would have done the ſame, had he join'd

join'd the Sentiment which is now aſcrib'd to *Hieronymus*, to the old Opinion of *Ariſtippus*; for they differ from one another; for which Reaſon each uſes a ſeparate *Ultimation*, though both of them underſtood *Greek* extremely well: And yet *Ariſtippus*, who places *Supreme Good* in *Pleaſure*, never maintain'd the *Privation of Pain* to be *Pleaſure*; nor did *Hieronymus*, who placed the *Supreme Good* in the *Privation of Pain*, ever call that State of *Indolence* by the Name of *Pleaſure*; the Reaſon is plain, becauſe he never reckon'd *Pleaſure* to be among the Things that Nature covets.

CHAP. III.

BUT that you may not imagine our Difference to be only with regard to Words, let me tell you, that *being without Pain*, and *being in Pleaſure*, are two diſtinct Things; and you endeavour not only to affix one Name to thoſe two very diſtinct Things (for that I could more eaſily bear) but to make them both the *ſame Thing*, which is irreconcileable to all Senſe and Reaſon. As *Epicurus* approv'd of *both*, he ought to have adapted *both*; as in fact he does, but without any Diſtinction of Terms: For, while in a great many Paſſages he extols that kind of Pleaſure which all of us agree on to be Pleaſure, he ventures to ſay, that he never once ſuſpected that there can be any Good ſeparated from the *Ariſtippean* kind of Pleaſure; and this he delivers in a Diſcourſe which wholly treats of the Supreme Good. But in another Book, wherein he

he comprizes in a narrow Compaſs his moſt weighty Maxims, and which he is ſaid to have utter'd as ſo many Oracles of Wiſdom, he writes in the following Words. (No doubt, *Torquatus*, you are perfectly acquainted with them; for you, and all his Sect, have ſurely got by heart his Κυριαι δοξαι, that is, his Choice Preſcriptions, as being a brief Digeſt of his moſt weighty Maxims for the Attainment of a happy Life;) Mind therefore whether I tranſlate his Words unfairly:

"If the Efficients of Pleaſure to the Luxurious, freed them from the Fear of Gods, Death, and Pain, and preſcribed Bounds to the Appetites; I ſhould have nothing to object to them, ſince all would be full of Pleaſure; nor could there be the leaſt room for Pain or Sickneſs, that is, for any Evil."

TRIARIUS could not reſtrain himſelf upon this Quotation: Pr'ythee, *Torquatus, ſays he*, are theſe the Words of *Epicurus?* Now, I do believe he knew they were, but that he had a mind to extort the Confeſſion out of *Torquatus*. But the other, not at all daunted, anſwer'd with a ready Aſſurance, Theſe are indeed his very *Words*, but you don't comprehend his *Meaning*. Then, *anſwer'd I*, he means one thing, and ſpeaks another: But here I very well underſtand what he ſays, for he ſpeaks in very plain Terms; and if he tells us, in effect, that * the Luxurious are not to be blamed if they

* *The Luxurious*] Commentators have taken great Liberties here, to invert the Order of this Sentence; but as I cannot find they are warranted by any MS, and as I think the Words make very good Senſe as they ſtand, I have alter'd nothing.

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are *wiſe*, it is as abſurd as if he ſhould ſay, that Parricides are not to be reproved if they are not *paſſionate*, nor fear the Gods, Death, nor Pain. But to what Purpoſe does he make any Exception as to the Luxurious, or ſuppoſe that any of them, who live in a State of Luxury, would not merit the Reproof of our Philoſopher under that Denomination, provided they took care to conform themſelves in other Circumſtances?

BUT, Friend *Epicurus*, would the Luxurious deſerve no Reproof from you, for living in ſuch a manner as to purſue Pleaſure *indiſcriminately*, eſpecially ſince, according to you, the *Perfection of Pleaſure* conſiſts in the *Privation of Pain?* Beſides, we may find ſome very eminent Sots, who make no ſcruple to devour even the Meat of the Sacrifices upon the * Platter of the Prieſt; and then have ſuch a Contempt for Death, as to have always this Verſe from the † *Hymnis* in their Mouths;

Give me ſix Months of Pleaſure out,
The ſeventh to Pluto *I'll devote.*

And they are furniſhed with *Epicurus'* Antidotes againſt Pain, as regularly as from ‡ a Diſpenſary. *If Life is painful, let it be ſhort; if long, let it be light.* Yet I cannot underſtand how a Man can be luxurious, and yet preſcribe Bounds to his Appetite.

THEN where is the Senſe of ſaying, *I ſhould have nothing to object to the Luxurious, if they preſcribed Bounds to their Appetites*; when it is

* *Platter of the Prieſt*;] Orig. *Edant de Patélla.*

† This probably was a Comedy of *Menander*, tranſlated into *Latin.*

‡ *A Diſpenſary.*] Orig. *De Narthecio.*

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the ſame as to ſay, *I ſhould have no Objections againſt Sots, if they were not Sots*, or *I ſhould like the Wicked very well, if they were Men of Virtue.* But our auſtere Philoſopher thinks, that Luxury is not blameable in itſelf: And in Conſcience, *Torquatus*, to tell the Truth, he is in the right as to his Opinion, if *Pleaſure* is the chief *Good.* I hope you will not here, as you generally do, bring in a Suppoſition of that kind of Sots-who vomit at Table, and are carried away from their Meals, and cram themſelves next Day, over Yeſterday's Crudities. Who boaſt of never having ſeen the Sun either ſetting or riſing, and who are Beggars after waſting their Patrimonies. None of us imagine that ſuch Sots have Pleaſure in Life: No! I ſpeak of the neat, the elegant, thoſe who employ the moſt exquiſite Cooks and Bakers, who prevent Crudities by the Exerciſe of Angling, Hunting and Hawking, and have every thing in the utmoſt Perfection; * *Whoſe Wines*, as *Lucilius* has it, *being pour'd from a capacious*

* *Whoſe Wines,*] This is a Quotation from *Lucilius*, and a very perplext Quotation it is. I ſhall give my Reader the Original, and offer a Conjecture or two of my own, tho' it is one of the deſperate Paſſages given up by the Critics. The manner in which it ſtands is: *Quibus vinum defuſum é pleno ſit: Hirſiphon, cui nihil dempſit; nix & ſacculus abſtulerit; adhibentes ludos.* This, notwithſtanding the idle and numerous Conjectures of the Commentators, I take to be the true Reading, and the *Engliſh* to be:

Whoſe Wine is drawn from a full Hogſhead, and which is fine enough not to require to be rack'd off by Hirſiphon, and cool enough not to need the Aid of palling Bags of Snow. The Reader will pleaſe to obſerve, that the *Romans* made uſe of Snow-Bags to cool their Wines: And as to the Hirſiphon, which none of the Critics know any thing about, it was probably a long Pipe, about the Thickneſs of a diſtended Gut, by which they rack'd off their Wine in the ſame manner as we do our Ale; but leaving a good deal of Sediment at the Bottom

capacious Veſſel, can require neither to be rack'd off by a Siphon, nor cool'd by a Sack full of Snow; always at Play; and all that: Without which Ingredients of Life, *Epicurus* ſays, he does not know what *Good* is. Let there be likewiſe beautiful Boys to ſerve them; and their Dreſſes, their Plate, their *Corinthian* Vaſes, the Spot itſelf, and the Building thereon, all in the ſame Taſte.

I WILL own that thoſe Senſualiſts live well, but never that they live happily. From this it will follow, not that Pleaſure ceaſes to be Pleaſure, but that it is not the Supreme Good. It was not an Inſenſibility of Pleaſure in *Lælius*, who when young was the Diſciple of *Diogenes* the *Stoic*, and afterwards of *Panetius*, that got him the Epithet of the *Wiſe*, but becauſe he deſpiſed Pleaſure: For it does not follow, that a Man who has a *diſcerning* Heart ſhould have a very *diſtinguiſhing* Palate. You remember the Verſes:

* *O Dock-leaf, when you're known you then are lov'd,*
Cry'd he, whoſe Wiſdom all Mankind approv'd.
Lælius,

tom of the Veſſel, is the Reaſon why the Poet ſays, *Hirſiphon cui nihil dempſit*, in like manner as the *nix & ſacculus abſtulerit* may be applied to that Strength and Flavour of the Wine, which the mixing it with Snow muſt neceſſarily diminiſh. To go into all the Authorities to ſupport this Conjecture would be endleſs; I have always made it a Rule in my Notes to the foregoing Part of this Work, to offer ſuch Conjectures as naturally ſuggeſt. It is eaſy to find Authorities from reading to ſupport and reconcile the wildeſt; but if the Reaſon of a Criticiſm does not occur at firſt, provided it is founded on proper Authority, there is very little Hopes of it's proving ſatisfactory to the Reader afterwards.

* *O Dock-leaf,*] It is a Pity that the Verſes quoted here and elſewhere by our Author, are not as familiar to us as they were in his

Lælius, *the truly great, whoſe Virtue's Rage,*
Laſh'd ev'ry Sot of our degenerate Age.
Publius Galonius, *what a Wretch you are,*
Ne'er did you ſup on palatable Fare:
Tho' Farms and Houſes in a Shrimp go down,
And in a Sturgeon's Sawce your Parks you drown.

THESE are the Words of a Man who accounting Pleaſure as *nothing*, thought no Man could live well if he accounted Pleaſure *every thing*. He does not deny, that *Galonius* ever had Pleaſure * in ſupping, for in that he would have been wrong, but that he ever ſupp'd well. He therefore makes a grave and ſevere Diſtinction betwixt *Pleaſure* and *Good*, and draws this Concluſion, That all they who ſup well, ſup with Pleaſure; but that it does not follow, that they who *ſup with Pleaſure, ſup well.* *Lucilius* always ſupp'd *well.*

WHAT is it to ſup well? Why, *Lucilius* tells you, † *upon ordinary Fare; but we muſt not forget*

his Age. There might be ſome particular Circumſtances to render the Verſes here quoted very pleaſant at the Time *Cicero* wrote, but ſurely they are a little uncouth now. The *Galonius* here mention'd was a noted *Epicure*, and is mention'd both by *Horace* and our Author elſewhere.

* *In ſupping,*] I am very unwilling to modernize a *Roman* Cuſtom, where the Original can be preſerv'd with the leaſt Propriety. The Reader will remember, that the chief Meal of the *Romans* was their Supper.

† *Upon ordinary Fare;*] Orig. *Cocto, condito, ſed cedo caput cenæ: ſermone bono. quid ex eo? Si quæris libenter.* Tho' I have, in Conformity with my Text, printed theſe Words as I find them there; yet the Reader of any Taſte will find they have been *beproſed* only by the *happy Stupidity* of *Tranſcribers* and *Critics*, who

get the chief Diſh, which is profitable Diſcourſe. And what aroſe from this? Why, his Pleaſure: For he came to Supper, that he might ſatisfy the Cravings of Nature. He was therefore in the right to deny that *Galonius* ever ſupp'd well: He was juſtified in ſaying that *Galonius* was a *Wretch*, eſpecially as he made the Art of Eating the whole of his Study; at the ſame time, no body will ſay but that *Galonius* was *pleaſed* when he *ſupp'd*. Then, ſay you, how can it be ſaid that he did not ſup well? My Anſwer is, Becauſe to ſup well, one muſt ſup *decently*, *frugally* and *genteelly*; whereas he ſupp'd *hoggiſhly*, *indulgingly* and *ſlovenly*. *Lælius* therefore did not prefer the *Sweetneſs* of the Dock-leaf to the *Glutton's Sturgeon*, for he overlook'd that very *Sweetneſs*; which he never would have done, had he placed his Chief Good in Pleaſure.

CHAP. IV.

WE are therefore to remove out of the way this Word *Pleaſure*, not only for the *Virtue of Living*, but for the *Decency of Diſcourſe*. Can we then call a thing *a Supreme Good in Life*, when we cannot perceive it to be ſo

did not perceive that they were part of *Lucilius*'s Words, continued to be quoted by our Author. I muſt however do *Manutius* the Juſtice to own that he *ſuſpected* this. The Reader perhaps will not be diſpleaſed to ſee a parallel Paſſage of our Author's, where he introduces the ſame Words in a manner that ſhews that this Verſe of *Lucilius* was become proverbial to him. It is from the 13th Book of his *Epiſtles* to *Atticus*, where he ſays, *Edit bibit ἀδρῶς & jucunde, opipare ſane & apparate: nec id ſolum ſed bene cocto, condito ſermone bono, & ſi quæri', libenter.*

even

even *in a Supper?* Then how can your Philoſopher talk of three Kinds of Deſires, thoſe which are *natural* and *neceſſary*, thoſe which are *natural* but *not neceſſary*, and thoſe which are neither *natural* nor *neceſſary?* In the *firſt* place, this is a very ſlovenly Diviſion; for he has made three Kinds out of two: This is not dividing a Thing, but breaking it in Pieces. For had he told us, that there are two kinds of Appetites, the *natural* and the *ſuperfluous*; and then divided the natural into two Kinds, the *neceſſary* and the *unneceſſary*, the thing had been done. And this is the way in which the Gentlemen, who are Maſters of the Learning that he deſpiſed, uſe to proceed: For it is abſurd in a Diviſion to reckon a Part of a Thing amongſt the general Heads of the Thing divided.

THIS however we could eaſily overlook; for he was above minding the Elegancy of Reaſoning; he ſpoke whatever came uppermoſt: Therefore let us indulge him in his way of ſpeaking, provided he is right in his Sentiments. And indeed I can juſt *endure*, tho' I cannot much *approve* of, Philoſophers talking of *ſetting Bounds to* * *Appetites*. How can an Appetite be bounded? No! it muſt be pluck'd up, it muſt be utter-

* *Appetites.*] The Reader will obſerve, that the Word uſed by our Author here is *Cupiditas*; which implies the Inordinacy of Appetite. It might be tranſlated perhaps more properly Luſt; but that would not be doing Juſtice to *Epicurus*'s Sentiments, becauſe Luſt in our Language, in the common Acceptation of the Word, implies ſomething more ſenſual, than *Epicurus* ſeem'd to have meant in his general Diviſion: Nor am I at all ſatisfied that our Author has very fairly tranſlated *Epicurus*'s Sentiment, when he annexes ſo very mean an Idea to the Word *Cupiditas*; and that *Epicurus* did not in effect mean the *Cravings of the Conſtitution*.

ly rooted out. For how can a Man be blamed for having an *Appetite*, if he can indulge it in a Manner that may be juſtified? By the ſame Rule you may ſay, let a Man be covetous, *but in Moderation*; let him be an Adulterer, *but ſtill with Moderation*; and in like manner *let him be luxurious*. What a Philoſophy is that which does not kill the *Degeneracy of our Affections*, but takes up with a *Mediocrity in Vice?* However, in the Diviſion I have mention'd, I entirely approve of his Meaning; I want only to ſet him right as to Method. Theſe Properties, he ought to term the *Cravings of our Conſtitution*. Let him elſewhere make uſe of the Word *Appetite*, as when he talks of *Avarice* and *Intemperance*, and other capital Vices; let him arraign theſe under the Name of *Appetites*.

But as he frequently takes thoſe and ſuch like Liberties, I will not cenſure him for ſo doing; for it becomes ſo great and ſo noble a Philoſopher to *venture boldly* in the Defence of his own Maxims: And yet by his too cloſely embracing *Pleaſure*, in the very ſame Senſe as the Word is underſtood by all the World, he frequently embaraſſes himſelf ſo, that there is nothing ſo ſhameful in it's own Nature, but that he ſeems to be capable of committing, provided he could do it without any Mortal being privy to it. In the next place, When he actually bluſhes, (for great is the Force of Nature) he brings himſelf off, by denying that it is poſſible for the Man *who feels no Pain*, to receive any *Addition of Pleaſure*. But then this *Abſence of Pain* is not term'd *Pleaſure*. *I don't mind Terms*, ſays he.

But

But how! what if it is quite a different Thing? *As to that*, ſays he, *I ſhall find many, very many, People, who are neither ſo inquiſitive nor ſo troubleſome as you are, and whom I can eaſily perſuade to whatever I have a mind.* But pray give me leave to obſerve, that if the higheſt Pleaſure conſiſts in the Abſence of Pain, why ought we to be under any Difficulty in ſaying, *that the higheſt Pain conſiſts in the Abſence of Pleaſure?* No! ſays he, *that never can be; becauſe it is not* Pleaſure, *but the* Privation of Pain, *that is oppoſed to* Pain *itſelf.*

* But it is a ſtrong Proof that this is all he could mean by Pleaſure, becauſe he owns, that when this is taken away, he does not know what can be term'd *Good*: And yet he goes on in mentioning the Senſations of the Palate and the Ear amongſt the Pleaſures of Life, together with Gratifications, which cannot with Decency be mentioned. Therefore that *Sole Good*, which this ſevere Philoſopher was acquainted with, did not, according to him, ſeem even to be *deſirable*; becauſe, by his Doctrine, when we are *void of Pain*, we have no *Deſire after Pleaſure*, † *our Senſes being as full of Pleaſure as they can be.* How contradictory is all this!

He never could have hamper'd himſelf in ſuch thorny Abſurdities, had he learned the Art of

* *But it is*] As this Paſſage appears to be mutilated, therefore I will not venture to warrant the Senſe in which I have tranſlated it. What I have endeavour'd, is to reconcile it to the Strain of *Cicero*'s Reaſoning, without departing from the Words that remain in the Original.

† *Our Senſes*] This Sentence is not in the Original, but ſeems to make our Author's Meaning more clear.

defining and *dividing*; The Force of Language, and indeed the common Acceptation of Words: For obſerve how he proceeds; he calls that a Pleaſure which no Man ever underſtood to be one, and makes it the ſame (tho' in reality they are quite different) *with progreſſive Pleaſure*: for thus he terms his ſweet, and, as it were, his inchanting Pleaſure. Theſe he ſometimes ſets ſo much at nought, that one would think he heard a * *Manius Curius* declaiming. Sometimes he ſo cries them up, that he abſolutely denies that he can have the leaſt Notion of any other Good: A Sentiment that does not require the Animadverſion of a Philoſopher, ſo much as the Chaſtiſement of a Cenſor; for it is not only a Defect in the Propriety of Language, but in the Morals of Society. He finds no Fault with *Luxury*, provided it is free from extravagant Appetites, and diſquieting Solicitudes.

By maintaining this Doctrine, he ſeems to aim at making his Followers *Philoſophers* before they commence *Senſualiſts*. If I am not miſtaken, we are directed to look for the Source of Supreme Good in the Birth of Animals: No ſooner is an Animal born than it hankers after Pleaſure, and covets it as *good*, while it rejects Pain as *evil*. And he tells us, that thoſe Animals, whoſe Senſes are yet undepraved, are the very beſt Judges

* *Manius Curius*] This Gentleman was a celebrated Example of Temperance and Abſtinence, and at the ſame time a great General. After many noble Conqueſts, he divided the conquer'd Lands among the *Roman* People, four Acres to a Man; but refuſed to take more to himſelf than he gave to the meaneſt Citizen: Aſſigning this Reaſon for it, that he did not deſerve to be a General, who could not be contented with the ſame Fare as a Soldier.

of

of *Things Good and Evil.* This, Sir, was your own Poſition, and theſe are your own Words. How full of Abſurdity are they! For by which of the Pleaſures, the *ſtable* or the *progreſſive*, ſhall a ſquawling Child judge betwixt *Supreme Good* and *Evil?* Since this is the Stile in which it pleaſes *Epicurus* we ſhould ſpeak: If by the *ſtable* Pleaſure; Then this proves, that all which Nature aims at in ſuch a State, is *Self-preſervation*; which I admit of: If by the *progreſſive* Pleaſure, as you ſay; Then there is no Pleaſure too ſhameful not to be embraced. And at the ſame time, this new-born Animal has no *conſcious Senſations* of that higheſt Pleaſure which you place in the *Privation of Pain.* Nor does *Epicurus* draw the Force of his Argument from Inſtances either of *Children* or of *Brutes*, tho' theſe he calls the *Mirrors of Nature*, to prove that Nature points out the Purſuit of this Pleaſure *of not feeling Pain.* For ſuch a Pleaſure could never move the Deſires of the Mind; nor has this State of *Indolence* any ſuch *impulſive Force*, as to *urge on* the Appetite. Therefore *Hieronymus* fails in this very Point. But thoſe Pleaſures that create delightful Senſations are *impulſive.* Therefore, whenever *Epicurus* wants to prove that Nature purſues *Pleaſure*, he always makes uſe of the laſt mention'd Kind; becauſe it is the *operative* Pleaſure that entices *Children* and *Brutes*, and not the *ſtable* Pleaſure, which conſiſts only in the *Privation of Pain.* How then is this reconcilable? That Nature ſhould have ſo early an Impulſe from one Pleaſure, and yet place the Perfection of her Bliſs in another.

CHAP. V.

FOR my part, I am of opinion, that there is no Diſcernment in Brutes; for, though they may not be *depraved*, yet it is poſſible for them to be *imperfect*. As there is a Difference betwixt a *Club* that is bent and made crooked by Art, and one that *naturally* grows ſo; thus the Nature of Brutes is not a Nature that is *depraved* by ill-training, but *defective* in itſelf. Nature does not *impel* a Child to *purſue Pleaſure*, but only to have a *Love for itſelf*, and to *will it's own Well-being and Preſervation*. Now, every Animal, as ſoon as it is born, has an Affection for itſelf and all it's Members; and it's firſt Concern is for it's two principal conſtitúent Parts, the *Mind* and the *Body*; next, for the ſeveral Parts of both; for in the Mind, as well as in the Body, there are doubtleſs ſome principal Parts; and no ſooner does it begin to have a ſlight Knowledge of theſe, than it begins to diſtinguiſh, by purſuing the principal Good that Nature beſtows, and rejecting the contrary.

IT is a great Diſpute, whether Pleaſure ought to be rank'd among theſe firſt innate Principles, or not? But be that as it will, to me it appears the groſſeſt Ignorance to think, that they conſiſt of nothing but *Pleaſure*, without any Concern for Members, Senſes, the Progreſs of the Underſtanding, or the Soundneſs and the Health of the Body; and yet it is upon this Hinge that all our Diſputation upon *Things Good and Evil* muſt turn. *Polemo*, after *Ariſtotle*, thought that

that the Chief Goods were thoſe I have juſt now mention'd; from hence ſprung the Maxim of the old *Academics* and *Peripatetics*, when they ſaid, that *the End of Good Things was to live according to Nature*, that is, *by the Aſſiſtance of Virtue to enjoy thoſe principal Gifts of Nature. Calipho* added nothing to *Virtue* beſides *Pleaſure*; *Diodorus*, nothing but the *Abſence of Pain*. The End of Good Things are conſequential to *all* thoſe Things I have mention'd. According to *Ariſtippus*, it conſiſts in meer Pleaſure; according to the *Stoics*, in living agreeably to Nature, which they make to conſiſt in living virtuouſly, that is, honeſtly; this again they explain, by living in a thorough Acquaintance of the Things which occur in Nature, making Choice of thoſe that are agreeable to them, and rejecting the contrary.

THEREFORE there are three *Ends* adopted by three Sects, each of which excludes the *Honeſtum*; the one by *Ariſtippus* or *Epicurus*, the other by *Hieronymus*, the other by *Carneades*; and three other, in which the *Honeſtum* is admitted with ſome Addition; I mean, thoſe of *Polemo*, *Callipho*, and *Diodorus*; and one unmix'd, adopted by *Zeno*, who placed it abſolutely in the *Decorum*, or the *Honeſtum*; for * *Pyrrho*, *Ariſto*, and *Herilus*, have been long

* Pyrrho, *&c.*] *Pyrrho* was the famous *Sceptic*, who affected to doubt of every thing.

Ariſto was a *Chian*, and the Diſciple of *Zeno* the Stoic; and was ſo excellent an Orator, that he was call'd *The Syren*.

Herilus, according to ſome was of *Chalcedon*, according to others of *Carthage*, and the Diſciple of *Zeno* likewiſe, though he afterwards wrote againſt his Maſter.

abandon'd.

abandon'd. The reſt have been conſiſtent with themſelves, and have proceeded upon a regular Scheme, as the End propoſed by *Ariſtippus* is *Pleaſure*; that by *Hieronymus*, *The Abſence of Pain*; and that by *Carneades*, *The Enjoyment of primary natural Gifts.*

BUT as to *Epicurus*, while he places *Pleaſure* at the Summit of Happineſs, if he means the ſame *Pleaſure* as *Ariſtippus* does, he ought, like him, to maintain it to be *the Chief of all Good*; if he means the ſame *Pleaſure* as *Hieronymus* does, he ought to have done the ſame Thing by it: For, as to his ſaying, that our Senſes adjudge Pleaſure to be *a Good*, and Pain *an Evil*, that is aſſigning more to our Senſes than the Laws allow to us, even when we are Arbitrators in a private Cauſe; for then we can judge nothing beyond our own Commiſſion. Therefore it is empty for Judges, when they pronounce Sentence, to add if *I may be allowed to judge*: * For, if the Matter did not properly come under their Cognizance, they ought not to have judged of it, no more than the Senſes ought to judge of aught but what comes under their Cognizance; which extends only to their judging of what is ſweet or ſour, ſmooth or rough, diſtant or near, ſtanding or moving, ſquare or round.

THEN how is Reaſon to decide? In the firſt place, by the Help of that Knowledge of Things, Divine and Human, which we properly term *Wiſdom*: In the next place, by the Concurrence

* *For, if the Matter*] All this Paſſage is extremely perplex'd and incorrect in the Original.

of

of the *Virtues* which Reaſon terms the Miſtreſſes of all (though you contend that they are but the *Pages* and *Handmaids* of Pleaſure) ſhe will by their unanimous Approbation pronounce, that there is ſo little room for contending that Pleaſure ought to uſurp the Throne *of Supreme Good*, which we are now diſputing of, that ſhe has not even a right, in any ſhape, to keep Company with *Honeſty*. The like would be her Deciſion as to *the Privation of Pain*.

THE Opinion of *Carneades* would be rejected likewiſe, as muſt all the Opinions concerning the *Supreme Good*, which make it partake either of *Pleaſure* or the *Privation of Pain*, or exclude *Honeſty* from it. And now Reaſon would leave only two Opinions to be conſider'd, and thoſe indeed muſt give full Employment to all her Faculties: For ſhe muſt either determine, that there is nothing *good* but what is *honeſt*, and nothing *evil* but what is *diſgraceful*; and that every thing elſe is of no Conſequence, farther than that they are Matters of meer Choice or Neglect, and not of Deſire or Averſion: or ſhe muſt prefer the Opinion which holds *that* to be good which is moſt embelliſh'd by *Honeſty*, as well as by theſe fundamental Principles of Nature, and compleated by the Progreſs of a Life uniformly virtuous. And right Reaſon will be the more clear in this Concluſion, by examining whether the Diſpute conſiſts in *Things* or in *Words*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

AS I now proceed on her Authority, I will follow the ſame Courſe; I will do what I can to aboliſh all wrangling; and therefore I ſhall be of opinion, that all the Sentiments of thoſe who quite cut Virtue off from this Enquiry, ought to have nothing to do in Philoſophy. And, in the firſt place, the Sentiments of *Ariſtippus* and all the *Cyrenaics*, who have been hardy enough to place the *Supreme Good* in that *Pleaſure* which communicates the moſt delightful Titillation to the *Senſes*, without having any Regard to the Abſence of Pain. Theſe Gentlemen did not perceive that, as a Horſe to the Race, an Ox to the Plough, and a Dog to the Field, ſo Mankind, as *Ariſtotle* ſays, was born for two Purpoſes; that of *Intelligence*, and that of *Action*; and becomes thereby, as it were, a *mortal God*: Whereas they, on the other hand, imagine this *divine Animal* to be created for the ſame Purpoſes as heavy dull Brutes; I mean, thoſe of eating and procreating; than which nothing can appear more abſurd.

So much againſt *Ariſtippus*, who held Pleaſure to be the ſupreme, nay, ſole Good, in the univerſal Acceptation of the Word; tho' in that you are of another Opinion. But he, as I ſaid, was in the wrong: For neither the Figure of our Bodies, nor the Excellencies of human Underſtanding, give us any Intimation that Mankind was born only to enjoy Pleaſures. Nor are we to mind

mind *Hieronymus*, who maintain'd, that the *Supreme Good* conſiſted in what you ſometimes, or rather too often, call an *Abſence of Pain:* For, if *Pain* is an *Evil*, it is not ſufficient in order to our *living well*, that we be free of this Pain. We ſhall leave this way of ſpeaking to *Ennius:*

Too happy is the Man who feels no Ill.

Let us judge of happy Life, not by the Removal of Evil, but by the Acquiſition of Good; nor let us ſeek it in the Pleaſure of *Ariſtippus*, nor in the other's Abſence of Pain, but in a Courſe of Activity and ſerious Reflection.

ALL I have ſaid here is applicable againſt the Chief Good maintain'd by *Carneades*; not that he publiſh'd it as his own real Opinion, ſo much as that he might harraſs the *Stoics*, to whom he was a declared Enemy. But his Supreme Good is indeed of ſuch a nature, that, when added to Virtue, it carries great Weight along with it, and ſeems calculated for the Perfection of happy Life; which is the very Queſtion we are now upon: For they who add to Virtue either Pleaſure, which Virtue undervalues; or the Abſence of Pain, which, though it has no Harm in it, yet can never be the *Supreme Good*; give her a very untowardly Addition: And yet I cannot underſtand the Reaſon why they do this ſo ſparingly and ſo niggardly, as if they were to buy a Portion to Virtue; in the firſt place, they tack the meaneſt Things to her; in the next place, they aſſign her only one or two Properties,

ties, inſtead of all that are conformable to the * Principles of Nature.

As theſe Principles of Nature to *Ariſto* and *Pyrrho* appear'd light and inconſiderable, they maintain'd, that there was no Difference between perfect Health and the moſt deſperate Sickneſs. Therefore it was quite right in Philoſophers to give up all Diſpute with them, as they have done long ago; for, while they made every thing to conſiſt in Virtue alone, to ſuch a Degree as to take from her the Election of thoſe Circumſtances, nor would allow her either an Original or a Foundation to reſt on, they deſtroyed that very Virtue which they embraced. But as to *Herilus*, who reduced every thing to Science, he had indeed in view one Good; but it was neither the Supreme Good, nor ſuch a Good as could direct Life. Therefore his Doctrine has been long rejected; and indeed, no body ſince *Chryſippus* has diſputed with him.

YOU therefore are the only Opponents that are left: For one does not know well how to deal with the *Academics*, becauſe they never affirm any thing; and want to take up with what is moſt probable, as it were in Deſpair of being able to attain what is certain. But *Epicurus* cuts out more Work for us; for his Doctrine is a Compoſition of two kinds of Pleaſure; and becauſe both he and his Friends, and a great many of his Followers afterwards, have really entertain'd this Sentiment; and as, I don't know by what means, the People, a Body who, though it

* *Principles*] I am of *Lambinus*'s Opinion, in leaving the four Words out at the End of this Paragraph, *viz. ea cum voluptate conjungerent.*

has

has the leaſt Authority, yet has the greateſt Power, are on their ſide; unleſs we confute the *Epicureans*, we muſt bid adieu to all Virtue, all Honour, and all true Glory.

CHAP. VII.

LET us therefore ſet aſide all other Opinions, and then the Diſpute will be, not betwixt *Torquatus* and *me*, but betwixt *Virtue* and *Pleaſure*; a Diſpute which *Chryſippus*, who is a Man of Senſe and Application, thinks of ſuch Importance, as to be deciſive of this whole Queſtion about Supreme Good. For my part, I am of opinion, if I ſhall be able to ſhew any Principle of Virtue, which by it's own Influence is lovely in itſelf, that all your Reaſoning muſt drop to the Ground. Therefore, after eſtabliſhing this Object, which I ſhall do in a few Words, as we are preſs'd in point of Time; I will then, *Torquatus*, anſwer all you have advanced, as far as my Memory will ſerve me.

THEN, by the Principle of Virtue, or the *Honeſtum*, I underſtand that Object which, excluſive of all accidental Utility, of all Rewards or Advantages, challenges our *Veneration*. What this Object is, cannot ſo well be underſtood by the Definition I have here given (though it may a little) as by the general Senſe of all Mankind, the Affections and Actions of every worthy Man: Theſe do a great many Things upon the ſingle Conſideration of their being becoming, fitting, and virtuous, without having regard to any conſequential Advantage. For though Men, in many other Reſpects, differ greatly from Beaſts, yet there

there is this *one* characteriſtical Difference betwixt them; That the Reaſon of Man was given him by Nature; together with an Underſtanding, *piercing, active, executing different Operations at the ſame inſtant*, and, in ſhort, *ſagacious*; an Underſtanding which can ſee, under one View, both the Cauſes and Conſequences; which can tranſplant the Simularity of one Object to another, and join disjunct Ideas; which can connect the Future with the Preſent, and ſurvey the whole Plan of After-life. The ſame Faculty of Reaſon makes Man deſire the Company of Men, and accommodate himſelf to them in Nature, Language, and Habitude; ſo that, beginning with domeſtic and intimate Endearments, his ſocial Affections dilate into ſuch Connections, as that he firſt becomes a Citizen of a certain Community, and then of the World. Thus, as *Plato* writes to *Architas*, He remembers he is not born for himſelf, but for his Country and his Friends; and that but a little Portion of his Exiſtence is allotted to himſelf.

As Nature has likewiſe implanted in Mankind a Paſſion for exploring Truth, which eaſily appears from our Endeavours to dip into the Secrets of Heaven, when free from Buſineſs on Earth; from thoſe Principles it is, that we are guided to a Love for all Truth, that is, for every thing that is faithful and conſtant; as likewiſe to a Hatred of whatever is vain, falſe, and deceitful, ſuch as Fraud, Perjury, Malice, and Injuſtice. The ſame *Reaſon* has ſomething in it that is great and magnificent, more fitted to command than to obey; not only bearing, but

ſcarcely

ſcarcely feeling human Accidents: There is ſomewhat in it that is high and exalted, void of all Fear, unſubmitting to any Reſtraint, and unyielding to any Maſter.

FROM theſe three kinds of the *Honeſtum*, a fourth follows, equally lovely, and the Reſult of the other three. In this conſiſts *Regularity* and *Moderation*. After viewing the Beauty of this Virtue in our own Perſons, we paſs from *Dignity of Behaviour* to *what is becoming* in Words and Actions: For, from the three Degrees of Merit which I mention'd above, we avoid *Temerity*, we are deterr'd from uſing *abuſive Language*, from *hurtful Actions*, and have an awful Reſtraint upon us from doing or ſpeaking aught that is unbecoming the *Dignity of Man*.

THUS, *Torquatus*, I have given you a high finiſh'd Picture of the *Honeſtum*, which entirely conſiſts of the four Virtues you too have mention'd. Your Maſter *Epicurus* ſays, he is quite at a loſs to know what this is, or what kind of a Principle they mean, who meaſure the Supreme Good by the *Honeſtum* or Virtue: Becauſe, if they refer every thing to this Principle, without admitting it to partake of any Degree of Pleaſure, he ſays, they make uſe of empty Sounds; (for theſe are his Words) "And that they neither "underſtand nor perceive the Meaning of the "Word *Honeſtum*; for, in the common Mode of "Speech, nothing is call'd the *Honeſtum*, but what "is applauded by popular Fame; which, *ſays he*, "tho' it is frequently more delightful than ſome

" Pleaſures, yet it is Pleaſure alone that gives it " it's Charms."

DON'T you ſee what a Difference there is here? The noble Philoſopher, who has not only put *Greece* and *Italy*, but all the barbarous World in a ſtirr, denies that he underſtands what the *Honeſtum* is, unleſs it conſiſts in Pleaſure or vulgar Applauſe. For my part, I am of opinion, that this may often be rather Matter of Diſhonour; and when it is not diſhonourable, yet, that it's being ſo is not owing to the Voice of the Multitude; That if it is fitting and laudable in itſelf, the Applauſe of the many can never ſtamp it with the Name of *Honeſtum*; but That it is of ſuch a nature, as to be praiſe-worthy from it's own intrinſic Beauty and Lovelineſs, though Mankind had neither Underſtanding to diſcern, nor a Tongue to praiſe it. Thus, overborne by the Force of Nature, when *Epicurus* could no longer ſtand his ground, he tells us, in another place, the ſame thing that you mention'd ſome time ago; that it was impoſſible to live *delectably*, without living *virtuouſly*.

BUT, *ſays he*, what do you mean by virtuouſly? is not that the ſame with delectably? Be it ſo, then it comes to this; It is impoſſible to live honeſtly, unleſs we do live virtuouſly: But cannot we do it without popular Applauſe? Why, he tells us, that without that we can't live delectably. What a ſhameful thing it is, that the Living of a wiſe Man ſhould depend upon the Tongues of Fools! Then what does he mean by *Honeſtum* in this place? Why, ſurely nothing,

unleſs

unleſs it can challenge Veneration by it's own intrinſic Worth: For, if it is commendable only for the Pleaſure that attends it, that is a Commendation we can buy from the Shambles. He is not a Man who, after rating the *Honeſtum* at that Degree as to declare it impoſſible to live delectably without it, thinks that the ſame *Honeſtum* conſiſts in popular Applauſe, without which he maintains it impoſſible to live delectably; or has a Notion of any other *honeſtum* but that which is fitting, that which is lovely in itſelf, by it's own Power, it's own Influence, and it's own Nature.

THEREFORE, *Torquatus*, when you ſay *Epicurus* call'd aloud, that it is impoſſible to live delectably, unleſs honeſtly, wiſely, and juſtly; you ſeem to do it with an air of Oſtentation on my particular Account; you put ſuch an Emphaſis upon your Words, becauſe of the Dignity of the Subject they expreſs, that you ſpoke in a higher Tone; you ſometimes rais'd yourſelf, and fix'd your Eyes on me, as if calling me to witneſs that *Epicurus* ſometimes commended Honeſty and Juſtice. You was in the right in making uſe of thoſe Words; becauſe, if they were diſuſed by Philoſophers, we could have no Occaſion for Philoſophy. For it was from their Affection for thoſe Words, *Wiſdom*, *Fortitude*, *Juſtice*, and *Temperance* (Terms that are ſeldom uſed by *Epicurus*) that Men of moſt excellent Capacities applied to the Study of Philoſophy. *Plato* tells us, that though the Senſe of Seeing is very exquiſite in Mankind, yet it can-

not diſcern Wiſdom. What a Glow of Paſſion would ſhe raiſe in our Breaſts, were ſhe a viſible Object! But why? For her excellent Hand in the Oeconomy of Pleaſure? Why is Juſtice prais'd? or whence this old thread-bare Proverb, * *No Advantage in the Dark?* It is plain and obvious, that this Saying relates only to the Action; that in all our Deeds we may regard the Nature of the Thing, and not the Preſence or Abſence of Witneſſes.

YOUR Arguments likewiſe were but ſlight and feeble, when you maintain'd, that the Wicked are tormented by conſcious Guilt, as much as by the Terror of Puniſhment; which either overtakes them, or hangs an eternal Dread over them leſt it ſhould overtake them. But then, we are not to ſuppoſe every Villain to be timid and fearful, or to have a natural Softneſs in him, which imprints Torture and Dread upon his Spirits for every Crime he commits: For I can produce you a Fellow, who ſlily adapts every thing to his own Advantage; a ſharp, artful, batter'd Rogue, and never at a loſs in his Contrivances how to cheat, provided he can do it privately, without any Witneſs by, and without any Danger of being convicted. What! do you imagine that I was talking of a *Lucius Tubulus*, who,

* *No Advantage in the Dark?*] This Proverb took it's Riſe from a fooliſh Diverſion, which ſtill abounds very much in the Country of *Italy:* Two Men meet together, and one of them holds up one, two, or more Fingers above the other's Head, who is to gueſs the preciſe Number; but if the Holder-up has a mind to cheat, it is very eaſy for him to do it, becauſe the Gueſſer can't ſee what Number of Fingers was held up.

when

when Prætor, while he was ſitting on the Bench of Juſtice in a Criminal Cauſe, took Money ſo openly for his Judgment, that the next Year *Pub. Scævola*, the Tribune of the Commons, brought a Bill in before them to try him for the Fact. The Bill paſſing into a Law, the Senate appointed *Cn. Scipio* to be Preſident of the Commiſſion that was to try him. *Tubulus* went into voluntary Exile, without daring to ſtand the Trial; for the Thing was notorious.

We are not therefore talking of a Rogue, but of an artful Rogue, ſuch as * *Q. Pompeius* ſhew'd himſelf, in denying the Treaty he made with the *Numantines*; nor are we talking of a Fellow who fears every thing. In the firſt place, I ſpeak of a Villain who never minds the Hints of Conſcience, and who can eaſily ſtifle her; of a Fellow who is cloſe and ſecret, and is ſo far from betraying himſelf, that he is perfect enough in his Trade to ſeem to be pain'd at the wicked Actions of another. This is the Meaning of being artful. I remember I was along with *Pub. Sextilius Rufus*, when he inform'd his Friends that he was Heir to *Q. Fadius Gallus*, whoſe laſt Will bore, that he had been deſired by *Sextilius* to convey all his Eſtate to his Daughter. *Sextilius* denied the Deed; which he run no Hazard in doing; for who was to contradict him? none of *us* could; and yet it was much more probable that the Perſon intereſted ſhould lye, than the Perſon who had wrote that the other requir'd what he was in Duty bound to. He added, that he was ſworn to the Obſervance of the

* The Reader will find this Story at large in *Livy*.

* *Voconian Law*, that he durſt not act againſt it, but with the Conſent of his Friends.

A GREAT many young Men of us were preſent indeed, but then there were a great many Perſons of very conſiderable Diſtinction, and not one of them could take it upon him to adjudge to the † Daughter a larger Portion of the Eſtate than was allowed her by the *Voconian* Law. *Sextilius* thus came to a large Inheritance; whereas, had he followed their Maxims, who prefer what is *honeſt and fitting* to all Conſiderations of *Profit* and *Intereſt*, he had not touched a Penny. Ay, but, *ſay you*, ſurely all his Life after was full of *Solicitude* and *Remorſe*. Take my Word for it, no ſuch thing; ſo far from it, that he was extremely well pleaſed at being Maſter of ſo large an Eſtate, for he thought it was a great Point gain'd to get Money without breaking the Laws, nay, in obſerving the Letter of them: And indeed your Sect ought to run all Hazards to get Money, becauſe ſhe is the Procureſs of many and great Pleaſures.

* Voconian *Law*,] This was a Law to diſable very rich Men from leaving their Eſtates to their Daughters.

† *Daughter*] The whole of this Affair ſeems to have been, that tho' the *Voconian* Law prohibited Daughters from inheriting large Eſtates by the Will of the Father; yet they might have done it, if the next of Kin gave his Conſent: Which was the ſame as in *Athens*. This *Fadius*, being an unſuſpecting, well meaning Man, thought it was ſufficient, if he put it in his Will, that the next in Kin, who appears to have been this *P. Sextilius Rufus*, gave his Conſent that his Daughter ſhould inherit; and no doubt he gave *Sextilius* a valuable Conſideration in his own Life-time for his Conſent. The Roguery therefore of *Sextilius* conſiſted in denying, that he had ever given any ſuch Conſent as was expreſs'd by *Fadius* in his Will, which was no Evidence againſt him; and ſo he cut the Lady off with the Portion allotted her by the *Voconian* Law.

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As they therefore, who deem what is right and honourable to be *intrinſically deſirable*, are ready to undergo every kind of Danger for the *moral Charms* of what is *fitting* and *virtuous in Life*; ſo you, who meaſure every thing by *Pleaſure*, ought, from the ſame Motive, to venture upon hazardous Undertakings, that you may be rewarded with mighty Pleaſures. And a true *Epicurean*, who is determined to obtain the *Supreme Good in Life*, muſt act as boldly as if a *Scipio*'s Paſſion for Glory were to draw an *Hannibal* into *Africa*. And what vaſt Dangers did *Scipio* encounter, tho' he directed all his mighty Efforts not to *Pleaſure*, but to *Virtue?* Thus your Sage, when ſtimulated by any Proſpect of Advantage, will fight with all his Heart and Soul, when there is occaſion. The Roguery may be done ſecretly: *Oh! that gives him Joy.* He is caught in the Fact, *why then he will deſpiſe all Puniſhment*, becauſe he is prepared for the Contempt of Death, of Exile, and of Pain itſelf; which, when you propoſe as a Penalty on the Wicked, you make to be *inſufferable:* But when you maintain, that the Wiſe always have a greater Share of *Good* than of *Evil*, then it is *tolerable*.

But feign to yourſelf a Perſon not only cunning in the roguiſh Actions he commits, but of a very powerful Intereſt in the State; ſuch as *Marcus Craſſus* once had, who, by the bye, always ſpent his own Money; ſuch as our Friend *Pompey* has at preſent, to whom all grateful Reſpects are owing for his Practice of Virtue: For tho' in his Life he is ſtrictly juſt, yet, were he otherwiſe, none could call him to Account.

And indeed in *common Life*, how many unjuſt Things might be done, and yet no body be able to expoſe them. Suppoſing a Friend on his Death-bed ſhould, without reducing it in Writing, as *Fadius* did, deſire you to give his Eſtate to his Daughter, without ſpeaking a Word of it to any body elſe; How would you act in ſuch a Caſe? I do believe that *you* would give it, and ſo perhaps would *Epicurus* have done; as did *Sextus Peducæus*, who has left us a Son the Image of his own Humanity and Virtue. This learned as well as excellent and honeſt Man, being required by *Ca. Plotius* of *Nurſia*, a magnificent *Roman* Knight, to do ſuch a thing, without any body's being privy to the Requeſt, came to the Lady, who was not dreaming of any ſuch Matter, acquainted her with her Husband's Commands, and gave her back the Eſtate. But let me ask of yourſelf, becauſe I am perſuaded you would have done the ſame thing, whether you are not ſenſible that the great Force of Nature appears in your doing Things in which you evidently follow the Dictates of *Benevolence*, and not of *Pleaſure*, while you profeſs that every thing you do has a Tendency to your own *Advantage* and *Pleaſure*? And whether it does not thereby appear that *undepraved Nature* is ſtronger than *perverted Judgment*?

SAYS *Carneades*, if you knew that a Snake was lurking ſomewhere, and that one whoſe Death would be an Advantage to you was going to ſit upon it, you would act like a Villain if you did not put him on his Guard not to ſit down on that Spot. But ſtill you would be very ſafe if you did not,

not, as no body could convict you that you knew the Snake was there. But too much of this: For it is plain, that unleſs *Equity*, *Honour* and *Juſtice*, are natural Affections within us, or if they are all to be ſecundary to Profit, it is impoſſible to find a *good Man*. And I have been very full upon theſe Subjects in the Perſon of *Lælius*, in my *Treatiſe upon a Republic*.

APPLY this Doctrine to *Modeſty* or *Temperance*, by which I mean an Abſtinence of our Appetites under the Command of Reaſon: Does not a Man violate Chaſtity, if he indulges his Luſts, tho' without a Witneſs? Is nothing immoral in itſelf, tho' attended with no open Infamy? What do you ſay of our Heroes, do they face the Fight, and laviſh their Blood for their Country, only becauſe they have made an Eſtimate of the Pleaſures which they know they ſhall purchaſe by ſuch Actions? Or, is it becauſe they are ſpurr'd on by a certain Heat and Vigour of Spirit? Give me leave to ask you, my Friend, Were your * *Imperial* Anceſtor to hear our Diſcourſe, whether he would take more Pleaſure in hearing your Sentiments, or mine? *I* maintain, that nothing he did was on his own Account, but all for his Country; and *you*, that he had no Motive for what he did but *Self*. But were you to proceed to explain this Maxim, and to unfold your Meaning, and ſay, that he did nothing but for *Pleaſure*; how do you imagine he would bear it?

HOWEVER, be it as you will, *Torquatus* did

* Imperial] Orig. *Imperioſus*, one who had acted as Imperator, or General.

this

this for his *own Ends*; for I chuſe theſe Words rather than *Pleaſures*, eſpecially as I talk of ſo great a Man. But had his Colleague, *Publius Decius*, the firſt of that Family who bore the Conſulate, any Notion of *Pleaſure*, when he devoted himſelf, and plunged with his Horſe, headlong into the midſt of the *Latin* Ranks. For where or when was he to enjoy this *Pleaſure*, when he knew that he was to die the very next Inſtant, and courted that Death with a ſtronger Paſſion than ever *Epicurus* thought Pleaſure itſelf deſerved? And why ſhould his Son have imitated him in his fourth Conſulate, had not the Action been *ſelf-laudable?* Nor would his Grandſon, while as Conſul he was fighting againſt *Pyrrhus*, have fallen in Battle, and offer'd himſelf as the third Victim for his Country in the ſame Family. ——

I WILL check myſelf in giving any more Inſtances. —— The *Greeks* have but a few, *Leonides*, *Epaminondas*, and three or four more. —— Were I to bring Examples from our own Hiſtory, I could ſhew you Pleaſure come and ſurrender herſelf in Chains to the Diſpoſal of *Virtue*: But the Light would fail me; and as *A. Varrius*, who was look'd upon to be a teſty Judge, ſaid to his Brother on the Bench, when more Witneſſes were call'd for after ſome had been examin'd: *We have either had Evidence enough, or I don't know what is enough*; ſo I think I have brought you Witneſſes enough. For how! was it Pleaſure that induced you, the worthy Repreſentative of your Anceſtors, to ſnatch the Conſulate, when you was but a Youth, from *Publius Sylla*, whom you impeach'd before your Father, who approv'd

prov'd himſelf a Man of the moſt conſumate Virtue in all Stations of Life, both as a Conſul and as a Citizen, eſpecially after his Conſulate; and under whoſe Directions I too gave ſome Proofs of my Actions, that *Self* was the leaſt of my Conſideration?

BUT what a ſhining Figure did you make, when, on the one hand, you imaged a Perſon brim full of the moſt various and exquiſite Pleaſures, without feeling *preſent*, or fearing *future* Pain; and, on the other hand, a Perſon under the moſt exquiſite Tortures all over his Body, without the leaſt Alleviation from Pleaſure, and without the leaſt Proſpect of his ever taſting it? And then you put the Queſtion, Whether there could be a more *happy* Object than the one, or a more *miſerable* one than the other? Then you drew this Concluſion from the whole, that *Pain was the Supreme Evil, and Pleaſure the Supreme Good.*

L. THORIUS BALBUS was of *Lanuvium*, but before your Time. This Gentleman lived in ſuch a Manner as to be plentifully ſupplied with all the moſt exquiſite Pleaſures that could be deviſed. He was both keen in his Purſuit of them, and diſtinguiſhing and * curious in their ſeveral Kinds. He was ſo far from being ſuperſtitious, that he deſpiſed the † numerous Sacrifices and Temples of his own Corporation; and ſo little afraid to die, that he fell in

* *Curious*] The common Reading has it *Copioſus*, which, being the ſame as *abundare*, in the Sentence immediately before, it ſeems to make it much better Senſe to read *Curioſus*.

† *Numerous Sacrifices*] *Lanuvium* was noted for the many religious Rites perform'd in it, eſpecially to *Juno Soſpita*.

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the Field, and in his Country's Service. He did not meaſure his Appetites by *Epicurus*'s Diſtinctions, but by *his own Satiety*; at the ſame time he had great Regard for his Health. The Exerciſes he uſed were ſuch as made him come to Table with a keen Appetite both for Victuals and Drink; his Food was of the moſt delicate Kind, and the eaſieſt of Digeſtion; his Wine the moſt generous, and he never drank it ſo as to hurt himſelf. He enjoyed all thoſe other Circumſtances, without which *Epicurus* ſays he has no Notion of *Good*. He felt no kind of Pain; if it had attack'd him, he would have borne it like a Man, and have had Recourſe rather to *Phyſic* than *Philoſophy*. His Complexion was excellent, his Health firm, his Intereſt great; and in ſhort, his Life mov'd in a continual Circle of all kinds of Pleaſures.

In your Language you, no doubt, will pronounce ſuch a Perſon *compleatly happy*. I ſhall not preſume to bring any body in Competition with him, but Virtue does it for me. She boldly prefers *Marcus Regulus* to your happy Man. *Regulus*, who of his own Choice, without any Conſtraint, but that Word of Honour he had plighted to his Enemy, return'd from his Country to *Carthage*; where Virtue pronounces him more happy under all the Tortures of Watching and Hunger, than *Thorius* quaffing on a Bed of Roſes. He had been at the Head of great Wars, he had been twice Conſul, and had triumphed; and yet he thought no Circumſtance in the former Part of his Life, ſo great or ſo glorious as this laſt Penalty which he ſuffered for his Honour

and

and his Reſolution: That Miſery which *we* can ſcarce bear without *ſhrinking*, *he* bore without *repining*. For the Afflicted are happy, not in their Mirth, nor their Wantonneſs, nor their Laugh, nor their Joke, the Symptoms of Unconcern, but in their Reſolution and Firmneſs of Mind.

LUCRETIA was raviſh'd by the Son of a King; ſhe adjured her Country to revenge her Wrong, then ſhe kill'd herſelf. This Affliction to the People of *Rome*, became, by the Management of *Brutus*, the Cauſe of their Liberty; and the Lady's Reputation was ſo high, that her Husband and her Father were made Conſuls the firſt Year. *L. Virginius* was but a private Perſon, of ſmall Intereſt; yet in the ſixtieth Year after the Recovery of *Roman* Liberty, with his own Hand he ſtabb'd his Virgin-daughter, rather than ſuffer her to be proſtituted to the Luſt of *Appius Claudius*, who then was the Tyrant of his Country.

THESE, my Friend, are Inſtances that you muſt either ſet at nought, or abandon your Patronage of Senſuality. But what a Patronage, or what a Cauſe is that which can bring no eminent Man, either to bear Witneſs in it's Behalf, or appear for it's Character? For as we from our Chronicles bring thoſe Heroes as Evidences for us, whoſe Lives were continued Scenes of Toil, and who abhorr'd the Word *Pleaſure*; ſo in all your Diſputations Hiſtory is unmention'd. Never did I, in the School of *Epicurus*, hear *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, *Miltiades*, *Themiſtocles* or *Epaminondas*, named; tho' they are in the Mouths of all the other

other Philoſophers. But now, as we have begun to talk of theſe Matters, * our Friend *Atticus* ſhall from his Magazine ſupply us with a Liſt of the many great Men who are Evidences for your Doctrine.

Is it not better to mention ſomewhat of them, than to hear of † *Themiſta* in ſo many Volumes. Let us pardon this in the *Greeks:* Tho' it is from them that we have Philoſophy, and all our liberal Arts, yet ſtill they uſurp a Privilege, of indulging in Liberties which we are deprived of. The *Stoics* oppoſe the *Peripatetics*; the one Sect denies, that any thing can be *good* unleſs it is *virtuous*; while the other, after allowing very *exalted* and *diſtinguiſhed* Qualities to *Virtue*, ſtill think that there are ſome bodily and external Circumſtances which are *good* in ſome degree. This Conteſt is *generous*, this Difference is *glorious*; for all the Diſpute is, who ſhall moſt ennoble *Virtue*. But when you diſpute with your Fellows, you muſt hear a great deal of the moſt ſhameful Pleaſures, which are very often mention'd by *Epicurus*. Believe me, *Torquatus*, you never would embrace ſuch a Doctrine, did you know yourſelf, your own Thoughts, and your own Affections. Give me leave to tell you, that you would be aſham'd of the Picture which ‡ *Cleanthes* uſed ſo ingeniouſly to deſcribe. He

* *Our Friend* Atticus] This is a kind of a Sneer upon *Atticus*, who was an *Epicurean* in Principle.

† *Themiſta*] We had occaſion to mention this Lady in our Author's Oration againſt *Piſo*. She was a mighty Championeſs for the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, who kept up a Correſpondence with her by Letters.

‡ *Cleanthes*] This Philoſopher ſucceeded *Zeno* as Chief of the *Stoics*.

deſired

desired his Hearers to image to themselves the Picture of Pleasure drawn in a beautiful Dress, with Royal Robes, and sitting on a Throne: The Virtues present as her Hand-maids, without minding any other Business than to serve Pleasure; only they sometimes whisper'd her in the Ear, to caution her, as far as Painting can express such a Thing, to take care of doing aught that was inconsiderate, or at which Mankind might be shock'd, or might produce any Pain; *as if they had said*, We Virtues are born only to serve you; we have nothing else to do.

CHAP. VIII.

BUT *Epicurus* denies (for here lies your Strength) that any Person can live *pleasurably*, who does not live *honestly*. Yet why am I to mind what he affirms or denies? I am to examine into the Consistency of that Man's Reasoning who thinks that Supreme Good consists in Pleasure: What Argument do you bring to prove that *Thorius*, * *Posthumius*, *Chius*, and *Orata*, the very Master of them all, did not live pleasantly? *Epicurus* himself, as I have mention'd, denies that any Fault can be found with the Life of the Luxurious, provided they are not Fools, that is, if they neither hope nor fear: And as he proposes an Antidote against both those Passions, he thereby promises a Licence for Luxury; for when these Things are removed, he

* *Posthumius*,] These were all *Epicureans*. *Orata* is very often mention'd, as being the original Inventor of several Pleasures.

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profeſſes he cannot find the leaſt thing in the Life of a Senſualiſt that is blameable.

THEREFORE, while you make Pleaſure the Directreſs of all your Actions, you never can either cheriſh or preſerve your Virtue; becauſe that Man can never be accounted either virtuous or juſt, who abſtains from what is wicked, only becauſe he may catch ſome Harm by it. You no doubt know,

* *Piety, from Fear, is Irreligion.*

BELIEVE me, this is as true a Maxim as ever was held; for no Man can be *honeſt*, if he has no other Motive for being ſo but *Fear:* And it is plain, that as ſoon as that *Fear* is over, he will ceaſe to be *honeſt*. Now, a Man is under no Influence of *Fear*, who can either conceal his Actions, or procure a Sanction for whatever he does from his great Intereſt; and ſuch a Perſon will certainly rather chuſe to be thought *a good Man*, tho' in reality *he is not*, than *be* one, and yet not have the Reputation *of being ſo*. Therefore it is extremely plain, that you put the Phantom of *Honeſty* upon us, for the *true* and *unvarying* Subſtance: And in ſome meaſure dictate, that we ſhould lay aſide the infallible Hints of our own Conſcience, to hunt after the wavering Opinion of others.

THE ſame may be ſaid of the other Virtues, all the Foundations of which you lay in the liquid fluctuating Subſtance of Pleaſure. Give me leave to ask you, whether we can properly call the

* *Piety*, &c.] This is another of our Author's proverbial Diſtichs, which we have ſupplied as we believe he meant it.

famous

famous *Torquatus*, *A brave Man?* For I am charm'd with the Idea of him, tho' you ſay that I ſhall not be able to ſeduce you: I ſay I am charm'd whenever I reflect upon your Name and Family; and, by Heavens, I now think I have my excellent and dear *Aulus Torquatus* before my Eyes! You muſt both of you be ſenſible, what a ſtrong, what a diſtinguiſh'd Affection he expreſs'd for me in a late famous Conjuncture: Yet, tho' the Paſſion of my Soul is to be *grateful*, never could I have regarded his Services, had I not perceiv'd that he befriended me for *my* Sake, and not *for his own*. But if you ſay, that it is every Man's Intereſt to do what is *right*, you give up the Queſtion in our Favour; for all we ſay, all we contend for, is, that *Performance* is the *Reward* of the *Moral Duties*.

EPICURUS denies this, and impoſes Pleaſure as a Tax upon every thing. But I now return to *Torquatus*. If our Hero had no other Motive but Pleaſure, when he fought the *Gaul* who challenged the *Romans* upon the Banks of the *Anio*; and won to himſelf both a Surname and a Chain from his Spoils, for no other Reaſon but becauſe ſuch Actions appear'd worthy *a Man of Courage*; I cannot think he was a *brave Man*. Now, if *Purity*, if *Modeſty*, if *Chaſtity*, or, in one Word, if *Temperance*, have no Reſtraint but the Fear of Puniſhment and Infamy, and are not guarded by their own *Sanctity*; where is the *Adultery*, where the *Uncleanneſs*, and where is the *Luſt*, that would not break out and diſperſe themſelves, as ſoon as they could be aſſur'd of *Secrecy*, of *Impunity* or *Toleration*?

BUT let me ask you, *Torquatus*, what you think of this ſingle Circumſtance? That you dare not, with all your Reputation, Genius, and Glory in the World, in a public Aſſembly, avow your own Actions, your own Deſigns, your Purſuits, your Views; to what End you direct them, from what Motive you want to compleat them, nor, in ſhort, what you deem to be the beſt Object in Life. For what would be your Succeſs, if, at the Commencement of your Magiſtracy, you appear'd in an Aſſembly of the People, and when you are about to inform them of the Meaſures of Juſtice you are reſolved to obſerve while in your Office (and perhaps you may think proper to go on in the old Way, of touching a little upon your Family and yourſelf;) I ſay, what Succeſs are you to expect, ſhould you tell the People, that all you are to act, while a Magiſtrate, will be merely from a Motive of Pleaſure, and that you never did any thing in your Life but from that Motive? But, ſay you, do you imagine *me* ſuch a Madman as to talk in this Strain to an ignorant Vulgar? Then ſpeak it to a *Court of Juſtice*, or, if you are afraid of the By-ſtanders there, ſpeak it in the *Senate Houſe*. But that you will never do: Why? unleſs becauſe it is a ſcandalous Declaration? So then, it ſeems you think *Triarius* and me proper Company to make ſuch Declarations in; well, be it ſo.

THE Term *Pleaſure* has no Dignity about it; but perhaps I don't underſtand it rightly: For you ſay as much, when you tell me I don't underſtand what *you* mean by Pleaſure. A very dark, difficult Matter it is indeed! When you talk

talk of your * *Individuums* and your *intermundane* Syſtems, all of them *none-xiſtents* and Impoſſibilities, then I underſtand you; but I can't for my life underſtand, what every Sparrow knows, *Pleaſure* in your Meaning of the Word. But what if I ſhould make you confeſs, that I not only underſtand what *Pleaſure* is (for it is a delightful Operation upon the Senſes) but even *your* Meaning of it? For ſometimes you take it in the very Senſe I have juſt now defin'd it, then you term it *operative Pleaſure*, and *productive of Variety*; ſometimes you will have it to be ſome other *Supreme Delight*, which can admit of no Addition; and ſometimes you make it conſiſt in *the Abſence of all Pain*, and then you term it *ſtable*.

WELL, admitting this to be Pleaſure, let me hear you declare, in any Aſſembly, that you have no Motive in all you do, but to keep yourſelf free of Pain. If you think you cannot do even this, conſiſtently with *common Decency* and your own Honour, then declare that every Action in your Magiſtracy, and in the whole Courſe of your Life, ſhall be guided with a view to your own Intereſt; that you will do nothing but what is for your own Conveniency, and nothing but from a ſelfiſh Motive. What a Shout, upon ſuch a Declaration, do you think an Aſſembly would raiſe? What Hopes would they

* *Individuums*] Meaning the Atoms and the intermundane Spaces of *Epicurus*, which he imagin'd the Gods inhabited, and, according to him, lay betwixt World and World. But it muſt be own'd, that this Doctrine of *Epicurus* hath not been rightly repreſented, as we ſhall have an Opportunity of examining in another Part of this Work.

entertain of that Conſulate, to which they are now impatient to raiſe you? And ſhall you follow that Syſtem of Living which, while you defend when by yourſelf and among your Friends, you dare not avow or publiſh to the World? Yet you have always on your Lips the Terms adopted by the *Peripatetics* and the *Stoics*. In Courts and in the Senate you talk of nothing but the *Moral Duties*, *Equity*, *Dignity*, *Truth*, *Rectitude*, *Honeſty*, *the Majeſty of the Government* and *the People of* Rome, *the undertaking every Danger for the State*, and *the dying for one's Country*. When you talk at this rate, you make us * heavy Animals ſtare, while you are laughing at us in your own Mind: For, while you are uſing all theſe magnificent, pompous Expreſſions, there is not a ſingle Word about *Pleaſure*; not only your *operative Pleaſure*, which every Man in Town and Country, and every Man among us who underſtands his Mother's Tongue, terms *Pleaſure*; but even that *ſtable Delight*, which nobody beſides yourſelves ever term *Pleaſure*, is not ſo much as mention'd.

INDEED you have no right to adapt our Words to your Sentiments; were you to diſguiſe your Look and your Air, to ſeem to appear with

* *Heavy Animals*] The Word in the Original is *Barones*, which is certainly the true Word, though very little uſed by *Latin* Authors, and ſeems to ſignify no other than a Man of plain common Senſe. It came to be adopted in After-times, to ſignify any Man who had Property, ſuch as the Barons with the *Anglo-Saxons*. And indeed almoſt all the Nations of *Europe* have adopted this Word in ſome Senſe or other. Formerly every Man of Property who held of the Crown, was a Baron, in all Parts of *Great Britain*.

greater Gravity, you would act unlike yourſelf: And ſhall you coin Words? ſhall you ſay what you do not think? ſhall you do by your Sentiments as you do by your Cloaths, keep one Sett for your private and another for your public Uſes? bear Oſtentation in your Forehead, and hide Truth in your Boſom? Is this right? To me thoſe Opinions appear to be true, which are, *honeſt*, *laudable*, and *noble*; which you can avow in the Senate, before the People, in every Company, and in every Aſſembly: For a Man ſhould bluſh to entertain that Sentiment which he bluſhes to expreſs.

As to Friendſhip, where can there be any room for it? or how can a Man be a Friend to another whom he does not love, independant of ſelfiſh Conſiderations? Now, as the very Term Friendſhip * implies *Love*, what is it to *love*, but to wiſh another at the very higheſt Pitch of Happineſs, though without the leaſt Return of Intereſt to yourſelf? But, ſay you, what if theſe Sentiments are *profitable* to me? Yes; perhaps the *ſeeming* to have them may be ſo; for it is impoſſible for you to *have* the Paſſion itſelf, unleſs you *feel* it; and how can you feel it, unleſs you know what *Love* is? Which is not produc'd from the ambiguous Syſtem of *Intereſt*, but is *ſpontaneous* and *ſelf-generative*. But, ſay you, I purſue *Self-Intereſt?* Then your Friendſhip will remain as long as you find your Account in it; for if *Self-Intereſt* conſtitutes, then *Self-Intereſt* diſſolves, *Friendſhip*.

* *Implies Love,*] Orig. *Quid autem eſt amare, à quo nomen ductum amicitiæ eſt.*

But what will you do if, as oft-times happens, *Self-Intereſt* ſhall abandon *Friendſhip?* will you abandon it too? Then where is your Friendſhip? Will you ſtick by your Friend? how can you conſiſtently with your own Doctrine? for what is *your* Doctrine of Friendſhip? Why, that it is amiable only becauſe it is profitable. But, ſay you, I ſhall incur the Public Hatred if I abandon my Friend? But let me firſt ask you, why this ſhould incur the Public Hatred, were it not in itſelf a ſhameful Action? But if you ſtick by a Friend only leſt you ſhould come to ſome Inconveniency ſhould you abandon him, then ſurely you'll wiſh his Death, that you may be freed from ſo unprofitable a Connection.

But ſuppoſing now, that this Connection was not only unprofitable, but even ruinous to your private Affairs; the Cauſe of your undertaking Fatigues, and running even the Danger of your Life; ſure you would then begin to look to yourſelf, and to reflect that every Man was born for himſelf and his own Pleaſure. Will you give yourſelf up into the Hands of a Tyrant to repledge your Friend, as the * *Pythagorean* did himſelf to the *Sicilian* Tyrant? Though you are *Pylades*, will you call yourſelf *Oreſtes*, that you may die for your Friend? If you are *Oreſtes*,

* We are told this Story of *Damon* and *Pythias:* One of them being condemn'd to die by *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, begg'd for a Reſpite of two or three Days, till he ſhould go into the Country to put his Family Affairs in order; while the other offer'd to remain in the Tyrant's Hands, as his Friend's Surety: The condemn'd Perſon came at the Expiration of the Time to releaſe his Friend; and the Tyrant was ſo touch'd with the Action, as to pardon them both, and begg'd that he might be a third in their Friendſhip. The Story of *Pylades* and *Oreſtes* is well known.

would

would you betray yourſelf and refute *Pylades*? or, if you could not ſucceed in that, would you beg that both of you might die together?

BELIEVE me, *Torquatus*, you are capable of doing all this; for I cannot conceive that you could be daunted, either by the Fear of Death or Pain, from performing any glorious Action. But I am not now diſputing about your natural Courage, but about your Doctrine. This Syſtem which you defend, the Precepts which you have learned and embraced, are totally ſubverſive of Friendſhip; let *Epicurus* extol it ever ſo much, as in effect he does. But, ſay you, he himſelf was the beſt of Friends. Indeed, Sir, I never diſputed his being a worthy, good-natur'd, humane Man. The preſent Queſtion is not with regard to his Morals, but the Opinions he has broach'd. I will leave to the *Greeklings* that Narrowneſs of Soul, which rails at thoſe who differ from them on any controverted Point. But ſuppoſing that *Epicurus* was very delicate in point of Friendſhip, yet, if what is ſaid of him is true (I don't take upon me to ſay whether it is or is not) it does not ſhew him to be a very acute Reaſoner.

BUT his Morals were approved of by multitudes —— perhaps with Reaſon; but yet the Approbation of multitudes is not the moſt infallible Teſt of Virtue. For in every Art, every Study, every Science, nay, with regard to Virtue itſelf, whatever is moſt excellent in it's own kind, is hardeſt to come at by the many. But the virtuous Practice of *Epicurus* himſelf, and many of his Followers, who at this Day are

both firm in their Friendſhips, conſtant and virtuous in the Diſcharge of every moral Duty, directing their Conduct not by a Motive of Pleaſure, but the Principles of Humanity; are very prevailing Arguments with me, for believing that the Influence of Honour is much ſtronger than that of Pleaſure. For ſome People live in ſuch a manner, that their Morals give the Lye to their Diſcourſe; and as the Profeſſions of the reſt of the World are ſaid to be beyond their Practice, ſo the Practice of ſome *Epicureans* is beyond their Profeſſions.

CHAP. IX.

BUT it muſt be own'd, this is not to our Purpoſe. Let us examine *your* Doctrine of Friendſhip. If I am not miſtaken, I learned it from one of *Epicurus*'s old Maxims: "That "Friendſhip was indiſcerpable from Pleaſure; "that it ought to be cultivated for that very "Reaſon; and that, without it, it was impoſſi- "ble for us to live in Safety, or without Fear, "nay, not with Delight." This I have ſufficiently anſwer'd already. You mention'd ſome Maxims of his later Diſciples, that were ſomewhat more diſintereſted, and, ſo far as I know, never taught by him. In the firſt place, that you courted a Friend at firſt, only for the Advantage that Friendſhip brought; but that, in the Courſe of a Familiarity, that Friend becomes dear even in himſelf, without the leaſt Regard to Pleaſure. Though this Doctrine is liable to many Objections, yet I accept what they offer. It is ſufficient

ficient for my Purpoſe, though not for theirs; for this is in effect owning, that it is ſome time or other poſſible for a Man to act rightly, without any View or Deſire of *Pleaſure*.

You have likewiſe told us, that others of your Sect maintain, that the Wiſe have made a kind of a League amongſt themſelves, to entertain the very ſame Sentiments for their Friends as they do for themſelves: That this may be done, that it frequently is done, and that it is eſſential to the Enjoyment of Pleaſure. If they are capable of entering into ſuch a League as this, they are capable of entering into another, for diſintereſtedly loving Equity, Modeſty, and all the Virtues in themſelves. And indeed, if we cultivate Friendſhips only for the Profits and Advantages they bring, if no Endearments attend them to make them amiable in and by themſelves, it is a Matter of Doubt whether we do not prefer our Eſtates and Houſes to our Friends.

You have taken care to mention the excellent Words in which *Epicurus* praiſes Friendſhip. I don't now enquire into what he ſays, but into what he can ſay conſiſtently with his own Syſtem and Maxims. Friendſhip is purſued for the Advantages attending it. Do you then believe, that *Triarius* here can be of more Advantage to you, than all your Farms at *Puteoli?* Muſter up all your Conſiderations: The Protection of Friends. Why, you are protected ſufficiently by yourſelf, by the Laws of your Country, and by Friendſhips of a looſer Connection. At preſent you are above Contempt, nay, it is eaſy for you to avoid

avoid all Malice and Envy. Now, *Epicurus*'s Doctrine is adapted to thoſe Purpoſes: And a Man, without making ſo generous a Uſe of a great Eſtate as you do, may, even without this refin'd Pitch of Friendſhip, be honourably both guarded and ſecur'd by an extenſive Popularity. But then, ſay you, where ſhall I drop my Jokes? with whom ſhall I lodge my ſerious Concerns? or to whom communicate all my Secrets? Why, they will be all ſafeſt in your own Breaſt, or in that of an *intimate Acquaintance*. But granting all thoſe Circumſtances to be Conveniences in Life, yet what are they, compared to the Benefits ariſing from ſo large an Eſtate? You may now therefore be ſenſible, that if we meaſure Friendſhip by it's own Value, nothing can be more precious; but if by the *Profit* attending it, that the ſtricteſt Connection of Friendſhip is inferior to the Value of a good Eſtate. You therefore ought to love *me*, and not *mine*, if you have a mind that we ſhould live together as true Friends for the future.

But we have been too prolix upon the plaineſt Points: For, after demonſtrating and concluding that there is no room either for Virtues or Friendſhips, if every thing is to regard *Pleaſure*, there is occaſion to ſay very little more. But that no part of what you have laid down may ſeem to go unanſwer'd, I will touch a little upon the remaining Part of your Diſcourſe.

As therefore the whole of Philoſophy relates to the Happineſs of Life, and as it was the Love which Mankind had for this only, that led them

to

to that Study; ſome place the Happineſs of Life in one thing, and ſome in another; and you in Pleaſure, as you do all Unhappineſs in Pain; let me firſt examine what you mean by the *Happineſs of Life?* And I believe you will agree, that if there is really ſuch a Thing as *Happineſs*, it muſt be own'd to be quite in the Power of the wiſe Man. For if the Happineſs of Life is a Thing we can loſe, we never had any ſuch *Happineſs*; for no Man can imagine, that what is frail and liable to decay, will always remain to him permanent and ſtable. Now, a Man who diſtruſts the Continuance of his *Good Things*, muſt needs be under Apprehenſions of being miſerable as ſoon as he loſes them; but no Man can be happy, while under the Dread of loſing his moſt important Concerns.

THERE is therefore no ſuch thing as this *Happineſs*; becauſe *Happineſs of Life* does not exiſt *partially*, but in the Perpetuity of it's Continuance. Nor is the Term *Happy Life* ever apply'd to any thing but what is *finiſh'd* and *complete*. Nor can any Man be ſometimes *happy*, and ſometimes *unhappy:* For the Man who thinks that he *may* be miſerable, cannot be happy; becauſe, when once we enter upon the *Happineſs of Life*, we continue in it as long as Wiſdom (the *Manufactreſs* of Happineſs) continues with us. Nor does ſhe wait for the laſt Scene of Life to pronounce it happy; as *Herodotus* tells us, *Solon* wrote to *Cræſus:* In like manner, as you own'd, *Epicurus* tells us, that the Length of happy Life does not at all contribute to it's Happineſs; and that one may experience

perience as much Pleaſure in a limited Time, as he could were it to be eternal.

But all this Doctrine is extremely abſurd: For at the ſame time he makes Supreme Good to conſiſt in Pleaſure, he tells us that Pleaſure is no greater, when continued thro' the infinite Progreſſion of Ages, than when confin'd to a narrow, limited Period. He who places *Supreme Good* in *Virtue*, may ſay, that the *Happineſs of his Life* is perfect, thro' the Perfection of his Virtue: For he denies that Time can bring any Addition to his *Supreme Good*. But the Perſon who places the Happineſs of Life in *Pleaſure* is inconſiſtent with himſelf, if he ſays that Pleaſure receives no Addition from it's Continuance: For he may ſay the ſame thing of *Pain*. But does not the Length of Pain add to it's Miſery? and, by the ſame Experience, does not the Continuance of Pleaſure inhance it's Value? Give me leave to ask you the Reaſon why *Epicurus* always calls God *Happy* and *Eternal?* For, deprive *Jupiter* of his *Eternity*, *Epicurus* is as happy a Being as *Jupiter:* Becauſe both of them are in Poſſeſſion of *Supreme Good*, that is, of *Pleaſure*. But, ſay you, *Epicurus* is ſubject to Pain. Why! there is nothing in that; for he tells us, that were he broiling, he would call out that *it was delightful.*

In what Circumſtance then has the God the better of him, if not in his Eternity? And what *Good* is there in Eternity, beſides ſupreme and perpetual Pleaſure? Now, what does it ſignify to talk big, unleſs one talks conſiſtently? Happy Life conſiſts in *bodily Pleaſure*; I will add, if

you

you will, in *mental Pleaſure* too, if the Senſations of the Mind, as you ſay, depend on thoſe of the Body. But alas! how can this Pleaſure be enſur'd for ever to a wiſe Man? For the Eſſentials of Pleaſure are not in the Power of the Wiſe; Becauſe your Happineſs does not conſiſt in Wiſdom, but in thoſe Materials which Wiſdom procures for compoſing Happineſs. But all this is foreign to the Man. Now, whatever is foreign, is in hazard; and therefore *Happineſs in Life* is ſubject to Fortune, which *Epicurus* holds to be *but a ſmall Conſideration to a wiſe Man.*

BUT you will tell me this is all trifling, *for Nature itſelf ſufficiently enriches the Wiſe*; and *Epicurus* tells us, that thoſe Riches are attainable. This is very finely ſaid; and I have nothing to object to it: For, he ſays, that the moſt ſlender Fare, that is, the meaneſt Victuals and Drink, can give as much Pleaſure as the moſt exquiſite and elegant Dainties. This I would allow him, would he at the ſame time admit that the Quality of our Food was no conſtituent Part of happy Life. I would praiſe him for that, for it is Truth. I can hear *Socrates*, who never ranked Pleaſure under any Head of Happineſs, ſay, *That Hunger gives the beſt Sawce to Victuals, and Thirſt the higheſt Flavour to Drink.* But I can't bear a Man, who regards Pleaſure as the chief End of Living, talking as temperately as a *Piſo* lives, yet living like a *Galonius*. Nor do I think that ſuch a Man underſtands what he ſays.

HE tells us, that natural Riches are attainable, becauſe Nature is contented with but a little.

No

No doubt ſhe would be ſo, did ſhe not put ſuch a Value upon Pleaſure. But, ſaid *Epicurus*, *The meaneſt Things give us as exquiſite Senſations of Pleaſure as the richeſt.* But this is talking, not only like a Man void of all Underſtanding, but void of all Taſte. This is a Language for thoſe who, deſpiſing Pleaſure itſelf, put a Sturgeon and a Herring upon the ſame Footing. But the Man who places *Supreme Good* in Pleaſure, is not to judge by his Reaſon, but his Senſes; and is to call that *moſt excellent* which is *moſt delicious.*

BUT admitting that the higheſt Pleaſures may be attain'd at little, or, if you will, no Expence; Let there be as exquiſite Pleaſure in the Watercreſſes, which *Xenophon* tells us the *Perſians* us'd to eat, as in the Banquets of *Syracuſe*, which *Plato* ſo loudly condemns; let, I ſay, the Purchaſe of Pleaſure be as cheap as you have a mind; but ſtill what ſhall we ſay with regard to *Pain*, which may be attended with ſuch Tortures as to be abſolutely incompatible with *Happineſs*, if *Pain* is the *greateſt Evil.*

FOR *Metrodorus*, who was a ſecond *Epicurus*, deſcribes a happy Man in the following Terms: *When he has a healthful Conſtitution of Body, and is well aſſur'd that it will continue ſo.* But how can any Man be aſſur'd how his Conſtitution will be, I will not ſay for a Year, but for a Day? *Pain* therefore, or Supreme Evil, is always to be fear'd, even when abſent; for we are every Moment liable to it: And pray, how is the Dread of the *greateſt Evil* reconcilable to the *Happineſs of Life?*

BUT,

BUT, *ſays he, Epicurus* preſcribes a Method for being above Pain. Now, there is an Abſurdity in the very Terms of being above the *greateſt Evil.* But what is his *Method?* Why, he tells us, *that the moſt exquiſite Pain is but ſhort.* In the *firſt* place, What do you call *ſhort?* In the next place, What is it you term *the moſt exquiſite Pain?* For may not the moſt exquiſite Pain remain for ſeveral Days, nay Months, unleſs you mean that Pain which kills as ſoon as it ſeizes; but who is afraid of that Pain?

I WISH you had had a Receipt for alleviating the Pain with which I ſaw my Friend *Cn. Octavius,* the beſt and the moſt humane of Mankind, waſted; not once, or for a ſhort Time, but often, and long. Immortal Gods! what excruciating Pains did he bear, when every Joint about him ſeem'd to be burning? Yet was he not wretched, tho' oppreſs'd; becauſe to him Pain was not the greateſt Evil: But he muſt have been miſerable, had he ſwimm'd in Pleaſures down the Stream of a vicious, profligate Life.

AS to what you ſay, that Pain, if great, is ſhort, and continued Pain becomes light, I cannot underſtand how that can be: For I have ſeen very great Pain continue for a long Time; yet it hath received a Mitigation from another and a truer Cauſe, a Cauſe that can be of no Service to you, as you love not Virtue for herſelf. There are ſome Precepts, nay, I may call them Laws, laid down by a brave Man, which prevent his ſhrinking under Pain. Therefore it is ſhameful, I will not ſay, to complain; for that ſometimes cannot

not be avoided, but to blubber, as *Philoctetes* did, in the *Lesbian* Cave:

Thro' the wide Vault his Cries and Groans reſound,
And his loud Howl, the arched Rocks rebound.

LET *Epicurus*, if he can, put himſelf in the Place of a Perſon,

* *Deep in whoſe Veins the Viper's Venom flows,*
And circulates intolerable Woes.

TRANSFORM but *Epicurus* into *Philoctetes*, then let him tell us, *the Pain that is exquiſite is ſhort*; but let him do it after he has lain, like *Philoctetes*, for ten Years within the Cave.

As to his Maxim, *If Pain continues long it is light*; for it admits of Intervals and Relaxations. In the *firſt* place, This does not often happen; in the next place, What Alleviation does that *Relaxation* bring, which is attended with the recent Memory of paſt Pain, and is tormented by the Dread of *future* and perhaps *immediate* Pain? Why then, ſays *Epicurus*, ſuch Men ought to die: That perhaps may be the beſt Courſe; But then what becomes of your Maxim, *That a wiſe Man may always command a greater Share of Pleaſure than he feels of Pain.* For if this Maxim is true, you do very ill to adviſe him to put an End to his Life. Let us rather ſay, that

* *Deep in*] This alludes to the Story of the Sufferings of *Philoctetes*, who was wounded by one of *Hercules*'s envenom'd Arrows; and is part of a Play of *Euripides* upon that Subject.

it

it is ſhameful for a Man to be diſcouraged, to be broken with, to ſink under Pain. For your Maxim, *If Pain is exquiſite, it is ſhort; if long, light,* is but a Piece of meer Jargon. No; Pain can only be mitigated by the Application of *Virtue, Magnanimity, Patience* and *Courage.*

THAT I may not ramble, let us hear the dying Words of *Epicurus*; and from thence you may conclude how widely his Practice differ'd from his Profeſſion.

EPICURUS *to* *Hermachus, *Health. Theſe Lines I have wrote on a happy, tho' the laſt Day of my Life; for I felt ſuch Pains in my Belly and my Bowels, that nothing could exceed them.* Why; if Pain is the greateſt Evil, this Man ſurely was *unhappy*, his Condition can admit of no other Term. But let us hear how he goes on:

YET all thoſe Pains are compenſated by the Joy I feel in my Mind, and by reflecting on the great Diſcoveries I have made in Reaſoning and Philoſophy. But do you in conſequence of that Affection, which you have from a Child borne for me and Philoſophy, take the Children of Metrodorus *under your Tuition?*

Now, I would not prefer the Death of *Epaminondas,* or *Leonidas,* to that of *Epicurus.* Tho' the firſt of them, after defeating the *Lacedæmonians* at *Mantinea,* finding himſelf mortally wounded, no ſooner was ſenſible of it, than he ask'd, *whether his Shield was ſafe?* After his Attendants in Tears anſwer'd him it was,

* Hermachus,] This *Hermachus* was an intimate Friend of *Epicurus.*

he then ask'd, *whether the Enemy was put to the Rout?* This too being answer'd according to his Wishes, he order'd the Javelin that was sticking in his Body to be pull'd out; which being followed by a large Effusion of Blood, he joyfully died in the Arms of Victory.

As to *Leonidas*, the King of *Lacedæmon*, he, together with three Hundred *Spartans*, withstood the Enemy in the Streights of *Thermopyle*, after determining that Flight was shameful, and Death glorious. The Deaths of Generals are famous; whereas Philosophers commonly die on their Beds. Yet what *Epicurus* mentions to be his greatest Pride in dying, is worth remarking: *These Pains*, says he, *are compensated by Joy*. Indeed, *Epicurus*, I hear the Voice of a Philosopher; but you have forgot what was fit for you to say. For in the *first* place, If those Discoveries, which you say you have Pleasure in reflecting on, are true; if what you wrote and discovered is true, it is impossible you should rejoice, for you have not now one corporeal Sense to gratify: And you often taught, *there could be neither Joy nor Pain but arising from the Body. I rejoice*, says he, *in the past*. In what past? If it regarded the Body; I see you balancing your Pains by your Philosophy, but not by the Remembrance of the Pleasures which your Body had enjoy'd. If they regarded the Mind, it is false; because you deny that the Mind can be sensible of any Joy independant of the Body. Then why did you recommend to him the Children of *Metrodorus?* What relation had this noble disin-

diſintereſted Act of Humanity, for ſo I eſteem it, to the Body?

VIEW it, *Torquatus*, in what Light you will; but you will find nothing in this charming Epiſtle of *Epicurus*'s agreeable or conformable to his own Doctrine. He confutes himſelf; and his Probity and Morals are Antidotes to the Poiſon of his Writings. For that Recommendation of the Children, that tender Remembrance of Friendſhip, that Senſe of the higheſt Moral Duties which he retain'd to his lateſt Gaſp, are Proofs that Probity is the innate Gift of Man, unbrib'd by Pleaſures, and unhir'd by Reward. Nor indeed can we require a nobler Proof, that Honeſty and Virtue are intrinſically amiable, than in ſeeing ſuch exalted Humanity in a dying Perſon.

BUT as I think the Letter I have juſt now almoſt litterally tranſlated highly commendable, tho' it's Sentiments are far from being conſiſtent with the Doctrine of his Philoſophy; ſo I am of opinion, that his laſt Will is not only below the Gravity of a Philoſopher, but even contradictory to his own Sentiments. For he often maintain'd at large, and very briefly and ſuccinctly in the Book I juſt mention'd, *that Death was no Concern of ours: For whatever is diſſolved is without Senſe, and that which is without Senſe can never affect us.* He might have cloathed this in more fit and elegant Expreſſions; for, as he lays the Sentiment down, *that which is diſſolved is without Senſe*, does not ſufficiently imply what *Diſſolution* is.

BUT tho' I underſtand his Meaning, I am ſtill at Liberty to enquire, ſince all Senſe is extin-

guiſh'd by *Diſſolution*, that is, by *Death*, and all after is nothing that affects us, why he ſo minutely and carefully provides in his latter Will, that his Heirs *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, *ſhall, at the Diſcretion of* Hermachus, *beſtow a certain Proportion of Money for the annual Celebration of his Birth-day in the Month of* January. And likewiſe, *that every Month, on the twentieth Day of the Moon, they ſhould contribute to a Feaſt for his Companions in Philoſophy, in honour of himſelf and* Metrodorus.

I WILL not not ſay that thoſe Proviſions were unworthy of a fine Gentleman and an agreeable Companion; but ſurely it was inconſiſtent with a Philoſopher, eſpecially a natural Philoſopher, as he wanted to paſs for, to think that there could be ſuch a thing as the anniverſary Revolution of any Man's Birth-day. Can the ſame Day come about oftener than once? ſurely not. *But ſuch another Day may.* No; not without an Intervention of many thouſand Years, when the Revolution of the heavenly Bodies forms the ſame Syſtem, as it did on the Day you want to commemorate: For there can be no ſuch thing as any Man's ſecond Birth-day. But you tell me, *that a certain Day is held as ſuch*, as if I did not know that. But be that it will, why is he to be honour'd after Death? or why ſhould he make ſuch a Proviſion by his laſt Will, after delivering it as an Oracle, that nothing can affect us after Death? This was not acting like a Man, who, in his Mind, had travelled over innumerable Worlds and Regions, which never had

had either Limits or Bounds. *Democritus* could never have been guilty of any ſuch thing. I chuſe to mention *him* rather than others, becauſe *Epicurus* has followed him alone.

BUT if a Day was to be celebrated, why ſhould it be the Day on which he came into the World, rather than that on which he became wiſe? But, ſay you, he could not have been wiſe, if he had not been born; and, ſay I, he could not have been born, if his Grandmother had not been born before him.

IN ſhort, *Torquatus*, the whole Matter is this; that it is inconſiſtent with Men of Learning to order their Memory to be celebrated after their Deaths. I ſhall not here mention the manner in which you celebrate thoſe Birth-days, or how much you expoſe yourſelf to the Ridicule of Men of Wit. I am not for wrangling. I will only venture to ſay, that it had been more grateful in *you*, to have *celebrated* the Birth-day of *Epicurus*, than it was *decent* for *him* to provide for it by his Will.

BUT to return to our Purpoſe; for we were led into the Digreſſion upon the Letter, while we were diſcourſing of Pain. Give me now leave to ſum up the whole, as follows: A Man who is involved in the greateſt Evil, cannot be happy while he continues in that State; but the wiſe Man is always happy, though he is ſometimes in Pain: *Therefore Pain is not the greateſt Evil.* Now what becomes of your Maxim, *That paſt Felicities never can be loſt to the Wiſe, and that he ought not to remember paſt Evils?* In the firſt place, is it in our Power to

remember but juſt what we pleaſe? When *Simonides*, or ſomebody elſe, promis'd to help *Themiſtocles* to an Art of Memory, he anſwer'd him, *I had rather you would furniſh me with the Art of Forgetfulneſs; for I remember, in ſpite of myſelf, what I would chuſe to forget, but I cannot forget what I would chuſe not to remember.*

THIS was a ſenſible Anſwer, for the Thing is ſo; and Philoſophers take too much upon them, when they *forbid a Man to remember.* Take care that you don't act as deſpotically, or rather more ſo, than *Manlius* himſelf, if you command more than I am able to perform. But what if even the Memory of paſt Evils is delightful? as ſome Proverbs tell us, which have more Truth in them than *your* Maxims. For it is a common Saying, *Paſt Labours are ſweet.* And there is a Sentence in *Euripides*, not much amiſs; which, if I can, I will tranſlate into our Tongue, for you all know it in *Greek:*

Sweet the Remembrance is of Labours paſt.

BUT let us return to paſt Felicities. Were yours ſuch as *Marius* could boaſt of, when the Remembrance of them alleviated his Pain, whilſt he was in Baniſhment, in Poverty, and ſunk in a Moraſs; then would I give both Attention and Approbation to your Doctrine: For the Happineſs of a wiſe Man's Life never can be complete or finiſh'd, if all his noble Counſels and Actions were to periſh in Oblivion within his own Mind.

BUT with you, the Remembrance of Pleaſures you have taſted, nay, ſenſually taſted, makes the Happineſs of Life: For, if there were any others, then your Maxim would be falſe, *That all the Pleaſures of the Mind ariſe from it's Communication with the Body.* But if the Pleaſure of the Body, even when paſt, gives Delight, I cannot imagine why *Ariſtotle* ſo much ridicul'd the Epitaph of *Sardanapalus*; in which that *Aſſyrian* Monarch boaſts, *that he had carried off with him all his Pleaſures:* For, ſaid *Ariſtotle*, if he could enjoy thoſe Pleaſures only during the very Moment in which he was taſting them in his Life-time, how could they remain with him after his Death? Therefore the Pleaſures of the Body are *momentary* and *inſtantaneous*, and oftner give us Reaſon to repent of them, than to indulge their Remembrance. So that *Africanus* is much more happy, when he addreſſes his Country in the following Words:

* *Thou*, Rome, *no more ſhalt hoſtile Terrors fear,*
Since Scipio's *Toils thy laſting Glories rear.*

This is a fine Sentiment. The Hero rejoices in reflecting on his *Toils*; you bid us rejoice in reflecting on our *Pleaſures*. He recollects the Remembrance of what never had any Relation to that ſenſual Pleaſure, in which you are entirely immers'd.

BUT how can you prove your Aſſertion, that all the Pleaſures and Pains of the Mind ariſe

* *Thou*, Rome,] Theſe Verſes are only partially quoted from *Ennius*.

from their Communication with thoſe of the Body? Did you never feel Delight? I know whom I ſpeak to: I ſpeak to *Torquatus*; and I ask of him, if nothing ever delighted him purely by it's own intrinſic Beauty and Value? I don't talk of Dignity, Honour, or the Luſtre of Virtue, which we have already mention'd: I mean the reading or ſpeaking of an Oration or Poem, your Knowledge in the Hiſtory of Men and Countries; a Statue, a Picture, a fine Situation, Plays, a Hunting-Match, * *Lucullus*'s Villa; for I will not mention your own, becauſe I know you would have had a Subterfuge there, as you would have pleaded a perſonal Intereſt in it. But let me ask you, whether you will reſolve the Pleaſure thoſe Objects give you into ſenſual Delight? or, if there is any thing that can pleaſe you by it's own Reſult? You will either be extremely perverſe, if you perſiſt in reſolving all theſe into bodily Senſation; or you muſt abandon the whole Syſtem of *Epicurus*'s *Pleaſure*, if you do not.

But as to what you maintain'd, that the Pleaſures and Pains of the Mind are more exquiſite than thoſe of the Body, becauſe the Mind has a Conſciouſneſs of three Periods, and the Body only of one, which is the preſent; how can you prove, that the Man who feels Joy on my account, is ſenſible of it in a greater Degree than I myſelf am? The Pleaſure of the Mind ariſes from it's Connection with that of the Body, and is more exquiſite than that of the Body:

* This *Villa* was very famous amongſt the *Romans* in our Author's Time.

Therefore

Therefore the Perſon who pays a Congratulation, feels more Joy than he who receives it. But while you want to make the wiſe Man happy, in poſſeſſing greater Pleaſures in his Mind than thoſe of the Body can be in any Reſpect, you don't foreſee the Conſequence; becauſe, by the ſame way of Reaſoning, the Pains of his Mind muſt be likewiſe more exquiſite than thoſe of his Body. Thus, the Man whom you pronounce to be always *happy*, muſt ſometimes be *miſerable:* But indeed you never can make him happy, while you make every thing ſubſervient to Pleaſure and Pain.

CHAP. X.

THEREFORE, *Torquatus*, you muſt ſearch out ſome other Supreme Good in Life. Let us leave Pleaſure to Brutes, whoſe Evidence you call into your Aſſiſtance upon this Occaſion. But what if it ſhould appear, that even the Brutes, under the Guidance of Nature, have ſome other Principle to gratify beſides Pleaſure; as we may conclude by their performing certain Actions with a perceptible Degree of Satisfaction, though attended with Labour, ſuch as bringing forth and nurturing their Young? Some of them love rambling and travelling, while others of them herd together in ſome reſpect like a ſocial Community.

IN certain kinds of Birds we perceive ſome Indication of Affection, Knowledge, and Memory; and in many we may obſerve * Order. There-

* *Order.*] I have here choſen to read *Diſciplina* rather than *Deſideria* in the Original.

fore

fore, ſhall there be in Beaſts ſome Reſemblance of human Virtues diſtinct *from* Pleaſure, and ſhall there be in Man no Virtue but what is directed *to* Pleaſure? and ſhall we ſay, that Nature has beſtow'd no characteriſtical Property upon Man, who ſo eminently excels all other Creatures?

BUT indeed, if every thing conſiſts in Pleaſure, we are very much inferior to Brutes: For to them the Earth affords abundant and various Supplies of Paſture, without their toiling; while we have the greateſt Difficulty to come at Food, after ſevere Labour. Yet can I never imagine that the Supreme Good to Man and to Beaſt is the ſame. For why ſo much Induſtry in attaining to Perfection in the Arts, ſo fair a Combination of noble Purſuits, ſo lovely a Train of Virtues, to purchaſe Pleaſure without any other Conſideration.

SUPPOSING, when *Xerxes* had march'd over the Seas, and ſail'd over the Land, with all his Train of Sea and Land Forces, after throwing a Bridge over the *Helleſpont*, and piercing thro' Mount *Athos*, in his impetuous Irruption into *Greece*; any body had ask'd him, what the Intention was of ſo numerous and ſo war-like an Appearance? and that he had anſwer'd, *he wanted to carry off ſome Honey from* Hymettus; no doubt all his Parade would have appear'd very ridiculous. In like manner, if we ſay, that the wiſe Man, who, being inſtructed and furniſh'd in all the numerous nobleſt Arts and Virtues, does not, like *Xerxes*, travel over Seas and ſail over Mountains, but reviews in his Mind the whole

whole Extent of Heaven, Earth, and Sea; I ſay, ſhould we ſay that he does it all *to acquire Pleaſure*, we may with equal Reaſon ſay, that he undertakes all his mighty Labour to *taſte Honey*.

BELIEVE me, *Torquatus*, we are born for nobler and more exalted Purpoſes. This appears not alone from the Faculties of the Mind, which contain the Memory of numberleſs Objects in Life; a Sagacity in conjecturing future Events that approaches to Divinity; a Senſe of Shame, which moderates our Appetites; a Love of Juſtice, that faithful Guardian of Society; a firm and fixed Contempt of Pain and Death, amidſt all the Toils we ſuffer, and all the Dangers we undergo; for theſe are the mental Properties: But I will refer you to reflect upon the Frame of his Limbs, nay, his Senſes; which you will find are calculated, like the reſt of his Body, to be not only the *Attendants*, but the *Inſtruments* of his Virtues.

BUT what if there are many Properties in the Body itſelf, that are preferable to Pleaſure; ſuch as Strength, Health, Swiftneſs, and Comelineſs? Then what will you ſay of the Properties of the Underſtanding, which the moſt learned of the Ancients thought to partake of ſomewhat that is *Celeſtial* and *Divine?* Now, if Supreme Good conſiſts in Pleaſure, as you maintain, the higheſt of our Wiſhes would be to wallow Night and Day, without the leaſt Intermiſſion, in the moſt exquiſite Pleaſure, that our Senſes might be operated upon by, as it were, an Effuſion of all Delight. But where is there a Man who would

would be worthy of that Name, ſhould he chuſe to paſs even one Day in ſuch Pleaſure?

THE *Cyrenaics*, 'tis true, avow this; you are a little more ſhame-fac'd; but they are more conſiſtent with their own Doctrine. But without reviewing thoſe ſublime Arts which, if a Man had not, he was term'd by our Anceſtors, **a Cypher in the Creation*; let me ask you, whether you think (I won't ſay an *Homer*, an *Archilochus*, a *Pindar*) even a *Phidias*, a *Polycletus*, a *Zeuxis*, directed their Arts to the Purpoſes of ſenſual Pleaſures? And ſhall an Artiſt propoſe a nobler End to himſelf from the Beauty of his Figures, than a Patriot from the Merit of his Actions? But indeed no other Cauſe can be aſſign'd for this mighty Deluſion, which has ſpread ſo far and ſo wide, than, That when a Man conceives Pleaſure to be the Supreme Good, he holds no Conſultation with thoſe Properties of his Mind, which contain his Reaſon and his Sagacity; but with his Appetites, which form the ſlighteſt Part of the Human Underſtanding. For, let me ask you, if there are Gods, as even *you* own there are, whether it is poſſible for them to be happy, without enjoying bodily Pleaſures? or, if they can be happy without Pleaſures of that Nature, why you ſhould deny a like Property to the Mind of a wiſe Man?

READ, *Torquatus*, the Encomiums, not of *Homer*'s Heroes, nor of *Cyrus*, or of *Ageſilaus*, or *Ariſtides*, *Themiſtocles*, *Philip*, or *Alexander*; but of our own Countrymen, of your own Family; and you won't find one of them prais'd

* Orig. *Inertem.*

for

for being an excellent Artiſt in the *Science and Myſtery of Pleaſure.* The Inſcriptions upon their Monuments are not at all to this Effect. You ſee the Inſcription over the * Gate, WHOM VERY MANY NATIONS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED UPON AS THE BEST OF THE PEOPLE. Can we imagine that very many Nations agreed in giving this Character to *Calatinus*, becauſe he had the moſt excellent Hand in procuring and preparing Pleaſures? When we ſay of young Men, that they promiſe well, and ſhew happy Diſpoſitions, do we mean that they will take care to ſerve themſelves only, and to do whatever can moſt gratify their own Intereſts? Don't you perceive what univerſal Diſturbance and Confuſion this muſt introduce? It aboliſhes all Benevolence, all Affection, the Bonds of Concord. For if you do a Favour to any Man, meerly on your own account, you are not *his* Friend, but an Uſurer; and there is no kind of Thanks due to any Man, who does a Kindneſs only for his own Profit. Nay, the moſt exalted Virtues muſt be laid in the Duſt, if Pleaſure ſhall command. And there are at the ſame time many ſcandalous Vices, which it will be hard to prove that Wiſdom can guard againſt, any otherwiſe than by allowing Virtue in itſelf to be very powerful.

BUT not to deſcend into other Particulars, which are innumerable, genuine Virtue muſt neceſſarily ſhut up every Avenue of Pleaſure. You are not to expect a Proof of this from ME. You need but turn your Eyes inward upon your own Breaſt; prove and examine it with all the In-

* This Inſcription was over the *Porta Capena.*

tenſeneſs

tenſeneſs of Thought; then put the Queſtion to yourſelf, whether you would chuſe, in the Fruition of perpetual Pleaſure, to live for ever in that Tranquility you ſo often talk of, without feeling Pain, and be at the ſame time free of all Apprehenſion of Pain; a Pleaſure which you uſed to tack to the other, but a Pleaſure that never can exiſt? or whether you would chuſe to poſſeſs the Love and Eſteem of the World, by relieving and ſuccouring the Needy, though even at the Expence of *Hercules*'s * Sufferings; for our Anceſtors gave to ſuch Toils as were indiſpenſable to our Duties in Life, the uncomfortable Appellation of *Sufferings*. I would preſs for, and inſiſt upon, an Anſwer to this Queſtion, were I not afraid of your maintaining that *Hercules* himſelf, who toil'd ſo extremely for the Good of Mankind, perform'd all he did for Pleaſure.

HAVING thus finiſh'd my Diſcourſe, I have ſome Friends, *ſaid* Torquatus, whom I will lay all this before; and though I have ſomewhat myſelf to offer in anſwer to it, yet I chuſe to refer you to them, as you will find them much riper upon the Subject than I am. *I ſuppoſe you mean thoſe very worthy as well as learned Men*, Syro *and* Philodemus? The very ſame, *reply'd he*. With all my heart, *ſaid I*; but it is more reaſonable that *Triarius* here ſhould paſs ſome Judgment upon our Difference. I am afraid we ſhould have a very partial Judgment from him, at leaſt with regard to this Point, *re-*

* Orig. *Ærumnæ*.

ply'd

ply'd Torquatus *with a Smile.* You can talk of thoſe Matters with Temperance; but he, like a true *Stoic*, quite harraſſes us. Nay, *interrupts* Triarius, you ſhall have more of that hereafter; for I ſhall ever have in readineſs for you what I have juſt now heard; but I won't attack you, till I perceive that you are quite prepar'd by thoſe Gentlemen you talk of.

UPON this we put an End both to our Diſputation and our Walk.

The End of the Second Book.

M. TULLIUS

M. TULLIUS CICERO

Concerning the

ENDS *of* THINGS *GOOD* and *EVIL.*

BOOK the THIRD.

CHAP. I.

WERE Pleaſure, my Friend *Brutus*, to plead her own own Cauſe, without her obſtinate Advocates, I am of opinion, that ſhe would, from a Conviction by what is ſaid in the laſt Book, yield it up to the Dignity of Virtue. For it would be downright Impudence in her to hold longer out againſt Virtue, to prefer what is *pleaſurable* to what is *honeſt*; or to value the titillating Delight of the Body, and the Joy that ariſes from it, above Majeſty and Firmneſs of Mind. Let us therefore bid her adieu, and confine

fine her to her own Province, leaſt her Attractions and Charms ſhould prevent the Strictneſs of our important Enquiry.

FOR the Subject of it is where Supreme Good is ſeated; ſince we find the ſame Arguments, which prove Pleaſure to be far removed from it, ſerve almoſt equally againſt thoſe who maintain the Privation of Pain to be the End of *good Things*. Nor indeed is it poſſible to prove that Supreme Good exiſts without Virtue, that beſt of all good Things. Therefore, tho' I have pretty well diſcharged my Duty in the Diſcourſe I held with *Torquatus*, yet the Diſpute I am now to enter into with the *Stoics* will be more obſtinate. The *Epicurean* Tenets, with regard to Pleaſure, are manag'd neither ſubtilly nor abſtruſely: For as they who maintain them are not very artful Diſputants, ſo there is not a great deal of Difficulty in refuting them: Becauſe *Epicurus* tells us, that we ought not ſo much as to diſpute of Pleaſure, as all the Judgment that can be found of it is placed in the Senſes; ſo that it is ſufficient for us to have a Hint from them, without our going into farther Diſſertations. Therefore the Diſpute betwixt *Torquatus* and me was extremely plain; for in his Diſcourſe he made uſe of no Intricacies or Windings: And I think my Reaſoning was extremely clear. But you are ſenſible how ſubtile, or rather thorny, the Manner of the *Stoics* is; even when they diſpute with the *Greeks*, and much more ſo with us, who muſt even coin Words, and annex new Terms to new Objects. This is what can ſurprize no Man who has any tolerable Share of Learning,

when he reflects, that in every Art which is not commonly practiſed, there muſt be a large Creation of new Terms to expreſs the ſeveral Subjects peculiar to that Art. Thus Logicians and Naturaliſts make uſe of pure *Greek* Terms. As to Geometricians, Muſicians and Grammarians, they have all of them a certain Language of their own. As to the Art of Rhetoric, which quite belongs to popular Aſſemblies and the *Forum*, it has, as it were, peculiar and proper Terms.

But not to mention thoſe more elegant and polite Arts, even Tradeſmen can't carry on their own Buſineſs without uſing technical and bye Terms, which we are unacquainted with. Nay Agriculture itſelf, the moſt remote of all Profeſſions from Politeneſs and Elegance, has mark'd the different Branches of it's own Buſineſs with Terms that are ſtrange to the reſt of the World. But this is a Liberty much more neceſſary to Philoſophy; which is the *Art of Life*: Nor is it poſſible to adapt to it one Word ſnatch'd from the Bar.

But of all Philoſophers the *Stoics* have introduc'd the greateſt Innovations; for their Chief, *Zeno*, was not ſo properly an Inventor of *new Principles* as of *new Words*. But if in a Language generally thought to be the moſt copious, the *Greeks* allow'd their learned Men to coin Words when they were to diſpute upon any uncommon Topic; how much more allowable is this Liberty to us, who are the firſt that have ventur'd upon thoſe Subjects in our Language? But at the ſame time, I have often ſaid, and thereby given great Umbrage, not only to the *Greeks*,

Greeks, but to ſuch of our own Countrymen as choſe rather to be thought *Greeks* than *Romans*, that far from yielding to the *Greeks* in Richneſs of Expreſſion, we out-do them. We are therefore now to endeavour to prove this, not only in Arts that are peculiar to us, but in their own Arts; for with regard to certain general Terms, ſuch as Philoſophy, Rhetoric, Logic, Geometry and Muſic, we look upon them as *Latin* Terms, and Uſe has adapted them to our Language without their being originally ſo (not but they might have been juſt as well expreſs'd in *Latin*;) therefore I conſider them as Words of our own. And ſo much for *Words*.

But as to *Things*, *Brutus*, I am very often afraid leſt I ſhould be blam'd for addreſſing myſelf to you, who are ſo great a Proficient in Philoſophy, and that too of the moſt excellent Kind. I ſhould indeed juſtly merit Cenſure, if I did this from any Vanity of inſtructing you; but as that is far from being the Caſe, and as I don't ſend theſe Papers to you with any View of informing you in what you already are ſo compleat a Maſter; but becauſe I can uſe greateſt Freedom with your Name, and becauſe at the ſame time I look upon you to be the moſt candid Critic and Judge of thoſe Studies which are in common to us both; give therefore, as uſual, a ſtrict Attention, that you may be able to judge of the Diſpute I once had with that divine and extraordinary Perſon, your Uncle.

For when I was at *Tuſculanum*, and wanted to look into ſome Books from the Library of

the * young *Lucullus*, I came to his Country-ſeat, as uſual, to fetch them. When I came thither I ſaw *Marcus Cato*, who I did not know was there, ſitting in the Library, quite pil'd round with Heaps of *Stoic* Books. You know how unexhauſted his Deſire, and how inſatiable his Thirſt was for reading; inſomuch, that, without the leaſt Regard to the idle Reproaches of the People, he uſed to read even in the Senate-Houſe, while the Senate was aſſembling, but ſtill without his omiting one Duty he owed to his Country: So you may eaſily imagine, that when he was at Leiſure, and had the Conveniency of ſo noble a Library, he was quite a Devourer of Books, if I may be allow'd to adapt ſuch an Expreſſion to ſo important a Subject.

As it happen'd that we met without either of us expecting the other, he immediately roſe up, and accoſted me with the uſual Salutation, *Pr'ythee what has brought you hither?* I ſuppoſe you come from your Country-ſeat, and had I known you had been there, I would have waited upon you. Yeſterday, *anſwer'd I*, after the Shews were begun I left the City, and arriv'd in the Evening: But my Errand here is to fetch away ſome Books: And, by the bye, *Cato*, our young Friend *Lucullus* muſt be made acquainted with all this noble Collection; for I ſhould chuſe he were fonder of this Library than of all the other

* *Young* Lucullus,] This young Gentleman was Heir to the famous General *Lucullus*, who built and furniſhed this *Villa*; and was Nephew to *Cato* by his Uterine Siſter *Servilia*, who was of the Family of the *Cæpiones*.

Furni-

Furniture belonging to his *Villa*: For I take great Concern in him. But it belongs properly to your Charge, that he be ſo educated as to be worthy of his Father, our Friend *Cæpio*, and yourſelf, who are his near Relation. But my Concern is not without good Cauſe: For I am ſtill touched when I reflect upon his Grandfather; you know, *Cato*, how much I valued *Cæpio*, who, in my Judgment, had he been now alive, would have been one of the leading Men in *Rome*: And *Lucullus* is ſtill preſent to my Eyes, a Man the moſt excellent of Mankind, my intimate Friend and endeared Companion.

It is, *anſwer'd he*, generous in you, to have a Regard for the Memory, and an Affection for the Deſcendants of two Men who recommended the Care of their Children to you by their laſt Wills. As to what you ſay is my Duty, I own it; but I join you as my Partner in diſcharging it. Let me add too, that the Boy already gives many Indications both of good Nature and Genius. But conſider how young he is. I do conſider that, *anſwer'd I*; but ſtill he ought to be initiated in thoſe Arts, which, if he drinks in while he is young, will prepare and fit him for higher Attainments. That, *replied he*, we ſhall take frequent and ſerious Occaſions of diſcourſing about hereafter, and let us ſtill act in Concert one with another; but pray let us ſit down — Which we accordingly did.

CHAP. II.

WHEN we were ſeated; *Says* Cato, What occaſion have you for any Books from hence, as you are furniſhed with ſo fine a Library of your own? I came, *anſwer'd I*, to carry away with me ſome Commentaries of *Ariſtotle*, which I knew were here, that I might read them while I am at leiſure; which is not, you know, often my Caſe. How deſirous I am, *anſwer'd he*, that you ſhould incline to the *Stoics!* For if any Man ever had, *you* ſurely have reaſon to admit nothing for Good but Virtue. Take care, *anſwer'd I*, how you impoſe new Terms upon Things, which, in effect, both you and I underſtand in the ſame Senſe. For we are agreed in *Meaning*, we only differ in *Expreſſion*. We are far from being agreed, *anſwer'd he*; for if you admit that any thing beſides the *Honeſtum* is deſirable, or to be accounted a Good, you both extinguiſh the *Honeſtum* itſelf, which is the Eye of Virtue, and abſolutely demoliſh Virtue.

CATO, replied I, this is very fine talking; but take care leſt you have this Knack of pouring out pretty Expreſſions, in common with *Pyrrho* and *Ariſto*, who put all Things upon a Level. I ſhould be glad to know your Sentiments of their Doctrine. If you want to know my Sentiments, then, *anſwer'd he*, they are, That all the worthy, the brave, the juſt and the wiſeſt *Romans* we have either ſeen or heard of, who, without following any Dictates but thoſe of Nature, have perform'd glorious Deeds: All thoſe Patriots,

Patriots, I ſay, were much better tutor'd by Nature alone, than they could have been by any Syſtem of Philoſophy they could have embrac'd, excepting that which accounts nothing Good beſides *Honeſty*, and nothing Evil beſides *Turpitude*. All the other Syſtems of Philoſophy are more or leſs remov'd from this Doctrine; but ſtill, all of them who admit into the Number of Things either Good or Evil, aught that is independant of Virtue, in my opinion are ſo far from aſſiſting or confirming our Progreſs in ſound Morals, that they vitiate even Nature itſelf. For unleſs it is granted that nothing can be *good* beſides what is honeſt, it is impoſſible to attain to *Happineſs in Life*. And in this Caſe, I don't conceive why we ſhould give any Application to the Study of Philoſophy. For if the wiſe Man can at any time be unhappy, I ſhould think all our ſhining famous Virtues of very little Value.

CATO, replied I, you would have ſaid the very ſame Things you have ſaid now, had you follow'd *Pyrrho* or *Ariſto*. For you are very ſenſible that they held this *Honeſtum* to be not only the *Chief*, but, as you do, the *Sole* Good. If it is; Then what I perceive you aim at muſt follow, That all wiſe Men muſt be happy. Don't you therefore approve of their Doctrine? are you not of opinion that we ought to embrace their Sentiments? By no means theirs, *anſwer'd he*, becauſe it is the Characteriſtic of Virtue to have an Election in thoſe Objects that are agreeable to Nature; whereas they have levelled them all to ſuch a Degree, and made the whole ſuch matter

of Indifference, that they follow no Choice of hers, and thereby have taken away Virtue itſelf.

In this, *replied I*, you ſpeak extremely well; but I doubt much whether you don't do the ſame thing, as you admit nothing can be good but what is morally fitting and honeſt, and take away all Difference as to all other Objects. That is, *replied he*, ſuppoſing *I took it away*; but I *leave* it. How can that be, *anſwers I*, if Virtue only; if only that which you call honeſt, laudable, beautiful (for different Words ſignifying the ſame thing will no doubt illuſtrate it the more) I ſay, if that is the Sole Good, what other Object of Choice can you have? Or, if there is nothing Evil, but what is baſe, diſhoneſt, unbecoming, wicked, flagitious and vile (for I will give you ſynonimous Terms for this too, to mark it the ſtronger;) What elſe is there that you ought to avoid? As you are not ignorant, *anſwers he*, of what I am to ſay on this Head, and as I ſuſpect that you will endeavour to take ſome Advantage of the Shortneſs of my Anſwers, I will not reply to every Particular; I will rather explain, as we are now at leiſure, unleſs you think it impertinent, the whole Syſtem of *Zeno* and the *Stoics*. So far from being impertinent, *replied I*, that ſuch an Explanation will very much enable us to ſucceed in our Enquiry. Then, *ſaid he*, let us do our beſt, tho' the *Stoical* Syſtem is ſomewhat difficult and dark. For as, in the *Greek* Language, thoſe very Terms which ſignify new Objects, have at ſome time or other appear'd uncouth, tho' they are now render'd familiar by Cuſtom;

Cuſtom, how aukward muſt ſuch Terms appear in *Latin*?

THIS, *replied I*, may be made very eaſy: For if *Zeno* took a Liberty to adapt a new Name to every new Object he had diſcover'd, why ſhould not *Cato* do the ſame? And yet you need not be bound up, like aukward Tranſlators to a literal Verſion, if there is any common Expreſſion that conveys the ſame Meaning. For my part, when I meet with any thing that the *Greeks* expreſs in one Word, if I cannot do otherwiſe, I expreſs it by two or three; at the ſame time I think we ought to have a Liberty to uſe a *Greek* Word, if we cannot expreſs the ſame thing in *Latin*: 'Twere hard if we ſhould be allowed to make uſe of *Ephippia* for Horſe-harneſs, and *Acratophora* for Hogſheads, and not of *Proegmena* and *Apoproegmena*; tho' the two laſt Terms are as well expreſs'd by *eligible* and *non-eligible*. I thank you, *replied my Friend*, for helping me out; and I will chuſe to make uſe of thoſe *Latin* Expreſſions you have juſt now mention'd. If you find me at a loſs in any thing elſe, I ſhall expect your Aſſiſtance. With all my Heart, *replied I*; but Fortune favours the brave. Therefore begin, I intreat you; for to what more divine Exerciſe can we apply?

CHAP. III.

THE Philoſophers, *continu'd he*, whoſe Syſtem I approve of, are of opinion, that as ſoon as any Creature is born, for here we muſt commence our Diſquiſition, it has an Affection

fection for itſelf; it endeavours it's own Preſervation with that of it's own Well-being, and is impelled to the love of every thing that can contribute to thoſe Purpoſes. At the ſame time, it has an Abhorrence of Diſſolution, and of every thing which ſeems to contribute thereto. As a Proof of this we are to conſider, that even Infants purſue what is beneficial, and reject the contrary, before ever they have any Senſation either of Pleaſure or Pain; which never could happen, unleſs they had an Affection for their own Preſervation, and dreaded the Diſſolution of their Being. Now, they never could purſue any thing, unleſs they had ſome Conſciouſneſs which dictates to them the Love of themſelves, and of what belongs to them. From this we are to conclude, that the Principle of Affection ariſes from *Self*.

But moſt of the *Stoics* are of opinion, that Pleaſure is not to be accounted amongſt the natural Principles of Self-love; and I am entirely of their Opinion: Becauſe, if Nature had connected Pleaſure with thoſe Objects of our firſt Deſires, it might be attended with very ſhameful Conſequences. But to prove that we naturally love certain primary Objects, we need but to conſider, that every Being, when left to his own Choice, chuſes rather to have all the Members of his Body ſound and entire, than imperfect and diſtorted for the * *like Purpoſes*.

As to our Perceptions of Objects, or, if this Expreſſion is either too uncouth, or too unin-

* *Like Purpoſes.*] The Commentators have not taken notice here, that the Words in the Original, *eodem uſu*, ſeem to be ſuperfluous.

telligible

telligible, let us call them καταλήψεις; We are of opinion, that we ſhould endeavour to acquire thoſe on their own Account, becauſe they have a certain intrinſic Property, which as it were comprizes and contains Truth. This Affection we may perceive in little ones, whom we ſee touch'd with Pleaſure when they make a Diſcovery, by the light of their own Reaſon, of any thing, even though it does not concern themſelves.

We likewiſe ſay, that the Arts are worthy of our Application, both becauſe they are deſerving our Affections, and becauſe ariſing from intellectual Principles, and containing ſomewhat in themſelves that is digeſted by Reaſon and Method. We likewiſe believe, that of all Things which are contrary to Nature, there is nothing to which we are ſo averſe as the giving our Aſſent to a Falſhood. Now, of the Members of the Body, ſome of them ſeem to be given by Nature for particular Purpoſes; ſuch as the Hands, the Feet, the Legs; and all the interior Parts; the Deſcription and Uſes of which belong to the Diſcuſſion of the Phyſicians. But other Parts of the Body ſerve no Purpoſes of Uſe, and are only for Ornament; like the Tail to the Peacock, the gloſſy Feathers to the Dove, and the Breaſts and Beard to Man.

All this is dry talking; becauſe they are, as it were, the firſt Elements of Nature; and ſuch as can admit of no Richneſs of Expreſſion, which indeed I am far from aiming at. But when I come to ſpeak of more important Subjects, the Matter will furniſh Expreſſion, and both ennoble

and

and embelliſh the Stile. There, *interrupted I*, you are in the right: But yet, when an excellent Subject is *clearly* handled, I think it is *elegantly* handled. Now, it would be childiſh to endeavour to treat thoſe Matters we are now diſcuſſing with the Flowers of Speech, but it ſhews a Man of Learning and Underſtanding to expreſs them in plain clear Terms.

THEN, *continues he*, let us proceed, becauſe we have made ſome Digreſſion from theſe Principles of Nature, with which my following Poſitions muſt agree. Now, my firſt Diviſion is as follows: A Thing is ſaid to be eſtimable. In my opinion it is called ſo, either becauſe it is agreeable to Nature, or becauſe it has Properties productive of ſomewhat worthy of our Election, as containing ſome eſtimable Quality: This is what *Zeno* calls ἀξίαν. And, on the other hand, whatever is not valuable is oppoſed to what is. Thus, the Principles being laid down, that whatever is according to Nature is eligible in itſelf, and the contrary to be rejected; our firſt Duty (for ſo I call their καθηκος) is to preſerve the State in which Nature has placed us; and then to endeavour at thoſe Things which are agreeable to Nature, and repel whatever is otherwiſe. This Election and Antipathy being eſtabliſh'd, we now come to Election in conjunction with Duty. From thence ariſes that perpetual Election, that Election which is invariable and agreeable to Nature; and here we begin firſt to underſtand what are the Contents and the true Properties of Good.

FOR

FOR the first Affections of Man are for those Things which are agreeable to Nature: But, as soon as he is capable of Intelligence, or rather Perception (which the *Stoics* call ἐννοια) and sees the Order and, as it were, the Harmony of Actions, he puts a much greater Value upon this, than upon all the Objects of his primary Affections. And thus, from Perception and Reason, he is brought to determine within himself, that the noblest and the most desirable human Good consists in what the *Stoics* call ὁμολογια; but we, if you please, will term it *Fitness*. As this therefore contains that Good to which every honest Action ought to be referr'd, the *Honestum* itself, which is reckon'd a Good, though but consequential, is the only Object that is desirable, through it's own Influence and Dignity; whereas none of the primary Objects of Nature are intrinsically desirable.

BUT as the Duties, as I have call'd them, arise from the Principles of Nature, they must consequently have a Relation to them. So that we may truly maintain, that the Direction of all Duties is to recover or preserve the Principles of Nature. Not that this is the Ultimation of Good Things, because the primary Affections of Nature do not include a virtuous Agency; for, as I observ'd, this is only consequential and secondary to them; yet still it is agreeable to Nature, and is a much stronger Motive to excite our Desires, than all that is antecedent to it.

BUT here I must obviate a Mistake, which one might fall into by imagining that I have laid down two *Ultimations of Good:* For, supposing a Man

a Man wanted to take aim at an Object with a Javelin or an Arrow, in the ſame manner as we aim at Ultimate Good, he will think himſelf oblig'd to do all he can to hit his Mark; juſt ſo a Man, who aims at *Ultimate Good*, will do all he can to hit it, and uſe every Expedient for that Purpoſe. Therefore when we ſay, that we ought to apply ourſelves to *preſerve the primary Goods of Nature*, we don't mean that they are the *Ultimate Goods*, but that we ſhould endeavour to preſerve and uſe them as the means of * hitting that Mark.

Now, ſince all our Duties take their Riſe from the Principles of Nature, ſo does Wiſdom: But, as it often happens, that when a Perſon is introduced to another, he comes to have a greater Value for that other, than for the Perſon who introduced him; in like manner it is not at all ſurprizing, that after the Principles of Nature have introduced us to Wiſdom, we ſhould have a greater Affection for her than for them, tho' they introduced us. And as each of our Members is viſibly calculated for ſome particular Purpoſes of Life, ſo that Appetite of the Mind (which the *Greeks* call ὁρμη) is not calculated for every kind of Life, but to a certain Rule of Living. The ſame may be ſaid of Reaſon and perfect Reaſon.

Thus, as Players have a particular Action, and Dancers a particular Motion, we ought to regu-

* *Hitting that Mark.*] The Original of the two preceding Sentences is ſo extremely perplex'd where it is not conciſe, and ſo conciſe where it is not perplex'd, that I have choſen to follow what I believe to be my Author's Sentiment, rather than what Critics conjecture to be his Words.

late

late our Lives by particular Rules, and not by every Rule: A Life thus regulated, we call proper and fitting to Nature.

FOR we don't believe, that Wiſdom is like the Art either of a Pilot or a Phyſician, but rather like thoſe I juſt mention'd of the Player and the Dancer, where the End to be attain'd, by which I mean the Effects of the Art, is inherent, and not foreign, to the Art itſelf. And yet there is another Difference betwixt Wiſdom and thoſe very Arts; becauſe thoſe Parts of the latter, which are rightly executed, do not comprize the whole Oeconomy and Property of thoſe Arts; whereas ſuch of our Actions as are fitting, or if you will rational, or as the *Greeks* call them κατορθωματα, contain the whole Sum of Virtue; for Wiſdom only is abſolutely collected in herſelf, which is not the Caſe with the other Arts.

I SAY it again, therefore, that the Ends of Medicine and Sailing are very abſurdly compared to the End of Wiſdom: For Wiſdom comprehends Magnanimity and Juſtice, and that Elevation of Mind which places a Man above Accidents; of which Effects all other Arts are void. Now, it is impoſſible for any Man to poſſeſs the Virtues I have juſt now mention'd, without laying it down to himſelf as a Rule, That there is no other Difference in Nature, but that betwixt *Honeſty* and *Turpitude*. Let us now examine how excellently well theſe Conſequences follow from the Principles I have laid down.

I BELIEVE you perceive that I term the Object call'd by the *Greek* τελος, ſometimes the *Extreme*, ſometimes the *Ultimate*, ſometimes the *Higheſt*,

Higheſt, we may even call it the *End*. As therefore the extreme Purpoſe is to live *fitly* and *agreeably* to Nature, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that all wiſe Men at all times live *happily* and *completely fortunate*, that nothing embarraſſes them, that nothing is their Hinderance, and that they want for nothing. As to our judging that nothing can be Good that is not Virtuous (a Doctrine as neceſſary to the Happineſs of our Lives, as to the Syſtem of our Doctrine) that is a Point which will admit of all the Variety and Copiouſneſs of Eloquence, of all the Ornaments, Flowers, and Heightenings of embelliſh'd Rhetoric and ſublime Sentiment. But I am better pleas'd with the pointed Conciſeneſs of the *Stoics*.

THEY therefore reaſon thus: Whatever is good is commendable. Now, every thing that is *commendable* is *honeſt*; therefore whatever is *good* is *honeſt*. Don't you think this is a ſtrong Concluſion? Surely it is; for the *Conſequences* of the two firſt *Propoſitions* form the *Concluſion*. Now, the firſt of thoſe two Propoſitions that form this Concluſion, is generally impung'd; which is, *that all Good is commendable*; for it is allowed on all hands, that whatever is *commendable* is *honeſt*. Now, it is a groſs Abſurdity ſay, that there can be any Good that is not *deſirable*, or that we can *deſire* aught that is not *agreeable*; or, if it is *agreeable*, that we ought not to *love* and conſequently *eſteem* it: Thus it becomes *commendable*, or, which is the ſame thing, *honeſt*; and we conclude, that every *Good* is *honeſt*.

IN

In the next place, let me ask you, what Man can glory in a wretched or an uncomfortable Life? The only Subject of Glory is *Happineſs*: From which I infer, that a *happy* Life is, as it were, Matter of that Glory which nothing but an *honeſt* Life can challenge. Thus we conclude, that an *honeſt* Life is a *happy* Life. And becauſe the Man who happens to have a *right* to challenge Praiſe, is poſſeſs'd of ſome remarkable Pretenſions to Honour and Glory, he has a juſt Claim to be term'd *happy*, on account of thoſe mighty and important Conſiderations: The ſame Concluſion is ſtrictly applicable to the Life of ſuch a Man. Therefore, if the *Happineſs of Life* is meaſur'd by *Honeſty*, the *Honeſtum* alone is to be accounted *Good*.

But to come to an undeniable Propoſition; let me ask you, how it ever can happen that the Mind of Man ſhould deſerve the Appellations of *Conſtant*, *Firm*, *Great*, or *Brave*; unleſs we lay it down as a Principle, that Pain is not an Evil? For, as it is inconceivable that a Man ſhould not fear Death, if he looks upon it as an Evil, ſo no Man can be unconcern'd about or deſpiſe a Thing which he is convinc'd is an Evil. This Maxim being laid down, and unanimouſly eſtabliſh'd, we maintain, that a brave and generous Mind deſpiſes and ſlights all the poſſible Contingencies of Life; and when this is admitted, we conclude, that nothing but *moral Turpitude* is an *Evil*. And this exalted, this excellent, generous, and truly brave Perſon; this Man who is ſuperior to all human Accidents; this Object of every Merit we can con-

ceive; this Object of our preſent Enquiry; ought to have a fix'd Confidence in himſelf, and to preſerve an undiſmay'd Survey of his paſt and future Life, with a firm Conviction, that the wiſe Man is never liable to Evil. This will at the ſame time give him to underſtand, that nothing can be *good* but what is *honeſt*; and that *living happily* is *living honeſtly*, that is, *virtuouſly*.

NOR am I ignorant, that Philoſophers have been divided in their Opinions; I mean thoſe Philoſophers who make the *Chief*, or what I call the *Ultimate Good*, to be ſeated in the Mind. Though ſome have followed theſe Opinions, with all the Errors attending them, yet I prefer that Sect which places *Supreme Good* in the Mind, and in Virtue, to every Denomination, not only of thoſe three, who have ſeparated Virtue from Supreme Good, by ranking Pleaſure, or the Privation of Pain, or the Principles of Nature, among Supreme Goods; but even to the other three Sects, who think that Virtue muſt be lame without ſome *Addition*, and therefore have each of them ſeparately added to her ſome one or other of the Properties I have juſt mention'd.

THOSE Philoſophers have likewiſe run into Abſurdities, who maintain, that *Supreme Good* conſiſts in *Science*, that there is no Difference of Things, and that therefore the wiſe Man is happy who gives no Preference of one Thing to another upon any Conſideration. Thus ſome *Academics* are ſaid to maintain, that the *Supreme Good* and higheſt Duty of a wiſe Man, is to diſtruſt what he ſees, and always obſtinately to

ſuſpend

ſuſpend his own Aſſent. We uſe to diſcuſs each of theſe Opinions in a very copious Manner. But it is needleſs to be prolix upon Matters that are ſelf-evident: For what can be more plain than, that if there is no Difference betwixt thoſe Things which are *contrary*, and thoſe Things which are *agreeable* to Nature, all that Prudence which is now the Object of our Enquiry and Veneration, is aboliſh'd?

HAVING therefore thus diſcuſs'd the Opinions I have mention'd, and thoſe that are correſpondent to them, it remains, that *Supreme Good* conſiſts in living in an exact Acquaintance with theſe Properties of Nature, by *chuſing* whatever is *agreeable* to her, and *rejecting* every thing which may *ſhock* her; in ſhort, to make our Lives to *ſquare* and *coincide* with Nature.

IN the other Arts, when we mention any thing as being *artificial*, we ſuppoſe it to be the Reſult and Production of a particular Art. This is what your Adepts call ἐπιγεννηματικον. But when we mention a Thing to be done *wiſely*, we mean a *primary Fitneſs:* For whatever proceeds from a wiſe Man, ought to be *complete* in all Reſpects, becauſe in that conſiſts what we call *the Object of Deſire.* For, as it is an Offence to betray one's Country, to violate our Parents, or to plunder Temples, all which are Criminal through their Effects; ſo it is an Offence to be ſuſceptible of *Fear*, *Sorrow*, or *Luſt*, though attended by no Effects. But as theſe are Offences not by their *Effects* and *Conſequences*, but *primarily*; ſo whatever flows from Virtue, muſt be accounted to be *right* by

it's *firſt Conception*, without any *exterior Application* to complete it.

Now Good, a Term that takes up ſo much of our Diſcourſe, is likewiſe to be defined. Philoſophers have ſeverally differ'd from one another in their Definitions of this, but they all come to the ſame Purpoſe. For my part, I agree with *Diogenes*, who defines *Good* to be that which is conſummate by Nature: As to Advantage (for ſo we call the ὠφελμα) which is the Conſequence of *Good*, he ſays, that it is an *Emanation*, or a *Circumſtance*, proceeding from *Nature's Perfection*. And as Ideas ariſe in our Minds from whatever we know through Habit, Conjunction, Similitude, or the *Analogy of Reaſon*; from this fourth and laſt-mention'd Property we have the Idea of *Good*: For when this *Rational Analogy* raiſes the Mind, in a progreſſive Gradation, from the Things which have a *natural Fitneſs*, then ſhe comes to the Knowledge of *Good*.

But we do not perceive or diſtinguiſh Good, by means of any *Acceſſion*, *Addition*, or *Compariſon* with other Objects; but through the Power of it's own Influence. Thus, though Honey is the Chief of all Sweets, yet we taſte it's Sweetneſs from it's own inherent Properties, and not by comparing it with other Sweets. In like manner, the *Good* we are now treating of is *extremely valuable*; but then that *Value* is *ſpecific*, and not *comparative*: For as that *Eſtimation* which is call'd ἀξια, is to be rank'd neither among *Things Good* or *Evil*, it may admit of *Addition*, but it will ſtill invariably preſerve

ſerve it's own Nature; whereas the *Eſtimation* form'd of *Virtue*, is of a different kind, as depending upon *intrinſical* and not *accidental* Properties.

As to *mental Perturbations*, which render the Lives of Fools *miſerable* and *calamitous*, even theſe are not affected by any natural Impulſe. The *Greeks* call thoſe πάθαι. And if I had a mind to tranſlate the Word, I would call them *Diſeaſes*; but that Expreſſion would not be ſo univerſally applicable to them, for no body calls *Pity*, or even *Anger*, a *Diſeaſe*, though they call each a πάθος; therefore let us call them *Perturbations*, which is a Term that implies ſomewhat that is *vitious*. All theſe *Perturbations* may be comprehended under four general Heads, but admit of many Subdiviſions. Their general Diviſion is into *Uneaſineſs*, *Fear*, *Luſt*, and that voluptuary Elevation of a wanton Spirit which I call *Joy*; though the *Stoics* generally term it both as applicable to Soul and Body, ἡδονη. But, as I have ſaid, thoſe *Perturbations* do not proceed from any *Impulſe of Nature*; all of them are Opinions or Judgments, raſhly form'd and founded upon ſlight Foundations; a wiſe Man therefore is always void of them.

But we hold, in common with many other Philoſophers, that every thing which is *honeſt* is *intrinſically deſirable:* For, excepting the three Doctrines which exclude *Virtue* out of *Supreme Good*, this is an Opinion held by all the other Philoſophers, eſpecially theſe *Stoics*, who will admit nothing beſides the *Honeſtum* to be a

Good. But the Defence of this Opinion is both eaſy and ready: For what Man's Avarice was ever ſo intenſe, what Man's Luſts were ever ſo unbridled, as that he would not chuſe *guiltleſly* to accompliſh thoſe Ends, which, before he ſhould fail in, he would be guilty of any Villany to attain to, rather than compaſs them by a flagitious Action, even tho' attended with the fulleſt Aſſurances of *Impunity?*

BUT what *Utility*, or what *Advantage* do we propoſe, when we dive into the hidden Operations of Nature, ſuch as the Principles which direct the Movement and Revolution of the heavenly Bodies? Or, is there a Man ſo clowniſh in his Manners, or ſo obſtinately obdur'd to natural Purſuits, as to be averſe to an Acquaintance with Objects worthy his Knowledge, and to reject and undervalue them, unleſs attended with ſome Pleaſure to his Senſes, or Gratification to his Purſe? For, is there a Man who feels no mental Pleaſure in entering into the *Actions*, *Sayings* and *Views* of our Anceſtors, of the *Africani*, or my Grandfather, whom you have always in your Mouth, or our other Heroes, diſtinguiſh'd by their Courage and Virtues?

NAY, is there a Perſon brought up in an honeſt Family, and educated in a liberal Manner, who is not ſhock'd at a ſhameful Action, even tho' it be no ways detrimental to himſelf? Can any Man, with any degree of Patience, ſee another living in an impure, flagitious Courſe of Life? Is there a Man who has not a hearty Averſion to the ſordid, the vain, the treacherous, and the deceitful? What other Argument, beſides

ſides the Averſion which our Nature has to *Turpitude itſelf*, can reſtrain Man, in Darkneſs and Solitude, from all manner of Impiety? I ſay, what other Argument can do it, beſides that Averſion which Turpitude creates by it's own Diſhoneſty? I might bring numberleſs Inſtances to confirm this Opinion, but it is unneceſſary: For there is not a more indiſputable Truth, than that *Virtue* or the *Honeſtum* is *deſirable in it's own Nature*, and *Turpitude* proportionably *deteſtable*.

HAVING thus laid it down, that the *Honeſtum* is the *Sole Good*, it is a natural Conſequence, that the *Honeſtum* is more valuable than thoſe intermediate Objects that ariſe from it. Whereas when we ſay, that *Folly*, *Raſhneſs*, *Injuſtice* and *Intemperance*, are *deteſtable* for their *Conſequences*; we don't ſay it in contradiction to what I have already laid down, that *Turpitude* is the *Sole Evil:* Becauſe thoſe Qualities don't immediately affect the Body with any Inconveniency, but regard that Turpitude of Action which ariſes from Vice. Tho' the *Greeks* call theſe κακιαι, yet I chuſe rather to call them *Vices* than *Evils*.

YOU have ſpoke, *Cato*, *replied I*, in very noble and ſignificant Terms; therefore you ſeem to me to teach Philoſophy *Latin*, and to adopt it into this State. Hitherto, ſhe appears to have been a Stranger at *Rome*, and unacquainted with our Language, chiefly by reaſon of our Penury of Ideas and Terms to convey our Meaning. I know indeed there are ſome People who can philoſophize in any Language, but then they uſe neither *Diviſions* nor *Definitions*; becauſe they ſay they aſſent to nothing but that which Nature

tacitly conſents to. Therefore, tho' the Things they treat of are far from being *obſcure*, they beſtow but very little Pains upon the Elegance of Language. But I moſt attentively heard you, and will treaſure up in my Memory all the Names you have affix'd to thoſe Qualities you have talk'd of. Perhaps I may now have occaſion to uſe them myſelf.

I APPROVE of your placing Vices over-againſt their oppoſite Virtues; for this is agreeable to the Genius of our Language: * For whatever is blameable in itſelf, I think deſerves the Name of *Vice*, for it is blameable for it's relation to Vice; whereas, had you called κακια Malice, the Nature of our Language would have led us to conſider one particular Vice; but now the Word *Vice* is put in oppoſition to Virtue in general.

HERE *Cato* interrupted me; A very great Diſpute, *ſays he*, ariſes upon theſe Maxims. On the part of the *Peripatetics* it has been handled with more Gentleneſs; for their manner of diſputing, thro' their Ignorance of Logic, takes a good deal from the Edge of their Reaſoning. But your Friend *Carneades*, who, with a profound Knowledge in Logic, was a compleat Maſter of Eloquence, brought the Thing to a very narrow Point. He maintain'd, that in all this Queſtion about *Good* and *Evil*, the Difference betwixt the *Stoics* and *Peripatetics* does not conſiſt in Things, but in Words. But nothing is more clear to me, than that the Sentiments of thoſe Philoſophers are different from one another, not ſo much in Words as in Things: I

* *For whatever*] The Original there cannot be tranſlated. I have given ſomewhat of the Meaning.

ſay,

ſay, the Difference betwixt the *Stoics* lies in Senſe and not in Sounds; for the *Peripatetics* maintain, that every thing which they call Good relates to the Happineſs of Life; whereas we are of opinion, that whatever is worthy of any Eſtimation, is comprehended in that Happineſs.

Now, can there be any thing more certain, than that, according to the Syſtem which ranks *Pain* as an *Evil*, the wiſe Man if upon a Rack cannot be happy? Whereas, according to that which looks upon *Pain* as no *Evil*, it rationally follows, that the wiſe Man amidſt all Torments preſerves the Happineſs of Life. For if a Man, ſuffering for his Country, endures *Pain* with greater Conſtancy than thoſe who endure it upon a ſlighter Occaſion; then it follows, that it is *Opinion*, and not *Nature*, that proportions the Degree of Pain.

Nor can we agree with the *Peripatetics*, who, eſtabliſhing three kinds of Goods, maintain, that the Happineſs of every Man is proportion'd to the Share of bodily or outward *good Things* which he enjoys: I ſay, we cannot approve of this Doctrine which teaches, that the Enjoyment of the moſt valuable Bleſſings relating to the Body, makes a Man the happier. For they hold, that the Perfection of happy Life conſiſts in perſonal *good Things*. Our Doctrine is quite the reverſe; as we are perſuaded, that neither the Happineſs, the Enjoyment, nor the Value of Life depends upon the abundance even of the *good Things of Nature*; and conſequently, that the Variety of perſonal Gratifications muſt far leſs contribute to the Happineſs of Life.

For

FOR if both *Wiſdom* and *Health* are *Objects of our Wiſhes*, they ought to be much more ſo in Conjunction, than if *Wiſdom* were by itſelf; and yet if both of them are Objects of our *Eſteem*, they are not *conjunctly* more *valuable* than Wiſdom is *ſeparately*. For tho' we allow that *Health* deſerves ſome Eſteem, yet we never admit it to be a *Good:* * nor that any Object, which is matter of comparative Eſtimation, can be of ſuch a Value as to be preferr'd to Wiſdom. Here the *Peripatetics* and we differ: For they maintain, that the Honeſty of an Action is more deſirable when not attended by Pain, than the ſame Action would be if it were; we are of a different Opinion, whether right or wrong, I ſhall examine hereafter. But how can there be a greater Difference as to Things, than this is?

CHAP. IV.

FOR, as the Light of a *Lamp* is dimm'd and overpower'd by the Brightneſs of the *Sun*, as a Drop of Brine is loſt in the *Ægean* Sea, or a Farthing in the Riches of *Cræſus*, or a ſingle Pace in the Diſtance betwixt this and *India*; ſo by the End of *good Things*, which the *Stoics* lay down, all the Value of outward and perſonal Enjoyments is neceſſarily dimm'd, overpower'd and loſt in the Splendor and Extent of Virtue. And whereas † *Opportunity*, for ſo I call the

* *Nor that*] Orig. *Cenſemus nullam eſſe tantam eſtimationem, ut ea virtuti ante ponatur.*

† *Opportunity*,] I could find no better Tranſlation for the Word *Opportunitas*. It ſignifies here the Obligation which a Man is under to act according to the Fitneſs of relative Circumſtances.

Greek

Greek εὐκαιρια, does not become greater by the Extent of Time; becauſe all *Opportunities* are confin'd to certain Bounds; In like manner a right Effect (*for ſo I call* κατορθωσις, *becauſe a right Action is called* κατορθωμα) Propriety of Action, and, in ſhort, that Good which conſiſts in the *Fitneſs of Nature*, can admit of no Acceſſion.

For, like *Opportunity*, thoſe Circumſtances I have mention'd receive no Addition from the Duration of Time: For this Reaſon, the *Stoics* think that Life is neither more eligible or more deſirable from the *Length* or *Shortneſs of it's Duration*; and they make uſe of the following Simile: *Suppoſing a Buskin fits a Foot, then a thouſand Buskins would not be more valuable for this Purpoſe than that one Pair; nor would the Wearer matter whether the others were larger or leſs.* Thus in the *Good*, which is bounded by *Conveniency* and *Opportunity*, the Proportions of *more* or *leſs*, or *longer* or *ſhorter*, are never regarded.

The Objection to this has but little Edge: If, *ſay they*, a State of good Health is more valuable when it is *long*, than when it is *ſhort*, Wiſdom is proportionably more valuable from the Duration of enjoying it. They don't obſerve, that the Value of Health is judged by *Space*, but that of Virtue by *Opportunity*. Thus, they who maintain this Principle in effect ſay, that a good *Death*, and a good *Labour in Child-birth*, is better when *long* than when *ſhort*. They don't perceive, that ſome Things are valued from the Shortneſs, and others from the Length of their Duration.

There

THERE is another Error of the ſame kind, in maintaining that the *End*, or what we call the *Extream* and *Ultimate of good Things*, can receive any *Addition*; and likewiſe, that one Man can be *wiſer* than *another*, or that one Man can have a *greater Share* of *Merit* or *Demerit* than *another*. This is contradictory to our Doctrine, becauſe we think that the *End of good Things* can admit of no *Acceſſion*. For, as a Man who is drowned in the Water has his Breath as effectually ſtopp'd when within an Inch of the Surface, as if he was ſunk to it's very Bottom; or as the *Puppy* a Minute before his Eyes opens, is as blind as the *Puppy* that is juſt born; the Man who makes a *little* Progreſs towards *Virtue*, is equally *miſerable* as he who has made *none at all*.

I KNOW that theſe Things appear ſurpriſing; but as the Principles I have mention'd are firm and true, ſo muſt their Conſequences and Effects be: Therefore we ought to entertain no doubt as to the Truth of them. But, tho' the *Stoics* deny that either Virtues or Vices can receive any *Augmentation*, yet they think that either of them may be more diffuſed and dilated.

NOW, *Diogenes* is of opinion, that *Riches* not only have the Power of *procuring Pleaſure* and *Health*, but that they *include them*; but that they cannot do the ſame with regard to *Virtue*, or the *other Arts*, for they may *guide to them*, but never can *contain* them. Therefore, if *Pleaſure* and *Health* are to be accounted among the Number of *good Things*, conſequently *Riches* ought to be the ſame. But if *Wiſdom* is a *Good*, it does not follow, that *Wealth* is a *Good* likewiſe:

wiſe: Nor can any *Good* ever be included within an Object that *is not a Good*; for this Reaſon, becauſe that *Knowledge* and *Comprehenſion* which make the Arts our own, ſtimulate Deſire; whereas *Riches*, not being in the Number of *good Things*, never can contain any *Art*.

But our Obſervations with regard to the Arts are not applicable to Virtue, becauſe ſhe requires great *Meditation* and *Intenſeneſs of Thought*; which is not the Caſe with the Arts: And becauſe Virtue comprehends the Permanence, the Firmneſs, and the Reſolution of a whole Life; which we perceive is not the ſame with regard to the Arts.

The Difference of *Things* comes next to be explain'd. Now, if we aboliſh all Difference in Things, then, like *Ariſto*, we confound the whole Plan of Life. Nor is there any Province or Operation left for Wiſdom, when we admit of no manner of Difference or Election in thoſe Objects which relate to the Conduct of Life. This being then laid down as a certain Truth, that the *Honeſtum* is the *Sole Good*, and *Turpitude* the *Sole Evil*; our Sect ſo far admits a Difference betwixt them, and thoſe Objects that never can affect the Happineſs or Miſery of Life, That ſome of the latter are allowed to be *valuable*, others not, and others *indifferent*.

As to valuable Objects, *Zeno* maintain'd, that ſome of them included in themſelves a ſufficient reaſon of Preference, ſuch as Health, Soundneſs of Senſe, the Abſence of Pain, Riches, and the like; but that others of them did not. And that the ſame thing may be ſaid of Objects below our Value,

Value, that they included in themſelves ſufficient Reaſon for their being rejected; ſuch as Pain, Sickneſs, the Loſs of Senſes, Poverty, Ignominy, and the like; but that others did not. Hence aroſe what *Zeno* call'd προηγμενον, and it's oppoſite ἀποπροηγμενον; new Terms, which he was oblig'd to coin even in that copious Language; a Liberty, which the Penury of our Tongue, notwithſtanding your calling it ſo copious, denies to us. But it may not be impertinent, in order to explain the Force of the Expreſſion, to lay before you the Occaſion of *Zeno*'s coining this Word.

As no body, *ſaid he*, in a Court ſays, that the King is preferr'd to Dignity (for this is the προηγμενον) but thoſe who are in a ſubordinate Degree of Honour, whoſe Rank has ſome, more or leſs diſtant, Relation to the Royal Dignity; thus in Life we never call thoſe Things which are in a primary Rank, προηγμενά, *Preferables*, but ſuch as are in a ſubordinate one. The literal Senſe of both Expreſſions is, Things *promoted* or *caſt behind*, or, as I ſaid, *Preferables* or *rejected*. But if we underſtand the Thing, we ought to be extremely eaſy with regard to the Import of the Expreſſion.

Now, as we hold that every thing which is Good is in the firſt Rank, it neceſſarily follows, that what we thus call *preferable* or *promoted*, is neither *Good* nor *Evil*; we therefore define ſuch an Object to be *indifferent*, and to poſſeſs only a certain Degree of *Value*. As the *Greeks* term this ἀδιαφορον, ſo the Word *indifferent* ſuggeſts itſelf to me. But it is impoſſible that aught, which

which is either *agreeable* or *repugnant* to Nature, can be *in a State of Indifference*; but the Things that are in this State, are not abſolutely void of Value; and if ſo, ſome of them are *Preferables*.

THIS is therefore a proper Diſtinction; and to make the Caſe ſtill the more eaſily comprehended, they give us this *Simile*: *We propoſe it as an* Ultimate, *or* End, *that a* Dye *ſhould caſt up the higheſt Number*. If the Dye ſhould be caſt in that manner, then the Caſting is, as it were, the *Preferable* for coming at the *End*, and not if it is otherwiſe; and yet, this *Mean*, or *Preferable*, is not the *End* I mention'd. Thus *Preferables* regard the *End*, but are different from the Power and Nature of the *End*.

THE next Diviſion is, into thoſe *Good Things* which belong to, or are the Appurtenances of, that End; Thoſe which effect it; And thoſe which do both. The *Greeks* call the firſt τελικα, and the ſecond ποιητικα; and I have choſen to expreſs them in more Words, as I am determin'd, for the ſake of Perſpicuity, always to uſe more Words than one, when I cannot bring the ſame Meaning within the Compaſs of one Word. As to the *Appurtenances* of it, theſe conſiſt wholly of *honeſt Actions*; and the *Efficient* of it, in *Friendſhip alone*. But they maintain, that *Wiſdom* is both an *Appurtenance* and an *Efficient*; becauſe, as *Wiſdom* implies acting with Propriety, it is an *Appurtenance*; and as it *occaſions* and *effects honeſt Actions*, it may therefore be call'd an *Efficient*.

As to *Preferables*, they are partly ſo in their own Nature, partly from their Effects, and ſome *for both* thoſe Reaſons. Of the firſt kind is the Compoſure of the Face and the Countenance, our Mein and Air; in all which there is ſomething to be *preferr'd*, and ſomething to be *rejected*. Other Objects are call'd *Preferables* becauſe of their *Effects*, ſuch as *Money*; others for both theſe Reaſons, ſuch as the *Soundneſs of our Senſes*, and *good Health*.

As to *good Fame*, which the *Greeks* call εὐδοξία, or *Glory*, though I chuſe to call it *good Fame*; *Chryſippus* indeed and *Diogenes* were of opinion, that if we take from it the *Utility* attending it, it is not worth even the wagging of our Finger. And I am ſincerely of their Opinion. But their Succeſſors, not being able to withſtand the Arguments of *Carneades*, allowed, that the *good Fame* I have mention'd was *preferable* and *eligible* in itſelf; and that every Gentleman of liberal Education, was extremely well pleas'd to hear himſelf well ſpoken of by his Parents, his Relations, and by Men of Virtue, even for the thing itſelf, independant of the Utility attending it. They farther ſay, that our innate Love for our Children leads us to conſult their Advantage, even ſuppoſing them to be poſthumous; and in like manner we ought to have a Regard for our Reputation after Death, on it's own account, independant of all other Conſiderations.

But though we admit of no other Good but the *Honeſtum*, yet it is proper for us to do our *Duty*, as we rank that Duty neither amongſt good

good nor evil Things; becauſe, amongſt *thoſe Things* that are *indifferent* betwixt *Good* and *Evil*, there is ſtill a Balance of Reaſon which preponderates, ſo as to juſtify the Election we make in acquitting ourſelves of them. Therefore, even the Probability of Action is determinable by Reaſon. Now, *Duty* is conſtituted in ſuch a manner, that a Probability of Reaſon may be given for performing it. From this it follows, that *Duty* is in a kind of an indifferent State betwixt *Things good* and *Things evil*; and as there may be ſomewhat in the Number of thoſe Things, which are accounted neither *Virtues* nor *Vices*, which may be uſeful, we are therefore not to aboliſh it. There is likewiſe an Action of ſuch a nature, as that we are directed by Reaſon in ſome meaſure to perform it. Now, that which we perform by the Dictates of Reaſon, we call a *Duty*. A *Duty* therefore is of that nature, as to be number'd among *Things* neither *Good* nor *Evil*.

HENCE it is plain, that the wiſe Man has ſome Buſineſs even with thoſe *indifferent Things*: Therefore, when he performs *a Duty*, his *Judgment* leads him to conſider how far it is *a Duty*; and, as his Judgment is always infallible, his Duty will always be in the Number of Things *indifferent*; as may be proved from the following Reaſoning.

AS there is ſomewhat that we call the *Fitneſs of Action*, this is the ſame as *a perfect Duty*: Now, as there is ſuch a thing as *a perfect Duty*, there is likewiſe ſuch a thing as *an imperfect one*. Thus, if *the honeſtly giving up a Depo-*

ſit is a *fitting Action*, *ſimply* to give up a Depoſit is a *Duty*; for the Addition of the Word *honeſtly* conſtitutes the *Fitneſs of the Action*, as the *ſimple Rendition* does the *Duty*; and becauſe it is doubtleſs, that there is an *Election* even in Things *indifferent* betwixt *Good* and *Evil*, every thing done in conſequence of that Election, comes under the Head of *Duty in general*. From which it follows, that, as all Mankind love themſelves, the Fool, as well as the wiſe Man, will affect what is *agreeable to Nature*, and reject the contrary. Therefore, there is a certain Duty in common, both with the *Wiſe* and the *Fooliſh*, which conſtitutes their dealing in what we call *Things indifferent*.

But as all our Duties ariſe from thoſe Objects, we rightly conclude, that all our Conſiderations refer to them, eſpecially ſuch of them as regard *Life* and *Death*. When a Man poſſeſſes a *Plurality* of Things which are *agreeable to Nature*, then this Man's Duty is *to live*; but when a Man is in a State, where the *Plurality of it's Circumſtances* either are, or appear to be, *contrary to Nature*, then it is ſuch a Man's Duty *to die*. From whence it appears, that it may ſometimes be the wiſe Man's Duty to *leave Life*, even tho' *he is happy*, and the Fool will *live while he is wretched*.

For the Good and Evil we have ſo often mention'd, are poſterior Conſiderations. Now, it falls under the Judgment and Election of the wiſe Man, to conſider what Things are *primary*, what are *ſecondary*, and what *contrary* to Nature. Theſe are, as it were, immediate Objects of the

wiſe

wiſe Man's Conſideration. Therefore, the Reaſon that determines us either to remain in, or leave, *Life*, is to be meaſured by all thoſe Conſiderations I have mention'd: For Death is to be wiſh'd for neither by thoſe who hold their Lives together with their Virtue, nor by thoſe who live void of Virtue; and it is often the Duty of a wiſe Man to leave Life, though poſſeſs'd of perfect Happineſs, if it is proper for him to do it, which Propriety is to be meaſur'd by the Opportunities he has of living *agreeably to Nature*. For they are of opinion, that to hold Happineſs with Life, depends upon *Opportunity*; therefore Wiſdom commands the wiſe Man to leave even her, * if there is Occaſion. So that, as Vice has not ſuch an Influence as to be the Cauſe of *voluntary Death*, it is plain, that it is the Duty of a Fool, even though miſerable, to remain in Life, if in Poſſeſſion of a Plurality of thoſe Circumſtances which we ſay are agreeable to Nature: And becauſe he is equally miſerable whether he lives or dies, nor does the Continuance of his Life make it the more to be avoided; we rightly conclude, that he who can enjoy the greateſt Number of natural good Things, ought to live.

CHAP. V.

THE *Stoics* likewiſe think it material to be underſtood, that it is through Nature that Parents bear an Affection for their Children,

* The Original here is obſcure, *ſi uſus ſit*; but I don't know that *Gruterus* had any great Reaſon for calling the common Reading, *ſi juſſerit*, impertinent. I have been oblig'd to ſupply ſomewhat, for the ſake of the Perſpicuity of all this Period.

which Affection gave riſe to *Human Society*; that this is chiefly underſtood from the Figure and Limbs of the Body, all which declare, that Nature had a Regard to the Purpoſes of *Procreation.* Now, it would have been an Inconſiſtency, had Nature's Impulſe led Men to procreate, without providing at the ſame time that they ſhould love their young ones. The Force of Nature is ſeen likewiſe in Beaſts; for when we perceive their Toils in bringing forth and training up their Young, we, as it were, hear the Voice of Nature herſelf. Therefore, as it is plain, that we have naturally an Averſion to *Pain*, ſo it appears, from the *ſame Inſtinct*, that we are impell'd to love thoſe whom we procreate.

FROM this follows the natural Intercourſe of Kindneſs amongſt Mankind; ſo that no Man ought, were it for no other Reaſon but becauſe he is a Man, to be a Stranger to another. For, as ſome of our Members ſeem to ſerve only their own Purpoſes, ſuch as the Eyes and the Ears; and others contribute to the Uſes of the other Members, as the Legs and Hands; ſo certain ſavage Brutes ſeem to be created for themſelves only. But the * *Nacre-fiſh*, which lies in an open Shell; and the Fiſh call'd the *Pinnoceres*, from it's guarding the *Pinna* or *Nacre-fiſh*, and which ſwims out of it's Shell, but is ſhut up whenever it retires into it; as telling it, that it ſhould beware: As likewiſe Ants, Bees, Storks,

* *Nacre-fiſh*,] This blind Story has been handed down by *Ariſtotle*, in his Hiſtory of Animals, *Book* 5. and *Pliny* ſeems to have had it from him, *l.* 9. *c.* 45.

perform

perform certain Functions for the ſake of other Creatures. This Connection is much more natural to *Man*; therefore we are by Nature form'd for Aſſemblies, Meetings, and Cities.

THE *Stoics* hold, the World to be rul'd by the Providence of the Gods; and that it is, as it were, the State or City of Gods and Men; and that every Individual is a Part of the Whole. From whence this natural Principle follows, that we ought to prefer the general Advantage to our own: For, as the Laws prefer the Welfare of the Whole to that of Individuals, ſo a worthy and a wiſe Man, who is ſubmiſſive to the Laws, and knows the ſocial Duties, conſults the general Utility before his own or any private Concern; and the Man who abandons the Public Utility for his own Profit or Advantage, is equally culpable with a *Traitor to his Country*. Thence it follows, that it is glorious to expoſe ourſelves to Death for our Country, from a Senſe that our Country ought to be dearer to us than ourſelves; and that it is a barbarous and inhuman Sentiment of ſome, who declare, that when they themſelves are dead, they are indifferent though a general Conflagration ſhould follow. This Sentiment us'd to be expreſs'd in a common **Greek* Diſtich: For no Truth is more certain, than that we ought to conſult the Advantage of our Poſterity even upon their own Account.

FROM this Affection of Sentiments aroſe the *Wills* and *Bequeathments* of dying Men; and the general Averſion to living in Solitude, tho' it were attended with an *Infinity of Pleaſures*.

* Ἐμοὶ θανεῖν γε καὶ μιχθῆναι πυρί. Euripides.

From whence we rightly conclude, that we are born for human Society and Intercourſe, and the Community of Nature. Now, a natural Impulſe directs every Man to do Good to as many as he can, and eſpecially by inſtructing and forming them to the Purpoſes of Wiſdom; and indeed it is not eaſy to find a Man who is not communicative to another of the Knowledge he poſſeſſes himſelf. We therefore have a Propenſity to teach as well as to learn. As Bulls naturally fight, with great Fierceneſs, to guard their Calves from the Lion, ſo they who have great Abilities and Opportunities (ſuch as *Hercules* and *Bacchus*) have a natural Inſtinct to preſerve Mankind.

Even when we call *Jupiter*, *The Beſt and Greateſt*, and give him the Appellations of *Salutary*, the *Hoſpitable*, the *Stayer*; we thereby intimate, that he is the Guardian of Mankind's Welfare. But it is by no means fitting, if we are worthleſs and inconſiderate in ourſelves, to entreat the Favour and Love of the Immortal Gods. Therefore, as we make uſe of our Members before we have learn'd the particular Uſes for which they were deſign'd, ſo Nature has connected and aſſociated us together in civil Society; which, if ſhe did not, there could be no room for Juſtice or Benevolence.

The *Stoics* farther hold, that though Mankind is connected by the Social Principles, yet that Mankind has no ſuch Connection with Brutes. For *Chryſippus* has excellently well obſerv'd, that Man was born for *Intercourſe* and *Society*, but that every thing elſe was made for the

the Service of Man and of the Gods; therefore Mankind had a Right to the Service of Beaſts. And becauſe the Nature of Man is ſuch, that ſocial Rights connect all Mankind together, the Man who preſerves thoſe Rights is called *Juſt*, and he who departs from them *Unjuſt*. But as in a Theatre, tho' it be common, yet there are proper Places for the ſeveral Spectators it contains; ſo, tho' the World, or a City, is in common, yet this is no Bar to every Individual poſſeſſing a determinate Share of Property in either.

SINCE we ſee then that Mankind is born for the Protection and Defence of Man, there is a Fitneſs in Nature which directs that the wiſe Man ſhould govern and direct the Public; and, that he may live the more agreeably to Nature, ſhe directs farther, that he ſhould take to himſelf a Wife, and beget Children out of her. They even think, that Love when refin'd is by no means unbecoming a wiſe Man. As to the Manners and Principles of the *Cynics*, ſome will have it, that they may be adopted by a wiſe Man, if he ſhould happen to be in ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances; others hold the reverſe.

THAT therefore mutual Society, Endearment and Connections may be kept up amongſt Mankind, they are of opinion, that *Emoluments* and *Damages*, which they term ὠφελματα and βλαμματα, ought to be in common likewiſe: Some of theſe being profitable, and others not. Theſe they term'd not only *common*, but *equal*. As to *Conveniences* and *Inconveniencies*; for ſo I term εὐχρηſτηματα and δυσχρηſτηματα; they hold them to be in *common*, but not *equal*. For thoſe

which do Good or Hurt, are *Goods* or *Evils*; and therefore admit of no *Degrees of Compariſon*: But as to Conveniencies and Inconveniences, theſe are Matters of *Choice* or *Diſlike*, and may not be *equal*. They hold that *Emoluments* are *in common*, but, that what is right or wrong, *is not in common*.

THEY likewiſe hold, that Friendſhip ought to be cultivated, becauſe it *does Good*. But ſome of them maintain, that in Friendſhip Regard for a Friend ought in a wiſe Man to be equal to that for himſelf; others ſay, that every Man is deareſt to himſelf. But ſtill the latter admit, that it is contrary to Juſtice for any Man to ſtrip another of any thing in order to appropriate it to himſelf. But this Doctrine is far from approving, that either Friendſhip or Juſtice ſhould be cultivated or practiſed for mercenary Ends; becauſe the ſame Ends may weaken or abuſe them. For there abſolutely could be no ſuch things as *Juſtice* or *Friendſhips*, unleſs they were cultivated for themſelves.

AS to what is term'd *right*, they hold it to be *Nature* itſelf; and that it is inconſiſtent with the Character of a wiſe Man to do an Injury, nay the leaſt Prejudice to any Perſon. Nor is it juſtifiable to enter into any Aſſociation or Confederacy, even with our Friends and Benefactors, for hurtful Purpoſes. And they lay it ſtrictly down as an abſolute Truth, That *Equity* is always inſeparable from *Utility*; and that whatever is *equitable* and *juſt*, is likewiſe *honeſt*; and convertibly, that whatever is *honeſt*, is *equitable* and *juſt*.

THEY

THEY likewiſe add *Logic* and *Phyſics* to the the Virtues I have been treating of; and dignify them both with the Appellation of *Virtues*. The firſt, becauſe it contains the Method for preventing our giving our Aſſent to any Falſity, or being impoſed upon by ſpecious Appearances; and becauſe by it we are enabled to defend and maintain all I have laid down with regard to *Good* and *Evil*. For they are of opinion, that any Perſon who has not this *Art*, may be miſled and impoſed upon. Therefore, if in all Caſes Temerity and Ignorance is to be avoided, that *Art*, which removes both, has a Right to be term'd *a Virtue*.

IT is likewiſe with good Reaſon that Phyſics obtain the ſame Diſtinction; becauſe, whoever has a mind to live agreeably to Nature, muſt remove himſelf from all worldly Conſiderations and Temptations. Nor indeed can a Man form a juſt Notion of *Goods* and *Evils*, without having a thorough Knowledge of the whole Oeconomy of Nature, and the Life of the Gods, and how far the partial Plan of Life is conformable to the general Scheme of Nature. He muſt likewiſe know the ancient Precepts of Wiſdom, which teach us *to make the beſt of our Time, to follow God, to know one's ſelf, and never to over-do in any thing*. Without Phyſics no Man can be ſenſible of the prodigious Importance of thoſe Precepts. It is this Knowledge alone that likewiſe teaches us how much Influence Nature has in the *Cultivation of Juſtice*, in the *Preſervation of Friendſhips*, and of all the other Endearments of Life: Nor indeed can we, unleſs

Phyſics

Phyſics unfold them, underſtand our Duties to the Gods, nor the Returns of Gratitude we owe them.

But I begin now to preceive that I have launch'd farther out than the Plan of my Diſcourſe requir'd me. But the wonderful Harmony of this Doctrine, and that incredible relation of Things to one another, have drawn me on. Immortal Gods! are you not ſtruck with Amazement! For what is there in the ſo elegant, ſo fitting Syſtem of Nature, what is there in the Works of Art, ſo harmonious, ſo compacted, ſo conſequential? Is there a Conſequence that does not follow from it's Premiſes? Is there a Conſequence that does not agree with it's Premiſes? Is not the whole of the Plan ſo connected together, that if you move one Tittle the whole drops to the Ground? Nor is there aught that can be mov'd. But then how majeſtic, how uniform, how magnificent, is the whole Character of a wiſe Man! who, after Reaſon has told him, that what is *honeſt* can alone be *good*, is neceſſarily happy; and in reality poſſeſſes all thoſe Circumſtances which are ſcoff'd at by the Fooliſh.

The wiſe Man has a better Right to the Title of *King* than *Tarquin* had, who could neither govern himſelf nor others. He is more properly term'd *the Maſter of the People*, which is the ſame as *Dictator*, than *Sylla* was, who was Maſter of three Infernal Vices, *Luxury*, *Avarice*, and *Cruelty*. He is more properly term'd *Rich* than ever *Craſſus* was, who, unleſs he had been in Want, never would have paſs'd the *Euphrates* without having the leaſt Grounds for a War. He may properly be ſaid to *poſſeſs all Things*, becauſe

cauſe he alone knows the Uſe of all Things. He may properly too be call'd *Lovely*, as the Features of the Mind are more lovely than thoſe of the Body. He alone has a Right to the Appellation of *Free*, as he is ſubject to no Sway, and the Slave of no Luſt.

He may properly be term'd *Invincible*, ſince whatever Fetters may be impoſed upon his Body, his Mind never admits of any. Nor does he wait for any Period of Life to have it pronounced whether he is happy at his Laſt day: Which one of the ſeven Sages, not very much like a Sage, admoniſh'd *Cræſus* of. For if *Cræſus* ever had been happy, he would have carried his Happineſs along with him to the very Pile which *Cyrus* order'd to be rear'd for burning him. Now, if none but a good Man can be happy, and if every good Man is happy; what can be more amiable than *Philoſophy*, or what more divine than *Virtue?*

The End of the Third Book.

M. Tullius

M. TULLIUS CICERO

Concerning the

ENDS *of* THINGS *GOOD* and *EVIL.*

BOOK the FOURTH.

CHAP. I.

HAVING thus ſpoke, he finiſh'd. You have, *anſwer'd I, Cato,* explain'd all this Variety of Matter with great Readineſs, and clear'd up it's Difficulty with great Perſpicuity; I muſt therefore either give up Thoughts of a Reply, or take time to conſider of it. It is not eaſy for one to make himſelf Maſter of a Syſtem, founded not indeed quite upon Truth (but that I muſt not yet venture to affirm) but founded, nay, compacted, with the greateſt Exactneſs and Accuracy. Do you talk ſo, *reply'd he;* you, whom, ſince the

the Commencement of this * new Law, I have ſeen in one Day anſwer an Impeachment, and finiſh your Pleading in three Hours; and do you imagine that I am to give you time for putting in your Anſwer? and yet there is as little to be ſaid for this Cauſe, as for ſome other Cauſes you have carry'd. Therefore attempt this too, eſpecially as you can be at no loſs for Matter in a Queſtion which both yourſelf and † others have ſo often diſcuſs'd.

GIVE me leave to ſay, *reply'd I*, that one muſt not venture too raſhly againſt the *Stoics*; not that I am very heartily with them, but becauſe I am reſtrain'd by Shame, as they advance ſo many Things which I ſcarcely underſtand. I own, *anſwer'd* Cato, ſome Things in their Syſtem are obſcure; but they are far from rendering them obſcure on purpoſe, for they are ſo in themſelves. Then I ask'd him: When the *Peripatetics* treat of the very *ſame Matters*, whence comes it that there is not a Word they make uſe of but what is extremely intelligible? How d'ye mean! *the ſame Matters, interrupted he*, have I not been ſhewing you all this time, that the Difference betwixt the *Stoics* and *Peripatetics* does not conſiſt in Words, but in the whole Matter of their Doctrine and Sentiments. Nay, my Friend, if you can but bring me to

* *New Law*,] This was the Law made by *Pompey* to regulate Trials, on occaſion of the Murder of *Clodius*. The Reader will find an ample Account of the whole of this Law, and the Occaſion of it, in *Aſconius*'s Argument, prefix'd to the Notes of our Author's Oration for *Milo*, printed in the firſt Volume of the Tranſlation of the *Orations*.

† See the *Oration* for *Muræna*, *vol.* 3. *p.* 185.

own that, *anſwer'd I*, I am wholly yours. Why, I thought I had ſaid enough to convince you, *reply'd he*; therefore, if you pleaſe, let us diſcuſs this Point firſt; or, if you have any thing elſe to offer, leave it to the laſt. Why not now? *anſwer'd I*; and, if I may be ſo bold to ask it, I ſhall expect you will anſwer what Queſtions I ſhall think fit to trouble you with? What you pleaſe as to that, *ſaid my Friend*; tho' I ſhould think it more reaſonable for each of us to ſpeak in his turn.

THEN I began: I am of opinion, *Cato*, that *Plato's* Scholars, *Speuſippus*, *Ariſtotle*, *Xenocrates*, and their Scholars, *Polemo* and *Theophraſtus*, had ſettled their Doctrine ſo fully and ſo elegantly, that *Zeno*, after hearing *Polemo*, had no Reaſon for diſſenting both from him and the other Philoſophers I have mention'd. Their Syſtem was as follows; and I beg the favour of you to mark what you think ought to be alter'd in it, without waiting for my replying to every Particular you have offer'd; for I think that the *Whole* of *their Syſtem* ought to be drawn out againſt the *Whole* of *yours*.

WHEN they perceiv'd that our Nature was fitted both for the moſt common and the nobleſt Virtues, I mean *Juſtice*, *Temperance*, and their Siſter Virtues; all which are like the other Arts, only differing in this, that the Virtues are directed to improve the Better part, the Heart of Man; they likewiſe perceiv'd that we purſued thoſe Virtues with greater Dignity and Spirit, and that we poſſeſs'd an *implanted*, or rather an *innate* Paſſion for *Knowledge*; that we were

were born for the Society and Community of Mankind, and that thoſe Qualities ſhone the brighteſt in the moſt exalted Genius. They divided their Syſtem of Philoſophy into three Parts, and we ſee *Zeno* retains the ſame Partition.

As one of thoſe Diviſions regards the Regulation of our Morals, I ſhall delay ſpeaking to it, it being as it were the very Foundation of the Queſtion we are now diſcuſſing: For we ſhall by and bye examine into the *Ends* of *Good Things*. Give me leave here only to obſerve, that the *Old Academics* and *Peripatetics*, who agreeing in Subſtance, differed only as to Terms, have treated, with great Dignity and Variety, of that Topic, which we properly ought to call *Civil Polity*, and the *Greeks* call πολιτικος.

How largely have they wrote upon Government? upon Laws? How many Rules in the Arts, nay, how many Examples of Eloquence, have they left us in their Diſcourſes? For the firſt Thing they did, was to expreſs, with great Elegance and Propriety, the Matter they were to examine into with the greateſt Delicacy; both defining and dividing it. Your Sect follows the ſame Method, but you do it more ſlovenly; you ſee how very pure and neat the Stile of the others is. In the next place, with what Sublimity, with what Perſpicuity, do they handle thoſe Topics, which require the Dignity and Ornament of Language? When they treat of Juſtice, Fortitude, Friendſhip, Old Age, Philoſophy, Government, Temperance, Courage,

* †††††,

* †††††, they are not for mumbling over nothing but Thiſtles, or gnawing only Bones like the *Stoics*; but they talk like Men who know how to treat great Subjects with Grace, and leſſer ones with Elegance. As Inſtances of this, I will produce you their Conſolations, their Exhortations, their Advices and Counſels, their Writings which they have addreſs'd to the greateſt Men; for being directed by the Nature of their Subjects, they made uſe of two manners of ſpeaking. Becauſe all controverted Points turn upon the Nature of the Thing, without regard to Perſons or Conjunctures; or admitting thoſe, upon a Point of Fact, of Law, or of Right. They therefore dealt in both manners; and by this Practice they attain'd to all that amazing Copiouſneſs, with which they handled both kinds.

ZENO and his Followers, either unable or unwilling to keep up this manner, certainly abandon'd it entirely; though *Cleanthes* and *Chryſippus* wrote the Art of Rhetoric; but ſuch an Art as a Man ought to read, if he deſires never to open his Lips. Hence you ſee in what manner they ſpeak; they coin new Words, they forſake what are in uſe. But what is their great Drift? Why, they tell us, that this whole World is our City. Yes; and this is a Conſideration that fires the Hearers! But what is the mighty Matter which it proves? That an Inhabitant of † *Circello*, forſooth, has a right to think, that all this World is his Borough. This fire the Mind!

* There is a Chaſm here in the Original.

† A Promontory in the *Tuſcan* Sea.

why,

why, it is enough to damp it, were it all on a Blaze.

As to your ſhort Concluſion, that the wiſe Man alone is a *King*, a *Dictator*, and a *Craſſus*; it was fine, it was full; but then you had it from the Art of Rhetoric. For when your Sect comes to talk of the Influence of Virtue, how very dry is all they ſay, though they make Virtue of ſo much Conſequence, that ſhe can of herſelf make a Man happy! They, as it were, prick one with their quick, ſharp, little Queſtions; but, even though we aſſent to them, they have no manner of Effect upon the Mind, and they go as they come; becauſe Matters of the greateſt weight, Things which are perhaps true in themſelves, are not handled as they ought to be, but a great deal too minutely.

The next Head, is the Method of diſputing, and the Study of Nature: For, as I have already ſaid, we ſhall ſoon talk of the *Supreme Good*, and direct our whole Diſcourſe to explain it. Now, *Zeno* made no Attempt to change any thing under either of thoſe Heads, for all ſtood extremely well in both. For what had the Ancients omitted in all the Syſtem of Diſputation? They defin'd a great deal, and have left us the Arts of Definition. As to the Diviſions and Subdiviſions which are annex'd to Definitions, they have both left us Inſtances of them, and Rules by which they are to be done. They have done the ſame by *oppoſing Properties*; by which they come to the Knowledge of *Kinds*, and each different *Species*. Then, at the Head of a rationally concluſive Argument, they put their

cleareſt Propoſitions; next follows their Diſpoſition; then they draw a Concluſion from the Meaſure of Truth, which every Propoſition contains.

BUT what a Variety of Arguments and rational Concluſions they have! and how very unlike is their manner to your captious Queſtions! How do they declare, in many Paſſages, that we muſt come at Truth neither by admitting the Evidence of the Senſes, without regarding that of Reaſon; nor by admitting that of Reaſon, and ſetting aſide that of the Senſes; and that we ought to diſtinguiſh betwixt the one and the other? All the Maxims and Doctrine of the *Logicians* were founded and invented by them. And though *Chryſippus* has beſtow'd great Pains upon this Art, yet *Zeno* has beſtow'd much leſs than the Ancients did; nor is what he has done any Improvement upon them; ſome Things he has quite omitted.

NOW, as there are two Arts which complete the Properties of Reaſoning and Diſcourſing, I mean the Art of Invention and that of Diſputation, both the *Stoics* and the *Peripatetics* have handled the latter: The *Peripatetics* have diſtinguiſh'd themſelves nobly upon the former, which the *Stoics* have not ſo much as attempted; for the *Peripatetics* have, with great Art and Method, taught this Art from Topics which you did not ſo much as dream of, and which, like Magazines, furniſh'd them with Arguments. By this means they are under no Neceſſity of always repeating over the ſame *Bead roll of Things*, nor of always hanging by their own

Notes;

Notes; for a Man who knows where every Argument is placed, and how he can come at it, ſuch a Perſon can clear up every Point be it ever ſo dark, and is always quite Maſter of his Argument in diſputing. It is true, there are ſome Men of great Capacity, who without any regular Study attain to an amazing Command of Language, yet ſtill Art is a more certain Guide than Nature. For the Effuſion of Language as from a Poet is one thing, but the digeſting it according to Method and Art, is another.

THE like may be ſaid of the Syſtem of Natural Philoſophy made uſe of by both Sects; not for the two Cauſes which *Epicurus* aſſigned, the ridding us of the Fear of *Death* and *Religion*; but becauſe the Knowledge of the celeſtial Bodies imprints a certain Modeſty upon the Spirits of thoſe who perceive what Wiſdom and what Regularity obtain with the Gods themſelves. The Works and the Handicraft of the Gods likewiſe ennoble human Reflection. The Experience of the Providence, the Intention and the Will of the Supreme Lord and Maſter of the Univerſe, teach us Juſtice. It is in proportion to the Degrees in which Reaſon is conform'd to his *Divine Nature*, that Philoſophers call it the *true* and *ſupreme Law*.

THERE is in the ſame Study of natural Cauſes a certain Pleaſure which makes us inſatiable after the Purſuit of them; and this is the only Pleaſure which we can taſte agreeable to the Principles of Virtue and Honour, when we have diſpatch'd our neceſſary Buſineſs, and are unbent from Labour. And now the *Stoics* have generally followed

them in the moſt important Points thro' all this Syſtem; ſuch as the owning the Being of Gods, and that every thing conſiſts of four Principles. But when any very difficult Point came to be diſcuſs'd, ſuch as, whether there was ſuch a thing as a fifth Principle from which Reaſon and Intelligence ariſes? which leads on to an Enquiry into the Nature of the Soul; *Zeno* call'd this *Fire*. He likewiſe differ'd in ſome other Points, but they were few. As to the great Concern, he was of the ſame Opinion with the *Peripatetics*, That the whole World and it's principal Parts were directed by a Divine Wiſdom and Providence. The Matter both as to Reaſon and Expreſſion is very dry with the *Stoics*, but rich and copious with the *Peripatetics*.

WHAT vaſt Diſcoveries and Collections have they made relating to the Nature, the Birth, the Limbs, and the Lives of Animals? How much have they wrote upon the Productions of the Earth? Have they not ſhewn by what Cauſes, and in what Manner a vaſt Multitude of Objects have been created? All which Store has furniſhed them with many and moſt infallible Arguments for explaining the Nature of Things. Therefore hitherto, ſo far as I can underſtand, *Zeno* had no manner of reaſon for changing the Name of his Sect: For tho' he did not follow the *Peripatetics* in every Particular, yet this is no Proof that he was not of their School. When *Epicurus* ſpeaks, at leaſt in Phyſics, I think I hear *Democritus*; he makes ſome few Variations, but granting he had made more, yet in moſt Points, and thoſe certainly the moſt important

tant, he repeats his very Words. As your Sect does the ſame, their Practice is no great Proof of their Gratitude to the Inventors of their Doctrine.

BUT enough of this; now give me leave to enquire whether *Zeno* has made ſuch Diſcoveries with regard to *Ultimate Good*, which is the Sum of all Philoſophy, as could warrant his Schiſm from the *Inventors*, and, in ſome meaſure, the *Parents* of his Philoſophy. Upon this head, *Cato*, tho' you have with great Accuracy explained *this End of good Things*, which comprehends Philoſophy, and in what Senſe and Manner it is underſtood by the *Stoics*; yet you will give me leave to explain likewiſe, and examine, ſo far as my Knowledge reaches, what new Diſcoveries *Zeno* has made in this Reſpect. For as his Predeceſſors, eſpecially *Polemo*, maintain'd that the *Supreme Good* conſiſted in living agreeably to Nature, the *Stoics* told us, that by theſe Words three Things were implied; *firſt*, To live in ſuch a Manner as to be perfectly acquainted with thoſe Meaſures that are agreeable to Nature. They declar'd that this was the End meant by *Zeno*, and that it implied what you mention'd, the living according to the Fitneſs of Nature.

THEY told us, that the next Thing implied was, To live in an Obſervance of all or moſt of the intermediate Duties. This, as they explain it, is inconſiſtent with the former: For that which is fitting, by which we expreſs the Word κατορθωμα, can happen only to the wiſe Man. Now this laſt belongs to an imperfect and not to a

perfect Duty, and therefore may fall to the Share of ſome Fools. The *third* Diviſion was, To live in the Enjoyment of all or the chief of the Things that are agreeable to Nature. But this does not fall within our Agency: For Supreme Good includes that kind of Life which enjoys Virtue, and thoſe Circumſtances which are agreeable to Nature, without falling within the Compaſs of our Power. But this Supreme Good which is ſignified by the third Diviſion, and that Life which is communicated by the *Supreme Good*, becauſe it is join'd with Virtue, is the Lot of *the Wiſe alone*. And this *End of good Things*, as we ſee it term'd by the *Stoics* themſelves, was laid down by *Xenocrates* and *Ariſtotle*. Therefore this primary Diſpoſition of Nature, at which your Diſquiſition commenc'd, is explain'd by them in pretty near the following Words:

EVERY Being in Nature affects it's own Preſervation, it's own Safety, and to retain the Properties of it's own Kind. They tell us likewiſe, that thoſe Arts which aſſiſt Nature are purſued for this Purpoſe. The chief of which is the *Art of Living*, ſo as to preſerve what Nature communicates, and to acquire whatever ſhe wants. The ſame Philoſophers have divided Human Nature into Soul and Body. And as we ought to have an Affection for each of them, they have told us, that the Virtues belonging to each ought in themſelves likewiſe to be the Object of our Affections; and as they gave an infinite Preference *to the Soul over the Body*, ſo they preferred the Virtues of the *Soul* to the

Properties

Properties of the *Body*. But as they made Wiſdom the Guardian and the Tutor of every Man, and gave her as a kind of an *Attendant* and *Aſſiſtant* to Nature; they told us, that the Property of Wiſdom was to protect Man, who was a Compound of Soul and Body; and that ſhe ſhould comfort and direct him in both thoſe Reſpects. Having laid down theſe plain Principles, they proceeded more artfully, and held it as a Principle, that there is a ready and obvious Method to eſtimate the Goods of the Body. As to thoſe of the Mind, their Enquiry was more accurate.

In the *firſt* place, They found that they contain'd the Seeds of *Juſtice*; and they were the firſt Philoſophers who held it as a Property of Nature, That the Being which procreates ſhould have an Affection for what it has procreated; and that the moſt ancient Inſtitutions, ſuch as the Conjunction of Man and Wife, were enjoin'd by Nature. From this Root proceed Affections for Kindred; and from thoſe Principles they trace the Original and Progreſs of all the Virtues. From this likewiſe aroſe that Magnanimity which with Eaſe repels and reſiſts the Attacks of Fortune, becauſe the greateſt Difficulties are ſurmountable by the wiſe Man. As to the Changes or Injuries of Fortune, that Life which was directed by the Principles of the old Philoſophers, had an evident Superiority.

From the Principles laid down by Nature aroſe certain ſublime Properties of good Things, partly proceeding from the Study of hidden Objects; becauſe a Paſſion for Knowledge is implanted

planted in the Mind; and from this follows that Deſire after Explanation and Enquiry which is the Property of Reaſon and of Man, who is the only Animal that is born with a Share of Modeſty, and ſome Senſe of Shame, and affects the Ties and Connections of Society, having a ſtrict Guard on himſelf of all he ſays and does, to do nothing but what is agreeable to Honeſty and Decency: From theſe Principles, or, as I call'd them, Seeds implanted by Nature, Temperance, Modeſty, Juſtice, and every Virtue is conſummated.

CHAP. II.

SUCH, *Cato*, is the Syſtem of the Philoſophers I ſpeak of: And now, that I have explain'd it, I ſhould be glad to know what Reaſon *Zeno* could have for diſſenting from this ancient Doctrine? what part of their Inſtitutes was not approved of by him? Did he not maintain, that all Nature affected it's own Preſervation? that every Creature had ſuch a Concern for itſelf, that it ſought it's own Safety, and it's well-being in it's own kind? Did he not maintain, that as the End of all Arts was to ſupply what Nature moſt affects, that the ſame Maxims ought to hold with regard to the whole Art of Life? That, as we are compoſed of Soul and Body, we ought to cultivate both, and all their Virtues, on their own account? Or, was *Zeno* diſpleas'd at the great Preference which is allowed to the Virtues of the Mind? Did their Opinions as to Prudence, the Knowledge of Things,

Things, the Society of Mankind, Temperance, Modeſty, Magnanimity, and the whole Syſtem of the *Honeſtum*, give him Diſtaſte? The *Stoics* themſelves will confeſs, that all we have ſaid on thoſe Heads is very noble; *Zeno* therefore had no Handle for his *Schiſm* here; they aſſign another Reaſon.

THE Ancients, forſooth, were under great Deluſions, and this *Zealot* for diſcovering Truth could not bear with them: For what could be more perverſe, more intolerable, or more ſtupid, than the placing among the Number of Good Things, Health, the Abſence of all Pain, the full Enjoyment of our Eye-ſight, and all our other Senſes; and not maintaining, that there is no manner of Difference betwixt theſe Properties and their Oppoſites? For all they term'd *Good*, were not *Goods*, but *Preferables*. Then, the Ancients ſhew'd great Stupidity in ſaying, that perſonal Accompliſhments were *deſirable* in themſelves, and that they were not rather *eligible* than *deſirable*: They then told us that this Doctrine holds with regard to the Whole of Life, which conſiſts of Virtue *alone*: That a Life abounding in all thoſe Circumſtances which are agreeable to Nature, is not more *deſirable*, but more *eligible*. And though Virtue renders human Happineſs abſolutely complete, yet the Wiſe may want ſome Things, even when completely happy; and that it is therefore their Buſineſs to repel from their Perſons, Pains, Diſeaſes, and Infirmities.

SURPRIZING Force of Genius! well-founded Reaſon for a new Doctrine! But go on. For the Conſequences, as you yourſelf very ſenſibly laid

laid them down, are, that all *Folly*, all *Injuſtice*, and all other *Vices*, are alike; that all Offences are equal; and that they who, in the Paths of Nature and Learning, have made the fartheſt Advances to Virtue, unleſs they fully reach her, are completely wretched; nor is there the leaſt Difference betwixt their Morals and that of the moſt *conſummate Ruffian*. So that *Plato*, with all his great Merit, if he was not a *wiſe Man*, in no reſpect led a better or a more happy Life than the moſt profligate Wretch. Theſe, forſooth, are the Improvements and Emendations upon the *Old Philoſophy*; Improvements and Emendations that never can find Admittance into the City, the Forum, or the Senate-houſe. For who could bear that a Man, who ſets up for the Director of a virtuous and wiſe Courſe of Life, ſhould talk at this rate, and change the Names of Things; and with the very ſame way of thinking as other Men, affix other Terms to Objects to which he allows the very ſame Properties; altering the *Sounds*, but retaining the *Senſe?*

WERE you Advocate for a Perſon who is impeach'd, would you in ſumming up your Pleading deny, that Baniſhment and Confiſcation of Goods were Evils? That they were not indeed eligible, but at the ſame time we ought not to avoid them? that a Judge ought not to be ſuſceptible of Pity? that if he was ſpeaking in an Aſſembly (tho' *Hannibal* was at our Gates, and could toſs a Javelin within our Walls) he ſhould tell them, that it was impoſſible that he could be miſerable, though ſubjected to Captivity, Slavery,

Slavery, Death, and the Loſs of his Country? When the Senate decreed a Triumph to *Africanus*, how came the Words of the Decree to run, *that it was on account of his Virtue and Felicity*, if no Man, excepting the Sage, can be ſaid to poſſeſs either *Virtue* or real *Felicity?* What kind of Philoſophy is this, that talks in a common Strain to the Public, but has a Language of it's own in the School; eſpecially as there is no Innovation as to the Senſe which their Words convey; there is no Alteration as to Things, for they remain the ſame, tho' differently cloath'd?

For what is the Difference in terming Riches Intereſt, or Health *Preferables*, and not *Good Things*; when the Perſon who terms them *Good Things*, allows them but the very ſame Qualities as you do, who call them *Preferables?* Therefore *Panætius* (a Perſon of the greateſt Ingenuity and Virtue, and one who was worthy the Friendſhip he liv'd in with *Scipio* and *Lælius*) when he was writing to *Q. Tubero, upon the Subject of ſuffering Pain*, never laid it down as a Maxim, that Pain was not an Evil; though, could he have proved that, it ought to have been his principal Topic: But he diſcours'd of it's Kind and Qualities, how foreign it was to our Nature, and of the Method and the Means of bearing it; as this Gentleman was a *Stoic*, I think his Sentiments condemn the Atrocity of your Expreſſions.

But, my Friend, that I may come nearer to what you advanced, I will act more cloſely, and will compare the Doctrine you have juſt now laid down with that which I prefer to it. As

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to thoſe Points which are in common betwixt you and the Ancients, we will take them as admitted on both ſides. As to thoſe which are controverted, we will if you pleaſe examine them. I ſhall be extremely well pleas'd, *ſaid he*, if you will deal more narrowly and cloſely, as you call it; for all the Topics you have advanced hitherto, are common-place Declamations; but from you I expect ſomething more elegant. From me! *reply'd I*; —— but I will do my beſt, without avoiding thoſe Common-places, if I find myſelf at a Loſs for Variety.

CHAP. III.

LET it therefore be a firſt Principle, that we have an Affection for ourſelves; and that the firſt Appetite implanted by Nature, is *Self-Preſervation*. This we both agree upon. We are next to examine into what *we are*; that we may preſerve ourſelves in the Condition which beſt fits us. Let it be admitted then *we are Men*, conſiſting of Soul and Body, with ſuch and ſuch Properties; and that we are bound, by the firſt Affection of Nature, to love thoſe two Objects, and from them to form the End of Supreme and Ultimate Good. This End, if my Principles are true, muſt neceſſarily conſiſt in our poſſeſſing, as far as we can, the greateſt Number, and the beſt, of thoſe Things which are agreeable to Nature. This is the End which the *Stoics* propoſe, but with this Difference, that I make uſe of more Words, and they uſe the ſhort Expreſſion, *to live according to Nature.*

ture. This to them ſeem'd *the Ultimate of Good Things.*

Now let them ſhew us, or do *you* rather ſhew us (for who is more able than yourſelf!) as both proceed on the ſame Principles, how you can make *living honeſtly* (or, which is the ſame thing, living agreeably to Virtue or Nature) to conſtitute *Supreme Good?* and in what manner, or in what place, you all at once drop the Body, and every thing which, though agreeable to *Nature*, you put out of our Power, even *Duty* itſelf? I likewiſe want to know, whence it happens that the *ſtrong Affections* which are *implanted* by *Nature*, ſhould all of a ſudden be *given up* by *Wiſdom?*

But now, ſuppoſing that we were not enquiring into what is the Supreme Good of Man, but of ſome Being conſiſting only of the Intellect; for Fictions are ſometimes allowable when they lead to Truth. Now, your Supreme Good could not be the ſame with that of this intellectual Being; for he would deſire Health, the Abſence of Pain, Self-Preſervation, the retaining of all thoſe Objects; and he would lay down, as his great End, the living according to Nature, which is, as I have already explain'd it, the being poſſeſs'd of the whole, the greateſt part, or the chief of thoſe Things which are agreeable to Nature.

For in whatever manner you ſuppoſe a living Being to be form'd, even ſuppoſing it to be incorporeal, we muſt neceſſarily imagine that there are ſome Properties in the Mind analogous to thoſe in the Body; ſo that it's *End of Good Things*

Things can by no manner of means exiſt any otherwiſe than I have laid out. Now *Chryſippus*, explaining the Differences in Animals, ſays, that ſome of them excel in bodily Qualifications, ſome in intellectual, and ſome in both. He then examines the End which each kind of Animal ought to lay down for itſelf. But after ranking Man under that Head of Animals in whom the Intellect predominates; he lays down for him ſuch a *Chief Good* as is proper not for a Being where the Intellect predominates, but where there is nothing but *Intellect*.

Now, there is but one way in which Virtue can be conſiſtently ſaid to be Supreme Good, and that is, ſuppoſing an Animal to be all Intellect. But ſuch an Animal muſt be form'd ſo as that it's Mind ſhould poſſeſs nothing that is conformable to Nature, as Health is. But this is a Being which cannot exiſt even in Imagination, without it's being ſubject to numberleſs Inconveniences. Should *Chryſippus* ſay, that ſome Things by reaſon of their Minuteneſs are indiſcernible; in this we are agreed. *Epicurus* tells us the ſame thing of Pleaſure; that ſome Pleaſures are ſo ſmall, as to be oftentimes obſcur'd and ſwallow'd up. But the great Properties of the Body, when improved by Time, and varying in themſelves, are not of this Rank. Therefore, when the Diſcernment of Objects are obſcur'd by reaſon of their Minuteneſs, it very often happens, that we admit it is of no Conſequence to us whether they exiſt or do not exiſt. In the ſame manner as in your Inſtances of the Sun, and the Treaſures of *Craſſus*; a Lamp gives no

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perceptible Addition of Light to the one, nor a Farthing any Increaſe of Wealth to the other: But as to Objects that don't admit of ſo great a Diminution, it happens that the Difference may not be ſo great. Thus, if a Month of pleaſurable Life is added to a Perſon who has lived equally pleaſurably for ten Years; this is a Good, becauſe Continuance is of ſome Conſequence to Pleaſure: And yet, though this Month were not added, it does not follow that the Happineſs of Life is thereby taken away. Now, perſonal Good Things are of the ſame nature with what I have juſt mention'd; for they admit of an Acceſſion which is worthy of all the Pains we can take about it: So that to me the *Stoics* don't ſeem to be in earneſt when they tell us, that if a Bottle, or a * Fleſh-bruſh, ſhould be a Circumſtance in a Life virtuouſly led, then that a wiſe Man would chuſe that Life with ſuch Acceſſions, yet without being one whit the happier for them.

THIS Simile deſerves to be confuted by Ridicule rather than Reaſoning; for can there be a juſter Subject of Ridicule, than a Man puzzling himſelf whether he ſhall have a Bottle or not? But, at the ſame time, if any Perſon ſhould relieve another from a Palſy or excruciating Pains, he has great Merit. Nay, if your boaſted Sage was forced by a Tyrant to undergo a Rack, he would not preſerve the ſame Compoſure of

* *Fleſh-bruſh,*] Orig. *Strigilis.* This was an Inſtrument with which the *Romans* uſed to rub themſelves in their Baths, and thereby open the Pores of the Body; and the Effects of it were very refreſhing.

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Countenance as if he had loſt his Bottle; but, like a Man entering upon a great and an arduous Conflict, when he ſaw that he was obliged to fight with Pain that formidable Foe, he would rouze every Faculty of Courage and Patience, and under their Guard enter upon that ſevere and (as I call'd it) arduous Conflict.

THEREFORE we are not talking of a Thing that can be undiſcernibly leſſen'd, becauſe ſuch a Thing muſt be extremely little; but of ſuch an Object as crowns the Meaſure of Good: For in a voluptuous Life one Pleaſure is drown'd amidſt Variety; yet this Pleaſure, ſmall as it is, is ſtill a part of that pleaſurable Life. A Farthing cannot be diſcern'd amidſt the Riches of *Craſſus*, and yet a Farthing is Part of thoſe Riches. In like manner, the Objects which we ſay are agreeable to Nature, are loſt in the continued Happineſs of Life; nevertheleſs they are Parts of that Happineſs. But if, as both of us muſt admit, there is a ſort of natural Appetite after Objects that are agreeable to Nature, then we muſt make ſome Eſtimate of all thoſe Objects. This done, we can at leiſure enquire into the Extent and Excellency, into the ſeveral Proportions they contribute to happy Life, and into thoſe Diminutions they admit of, by which they become quite, or next to quite, indiſcernible. But why ſo much Diſcourſe upon Things that are no way diſputed! For there is no Man who denies that there is an Analogy betwixt the Proportion of Supreme Good, and of the ſeveral Natures for which it is calculated. Now, Supreme Good is the final Reſult of every thing we aim at; becauſe

cauſe all Beings by Nature love themſelves: For where is the Being that ever abandons itſelf, or any Part of itſelf, or any Function or Power of that Part, or any Motion or Poſture of any of thoſe Things which are agreeable to Nature? Now Nature never forgets it's own primary Properties, nor is there an Inſtance of any Nature which does not retain it's own Faculties from it's Riſe to it's Diſſolution.

THEN how comes it that human Nature alone abandons Man, forgets the Body, and makes a Part and not the Whole of Man ſuſceptible of Supreme Good? And how ſhall we preſerve that Maxim in which the *Stoics* and all Sects agree, That that natural Ultimate of Good which we now enquire after, is alike in the Nature of all Beings? For, if ſo, Supreme Good would be alike according to the different Excellencies of the ſeveral Natures to which this Good became Supreme; for this ſeems to be the Ultimate Good of the *Stoics*.

THEN why do you boggle at changing the Principles of Nature? or why do you ſay, that every Animal, as ſoon as it is born, has an Affection for itſelf, and directs all it's Cares to Self-Preſervation? Why don't you rather ſay, that every Animal applies to attain that which is beſt to itſelf, that it is ſolely employed in preſerving it, and that all other *Natures* do nothing but preſerve what is ſeverally beſt to themſelves? But how can there be a *Beſt* without a Good, ſeparately exiſting? But if other Objects are deſirable, why is not the Ultimate of Things deſirable, meaſur'd by the Appetite after all thoſe

Things, or the greateſt part, or the moſt conſiderable of them?

PHIDIAS might have begun, and then have finiſh'd, a Statue; but he might have receiv'd it after being rough-hew'd by another, and then have finiſh'd it. In like manner, Wiſdom does not beget a Man, but receives him rough-hew'd from Nature; and, upon conſidering the Work of Nature, it is the Buſineſs of Wiſdom to finiſh what Nature has begun, as one would do a Statue.

In what manner then does Man come out of Nature's Hands? and what is the Province, what is the Operation of Wiſdom? what is it that ſhe is to complete and finiſh? If there is nothing to be finiſh'd beſides a certain Operation of his Intellect, that is, his Reaſon; why, then the Courſe of a virtuous Life is his Ultimate Good, becauſe Virtue is the Perfection of Reaſon. If ſhe has nothing to finiſh beſides the Body, then the whole will conſiſt in Health, in the Abſence of Pain, in Comelineſs, and ſuch-like Properties. But now that we are examining into the Supreme Good of Man, what ſhould hinder us to enquire into the Reſult of his whole Nature?

For, as it is unanimouſly admitted, that the whole Duty and Function of Wiſdom is directed to the Improvement of Man, ſome Sects (don't think that I am ſpeaking againſt the *Stoics* only) make Supreme Good as exiſting independant of our Faculties, as if they were talking of ſome irrational Animal; others, on the contrary, treat Man as an incorporeal Being. Therefore they attend

attend to nothing beſides his Mind; and yet the ſame Mind is not an empty vague *Being* (for I had no notion of that) but is cloathed in a certain kind of a Body; ſo that Virtue, abſtractedly conſider'd, is not ſufficient to content it, for it's Deſires are likewiſe after an Abſence of Pain. Both Sects therefore do the ſame Thing; they neglect the one hand to take care of the other; or, like *Herillus*, they cultivate the ſpeculative Properties of the Mind, but abandon the Exertion of the Will. As to the Opinion of thoſe who paſs over a vaſt Number of Objects, then fix upon one, it is extremely defective. That Doctrine therefore is complete and full, which, upon examining into the Supreme Good of Man, have left no part of him, either Soul or Body, unprovided for.

But your Sect, *Cato*, by acknowledging with us, that Virtue is the Principal and moſt Sublime of human Perfections, and that the Wiſe are complete and perfect; you, I ſay, dazzle the Eye of our Underſtanding by the Luſtre of Virtue: For every living Creature has ſome principal Excellency peculiar to itſelf, as there is in Horſes and Dogs; yet they require to be free of Pain, and to enjoy Health. Thus, in Man, his principal and moſt complete Excellency lies in Virtue; and this is the Characteriſtic of his Perfection. Therefore, to me, you don't ſeem to conſider the Path and the Progreſs of Nature; for ſhe does not the ſame Thing by Man as ſhe does by Corn; Rear him from a Stalk to an Ear, and then neglect the Stalk when ſhe has brought him to the Functions of Reaſon; for

her Affections are always ſuch, as that ſhe never quite abandons thoſe Objects which ſhe firſt deſir'd. Thus ſhe adds Reaſon to Senſe, and, after giving Reaſon it's Maturity, ſhe abandons not the Senſes.

VINES are cultivated; and the Deſign of this Culture is to preſerve the Vine, with all it's Parts, in the moſt thriving Condition. This is our way of thinking; for we muſt, as you do, ſometimes bring Similes in for the ſake of Inſtruction. If therefore this Culture was join'd to the Nature of the Vine itſelf, yet ſtill it would want thoſe other Cares that contribute towards it's Support and Improvement, as before; but at the ſame time it would prefer itſelf to all the other Parts of the Vine, and be perſuaded that the Vine had no Excellency preferable to itſelf. In like manner, when Senſe alone is added to Nature, ſhe will indeed preſerve it, but ſhe will at the ſame time preſerve herſelf; but when ſhe aſſociates Reaſon likewiſe, ſhe places her in ſo high a Sphere, that all the primary Objects of Nature are ſubject to her Tuition.

THEREFORE ſhe never departs from her Poſt of taking care of thoſe Objects which ſhe is ſet over, and in right of which ſhe has the Direction of the whole of Life. Nor can I enough admire the Inconſiſtency of thoſe who admit, that natural Appetites (which they call ὁρμη) and likewiſe Duty, nay, Virtue herſelf, have the Tuition of thoſe Things which are according to Nature: But when they want to come at Supreme Good, they over-leap them all, and inſtead of one they leave us two Operations; for, rather than ſhut

up

up every thing in the ſame End, they tell us, that ſome Objects are eligible, and others deſirable.

THEY tell us at the ſame time, that we can have no adequate Idea of Virtue, if thoſe Things which are foreign to her are conducive to a happy Life; whereas it is juſt the contrary. Becauſe it is impoſſible to introduce Virtue, unleſs all the Objects, either of her Choice or Averſion, have the ſame Ultimation. For, if we quite neglect them, we fall into the Errors and the Blunders of *Ariſto*, and forget the Principles which we have annex'd to Virtue herſelf: If, on the contrary, we don't overlook them, but yet neglect to bring them to the total Account of Supreme Good, then we ſhall border pretty near upon the Dotages of *Herillus*; for we muſt, in that caſe, lay out two Plans of Life; becauſe he makes two ſeparate Ultimations of Good, which, if they really did exiſt, ought to be connected; whereas they are now ſo divided, that they are in fact irreconcileable; which is extremely abſurd.

THEREFORE the contrary of what you hold is true; for it is impoſſible to form any conſiſtent Notion of Virtue, without her preſerving the primary Objects of Nature, and bringing them to the total Account. For we now are in ſearch of Virtue; not the Virtue that abandons, but the Virtue that preſerves Nature. But the Virtue you have adopted, guards one part, and abandons the reſt; and if the Frame of Humanity could ſpeak, it would tell you, that the very firſt Eſſays of it's Affections are directed to preſerve itſelf in it's original Nature. Now, when the

Affections of Man are in this infant State, he has no ſufficient Comprehenſion of thoſe Objects which Nature chiefly affects; therefore let us explain this Point; yet what can we underſtand farther by it, but that no part of Nature ſhould be neglected! Now, if there is nothing in Nature excepting Reaſon, the End of Good Things muſt conſiſt in Virtue only; but if there is a Body likewiſe, then the Conſequence of this Explanation is, that we abandon thoſe Objects which we held before the Matter was thus explain'd. Therefore, to depart from Nature is living agreeably to Nature. Thus ſome Philoſophers, after abſtracting themſelves from Senſe, and after they had thereby diſcover'd ſome more divine and exalted Properties of the Soul, abandon the Senſes quite: So your Sect, when, after affecting other Objects, they came to view the Beauty of Virtue, neglected all they had ſeen for the ſake of Virtue; forgetting that natural Affections are ſo extenſive as to link the Principle to the End, and without underſtanding that they thereby ſubverted the very Foundations of all thoſe beautiful and wonderful Objects they wanted to eſtabliſh.

THEREFORE I will venture to ſay, that the Philoſophy which conſtitutes the End of Good Things in a virtuous Life, is erroneous; but this in a greater or leſs Degree, according to the Sentiments of it's different Profeſſors. *Pyrrho* errs the moſt egregiouſly; for, after he has eſtabliſh'd Virtue, he leaves no other Object of Affection. Next comes *Ariſto*, who, not venturing to remove every thing clear away, introduced

duced ſome Objects which might ſtimulate the Affections of a wiſe Man for any Subject that can fall into and, as it were, ſuggeſt to his Mind. In this he is more reaſonable than *Pyrrho*, by allowing Man ſome kind of an Affection; but he falls below the other Philoſophers, becauſe he has totally deviated from Nature.

Now the *Stoics*, by making Virtue the ſole End of Good Things, reſemble thoſe Philoſophers. However, they have the Advantage of *Pyrrho*, becauſe they ſuppoſe a Principle of Duty; and of *Ariſto*, becauſe they diſclaim his imaginary Suggeſtions. But by their ſeparating from the End of Good Things thoſe Objects which they admit to be accommodated to Nature, and to be eligible in themſelves, they have deviated from Nature, and in ſome meaſure agree with *Ariſto*; for he mention'd certain unintelligible Suggeſtions; whereas they lay them down as Principles of Nature, but ſeparate them from the Ends and Ultimation of Good Things. When they lay them down as Matters of Election, they ſeem to follow Nature; but when they come to deny that they are conducive to the Happineſs of Life, there they abandon her.

What I have hitherto ſaid, has been in order to prove that *Zeno* had not ſufficient Reaſon for diſſenting from the Doctrine of his Maſters. Now, as to other Points; unleſs you, *Cato*, have a mind to offer ſomewhat in reply to what I have ſaid, or think that I have ſaid too much already----Neither, *anſwer'd he*; for I want to hear you finiſh the whole Diſpute, nor can I ever think your Diſcourſe tedious. I

am glad of that with all my heart, *reply'd I*; for what can be more delightful than to diſcourſe upon the Subject of Virtue with *Cato*, that Model of every Virtue!

BUT let me here obſerve, that your moſt weighty Sentiment, which leads up the whole Train of your Doctrine (I mean, that the *Honeſtum* is the Sole Good, and that the End of Good Things is living honeſtly) is in common to you and all the Philoſophers, who have conſtituted Virtue to be the Sole End of Good Things: And as to what you ſay, that Virtue cannot exiſt if we admit aught but what is honeſt to have a Share in her, the Philoſophers I have lately mention'd do the ſame.

I THINK *Zeno* would have acted much more reaſonably, if, in his Diſpute with *Polemo*, from whom he received all his Doctrine of the primary Affections of Nature, as they both ſet out upon the ſame Principles, he had mark'd the Place where he firſt ſtopp'd, and the very critical Point where the Controverſy begun; and not to have made uſe of the ſame Sentiments, and the ſame Arguments, which they make uſe of who maintain, that their Supreme Good does not come from Nature.

AT the ſame time I can by no means approve of your Philoſophers, who, after laying down the *Honeſtum* as the Supreme Good, tell us, that it is neceſſary ſome primary Objects, fitting and agreeable to Nature, ſhould be propos'd, from the Election of which Virtue may reſult: For Virtue was not plac'd in ſuch an Election, as that the very Ultimate of Good Things ſhould receive

receive an Acceſſion from ſome Object foreign to Virtue: For every Object, which we either elect or wiſh for, ought to come into the main Account of Good Things, that the Perſon who obtains it may have no other Object of Affection.

DON'T you perceive that they who place the Sum of Happineſs in Pleaſure, are very clear as to the Rules of acting or not acting? Not a Man amongſt them is under the leaſt Doubt as to the Tendency of all their Duties, as to the Objects they ought to purſue, and thoſe they ought to avoid. Suppoſing the Syſtem I now defend to be the Ultimate of Good Things, then the whole of our Duty and Practice will inſtantly appear; but as to you, who have no other Object but the Fitneſs and Honeſty of Action, you are quite at a loſs for the Source of every Duty and Practice.

IN this you are as much at a loſs as they who ſay, that the Object of their Purſuit conſiſts in whatever occurs or ſuggeſts to the Mind. You appeal to Nature; but Nature has a right to tell you, that you are in the wrong to ſeek the ultimate Purpoſe of happy Life, or the Principles of Action, from any Object but from her; becauſe there is one Syſtem of Reaſon, in which every Principle of Practice, and every Ultimate of Good, is included. She will tell you farther, that as the Sentiment of *Ariſto* was exploded, when he maintain'd that no Object differ'd from another, and that there was not the leaſt Diſtinction in Things, excepting that betwixt Virtues and Vices; that, in like manner, *Zeno* was in the wrong for maintaining that no Object, beſides

beſides Virtue or Vice, could have the ſmalleſt Tendency towards the Procurement of Supreme Good, and that tho' no Object could contribute to the Happineſs of Life, yet that thoſe Objects had Properties which excited the Affections; as if this very Excitement of the Affections was not directed towards the Attainment of Supreme Good. But can any thing be more inconſiſtent than what they tell us, that after Supreme Good is diſcover'd, they return to Nature for Directions as to the Principles, *upon which they act*, that is, of their Duties? For the Rule of Action and Duty, does not ſtimulate any Affection after thoſe Objects that are agreeable to Nature, but the latter ſtimulates both our Affections and the Practice of our Duties.

Now as to your ſententious Quickneſs which you call concluſive, and eſpecially that extreme ſhort Syllogyſm, *Every Good is commendable, whatever is commendable is honeſt; therefore whatever is good is honeſt*; Give me leave to ſay that this is but an edgeleſs Weapon. For I deny the firſt Propoſition, which were it omitted, would render the ſecond unneceſſary, for if every good were commendable, it muſt follow, that every thing that is honeſt is ſo too.

But who beſides *Pyrrho*, *Ariſto*, and ſuch others, from whom you differ, will make you this Conceſſion. *Ariſtotle*, *Xenocrates*, and all their Sect won't; for they admit Health, Strength, Riches, Glory, and ſuch other Objects to be Goods, but not that they are commendable or praiſe-worthy. Nor do they think that the End of good Things is ſo abſolutely included in Virtue

tue only, as that Virtue ought to have the Preference to all other Conſiderations.

WHAT then do you think they aim at, who with *Epicurus*, *Hieronymus*, and *Carneades*, if he has any Followers, entirely ſeparate Virtue from the End of Good Things? How do you imagine that *Callipho* or *Diodorus* could make you this Conceſſion, when they add to Honeſty a Property which is of a different kind? Therefore, *Cato*, you have thought fit firſt to lay down Premiſes which are not admitted, and then to draw from them what Conſequences you pleaſe. Now as to your * *Sorites*, which we think to be extremely vitious; "Whatever is good is eligible, "whatever is eligible is deſirable, whatever is de-"ſirable is commendable," and ſo thro' all the reſt of the Propoſitions; But here I will hold, for it never will be granted you, that whatever is deſirable is commendable. In like manner it was by no means a concluſive, but a very abſurd way of Reaſoning you laid down, when you told me, That Happineſs of Life is a Subject of Glory to thoſe who enjoy it, and that no Man who is not honeſt has a right to challenge Glory.

POLEMO will make this Conceſſion to *Zeno*, as will his Maſter and all his Sect, and the reſt, who, tho' they give Virtue a great Preference to all other Objects, yet ſtill throw in ſome Acceſſions to her for compleating *Supreme Good*. For admitting Virtue to be worthy of Glory, as ſhe really is, and that her Excellence above all other Objects is almoſt inexpreſſible;

* *Sorites*,] This was a String of Propoſitions following one another, and ſaid to be invented by *Chryſippus*.

and

and that Virtue alone may be happy, tho' without every other Object; yet it may be deny'd that ſhe is the *Sole Good*. Perhaps they who make Supreme Good not to conſiſt in Virtue, will not admit that ſhe can communicate that Happineſs of Life which gives a Man a Right to challenge Glory; and yet theſe Gentlemen at the ſame time make Pleaſure Matter of Glory and Boaſting. Therefore you perceive that you either lay down Premiſes which are deny'd, or that thoſe which are admitted, are ineffectual for your Purpoſe.

And indeed in all our Reaſonings and Concluſions I have been uſed to think that the Amendment of our Lives, our Conduct and our Paſſions, rather than of our Expreſſions, is an Object worthy of our Nature and of Philoſophy; for is there a Man who would quit his Way of thinking upon hearing thoſe quick and pointed Propoſitions which, you ſay, give you ſo much Pleaſure? For when they are quite eager to hear the Reaſons why *Pain is no Evil*, your Sect tells them, that Pain is a *ſharp, troubleſome, hateful, ſhocking* ſort of a thing, and very *difficult to be endur'd*. But becauſe there is no *Fraud*, nor *Knavery*, nor *Malice*, nor *Roguery*, nor *Turpitude* in Pain, therefore it is no Evil. When a Man hears all this, he may not perhaps be in a Diſpoſition to laugh, but for all that, he will go away as little ſteel'd againſt Pain, as he was when he came. But you tell us, that no brave Man can think Pain to be an Evil.

Is he any braver for thinking Pain, as you do, a *ſharp, troubleſome* ſort of a thing, and *ſcarcely*

to

to be borne? For Fearfulneſs ariſes not from Words, but from *Subjects.* You tell us too, that if a ſingle Letter of your Doctrine is changed, the whole Syſtem muſt fall to the Ground. Give me leave to ask you, whether I have changed a ſingle Letter, or whole Pages? Admitting that the Syſtem of your Sect is extremely conſiſtent with itſelf, and that it is quite firm and compact, as you called it; yet ſtill are we bound up from falling upon it, ſince all this conſiſtent unvarying Scheme is built upon falſe Principles.

LET me tell you, that *Zeno* your Friend, in the very firſt Maxims of his Philoſophy, deviates from Nature; and after he had placed ſupreme Good in the Excellency of the Underſtanding, which we call Virtue, nor would admit of any other Good but the *Honeſtum,* and denied that it was poſſible for Virtue to exiſt, if there was any thing in other Objects that admitted the ſmalleſt Degree of *better* or *worſe:* I ſay, after eſtabliſhing all thoſe Premiſes, he was perfectly conſiſtent in the Conſequences he drew. So far you are right, for I can have nothing to object; but then the Conſequences that are drawn are ſo very falſe, that it is impoſſible the Premiſſes ſhould be true.

YOU know it is an eſtabliſhed Rule in Logic, that if the Conſequence of a Propoſition is falſe, the Premiſes muſt be falſe of courſe. There is therefore a Concluſion ſo very true and clear, that the Logicians don't think it worth while to prove the Truth of it. *If a thing is* SO, *then it is* IN THAT MANNER; *if it is not* SO, *then it*

it cannot be IN THAT MANNER. Thus if your Conſequences are taken away, your Premiſes fall of courſe. But let us ſee what theſe Conſequences are. *That all Men, who are not wiſe, are equally wretched; that all wiſe Men are completely happy; that all fitting Actions are equal; that all Offences are alike.* All thoſe Poposítions ſound at firſt very pompouſly; but dwindle into nothing when you come to conſider them. For common Senſe, the Nature of Things, and Truth itſelf, has loudly proclaimed that it is a Fallacy to ſay there is no Difference in thoſe Things which *Zeno* has render'd equal.

CHAP. IV.

BUT your little * *Phœnician* (for you know that the *Citteans*, your Clients, came from *Phœnicia*) like a Man of Metal, when he found Nature was ſo ſtrongly againſt him, that he could make nothing of his Cauſe, began to deal in Words. And, in the firſt Place, he admitted thoſe Objects which we look upon to be *Goods*, to be eſteemed *fitting*, *convenient*, and *agreeable to Nature*; and he began to confeſs, that it was more convenient for the *wiſe Man*, who, by the bye, he ſuppoſed to be completely happy, to poſſeſs thoſe Objects, which all this time he does not venture to call *Goods:* He allowed them to be *fitting to Nature*, and held,

* *Phœnician,*] *Zeno* was a Native of *Citium*, a Town in *Cyprus*, which was a *Phœnician* Colony. *Cicero* calls him *Cato*'s, becauſe *Cato* reduced *Cyprus* into the Form of a Province, and was therefore looked upon to be the Patron of that Iſland.

that

that though *Plato* had not been a wiſe Man yet he would not have been in ſo bad a Condition as *Dionyſius* the Tyrant: That the beſt Courſe the latter could take was to die, becauſe it was quite a deſperate Chance that he ſhould ever be wiſe; but that the other ſhould live, becauſe he had a better Chance. That ſome Offences were tolerable, and others not; becauſe ſome Offences overlook as it were a greater Number of Duties than the others do. That there was a Species of Fools who can never come at Wiſdom; and others who might become wiſe with a little Pains.

ZENO, in all this, ſpoke differently from the reſt of Mankind; but thought in the very ſame Manner. Nor did he think that thoſe Objects which he would not admit to be *Goods*, were one whit leſs valuable than they thought them who held them to be *Goods*. What then did he mean by all his Alterations? If he had at leaſt beat them down a little in their Value, and ſet them at a lower Price than the *Peripatetics* hold them at, the World might then have thought that he had a different way of Thinking as well as of Speaking.

BUT what do you ſay as to the Happineſs of Life, which you make to be the ultimate Object? You deny it to be of that Kind which is filled with all thoſe things which Nature covets; you make it conſiſt wholly in Virtue; and as all Diſputes turn either upon the *Matter*, or the *Term*; you are equally ſubject to Altercation, if the thing is not underſtood, or the Term is miſtaken. But if neither of theſe is the Caſe, we are to endeavour

endeavour to make uſe of moſt common and fitting Expreſſions, by which I mean ſuch Expreſſions as can make the Subject beſt underſtood. Are we then to doubt that the Ancients did not make uſe of intelligible Expreſſions, if they were right as to the Matter they taught?

Let us therefore take a View of their Maxims, and then we will return to *Terms*. They ſay, that the Mind has an *Affection* for whatever it perceives to be agreeable to Nature, and that all Objects which are agreeable to Nature are worthy of ſome Eſteem; and this Eſteem is to be proportioned according to the Degree of Merit in every Object. And that of thoſe Objects which are agreeable to Nature, ſuch of them as are neither honeſt nor commendable, in no Degree excite that Affection which I have ſo often mentioned; and that the other Objects, which in all Animals are attended with *Pleaſure*, in Man are attended with *Reaſon* likewiſe. That from Objects which are fitting ariſe all that is *honeſt*, *beautiful*, and *praiſe-worthy*; but that the above are termed *natural* Objects, and when joined to the former, they in Conjunction complete and conſummate the Happineſs of Life.

They tell us likewiſe, that the moſt excellent of all thoſe Advantages (to which they who call them *Goods* allow no greater Degree of Merit than *Zeno*, who denies them to be ſo) is that which is *honeſt* and *praiſe-worthy*; but if there are two different *Honeſties* propoſed, the one attended by Health, the other by Diſeaſe, Nature could be in no manner of Doubt which of them

them to prefer; but at the ſame time the Influence of *Honeſty* is ſo *powerful*, and her *Superiority* and *Excellence* over all other Objects ſo *prevalent*, that no Rewards, no Puniſhments, can make her ever deviate from what ſhe has once decreed to be right. And that whatever appears to be *harſh*, *difficult*, or *troubleſome*, may be effaced by thoſe Virtues which adorn her Nature. But that ſuch Circumſtances were by no means either eaſy to be borne, nor were they to be contemned; for this would be giving Virtue a Power which ſhe has not. But we are to judge that the great *Efficients* of *happy* or *miſerable Life* do not conſiſt in thoſe Circumſtances.

In ſhort, the *Peripatetics* call thoſe Objects *Goods* which *Zeno* terms *eſtimable*, *eligible*, and *fitting to Nature*; and they term that Life *happy*, which contains the greateſt Number or the moſt conſiderable of thoſe Objects. But as to *Zeno*, he calls nothing *good*, but that which has a ſpecific Quality to excite the Affections, and he ſays that that Life alone is happy which is led with Virtue.

If our Diſpute were upon *Things*, here, *Cato*, we could have no Difference, for you and I think alike in every Reſpect; let us but change the *Terms*, and we agree as to *Things*. *Zeno* was ſenſible of this, but was pleaſed with the Magnificence and Pomp of Expreſſion; though at the ſame time, if his real Sentiments were conveyed by his Words, what Difference is there betwixt him and *Pyrrho*, or *Ariſto?* But if he diſapproved of their Doctrine,

to what Purpoſe do we diſpute about *Words*, when we are agreed as to *Things?*

SUPPOSING now the Scholars of *Plato* and their Hearers were to riſe from their Graves, and thus addreſs you: "When we heard, *M.* "*Cato*, that you was fond of Philoſophy, that "you was a Man of Virtue, an excellent Judge, "and a Perſon of the ſtricteſt Probity, we won- "dered why you ſhould prefer the *Stoics* to us, "when all their Sentiments, as to *Things Good* "*and Evil*, were learned by *Zeno* from *Polemo*. "The Terms they make uſe of, firſt excite our "*Admiration*, but when explain'd, raiſe our "*Laughter*. If you approve of our *Doctrine*, "why have you not made uſe of our *Terms*; "but if you have been ſway'd by the Autho- "rity of a great Name, why do you prefer this "Upſtart to all of us, and to *Plato* himſelf? "You who are deſtin'd to ſhare in the Govern- "ment of your Country, and who might be ſo "nobly embelliſhed and inſtructed by us, for "guarding both her Intereſts, and your own "Dignity of Character? For we have ſearched "into, we have digeſted, we have eſtabliſhed "Rules for thoſe Purpoſes; we have preſcribed "the Adminiſtration, the Conſtitutions, the "Forms, and the Changes of all Governments; "we have given Laws, Regulations and Man- "ners to Cities. As to Eloquence, that nobleſt "Embelliſhment to great Men, that Art in "which we hear you excel, what Additions "might not yours have received from our Writ- "ings?" After ſuch an Harangue, what An- ſwer would you give thoſe great Men? Why,

replies

replies Cato, I ſhould deſire the Favour of you, who have made the Harangue for *them*, to make likewiſe an Anſwer for *me*. Or rather, I ſhould requeſt ſome Leiſure to think of an Anſwer myſelf; but at preſent I am much more ſolicitous to hear you, and I will take another time for anſwering them, which ſhall be when I anſwer you.

BUT give me leave, Sir, to ſay, that if you were to anſwer them truly, you would tell them that you was far from condemning Perſons of ſo great Capacity and Weight; but that you had obſerved the *Stoic* Philoſophers had ſeen through ſome things, which the others could not underſtand, as living too long ago; that the the *Stoics* had diſputed with more Acuteneſs, and had diſtinguiſhed with more Weight and Strength on thoſe Matters. They were the firſt who denied that Health was ever *deſirable*; they admitted it to be *elegible*; not that Health was a *Good*, but that it contained *ſome Degree of Eſtimation*; and yet they who call it a *Good* put no greater Value on it than the *Stoics* do. But that you could not bear with this. You could not bear that thoſe old rough Gentlemen, as we uſed to call our Forefathers, ſhould believe, that a Man who lived honeſtly and at the ſame time had Health, Reputation, and Riches, ſhould lead a more comfortable or more deſirable Life, than the Perſon who, with equal Virtue was like * *Alcmeon* in *Ennius*.

Beſet with Sickneſs, Poverty, and Exile.

* *Alcmeon*] This is a Character in a Play of *Euripides* which *Ennius* tranſlated.

THESE old Gentlemen then were a little ſhort-ſighted in thinking that this former Life is more eligible, better and happier. As to the *Stoics*, they give it a *bare Preference* in Choice, not that ſuch a Life is more *happy*, but becauſe it is more *fitting to Nature*, and they tell us that all Men who are not *wiſe*, are equally *wretched*. This was a Diſcovery which the *Stoics* made, but it eſcaped their Predeceſſors; for they thought that Perſons ſtained with Crimes and Parricides, were more miſerable than People who, though poſſeſſing all the Purity of Life and Morals, have not arrived at perfect Wiſdom. And upon this Occaſion you produced thoſe very *unſimilar Similies*, which they make uſe of.

FOR is there a Man who does not know, ſuppoſing ſeveral Perſons wanted to emerge from a Depth of Water, that ſuch of them as were neareſt to the Surface, would be neareſt to Reſpiration; but for all that, they are as far from *actually reſpiring* as thoſe are who are at the very Bottom? But can it be inferred, that an Advance and Progreſs in Virtue can no way prevent our being miſerable, till we actually attain to her, becauſe you can't breathe till above the Surface of the Water. And becauſe Puppies, before their Eyes open, are equally blind with thoſe that are but juſt whelp'd; does it follow that *Plato*, before he had diſcovered Wiſdom, was as *mentally blind as* Phalaris.

THESE Compariſons, *Cato*, are all very lame; it is ſaying that whatever Progreſs one makes in getting rid of a Difficulty, yet he is never the nearer

nearer his Purpoſe till he actually is rid of it. It is admitted that the Man does not breathe before he emerges out of the Water, and Puppies are equally blind before their Eyes are opened as if they were to be blind for ever. But I will give you two Similies; one Man has a Diſorder in his Sight, another is ill of a Conſumption; both theſe Perſons on their proper Regimens daily grow better, the one in his Health, the other in his Seeing. Thoſe two Patients reſemble the Lovers of Virtue, their Blemiſhes are removed, their Defects are mended. You will not perhaps admit that the elder *Tiberius Gracchus* was more happy than his Son, tho the former endeavoured to eſtabliſh, the other to ruin his Country; yet he had not reached conſummate Wiſdom; How ſhould he? When? Where? Or whence ſhould he have it? Yet, as he had right Notions of Glory and Dignity, he had made great Progreſs in Virtue.

LET me now compare your Grandfather *Druſus* with *Caius Gracchus*, who was almoſt his Cotemporary. He endeavoured to heal thoſe Wounds of his Country, which the other inflicted. But nothing makes Men ſo miſerable as *Impiety* and *Wickedneſs*. Now I ſhall admit that all Fools are *miſerable*, which they in Reality are; yet the Man who wiſhes well to his Country is not as great a Wretch as he who wiſhes her Ruin. It is therefore a great Abatement in Vice, when a Man makes ever ſo ſmall a *Progreſs in Virtue*.

YOUR Sect admits that there is ſuch a thing as a *Progreſs in Virtue*? but denies there is any ſuch thing as an *Abatement in Vice*. It may be

worth while to conſider the Argument which thoſe clear-ſighted Gentlemen make uſe of for proving this. *As in the Arts which admit of Increaſe, their Oppoſites admit of the ſame; ſo Virtue admits of no Addition, therefore neither can Vice.* Whether is this clearing up a *doubtful* Propoſition by a *plain* one, or puzzling a *plain* Propoſition by a *doubtful* one? But no Truth can be more *plain* than that certain Vices are *ſtronger* in ſome Perſons than they are in others; But it is *doubtful* whether the *Supreme Good* may not admit of ſome Acceſſion. Your way then is, when you ſhould be clearing up the *doubtful* by the *plain*, to endeavour to puzzle the *plain* by introducing the *doubtful*.

THEREFORE, when you reaſon as I did juſt now, you muſt be hamper'd. You ſay all Vices are equal, becauſe that *End of Good Things* which you conſtitute admits of no Acceſſion; *now I ſay*, it being evident *that all Vices are not alike*, you muſt alter your *End of Good Things*; for it is an unerring Maxim in Reaſoning, that when a Conſequence is falſe, the Premiſes from which that Conſequence is drawn are falſe likewiſe.

How happens it then that you are ſo hamper'd? Why, from your boaſtful Oſtentation in fixing *your Supreme Good*; for when you exclude every thing from it but the *Honeſtum*; all *Concerns* about *bodily Health*, all *domeſtic Oeconomy*, all the *Order of Government*, all *the Courſe of Buſineſs*, all the *Duties of Life* fall to the Ground; and you are next under a Neceſſity of abandoning the *Honeſtum* itſelf, in which you make the Whole to conſiſt. All which

Argu-

Arguments are very forcibly urged by *Chryſippus* againſt *Ariſto*. From this Difficulty it is that all thoſe * *fallaciloquent Sophiſters*, as *Accius* terms them, proceed.

FOR what becomes of Wiſdom, when, by your removing all the Duties of Life, you leave her no Place of Repoſe. Now all the Duties of Life have been removed ever ſince you aboliſhed all manner of *Election* or *Difference* as to Things; for where can there be any *Difference* in Things that are put ſo much upon a Level that they are all the ſame? Theſe Difficulties have led them into Abſurdities worſe than even thoſe of *Ariſto*. His are plain, but yours intricate.

FOR ask *Ariſto*, whether he thinks the Abſence of Pain, Riches, and Health are Good Things? He will tell you, No. Ask him if their Contraries are Evils? He will tell you, No. Put the ſame Queſtion to *Zeno*, he will give you the ſelf-ſame Anſwer. This, no doubt, will put us in Amazement. Then let us ask both of them, how it is poſſible to go through the Functions of Life, if we think that there is no manner of Difference betwixt Health and Sickneſs, Eaſe and Torment, the being able, or not able to divert Cold and Hunger. Live! ſays *Ariſto*, why you may live like a Prince, for all that. Do what comes in your Head, then you never can have any Troubles, you never can have any Hopes, you never can have any Fears.

Fallaciloquent] I have kept as near to the Original here as I could, and the Expreſſion has not a bad Effect in either Language. This *Accius*, or *Attius*, was a Comic Poet, who wrote about the Year of *Rome* 622. He is mentioned by our Author in his Oration for *Archias*. See the Tranſlation of the *Orations*, Vol. I. p. 149.

WHAT does *Zeno* ſay to this? Why he tells you, that all this is Myſtery to him, and that it is impoſſible to live in this Manner; but that there is an immenſe Difference betwixt Honeſty and Turpitude, though in all other Objects there is none.

HE likewiſe tells us; nay, hear him out, and then keep from laughing if you can,----There are, *ſays he*, certain intermediate Objects, no way different from one another; and yet they are of ſuch a Nature, as that ſome of them are to be elected, others to be rejected, and others to be abſolutely neglected; which is ſaying, in other Words, ſome you are to take, ſome you are to leave, and others you are not to mind. But you juſt now told us, that there was no Manner of Difference in thoſe Objects; why, ſay you, I tell you ſo now; but this is with regard to Virtue and Vice.

A mighty Diſcovery indeed! But let us hear him out. Your Inſtances, ſays he, of Health, Wealth, and the Abſence of Pain, are what I cannot call *Goods*; but I will term them with the *Greeks* προεγμενα, or in *Latin Preferables*, or rather *Eligibles* and *Principals*, for theſe Terms are more pallatable and ſoft. As to Poverty, Sickneſs, and Pain, I don't call them *Evils*; but if you have a mind, I will call them Things to be rejected; therefore I don't ſay that I deſire the firſt, but that I chuſe, I wiſh, or prefer them; neither do I avoid their Contraries, but as it were I ſet them aſide.

BUT what ſays *Ariſtotle*, and *Plato*'s other Pupils? They tell us that every thing which

is

is agreeable to Nature is a *Good*, and whatever is otherwiſe is an *Evil*. Therefore don't you perceive that your Patron *Zeno* agreed with *Ariſto* as to Sounds, but differ'd with him as to Senſe; whereas he agreed with *Ariſtotle* and his Sect in Senſe, but differ'd with them as to Sounds. Then if they agree in Senſe, why ſhould not we chuſe to make uſe of the common uſual Terms. Let them ſhew me a Reaſon why I ſhould incline to deſpiſe Money the more, by ranking it among the Number of Preferables, rather than amongſt the Number of Good Things; why I ſhould better endure Pain, by looking upon it as a troubleſome, harſh, ſhocking Thing, than by calling it an Evil.

Our Friend, *M. Piſo*, uſed to rally the *Stoics* upon a great many of their Principles and eſpecially on this Head. You will not, ſays he, admit Health to be a Good; you call it a Preferable; to what Purpoſe do you make this Diſtinction? Will it check Avarice? Why, if we are to be determined by Words, the Word *Preferable* has more Syllables in it than the Word *Good*. But this is nothing to the Matter; Well, admitting it is not. But the Term at leaſt is of greater Weight; for I am quite ignorant of the Etymology of the Word *Good*; but the Word *Preferable* comes from its being preferred to other Objects. This is, I think, a weighty Conſideration. *Piſo* therefore concluded, that *Zeno* gives more Influences to Riches, by ranking them among Preferables, than *Ariſtotle* did, when he ranked them amongſt Goods. Still *Ariſtotle* never thought them to be a great *Good*; he ſtill thought they were

were contemptible, deſpicable, and undeſirable, when compared to Rectitude and Honeſty. And *Piſo*, through all his Diſpute relating to thoſe Names offered by *Zeno*, proceeded in ſuch a manner as to maintain that *Zeno* called thoſe things which he would not admit to be Goods by a more pleaſurable Name than we do, and gave more diſmal Appellations to thoſe Objects which he would not admit to be Evils.

THIS was *Piſo*'s way of Reaſoning. You know he was an excellent Perſon, and one who had the greateſt Affection for you; and when I have added but a very little to his Obſervations I will finiſh; becauſe it would be tedious to give a particular Anſwer to every thing you have advanced. For, by your verbal Juggling, you have purchaſed Kingdoms, Empires, Riches, and thoſe in ſuch Plenty, that you make the wiſe Man the ſole Proprietor of the World. The Sage alone poſſeſſes Beauty, Freedom, and Patriotiſm; and Fools, whom you call Madmen, their Contraries. You call thoſe things παραδοξα but we call them Miracles; but what Miracle is in them, when we view them nearer. Let me compare Notes with you, after you have ſettled the Meaning of every Word, and then we ſhall have no Difference. You ſay that all Crimes are equal. I don't talk to you on theſe Subjects in the ſame Strain I did when I defended *L. Muræna* upon your Impeachment. What I then ſaid, was before People who knew little of the Matter; beſides, I was to humour my Hearers; but now I muſt diſpute with more Caution. How came all Offences to be alike? Becauſe nothing

can

can be more honeſt than Honeſty, and nothing viler than Turpitude. Go on, for there is a very great Difference as to this very Point. Let us hear your uncommon Arguments for proving all Crimes to be equal. Says *Zeno*, if, in an Inſtrument conſiſting of many Strings, not one of them is properly ſet, ſo as to play in Concert, then they all are equally out of Tune; in like manner, Crimes, as they are all oppoſed to Virtue, they are all equally oppoſed, therefore they are equal. Here we are play'd upon by a Jargon, for it happens that all the Strings are out of Tune, but then it does not happen that they are all equally out of Tune, therefore this Compariſon is nothing to your Purpoſe, no more than we would admit that all Covetouſneſs is in the ſame Degree, though we may that it is of the ſame kind.

But now for another unſimilar Simile. A Pilot, ſay you, is equally blameable, if he runs a-ground with a Ship laden with Straw, as he would be if that ſame Ship were laden with Gold. Thus a Man who ſtrikes a Slave, is equally guilty with him who ſtrikes his Parent; but are you not ſenſible here that the Art of the Pilot has no manner of Concern with the Lading of the Ship, therefore it makes no Difference as to the good or bad Piloting, whether the Ship be laden with Straw or Gold. But a Man both can and ought to know the Difference betwixt a Parent and a Slave; therefore the Quality of the Tranſgreſſion has nothing to do in the Affair of Piloting, but a great deal in that of Duty. And if the Ship runs a-ground by Negligence

ligence of the Pilot, then the Offence is much greater when the Lading is Gold, than when it is Straw; for in all Arts we ſuppoſe ſomewhat that we call common Knowledge, which every Artiſt ought to poſſeſs. Therefore Offences even of this kind are not alike.

BUT the *Stoics* return with inflexible Firmneſs to the Charge. All Vices, ſay they, proceed from Weakneſs and Irreſolution. Now theſe are two bad Qualities, which equally prevail in all Fools, therefore Vices muſt neceſſarily be equal. But I doubt much whether it will be granted that bad Qualities prevail equally in all Fools; or that * *L. Tubullus* was equally weak and inconſtant with *Pub. Scævola*, upon whoſe Impeachment he was condemned; and that there is no Difference in the Nature of their Offences, ſo as that their being greater or leſs does not increaſe or diminiſh the Evil attending them.

THEREFORE, for now I will have done, your Friends the *Stoics* ſeem to me to be harder preſs'd by this ſingle Abſurdity, in that they think themſelves able to reconcile two jarring Opinions; for what can be more repugnant than for the ſame Man to ſay that Good can conſiſt in Honeſty alone, and at the ſame time, that our Affections for Objects, accommodated to the Purpoſes of Life ariſe from Nature; ſo that in defending thoſe Points, which are agreeable to their firſt Sentiment, they fall foul of *Ariſto*; when they give them up, then in Subſtance they are agreed with the *Peripatetics*.

* *L. Tubullus*] See Page 84.

They

They are *fell* Champions for Words; and becauſe they will not be beat out of their common Road of Expreſſion, they contract a Sourneſs, and Sullenneſs, both in their Diſcourſe and Manners.

PANÆTIUS, to avoid this Sullenneſs and Sourneſs, approved neither of their Harſhneſs of Sentiment, nor their thorny Method of Diſputation. In the firſt reſpect, he was gentle, in the laſt he was eminent; and, as we may ſee by his Writings, he was always quoting *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Xenocrates*, *Theophraſtus*, and *Dicæarchus*, Authors whom I ſtrongly recommend to your diligent and conſtant Peruſal.

BUT as it now grows late, and as I muſt return to my Country-Seat, enough at preſent; yet we ſhall often have Occaſion to diſcourſe on this Subject. With all my Heart, *reply'd he*; for we cannot be better employ'd; and the firſt Favour I beg of you is, to hear my Refutation of what you have advanced. But you are to remember, that you approve of all our Sentiments, only you make uſe of different Expreſſions; whereas I diſclaim the whole in you. That, *ſaid I*, is throwing in a Stop in my Way, but I ſhall conſider of it; upon which we parted.

The End of the Fourth Book.

M. TULLIUS

M. TULLIUS CICERO

Concerning the

ENDS *of* THINGS *GOOD* and *EVIL.*

BOOK the FIFTH.

CHAP. I.

AT *Athens, Brutus,* after I had heard *Antiochus* as uſual, in the *Ptolemean Gymnaſium,* along with * *M. Piſo,* my Brother *Quintus Titus Pomponius,* and *Lucius Cicero,* who by Kindred is my *Couſin German,* but holds the Place

* *M. Piſo,*] It is worth the Reader's Pains to obſerve, with what Addreſs our Author ſets out his ſeveral Characters. The two foregoing Conferences are introduced but with very little Ceremony. The Interlocutors were *Romans,* and *Zealots* for the ſeveral *Sects of Philoſophy* they embraced. There is therefore ſomewhat more *clumſy* in the Addreſs which brings the Diſpute upon the *Tapis,*

Place of *Brother* in my *Affections*. We made an

pis, than in that where a *Craſſus*, an *Antonius*, or a *Cæſar*, are Interlocutors, Men whoſe Learning, tho' eminent, form'd but the moſt inconſiderable Part of their Character; poliſhed in all the Functions of *High Life*, accompliſhed in the Arts of *Civil Government*, and adorn'd with every Virtue that gives *Beauty* to *Society*. The Introduction to the Part now before us, is one of the *genteeleſt*, as thoſe to the Conferences in the *De Oratore* is the *nobleſt* of any I know. But we may ſay of Literary Productions as of Phyſical, *That the Corruption of the beſt is the worſt*. The ſlovenly aukward Imitations into which the *Genteelneſs* of our Author's Manner has brought the Moderns, both *French* and *Engliſh*, leave it doubtful with me whether the Literary Fopperies in both Languages are not in a great Meaſure owing to the very Excellence I have now taken notice of.

——*Pudet hæc Opprobria nobis,*
Et dici potuiſſe & non potuiſſe refelli.

After aſking Pardon of my Readers for this general Remark, we are now to obſerve that the Interlocutors of the following Conference, were Gentlemen of Figure, Taſte, improved by Travel, and poſſeſſing every Accompliſhment which a high Rank and cloſe Application to the *Greek* Politeneſs could beſtow. As to their ſeveral Characters; *Antiochus* was a Native of *Aſcalonites*, and is commended by *Plutarch* in his Life of *Lucullus*, as a Man of the moſt profound Erudition, Genius and Eloquence, and the very Head of the old Academy at that time. Both He and *Piſo* are mentioned by our Author in Book I. *Of the Nature of the Gods*, in the following Terms.

Tres enim trium Diſciplinarum Principes conveniſtis. M. enim Piſo ſi adeſſet, nullius Philoſophiæ earum quidem quæ in honore ſunt vacaret locus. Tum Cotta ſi, inquit Liber Antiochi noſtri, qui ab eo nuper ad hunc Balbum miſſus eſt, vera loquitur, nihil eſt quod Piſonem Familiarem tuum, deſideres. Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re convenire videntur, verbis diſcrepare; quo de libro velim ſcire, Balbe, quid ſentias. Egone? inquit ille. Miror Antiochum hominem in primis acutum, non vidiſſe intereſſe plurimum inter Stoicos, qui honeſta a commodis non nomine ſed genere toto disjungerent, & Peripateticos, qui honeſta commiſcerent cum commodis, ut ea inter ſe magnitudine, & quaſi gradibus differrent. Hæc enim eſt non verborum parva, ſed rerum per magna diſſentio.

" Indeed, *ſays I*, I think I am come very ſeaſonably, as you ſay; " for here are three Chiefs of three principal Sects met together. If " *M. Piſo* was preſent, no Sect of Philoſophy that is in any Eſteem would

an Appointment amongſt our ſelves, to walk in the Afternoon to the *Academy*, becauſe at that Time of the Day it is freeſt from all Croud. Accordingly we met at *Piſo*'s, and entertaining our

" would want an Advocate. If *Antiochus*'s Book, *replies* Cotta, " which he lately ſent to *Balbus* ſays true, you have no Occaſion to " wiſh for your Friend *Piſo*; for *Antiochus* is of the opinion, that " the *Stoics* do not differ from the *Peripatetics* in fact, tho' they do " in words. I ſhould be glad to know what you think of that " Book *Balbus?* I? *ſays he.* I wonder that *Antiochus*, a Man of " the cleareſt Apprehenſion, ſhould not ſee what a vaſt Difference " there is between the *Stoics*, who diſtinguiſh the honeſt and the " profitable, not only in name, but abſolutely in kind; and the " *Peripatetics*, who blend the Honeſt with the Profitable in " ſuch a manner that they differ only in Degrees and Proportion, " and not in kind. This is not a little difference in Words, but a " great one in Things."

A little ſnappiſh modern Critic will, perhaps, be apt to ſmile at our Author's Inadvertency, in making *Piſo* ſeveral times mention the Converſation in the two former Books with *Cato*, when at the ſame time it is very certain *Piſo* was dead ſome time before this Converſation can be ſuppoſed to have happened.

Titus Pomponius Atticus, another of the Interlocutors in this Conference, was the famous *Epicurean* ſo diſtinguiſhed by his Friendſhip to our Author, the Politeneſs of his Manners, the Delicacy of his Taſte, and the Equanimity of his Conduct, that his Name is become but another Word for all thoſe Virtues?

Quintus, our Author's Brother, appears to have been a Man of Senſe, and of more than common Genius for the fine Arts.

The Younger *Cicero* is painted by our Author as poſſeſt of an amiable Modeſty and decent Curioſity after every Subject that could contribute towards the Improvement of a young Gentleman ſetting out in Life.

Having ſaid thus much with regard to the Characters introduced in this Converſation, we ſhall take a ſlight View of the Scene where it is laid. It is laid near *Athens*, which ſtill continued to be the *Miſtreſs of Science*, and in the *Academy* which lay within a ſhort Mile of *Athens*, with beautiful Rows of Trees on each ſide of the Road to it. One cannot raiſe our Reader's Ideas as to this noble Spot beyond thoſe he will feel from what is here ſaid by our Author.

The *Ptolemean Gymnaſium*, which is mentioned in the Opening, was ſo call'd from *Ptolemy*, and ſerv'd as a School for *intellectual*, as the other *Gymnaſium* did for *perſonal* Exerciſes.

ſelves

ſelves with various Subjects of Converſation, we walk'd the ſix *Stadia* from the Gate of *Dypylus* till upon entering the Academy, which is ſo juſtly celebrated, we found the very Solitude we wanted.

SAYS *Piſo*, ſhall I attribute it to *Nature*, or to *Prejudice*, That when we behold any of the Places which have been frequented by Perſonages worthy of Renown, it makes a ſtronger Impreſſion upon us, than the *hearing of their Actions*, or *reading their Writings*. I feel it now in my ſelf; My Mind is filled with *Plato*, whom we underſtand uſed firſt to diſpute in this Place; Thoſe little Gardens hard by, not only bring the Idea of him into my *Memory*, but ſet him in Perſon before my *Eyes*. Here walks *Speuſippus*, there *Xenocrates*, and there his Hearer *Polemo*; upon that very Spot he ſate. And indeed when I uſed to look round our *Senate Houſe*, I mean that of * *Hoſtilius*, not the New One, which to me ſeems to be leſſen'd by it's Enlargement, I had *Scipio*, *Cato*, *Lælius*, but, above all, my Grandfather before my Eyes. Such reverential Reſpect there is in *Places*, that it is not without ſome Reaſon the Art of Memory is drawn from them.

SAYS *Quintus*, it is juſt *Piſo* as you ſay. For I was looking upon the Seat at † *Collonum*, and

Hoſtilius,] The *Curia Hoſtilia* built by *Hoſtilius* was the Senate Houſe of the ancient *Romans*, and continued ſo to the Death of *Scipio Africanus*. It appears afterwards to have been ornamented and enlarged, and by what *Piſo* ſays here, to have loſt a great deal of that venerable Simplicity which made it the Object of his Awe.

† *Collonum*,] This was the Scene where *Sophocles* laid the Drama of his *Oedipus Collonæus*. The Verſes our Author ſpeaks of are in that Play, and inimitably tender and paſſionate in the Original.

there it's Inhabitant *Sophocles* preſented to my Sight. He is a Poet whom you know I both *admire* and *love*. Nay I am touched with the Idea, when in more remote Antiquity, *Oedipus* comes hither, and asks in thoſe enchantingly ſoft Numbers, *What Places thoſe are*. It is but an *Idea* you ſay, but it is a *moving* one. Says *Pomponius*, for my Part, my dear *Phædrus* and I are very much together, and as both of us are *Epicureans*, a Sect whom you uſed to inveigh againſt, we walk in *Epicurus*'s Gardens which we juſt now paſſed by. But I follow the old Proverb: *Remember the Living*. And yet I can't help thinking of *Epicurus*; for our Friends have not only Pictures of him in their *Houſes*, but wear them upon their *Cups* and their *Rings*.

OUR Friend *Pomponius*, *ſays I*, * has a mind to

* *Has a mind to be witty.*] Having already mentioned onr Author's Addreſs in introducing Characters, let us now view the vaſt Propriety in which each of them ſpeaks: *Piſo*, with a mind full of noble and beautiful Ideas from *Plato* and the other old Philoſophers, opens the Converſation with a noble and elevated Reflection full of Beauty and Tenderneſs, and founded upon the *feeling* Properties of human Nature, which makes ſo conſiderable a Part of the old Academic Philoſophy. *Quintus* ſmit with the Beauties of his particular Study has all his Ideas hurried to thoſe Scenes where his favourite Poet laid his Drama. *Atticus*, all Spirit, Life and Eaſe, opens with a piece of good-natur'd *Epicurean* Raillery, and very humorouſly lets them underſtand that his Sect had their Heroes of Gratitude to the Memory of their Founder, as well as others had. But at the ſame Time with a great deal of concealed Satyr he gives the Company to underſtand, that all theſe Notions aroſe from *ſenſual* Objects, and therefore that he gave way to them meerly becauſe the Repetition of theſe Objects render'd it more eaſy to indulge ſuch Speculations, than it would be for him to ſhake them off. Our Sect, *ſays he*, preſerves their *Epicurus* too, but where? *Etiam in Poculis & in Anulis.*

Our Author ſilently affects to preſerve that Superiority of Character which he always aſcribes to himſelf.

The

to be witty; perhaps he has a right to be ſo; for he has ſpent ſo much Time at *Athens*, that he ſeems to be quite an *Athenian*; nay, his very Sirname gives us to underſtand as much. However, *Piſo*, I am entirely of your opinion, That the Preſence of the Place generally gives an Edge and an Intenſeneſs to our Reflections upon Great Men. You may remember once when I came along with you to *Metapontus*, how I would not go to my Lodging, before I ſaw the Place and the Seat where *Pythagoras* ſpent his Days. At this very time, tho' there is not a Place in *Athens* but retains Memorials of the greateſt Men, yet I am at this Inſtant touch'd with the Sight of that Chair. It was there where *Carneades* diſputed; I think I now ſee him, for his Image is familiar to my Thought, and I imagine that the very Desk laments the Want of that Voice, and that Weight of Genius, which uſed to fill it.

Now that each of us, *ſays* Piſo, has made his Obſervations, excepting our Friend *Lucius*, I ſhould be glad to know what he thinks? Whether he fondly view'd that Spot where *Demoſthenes* and *Æſchines* uſed to contend? For every Man's Genius has a peculiar Bent. Don't ask Me, *replied* Lucius *with a Bluſh*, for I have gone down to the *Phalericum* upon the Strand, where *Demoſthenes* is ſaid to have declaimed to

The young Gentleman, *Lucius Cicero*, full of Fire and Ambition to riſe to the higheſt Poſts as others have done, by Eloquence, confirms the Queſtion put to him by *Piſo*, and runs directly to *Demoſthenes* and *Pericles*, but ſtill his Behaviour is full of *Reſpect* and *Modeſty*.

the Flood, that he might accuſtom his Voice to * drown it's Murmurs. A little while ago, I likewiſe ſtruck off to my right that I might viſit the Tomb of *Pericles*. But we have numberleſs Opportunities of this kind in this City, † *For ſtill we ſeem to tread on Claſſic Ground.*

THESE Studies, my Friend, *replies* Piſo, when directed to the Imitation of illuſtrious Perſonages, diſcover *Genius*; and when to Information in the Knowledge of Antiquities, they diſcover *Curioſity:* But we all join in encouraging you, forward, as I hope you are, in the generous Race, to imitate the Perfections of thoſe Perſons with whom you covet an Acquaintance. Although, *interrupted I*, our Friend *actually* practiſes your Precepts, yet, *Piſo*, I take your Advice kindly. Then, *replies he, with his uſual open Friendſhip*, let all of us contribute all we can to improve his Youth; and, in the firſt place, let him allot ſome part of his Studies to Philo-

* *Drown it's Murmurs*] Tho' I have tranſlated this Paſſage in the obvious Meaning of our Author, I cannot be ſure whether the *fremitus* mentioned in the Original does not ſignify *Popular Commotion*.

† *For ſtill*, &c.] This Line is taken from one of our own Poets and is a pretty cloſe Tranſlation of the Original here,

Quacunque enim ingredimur in aliquam Hiſtoriam veſtigium ponimus.

The Reader, no doubt, knows I mean Mr. *Addiſon*'s Epiſtle to my Lord *Halliſax* from *Italy*, and tho' I am not ſo ſanguine an Admirer of my Author, as to *affirm* that Mr. *Addiſon* copy'd his Addreſs in that Letter from this Paſſage of our Author, yet I can't help being wonderfully pleas'd with comparing them together. For my own Part I believe both of them were Originals in the Thought, which is natural, eaſy, ſenſible; and not only accommodated to the Situation of both the Perſons who expreſs it, but, which is very remarkable, there is a very ſtrong Simularity betwixt the Character of the *Engliſhman*, and that of the *Roman*, as here drawn by *Cicero*.

ſophy,

ſophy, both that he may imitate you whom he loves, and that he may more gracefully practiſe the Art he is now ſtudying. But are we, *Lucius*, to exhort you! ſo far from that, don't you pant after that Study. At leaſt, to me, you appear to hear *Antiochus* with a good deal of Satisfaction. That I do, *replies he, with an amiable Baſhfulneſs*; but you heard *Carneades* mention'd juſt now; It is thither I am rapt; but *Antiochus* calls me back, and I know nobody elſe whom I can hear.

ALTHO', *replies* Piſo, it may not perhaps paſs with your Friend here (meaning me) in Company, yet I will venture to call you out of the New Academy into the Old; in which, as you heard *Antiochus* declare, we not only reckon the Academics, ſuch as *Speuſippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemo*, *Crantor*, and others; but likewiſe the ancient *Peripatetics*, with *Ariſtotle* at the head of them, a Perſon whom, if *Plato* were out of the queſtion, we ought, perhaps, to place at the *Head of Philoſophy itſelf*. Let me therefore beg you will apply to thoſe Maſters. For as all *Liberal Knowledge*, all *Hiſtoric Art*, all the *Perfection of Eloquence* may be learned from their Writings, ſo they likewiſe contain ſuch Variety of the Arts, that without their Aſſiſtance no Man can gracefully attain to Excellency in any noble Study; they have form'd Orators, they have form'd Generals; they have form'd the moſt accompliſh'd Stateſmen, nay, to come to lower Objects, Mathematicians, Poets, Muſicians, and in ſhort, *Phyſicians* have been form'd in their

School, which we may look on as the Work houſe of all the Arts.

You know *Piſo*, *reply'd I*, that I am of the very ſame Way of thinking; but it happens very luckily that you have ſtarted this Subject. For my Friend *Lucius* here is extremely deſirous of learning the Sentiments of the old *Academics* you have mentioned, and likewiſe of the *Peripatetics*, with regard to the *End of Good Things*. Now we are of opinion that it will be eaſy for you to explain this Point; becauſe you entertain'd *Staſeas* the *Neopolitan* for many Years in your Houſe, and we have ſeen you for ſeveral Months examining thoſe very Matters with *Antiochus*. Very well, very well, *replied he*, *ſmiling*, You have artfully enough brought me to lead the Converſation; therefore I will give the young Gentleman all the Aſſiſtance I can, ſince we are ſo favoured with this Solitude; and yet tho' I had had the Word of a God for it, I could never have been brought to believe that I could have been diſputing in this Academy like a Philoſopher; but in endeavouring to pleaſe *him*, I may perhaps be tireſome to *you*. How can that be, *anſwer'd I*, when you do it at my Requeſt. After *Quintus* and *Pomponius* had ſignified that it would be equally agreeable to them, *Piſo* began; and I beg of you, my Friend *Brutus*, that you will give me your Attention, and judge whether I have ſufficiently explained his Meaning, which, if I miſtake not, you chiefly approv'd of, as you have frequently heard his Brother *Ariſtus*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

THEN he went on thus; I ſaid enough a little while ago, in as few Words as poſſible, to ſhew the Beauty of the *Peripatetic* Doctrine, but it's *Manner* like that of other Syſtems is threefold. One Part of it conſiſts of *Phyſics*, another of *Diſputation*, and another of *Practice*. The Inveſtigation of Nature is ſuch that to ſpeak Poetically,

No Part of Heaven or the Terraqueous Globe,
Their Knowledge has eſcaped.

Beſides, after diſcourſing upon the Principles of Things and the Syſtem of the World, they have drawn many Concluſions not only *probable*, but *mathematically demonſtrable*, and have apply'd a wonderful deal of Knowledge in Objects which they themſelves have diſcover'd, to the Study of the more hidden Properties of Nature.

ARISTOTLE has traced the Births, the Nutrition, and the Formation of all living Animals; *Theophraſtus*, the Nature of all Plants, together with the Principles and Conſtructions of almoſt every thing that vegitates upon the Face of the Earth. Theſe are Lights which facilitate the moſt abſtruſe Diſcoveries: And as to Diſputation, they give Rules for it not only as *Logicians*, but as *Orators*. *Ariſtotle* has pointed out the Method how to ſpeak on both ſides upon every Subject, not with a view of encouraging perpetual Wrangling, as was the Caſe of *Arceſilas*, but that we might be able upon every

Subject to expreſs whatever can be ſaid on either Side.

As to the third Part of Philoſophy, which relates to *Practice*, the ſame Perſons have apply'd it, not only to *private Life*, but to *Political Inſtitutions*. From *Ariſtotle* we learn the Manners, Cuſtoms, and Doctrines of almoſt all the States, not only in *Greece*, but elſewhere. From *Theophraſtus* we have learn'd their Laws. And after both of them had ſhewn the World what the *Political* Character of a Prince ought to be, they enlarged in their Writings upon the moſt excellent Form of Government. *Theophraſtus* has been fulleſt on the public Revolutions, and Conjunctures in a State, and the Manner of improving them according to the various Exigencies of Government. As to the Manner of Life which they beſt liked, it was of the *contemplative ſtudious* kind, which appeared moſt worthy of a wiſe Man, becauſe neareſt reſembling the Life of the Gods; and their Diſſertations upon thoſe Heads are generous and noble.

As to *Supreme Good*, they have wrote of it in two Manners, the one ſuited to vulgar Capacities, which Manner they have called ἐξοτερικον. The other is more poliſhed, and is contained in their Commentaries. They ſeem not to expreſs themſelves always the ſame way, and yet in the main there is no Difference (at leaſt among thoſe whom I have named) nor Inconſiſtency among themſelves. But when their Enquiry regards the *Happineſs of Life*, and when they lay it down that it ought to be ſuch alone as Philoſophy affects and purſues, there ſeems ſometimes

times to be ſome ſmall Matter of Doubt and Difference amongſt them; Whether *that* is entirely in the Power of the wiſe Man, or whether it may not be weakened or loſt in Adverſity? This chiefly proceeded from *Theophraſtus*'s Book *upon happy Life*; where he allows ſo much to Fortune, that were her Influence as great as he makes it, it would be impoſſible for Wiſdom to render Life *happy*. This Way of Reaſoning to me appears more *ſubtile*, and, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, more *effeminate*, than is conſiſtent with the *Force* and *Weight* of Virtue. Let us therefore hold by *Ariſtotle*, and his Son *Nicomachus*; whoſe excellent Writings upon Morals are aſcribed to *Ariſtotle* himſelf; but I ſee no Reaſon for ſuppoſing that the Son may not be like the Father. We are however to follow *Theophraſtus* in moſt Points, only allowing Virtue more *Firmneſs* and *Strength* than he does.

Let us follow thoſe Guides; for tho' in my Opinion their Succeſſors have kept better up to their Character than the Profeſſors of any other of the Sects of Philoſophy, yet at the ſame time they have ſo degenerated, that they ſeem to be the *heterogenous Spawn* of one another. In the firſt place *Strato* affected to be a Natural Philoſopher, and tho', as ſuch, his Character was very great, yet his Notions were generally new, and very little regarding the Morals of Mankind. *Lyſias* was his Scholar, a Man of copious Elocution, but dry in his Matter. Next followed the *Dapper elegant Ariſto*, but without any of that Dignity of Character which is required in a great Philoſopher; his Writings were indeed *numerous*

rous and *neat*, but ſtill, I don't know how, there is no Weight in what he ſays.

I OMIT many, and among them, the learned and polite *Hieronymus*, nor can I account for it, why I name him as a *Peripatetic*. For he made *Supreme Good* to conſiſt in being *free from Pain*. Now a Man who has a different Way of thinking with regard to *Supreme Good*, has a different Way of thinking with regard to the *whole Syſtem of Philoſophy*. *Critolaus* wanted to imitate the Ancients, and indeed he comes neareſt to them in *Gravity*, and he has a peculiar *Fulneſs of Expreſſion*; but ſtill he treads in his Father's Steps. His Hearer *Diodorus* added to *Honeſty* the *Abſence of Pain*; in this he likewiſe is *peculiar* in his Way of thinking, nor can he be truly called a *Peripatetic*, becauſe he differed from them in his Sentiments as to *Supreme Good*. Now my Friend *Antiochus* ſeems to me to be the moſt exact Follower of the ancient Opinion, which he holds to be the ſame with that of *Ariſto* and *Polemo*.

THEREFORE *Lucius* is in the right to expreſs the ſtrongeſt Curioſity for hearing *Supreme Good* treated of. Eor when once this is *eſtabliſhed*, the *Whole of Philoſophy* is *eſtabliſhed*. Becauſe in all other Matters, when any thing is either *omitted* or *unknown*, the Omiſſion is attended with no farther Inconveniency, than it's Importance extends to: Whereas if we are ignorant of the Nature of *Supreme Good*, we muſt neceſſarily be ignorant of the whole *rational Plan of Life*. This throws us into ſuch Confuſion that we know not into what Harbour to ſteer.

But

But when we know the true *Ends of Things*, when we underſtand the *Ultimation* of *Goods and Evils*, then it is that we diſcover the *true Courſe of Life*, and the *true Syſtem* of all the *Moral Duties*.

THERE is then an *End* to which every Action is directed, and by that the great Object of all our Purſuits, *Happineſs in Life*, may be *diſcover'd* and *attain'd*. And becauſe there is a great Difference of Opinion with regard to this, we will, as our Friend *Antiochus* is often fond of doing, uſe the Diviſion of *Carneades*. This Philoſopher ſaw, not only into all the *actual* Opinions of Philoſophers concerning *Supreme Good*, but into all the *poſſible* ones. He deny'd that there is any Art which could ariſe out of itſelf, becauſe there is ſtill *an Effect*, which muſt be *accompliſhed by the Art*, and yet *is foreign to it*. We have no Occaſion to lengthen this Maxim by running into Examples, becauſe it is evident that no Art is *confined to itſelf*, for the Art itſelf is different from it's Effect. Thus, as *Medicine* is the Art of *Curing*, *Piloting* that of *Sailing*, ſo *Prudence* is the *Art* of *Life*. Therefore it is neceſſary that ſhe ſhould have ſome Object *without* herſelf by which ſhe is regulated, and to which ſhe tends.

Now it is almoſt univerſally agreed upon, that the Purpoſe and Object of Wiſdom's Purſuit ought to be fitting and agreeable to Nature, and ſuch as intrinſically invites and charms the Affection of the Mind: This is what *Greeks* call ὁρμη. But then it is not quite ſo clear what this Principle is which creates thoſe Emotions by raiſ-

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ing the Affections of Nature in their very Infancy : And herein conſiſts the whole Diſpute of Philoſophers upon the Subject of *Supreme Good.* For in all this Queſtion upon the *Ends of Things Good and Evil,* when they come to enquire into their *Extreme* and *Ultimation,* they are oblig'd to ſearch for the very Fountain-Head which contains the *earlieſt Incitements of Nature.* This being once diſcover'd gives a Clue for the whole Diſquiſition *upon Good and Evil.*

Some are of Opinion that our firſt *Affection* is for *Pleaſure,* and our firſt *Averſion* is for *Pain:* Others that the firſt thing we covet is that we may be free from Pain, and the firſt Object we avoid is *Pain* itſelf. From theſe Opinions aroſe others with regard to what they call *the primary Objects of Nature,* in which they enumerate the *Soundneſs* and *Preſervation* of all our Members, Health, the entire Enjoyment of our Senſes, the Abſence of Pain; Strength, Beauty, and the like Properties; analogous to which there are in the Mind certain firſt Principles which may be term'd the Sparks and Seeds of Virtue.

As Nature is primarily impell'd either to *Deſire* or *Averſion,* by ſome Object which falls under one of theſe Heads; it being impoſſible that any other Object of either than what they contain can exiſt; it neceſſarily follows that all our Duties as to Objects which we are either to *purſue* or *decline,* regard ſome one or other of them; this becomes the Buſineſs of *Wiſdom,*

dom, which we have term'd *the Art of Life*, and by this ſhe is to direct her Progreſs in Life.

HENCE when ſhe has once eſtabliſh'd the firſt Object of Nature's Affection, ſhe can determine that Meaſure of *Rectitude* and *Honeſty* which is moſt correſpondent to one or other of them: Whether it be that the *Honeſtum* conſiſts in our doing every thing with a View of Pleaſure, even tho' we are diſappointed in our Aim; or that we be free from Pain, even tho' we can't attain that End; or that we may obtain the primary Properties of Nature. Thus it happens that Contradictions in Opinion, with regard to *the Ends of Things Good and Evil*, juſt correſpond with the different Sentiments as our firſt Affections. Others again, from the ſame Principles, make *every Duty of Life* to regard Pleaſure, the being free from Pain, or the Attainment of the *primary Properties of Nature*.

HAVING thus explain'd the ſix Opinions upon Supreme Good; the Leaders in the three laſt were *Ariſtippus*, *Hieronymus*, and *Carneades*; the firſt adopted *Pleaſure*; the ſecond, the *Abſence of Pain*; and the third the *primary Properties of Nature*; not that *Carneades* was the Author of the laſt Opinion, he only defended it for the Sake of Diſputation. Theſe three other Opinions have made their way as well as they could; one of them only has been defended, and that too with great Earneſtneſs. For no body ſays now, that the doing every thing for the Sake of Pleaſure, even tho' we miſs our End, nay that the very Intention of acting in

that

that manner is the *Honeſtum*, the ſole Good, and intrinſically deſirable. Nor does any body imagine that the avoiding Pain is an Object intrinſically deſirable, even ſuppoſing we could ſucceed in it: But then the *Stoics* maintain that the only *Honeſtum*, the only *intrinſically deſirable Object*, the *only Good*, is the endeavouring to attain thoſe Ends which are agreable to Nature, even tho' we are ſucceſsleſs in our Endeavours.

THESE are therefore the ſix uncomplex Opinions with regard to the Whole *of Things Good and Evil*, two of them have no Advocate, and the other four have: The *complex* Opinions as to *Supreme Good* are three: And if we look narrowly into the Nature of Things, we ſhall find there cannot be more. For we can either with *Callipho* and *Dinomachus*, to the *Honeſtum* join *Pleaſure*, or with *Diodorus* the *Abſence of Pain*, or the *primary Properties of Nature*, with the Ancients, for ſo we call the *Academics* and the *Peripatetics*.

BUT * as, *Brutus*, we cannot diſcuſs them all at once, it is ſufficient we now obſerve that Pleaſure ought to be remov'd out of the Queſtion; ſeeing, as I ſhall ſoon make it appear, we were born for nobler Purpoſes. Almoſt the ſame Arguments hold for the *Abſence of Pain* as for *Pleaſure*. Therefore as we have diſpu-

**As*, Brutus,] This is the Paſſage which I have already taken notice of as a Slip of our Author's Memory; I don't know whether my Reader will approve of the Manner in which I have remov'd the Abſurdity; whether he does or not

——— Non ego paucis
Offendar maculis quas aut incuria fudit
Aut humana parum cavit Natura ———

ted

ted upon *Pleaſure* with *Torquatus*, and upon *Honeſty*, as being the ſole End of *Supreme Good* with *Cato*; in the firſt Head all that has been ſaid againſt Pleaſure ſerves equally againſt the Abſence of Pain.

Nor need we, *continu'd* Piſo, to ſearch for other Topics againſt the Opinion of *Carneades*; for in whatever manner Supreme Good is laid out, if it is void of *Honeſty*, it is abſolutely incompatible with the Exiſtence of *Virtue*, the Practice of the *moral Duties*, or the Enjoyment of *Friendſhip*. Now the Aſſociation either of *Pleaſure*, or the *Abſence of Pain* with the *Honeſtum*, reverſes all thoſe intrinſic Properties which it meant to eſtabliſh. For the referring all you do to two Principles, the one of which pronounces a Man ſupremely happy, if he is free from Pain, and the other conſtitutes the meaneſt Part of our Nature, is *clouding*, nay *defiling* the whole Luſtre of Virtue. The *Stoics* only remain, who, after pilfering all the Syſtem from the *Academics* and *Peripatetics*, follow'd the ſame Principles under different Denominations. It would be better for us to take each of thoſe Opinions in pieces now; but we will at preſent purſue our own Scheme; and deal with the others when we think proper.

As to the *Security* of *Democritus*, who held a kind of a *mental Tranquillity*, which the *Greeks* call εὐθυμια, it has nothing to do in this Diſpute; becauſe in that ſame *mental Tranquillity* conſiſts the very *Happineſs of Life*. Now we are not examining *what it is*, but *whence it ariſes*. Neither can the now exploded

ploded Conceit of *Pyrrho*, *Ariſto*, and *Herillus*, be taken Notice of here, becauſe they can't be brought within the Compaſs we have preſcrib'd to our Diſputation. For as the whole of this Queſtion upon the *Ends*, or, as it were, the *Ultimation* of *Things Good and Evil*, ariſes from what we call *fitting* and *proportion'd* to *Nature*, and the Object that is firſt coveted *for itſelf*, all this is quite aboliſh'd by thoſe Philoſophers who maintain that as to Preference and Election, there is an abſolute indifference in all Objects wherein there is neither *Honeſty* nor *Turpitude*: And *Herillus*, if he really was of Opinion that there was nothing *Good* beſides *Science*, deſtroy'd all Conſiderations as to the *Conduct*, and all Regard as to *Duties of Life*. Thus we exclude all thoſe Sentiments; and as no other in reality can exiſt beſides thoſe we have mention'd, the Opinion of the Ancients muſt neceſſarily prevail.

CHAP. III.

LET us therefore commence our Enquiry where the Ancients commenc'd theirs, in which they are follow'd by the *Stoics*. Every living Creature loves itſelf; and, from its very Birth, directs all it's Efforts towards *Self-preſervation*; becauſe the firſt Principle implanted in it by Nature for the Rule of all it's After-life, is to preſerve itſelf in that State which Nature chiefly recommends. In the Infancy of it's Exiſtence this Diſpoſition is confus'd and uncertain, and reaches no farther than to preſerve itſelf in it's

it's preſent Condition: Without any Conſciouſneſs of it's own Properties, Powers or Nature. But after advancing a little in Age, in Proportion as it begins to perceive it's connection with, and relation to, other Objects, it gradually advances in knowing of itſelf, and in underſtanding the Purpoſe for which the Affections of the Mind, which I have mention'd, were implanted in it: And then it begins to covet thoſe Objects which it perceives to be fitting to it's Nature, and to repel the contrary. The Object of Affection therefore in every Animal conſiſts in that which is fitting to it's *Nature*. Thus the *End of Good Things* will be found to be the living according to Nature, and in that State which is beſt and moſt fitting to Nature.

BUT as every Animal has a Nature of it's own, it neceſſarily follows, that the Gratification of Nature is the End which they *all* affect. For there is no Inconſiſtency in ſaying, there are certain Properties in common with all living Creatutes, and in common betwixt Men and Brutes; becauſe Nature is in common with them all. But thoſe Ultimations and Perfections we are now enquiring after, are diſtinct and different in the ſeveral Kinds of Animals; each having one that is fitted and characteriſtical to the Affections of it's own Nature.

THEREFORE when we ſay that all living Creatures propoſe their *living according to Nature*, as the End of their living, I am not to be underſtood as if I ſaid that they all of them propoſe the ſame *End*. We can ſay, with great Truth, that it is in common with all Arts to

be built upon ſome Principles of Science; but then each Art has it's own Principles: Thus it is in common for all Animals to live *according to Nature*; but then their Natures are different; the Horſe has one Nature, the Ox another, and Man a third, * but yet it is in common to them all to have a certain End of living. This not only holds with regard to Animals, but in every Object which Nature nouriſhes, propagates and preſerves. Thus we ſee Plants and Vegetables, by their own inherent Properties, greatly contributing to their own Life and Growth, and towards the Attainment of their ſeveral Ends in their own Kinds. And that I may bring this whole Syſtem to one Point, I will be bold to affirm, that *all Nature* endeavours to preſerve itſelf, and propoſes her Continuance in that State which is beſt ſuited to it's own Kind, as it's final and ultimate Purpoſe: And that the End of all Objects inform'd by Nature, is not the *ſame*, but *alike*. From this we ought to conclude, that to a Man *the Ultimation of Good Things* is, that he may live agreeable to Nature: But then we explain this Nature to be *conſummate* and *perfect*. This then is what we are to examine; but if I do it a little prolixly I look for your Pardon, as I accommodate myſelf to the Age and Perſon of my Pupil, who perhaps has never heard this Doctrine before. By all means, *reply'd I*, tho' what you have ſaid hitherto is very well ſuited to every Age of Life.

* *But yet it is*] Orig: *Et tamen in omnibus ſumma communis.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

HAVING thus explain'd the *Ultimation of deſirable Objects*, reſum'd *Piſo*, I am now to demonſtrate why the Matter is as I have laid it out. Therefore let us begin from my firſt *Poſition*, which, in effect, is the *firſt* in the *Order of Things*, I mean one being perſwaded that every Animal *loves itſelf*. Tho' this can admit of no manner of Doubt, it being ſo inherent in our Nature, and ſo implanted in all our Senſes, that were any one to contradict it, he would not be regarded, yet that I may omit nothing, I think myſelf oblig'd to explain the Reaſons why it is ſo.

AND indeed how can we conceive that any living Creature is ſo form'd as to *hate itſelf:* This ſuppoſes two contradictory Principles; for at the ſame time that any Appetite of the Mind deliberately covets an Object prejudicial to it, becauſe it hates itſelf, the very exerting this Volition proceeds from a Principle of *Self-gratification*; and if ſo, then it both *hates* and *loves* itſelf at the ſame time, which is impoſſible. At leaſt it neceſſarily follows that a Man who is an Enemy to himſelf ſhould think *Goods* to be *Evils*, and *Evils* to be *Goods*; ſhould ſhun what is *deſirable*, and deſire what is to be *ſhunn'd*; all which Circumſtances doubtleſs deſtroy Life. For tho' a Man may be found who deſires Ropes or other Inſtruments of Deſtruction to himſelf, and, like *Menedemus* in *Terence*, thinks that *he would do leſs Injury to his Son if*, as he ex-

preſſes it, *he became miſerable himſelf*, yet ſtill ſuch a Perſon cannot be ſuppos'd to hate himſelf; but ſome give way to Pain, ſome to Luſt, others are hurried away by Paſſion; and while they are willingly ruſhing upon *Evils*, yet ſtill they think they are doing the *beſt* for themſelves. They don't ſcruple to tell you with the Poet,

This is my way of Living; do you follow your own.

As if they had declar'd War againſt themſelves, they hunt for *Croſſes* by Day, and *Torments* by Night; but ſtill they never accuſe themſelves of any *Impropriety in acting*; for that is the Complaint of thoſe who have a *Love* and *Affection* for themſelves; therefore when it is ſaid, that a Perſon has been *no Friend*, that he has been a *Foe*, that he has been an *Enemy* to himſelf, and that he wants to *leave Life*, we are ſtill to underſtand, that he acts all this upon ſome Principle, which is ſufficient to perſuade us that every Man has an *Affection for himſelf*. For it is not enough to ſay, that no Perſon hates himſelf; becauſe we are to underſtand that there is no Perſon who thinks his Condition in Life a *Matter of Indifference to him*; for it would deſtroy all the Affections of the Mind, if in the ſame Senſe that we feel no Inclinations either to one Side or another to Objects that are quite indifferent in themſelves, we ſhould imagine that we are abſolutely unconcerned about the Manner in which we ourſelves are affected.

It would likewiſe be abſurd were any one to advance that our Affections for ourſelves are directed in ſuch a Manner as to refer to ſome other Object foreign to ourſelves. This way of Speaking may indeed be applied to *Duties* and the *Virtues* of *Life*; yet ſtill the Meaning of it is well enough underſtood; but when applied to our own *Perſons*, we never can be underſtood to love ourſelves for any *foreign Object*; as *Pleaſure* for Inſtance; for we love *it* on *our own Account*, and not *ourſelves* on *it's Account*. There cannot therefore be a clearer Truth, than that every Man is *fond*, nay *paſſionately fond* of himſelf; for ſhew me the Man, when Death approaches,

Whoſe Veins are chill'd not, and his Viſage pale.

And indeed, if this Abhorrence in Nature to it's own Diſſolution, when exceſſive is *blameable*, ſo is an exceſſive *Dread of Pain*. But as all Mankind are generally affected in this Manner, that is ſufficient to prove Nature to *abhor Diſſolution*. And the higher that this *Abhorrence* riſes, as for Inſtance, when it becomes *juſtly blameable*, it gives us ſtill the ſtronger Reaſons for believing that it could *never riſe to that Exceſs*, were there not certain Seeds of it in Nature. I am not now ſpeaking of that *Dread of Death*, which Men diſcover when they reflect that they are to be deprived of the *Good Things* of this Life, or when filled with Terrors of what may happen after Death, or when ſhock'd with the Agonies that may attend their *going out of the World*, and for thoſe Rea-

ſons avoid Death? for even in the Caſe of *little Children*, who have no Conſciouſneſs of this kind about them, if, in joking with them, we threaten to throw them down from any Place, they diſcover *Conſternation*. Even Brutes, who, as *Pacuvius* ſays, *have no Sagacity in what is to happen*, tremble at the Apprehenſions of Death.

BUT who can imagine that the wiſe Man himſelf is not of the ſame Way of Thinking, and when about to die, that he is not * ſhock'd at the Thoughts

* *Shock'd*] As this Sentiment is delivered in the Character of *Piſo*, I don't know if we have a right to charge it upon our Author. Mr. *Addiſon*, hath, I think, accounted much more *nobly*, and the inimitable *Shakeſpear* much more *truly*, for the Abhorrence of Nature to Diſſolution.

The former of theſe Authors introduces *Cato* ſaying,

Whence this ſecret Dread and inward Horrour,
Of falling into nought? Why ſhrinks the Soul
Back on itſelf, and ſtartles at Deſtruction?
'Tis the Divinity that ſtirs within us.
'Tis Heaven itſelf that points out an Hereafter,
And intimates Eternity to Man.

This is very fine, but then it is drawn from Reading and Speculation, more than from the general Properties of Human Nature.

But *Shakeſpear*, who painted Nature from his own Feeling, and whoſe Feeling was perhaps the moſt exquiſite, and the trueſt of any Man who ever lived, in *Hamlet*'s Reaſoning, gives us no Picture of a Hero, nor of a Philoſopher, but of a *Man*, yet at the ſame time of ſuch a *Man* as every Hero and Philoſopher is, and ought to be.

——— Who would Fardles bear ———
But that the Thought of ſomething after Death,
That undiſcover'd Country from whoſe Bourn
No Traveller returns, puzzles the Will,
And makes us rather bear the Ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of:
Thus Conſcience doth make Cowards of us all,
And thus the native Hue of Reſolution
Is ſickly'd o'er with the pale Caſte of Thought;

And

Thoughts of being cut off from his deareſt Concerns, and at leaving the Light. But we have a more clear Proof of Nature's Influence in this Reſpect; for many People bear all the Calamities of *Beggary* that they may ſupport Life; ſome Men, bending into the Grave with Age, are thrown into Agonies at the Approach of Death; others bear all the Miſeries which are attributed to *Philoctetes* in the Play, who under the moſt inſufferable Torments, prolonged his Life, wretched as it was, by his Skill in Archery, as *Attius* has it,

---Tho' ſlow himſelf, his Arrows pierc'd the Fleet,
And the wing'd Prey fell flutt'ring at his Feet;
A Coat of Plumes repell'd the Weather's Rage,
And thus he lengthen'd Life's deteſted Stage.

I SPEAK of Human Kind, or rather of the Nature of whatever has Life, ſince almoſt the ſame Obſervation holds with Regard to *Plants* and *Trees*. I ſhall not determine, with ſome learned Men, that this *Inſtinct* is implanted by a *Supreme* and a *Divine Power*, nor that it is merely *fortuitous*. We ſee that Vegetables of all kinds are ſecured by *thick Barks* and *ſtrong Roots*. Animals derive the ſame Advantages from the *Diſtribution of their Senſes*, and a

And Enterprizes of great Pith and Moment
With this Deſign their Currents turn away
And loſe the Name of Action.

For for my Part I cannot help thinking in this Paſſage that *Piſo* is guilty of a little Anticlimax; for after he has eſtabliſhed the Abhorrence of Nature to Diſſolution, what had he to do to rank among the Objects that ſhock a wiſe Man in Death his *Deceſſus a ſuis*, and the *Lux relinquenda?*

certain *Diſpoſition of their Limbs*. Now though upon this Head I agree with thoſe who think that it all proceeds from the *Direction of Nature*, which muſt abandon her own *Eſſence*, ſhould ſhe neglect *thoſe Circumſtances*; yet I am very willing to allow thoſe who are of another Opinion to retain their own way of Thinking; but ſtill they are to underſtand, that when I ſpeak of the *Nature* of *Man*, I mean *Man* himſelf; for in this there is no Difference, becauſe a *Man* can ceaſe to be a *Man* ſooner than loſe his Affection for thoſe Objects that *ſuit his Nature*. The wiſeſt Philoſophers therefore were in the right to trace the Original of *Supreme Good* from Nature, and have been of Opinion that our Deſire after thoſe Things that are *fitting to Nature*, is implanted in every Object of that natural Affection which directs Self-preſervation.

We are next to examine into the *Nature of Man*, becauſe it is now ſufficiently evident that *naturally* every Being is *dear to itſelf*. This therefore is now the Object of our Enquiry. Now it is plain that *Body* and *Soul* are the conſtituent Parts of Man; as his principal Properties are thoſe of the *Soul*, his ſecondary ones thoſe of the *Body*. In the next Place, we are *intuitively* ſenſible that the Diſpoſition of his Body is ſuch as to be preferable to that of all other Creatures, and his Mind ſo formed, as to be both furniſhed with Senſes, and have that Excellence of *Sagacity* that directs the *Nature of the whole Man*, and in which there is a certain amazing Power of *Reaſoning* and *Diſtinguiſhing*, with a *Knowledge of all the Virtues*. As

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to the Properties of the Body their Value are not to be compared with the Qualities of the Mind; yet they at the ſame time are more eaſily diſcernable, therefore let us begin with them.

It is is therefore evident how fitted to Nature all the Parts of our Body are; together with the Whole of our Form, Shape and Stature. This, without all Doubt, may be ſaid of the Forehead, the Eyes, the Ears, and other Members, as we underſtand them to be *peculiar to Man*; but ſtill they require to be in a healthful flouriſhing State to enjoy their natural Functions and Uſes without any *Defect*, without any *Pain*, without any *Maim*. This is what Nature affects; for there is a certain Exertion of the Body which preſerves an Agreement through all the *Motions* and *Circumſtances* of Nature, in which, if there is any offenſive *Diſtortion*, or *Degeneracy*, by any *Deformity* in *Moving* or *Standing*, as for Inſtance, a Man's walking on his Hands, going *backward* and not *forward*, ſuch a Being plainly flies from itſelf; and *Man* being diveſted of *Man*, may be ſaid to hate his *own Nature*. Therefore there are certain Poſtures of Sitting; there are certain light and affected Motions, ſuch as thoſe uſed by impudent or effeminate Perſons, which ſeem *contrary to Nature*, and tho' the Fault lies in the *Mind*, yet *Human Nature* ſeems to be *alter'd in the Body itſelf*.

On the contrary, there are *decent* and *even Habits*, *Affections*, and *Manners* of the Body, which ſeem to be *fitting to Nature*.

As to the *Mind*, it is not ſufficient that it barely *exiſts*, for it muſt *exiſt* in ſuch a manner

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as that it may no ways be *impair'd in it's Faculties* or *defective in it's Virtues*. Every Senſe has a peculiar Quality, nor ought any of them to be under the leaſt Incumbrance as to their Functions in the quick and ready Perception of thoſe Objects which are immediately ſubjected to them. Now the Mind, and that principal Part of it which we call *Underſtanding*, poſſeſs more Virtues, of which there are two principal Kinds, one of them implanted by Nature, and is called *involuntary*; the other kind, as depending upon our *Will*, has the more proper Appellation of *voluntary*, and contains the moſt excellent of all our *intellectual Faculties*. Of the former Kind are *Docility*, *Memory*, and all thoſe Properties which go under the general Denomination of *Genius*, and whoever poſſeſſes thoſe Virtues is called an *ingenious Man*. But the other kind, which we call *voluntary*, comprehends the *great* and the *real* Virtues, ſuch as *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, *Juſtice*, and the like. This in brief is what has been obſerved with regard to the *Body* and the *Mind*, in which conſiſts all that belongs to the Nature of Man.

FROM this it is very evident, ſince we love ourſelves, and deſire that every thing ſhould be *perfect both in the Mind and the Body*, that thoſe Objects are *intrinſically dear to us*, and of the utmoſt Conſequence towards the *Happineſs of Life*. For the Purpoſe of Self-preſervation neceſſarily implies, that each Part of the Being ſhould be dear to itſelf, and the dearer, in Proportion to it's Degrees of *Perfection* and *Merit* in it's own kind; becauſe the Object of our Affection

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is a Life that is full of the *mental* and *bodily* Virtues; and in this, *Supreme Good* muſt neceſſarily conſiſt, ſince it ought to be the very *Ultimation of deſirable Objects.*

THIS being underſtood, there can be no doubt, that ſince Mankind are dear *to* themſelves and *in* themſelves, the Members both of their Body and Soul, and all the Circumſtances which belong to the Motion or State of either, are valuable and indear'd to Mankind on their own Account.

THESE Principles being explained, we may eaſily conjecture that we have the greateſt Affection for thoſe Properties about ourſelves which have the greateſt Dignity, conſequently the *mental* are preferr'd to the *corporal* Virtues, and thoſe that are *voluntary* to thoſe that are *involuntary*; the former are properly term'd *Virtues*, and are moſt excellent, becauſe they ariſe from *Reaſon*, the moſt divine Endowment of Man. Now every Being *created* or *preſerved* by Nature, without, or with but very little Intelligence, places it's Supreme Good in the Body; ſo that what was ſaid of a Sow was not amiſs, *That it's Soul was given it by way of Salt, to hinder it from ſtinking.*

BUT certain Beaſts poſſeſs Qualities which ſomewhat reſemble Virtues. *Lions*, for Inſtance, *Dogs* and *Horſes*; in whom we ſee not only ſome *ſenſual Emotions*, ſuch as Swine diſcover, but in ſome meaſure *intellectual ones.* But the *Mind* conſtitutes the *Whole of Man*, and *Reaſon* the *Whole of the Mind.* From this *Virtue* reſults, which is defined to be the *Perfection*

fection of Reaſon, and which they think require reiterated Explanations.

FOR there is a certain Similarity betwixt the Education and Perfection of *Vegetables* and thoſe of *Animals*; therefore we may ſay, that a *Vine lives*, and that it *dies*; that a Tree is *new*, that it is *old*, that it *flouriſhes*, and that it *decays*. So that it is not at all amiſs to apply ſome things, that are *fitting* and *foreign* to *Nature*, to *Vegetables* as well as *Animals*, and to ſuppoſe the Art of Agriculture to be, as it were, an Oeconomiſt for propagating and nouriſhing them, for pruning, lopping, rearing, advancing and aſſiſting them, that they may go as far as Nature can carry them. Therefore, Vines themſelves, if they could ſpeak, would tell us, that their Culture and Preſervation was to be provided for in ſuch and ſuch Manner. And now, ſince I have happened upon the Simile of a Vine, the Means of it's Preſervation are without itſelf: For it's own Properties are very ineffectual for preſerving it in a thriving State without Cultivation.

BUT ſuppoſing that a Vine was likewiſe to have an Addition of *Senſe*, ſo as to have a certain Affection, and to be ſelf-motive, what then do do you think it would do? Would it not, when left to itſelf, take care of thoſe Properties which the Gardener cultivated in it before? But would it not likewiſe be careful to preſerve it's Senſes, their Affections and their Members, if they had any? Thus it would join to thoſe Properties which it always had, thoſe other additional Properties; nor would it always have the

ſame

ſame End in view which the Gardiner had, but it would endeavour to live according to it's *after Acceſſion of Nature*; therefore it's End of Happineſs would be *like* what it was before, and yet not the *ſame*; for it would not now affect the Happineſs of a *Vegetable*, but of an *Animal*. But ſuppoſing that it was endued not only with the *Senſe*, but the *Soul* of a Man, would it not neceſſarily follow that it's former Properties would continue as before, and remain Objects of it's Cares; but that it's acceptional Properties would be ſtill much dearer to it? That the moſt valuable Part of thoſe would be it's *Mind*, and that it would place it's *ultimate Good* in the *Perfection* of it's Nature, inaſmuch as the *Mind* and the *Reaſon* would be by far the moſt *excellent* of it's conſtituent Parts. Thus the *ultimate End* of all Affections, when traced from the common Source of Nature, ariſes by many Gradations before it arrives at it's *Perfection*, which *Perfection* conſiſts in *Health of Body* and the *Perfection of the rational Faculties*.

SINCE Nature is ſuch as I have deſcribed it, if a Being, as ſoon as it is born, could know itſelf, and could judge of the *Power of it's whole Nature*, and each of it's *conſtituent Parts*, it would inſtantly be ſenſible of this *End* and *Ultimation* we are now in ſearch of, and wiſhing to attain, and it's Judgment would be *infallible* in every Reſpect. But now Nature in it's *Infancy* is wonderfully muffled up, nor is it poſſible either to diſcover or know her; but as we advance in each, we *gradually*, or rather *ſlowly* begin as it were, to *know ourſelves*, becauſe the firſt Sentiments

timents of our Nature are *obſcure* and *uncertain*, and the *infant Affections of our Mind* tend no farther, than that we may be *ſafe* and *ſound*. But when we begin to be capable of Reflection and Sentiment, when we begin to perceive *who we are*, and in what Properties we differ from other Creatures, then it is that we commence our *Purſuit* after thoſe Objects for which we were born.

We ſee ſome Properties ſimilar to theſe in Beaſts. At firſt, not one of them ſtirs from the Place in which it was born, but afterwards each of them moves by the peculiar Inſtinct of it's own Nature. Serpents creep, Ducks ſwim, Merlins fly, Bulls puſh with their Horns, Scorpions ſting, in ſhort, Inſtinct directs each of them how to live.

There is a Reſemblance of this in the human Race; for Infants, when juſt born, are *inactive* and *lumpiſh*, as if abſolutely without a Soul; but when they grow a little ſtronger, they uſe the Faculties both of *Mind* and *Senſes*. They then endeavour to raiſe themſelves upright by the Help of their Hands, and they know the People who educate them. They next take Pleaſure in their Equals, and are fond of aſſociating with them, and then apply to their little Diverſions. They are allured by telling Tales, and ſhew an Inclination to gratify their Companions with any thing they can ſpare from their own Stores. They take a great deal of Notice of what paſſes at home, and begin to make their Remarks and Obſervations. They are fond of knowing the Names of their Acquaintances; and

and if they get the better in any Diſpute with their Companions, they are quite tranſported with Joy; when worſted, they are ſunk and caſt down. All which we cannot imagine can happen without ſome Cauſe.

For the Strength of Reaſon in Man is ſo formed, as to be fitted for the *Perception of every Virtue*; therefore young Children, without any Inſtruction, are affected by the Reſemblance of thoſe Virtues which they had the Seeds of within themſelves, becauſe theſe are the *Elements of their Nature*; and as they increaſe, Virtue proceeds to it's Perfection; for as we are originally ſo formed as to contain within ourſelves certain Principles of *Affections* for particular Perſons, of *Liberality* and *Gratitude*; and as our Minds are fitted to attain *Knowledge*, *Wiſdom*, *Fortitude*, and to avoid the contrary Qualities, it is not without Reaſon that we diſcern in Boys, as it were the *Sparks of Virtue*, that ſtrike up in them the Light of Philoſophy, which they follow like a *God*, to attain to the *Perfection of Nature*; for as I have often already taken notice, we ſee, though faintly, the *Power of Nature* in Man through all the Tenderneſs of his Infancy, and through all the weakeſt Eſſays of his Wiſdom; but when his Underſtanding is confirmed by Age, he then feels the Force of Nature; yet is ſenſible withal, that it can make ſtill farther Advances, * though we muſt allow, that originally it had a ſeparate Exiſtence.

We are therefore to enter into the *Nature of Things*, and thoroughly to examine it's Wants,

* There is a great Perplexity in the Original here.

otherwiſe

otherwiſe we never ſhall be able *to know ourſelves*. A Precept which, becauſe it was too ſublime for the Apprehenſion of Mankind, is attributed to a God; therefore the *Pythian Apollo* enjoins us to *know ourſelves*. Now this Knowledge conſiſts only in our comprehending the Powers *both of our Soul and Body*, and in leading that Life which enjoys thoſe Objects that are *fitting to Nature*. But as the original Affection of the Mind was as I have deſcribed it, after our attaining thoſe things from Nature in the higheſt Perfection, we muſt confeſs, when we have attain'd what we thus affect, that Nature then makes a full Stop, as being in the State of *ſovereign Happineſs*; which muſt neceſſarily be an Object wholly deſirable in itſelf and by itſelf, becauſe I have already ſhewn, that all it's Parts are to be coveted for their own Worth.

BUT in enumerating the bodily Advantages, if it ſhould be thought an Omiſſion that I have paſt over *Pleaſure*, I ſhall take another Opportunity of examining whether Pleaſure *is* or *is not* one of thoſe Objects which are agreeable to Nature; as to our preſent Enquiry, *that* is nothing to the Purpoſe. For if Pleaſure does not (as I think it *does not*) perfect the Goods of Nature, we are in the right to leave it out; but if it is of that Importance which ſome People aſſign it, it does not at all jar with my Notion of *Supreme Good*; for if we make Pleaſure to be an Addition to what we have laid down as the primary Affections of Nature, this is only adding to them another *bodily Good*, but without changing that Syſtem of *Supreme Good* which I have laid down.

ALL

ALL my Reaſoning hitherto has been drawn from the firſt Affections of Nature. But now I will follow another kind to prove, that we have an innate Concern for the *whole of thoſe things collected*, not only from the Principle of *Self-love* that is within us, but becauſe every Part of Nature, both in our Bodies and Souls, has it's peculiar Powers. To begin with the former. Don't you perceive, when any Limb is diſproportioned, weak, or crippled, how People conceal it? How they ſtrive, how they work, either to hide entirely, or as much as is poſſible, any bodily Defect? And how much Pain they even put themſelves to for a Cure? How they endeavour to bring their Limbs to their natural Poſition, though perhaps that may be ſo far from making them more ſerviceable in the Functions of Life, that it may make them leſs ſo? For as Mankind have naturally an Affection for the whole of themſelves, for no other Reaſon but *for themſelves*, it neceſſarily follows, that where this Affection is for *the whole*, it muſt ſubſiſt in like manner for the ſeveral Members that conſtitute *the whole*.

BUT is there nothing which Nature herſelf points out as worthy her Obſervation in the Motions and Attitudes of the Body? The manner of a Perſon's Walking, of his Sitting, the Compoſure of his Air, and the Caſte of his Features; are we to think all thoſe Circumſtances beneath the Concern and Notice of a Gentleman? Don't we entertain a high Contempt and Hatred for many People, who by their Air and Poſtures appear to deſpiſe the Laws and Method of Na-

ture? And as all thoſe Circumſtances relate to the Body, why ſhould we not think *Comelineſs* to be an Object deſirable on it's own Account? For if we ſuppoſe that bodily *Deformity* and *Mutilations* are in themſelves to be avoided, why ſhould we not in the ſame, or perhaps in a greater Proportion, affect for itſelf the Gracefulneſs of Perſon? And if, in our *Attitudes* or *Motions*, we avoid *Meanneſs*, why ſhould we not deſire *Comelineſs?* We may ſay the ſame thing of *Health*, *Strength*, and the *Abſence of Pain*, which are all of them *deſirable*, not only for the Benefit attending them, but even on their own Account; becauſe Nature deſires *Perfection in all her Parts*; ſhe therefore affects for herſelf that Compoſure of the Perſon, which is moſt according to Nature; but Nature is quite broken, when the Body is either ſick, pain'd, or feeble.

Let us now view a nobler Sight, the Qualities of the Mind, which, in Proportion to their Excellency, diſcover the brighter Indications of Nature; for ſo innate within us is the Love of Knowledge and Learning, that no body can doubt of Mankind's being carried to purſue them, though they contained no temporary Advantage. Don't we ſee that even Blows cannot deter Boys from poring and ſearching into Objects? How they return to them after a Whipping; how tranſported they are when they come at any Knowledge? How eager they are to communicate this Knowledge to others? How fond they are of *Pomp*, *Plays*, and ſuch other *Shews*, and are ready, on their Account, to bear with Hunger and Thirſt? Nay, don't we ſee thoſe who have

have a Paſſion for *liberal Science* and the *fine Arts*, neglect all Concerns either of their *Health* or Family *Affairs*; and become ſo bewitch'd by the Charms of *Learning* and *Knowledge*, as to endure every Hardſhip; by the Pleaſure of Literature, compenſating the ſevereſt Cares and Toils?

To me *Homer* ſeems to have had ſomething like this in his Eye, in his Fictions of the *Syren* Songs. For the *Syrens* don't ſeem to have charm'd Paſſengers to tarry with them by any Sweetneſs of the Sounds, or any Novelty or Variety of Singing; but by their profeſſing a great Extent of Knowledge, ſo that the Deſire of Learning prevailed with Mankind; for in this Manner they invite *Ulyſſes*; (I have tranſlated that Paſſage, with ſeveral others of *Homer*,)

O Pride of Greece, Ulyſſes, *hither ſteer,*
And lend to our melodious Songs thine Ear;
For ne'er did Mortal o'er thoſe Billows ſail,
But hung with Rapture on our tuneful Tale.
Then, fill'd with ev'ry Grace the Muſe beſtows,
Homeward with Wit, and Wiſdom fraught,
he goes.
The Fortunes of the War our Songs employ,
That work'd the Fate of Heaven-devoted Troy.
The Toils and Labours of the Grecian *Crew,*
And Nature's ſelf lies open to our View *.

HOMER was ſenſible that his Fable would want *Probability*, ſhould he make the *Syrens* Song *catch ſo great a Man by the Ear*. Therefore they promis'd him *Knowledge*; which it was no wonder if a Man panting after Wiſ-

* This Quotation is from the *Odyſſee*; but my Tranſlation is from *Cicero's Latin*.

dom ſhould prefer to his Country; and indeed it is inherent to the Curious, to wiſh to know every Manner of Thing: But it is the Property of great Men to be led by the Contemplation of ſublime Objects to a Paſſion after Science.

How intenſe was *Archimedes*'s Study, when he did not know that his Country was loſt, while he was attentively deſcribing ſome Figures drawn in the Duſt? How *abſorpt in Muſic* have we ſeen the Soul of *Ariſtoxenes?* How paſſionately fond of Literature was the Life of *Ariſtophanes*. Need I to mention *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, or *Democrates*, whom a Deſire after Knowledge carried to the Extremities of the World. Whoever is not ſenſible of this, has never been in love with any noble Object of Study. And here when we are told that the Studies I have mention'd are cultivated for the *Pleaſures of the Underſtanding*, they who ſay ſo don't conceive that it is *that* very Circumſtance which makes them *intrinſically deſirable*; becauſe the Underſtanding is captivated without any Proſpect of Advantage, and is in love with Knowledge itſelf, even tho' attended with *Inconveniences*.

But why ſhould we longer pore upon Matters that are ſo very plain, let us queſtion ourſelves in what manner we are affected by contemplating the Motions of the Stars and the heavenly Bodies, and diſcovering the hidden Properties of Nature! How we are delighted by Hiſtory which we read from End to End, how we ſeek what has eſcap'd us, and purſue what we have commenc'd! I am ſenſible at the ſame time that there is *Advantage* as well as *Pleaſure* in reading

ing Hiſtory; but then how paſſionately fond are we to read Fictions, from whence no Manner of Advantage can be drawn!

How very earneſt are we to know the Name of any noted Perſon in Hiſtory, their Parents, their Country and Circumſtances, no way material to us? Don't we ſee that Men of the loweſt Rank of Life, who never could attain the leaſt Notion of being employ'd in Affairs of Conſequence, in ſhort *Tradeſmen*, are delighted with Hiſtory: Above all, we may perceive People who are bending to the Grave with Age, with whom all Action is over, ſhewing the moſt earneſt Attention in reading and hearing hiſtorical Tracts. Therefore we muſt neceſſarily admit, that in Matters of Learning and Knowledge, there are certain Properties which invite us to ſtudy and to comprehend them.

Some of the old Philoſophers have in their Fictions of the *happy Manſions*, deſcribed the Life of wiſe Men, who being void of all Manner of Care, and unconcern'd about any Inconveniency of Living, had no other Buſineſs but to paſs their whole Time in Enquiries and Diſſertations upon Nature. Now we ourſelves may perceive that ſuch Excerciſes not only ſeaſon the Pleaſures of Life, but are an Antidote for it's Calamities. Therefore a great many, while in the Power of Enemies or Tyrants, in Exile or in Priſon, have alleviated their Pains by literary Studies.

When *Phalerius Demetrius*, a leading Man in this State was wrongfully driven from his Country, he retir'd to King *Ptolemy* at *Alexandria*.

dria. As he was a great Maſter of this very Philoſophy which I now recommend to you, and had been a Hearer of *Theophraſtus*, therefore he, in that mournful Time of his Leiſure, compos'd many excellent Writings, not for any Profit, for that could not be the Caſe, but that the Culture of his *Mind* might ſerve, as it were, for Food to his *Nature.* And indeed, I myſelf have often heard the learned *Cn. Aufidius*, who had been *Prætor*, ſay, after he loſt his Eyes, *That he was more touch'd at his loſing the Light than at loſing any worldly Advantages.* In ſhort, we ſhould think *ſleeping* to be an unnatural thing, were it not that it brought ſome Relief to our Bodies, and were a Cure for our Toils; becauſe it takes away all Senſe and all Action; therefore we would take it to be no bad Alteration, as we now undergo almoſt unnatural Watchings, on Account of certain Views and Studies, if Nature did not require Sleep, or if ſhe could be repair'd in ſome other Manner.

But there are certain *clear*, *bright* and *indiſputable* Proofs, chiefly in Man, but in all other Animals likewiſe, that the Mind is always a working, and that it has an utter Abhorrence to *eternal Reſt.* This is eaſily diſcernible in young Boys. For tho' I am afraid I dwell too long on Inſtances of this Kind, yet all the ancient Philoſophers, eſpecially of our Sect, conſulted the *Nurſery*, becauſe they were of Opinion that Nature's *chief Delight* was beſt learn'd from Childhood. Therefore we ſee that Infants can never be at reſt; and when they grow a little up, they are ſo pleas'd with laborious Diverſions,

ſions, that they cannot be frighten'd from them, even by beating; and this Deſire of being ſtill employ'd about ſomewhat, grows in Proportion with ourſelves. Therefore we would not be confin'd to the ſweeteſt Sleep, even tho' our Dreams were as pleaſing as thoſe of *Endymion*; for if that were our Caſe, we ſhould think it the next to Death. But we likewiſe ſee that the moſt *indolent*, the moſt *unaccountably lazy* Perſons, often employ both their Mind and their Body: For when they are not unavoidably engag'd in Buſineſs, they call for *Dice*, or ſome other *Diverſion*, and make up a Party in *Converſation*; and when they cannot enjoy the liberal Delights of Learning, they haunt * Aſſemblies and Cabals. Even the Brutes which we ſhut up as Petts, are imparient under their Confinement, tho' they are better fed in it than if they were free; and long for their uſual Range and Freedom of roving, which was given them by Nature.

THEREFORE there is no Man of a good natural Spirit, or a liberal Education, who would enjoy Life, if it were upon the Terms of being ſhut out from all Buſineſs, and be fed upon the moſt exquiſite Dainties. For they chuſe either to do ſomewhat in a private Capacity, or, if their Genius riſe higher, they apply to Matters of Government, the Attainment of Honours, and the Poſſeſſion of Power; or elſe they de-

* *Aſſemblies and Cabals.*] Orig. *Circulos aliquos & ſemi-circulos conſectari.* The Critics, as uſual, when there is the leaſt Doubt as to a Paſſage, have not ſaid a Word about the Meaning of this Expreſſion; whether it is as I have tranſlated it, or whether the Author did not mean, "That ſuch Perſons, rather than be *quite* idle, "ſcrawl'd *Circles and Semi-circles upon the Walls*," I am uncertain.

dicate themſelves entirely to literary Studies. A Life like any of theſe is ſo far from being attended with Pleaſures, that it is ſubjected to Cares, Anxieties and Watchfulneſs. Without either courting Pleaſure or avoiding Toil, they ſeek to enjoy, by the Force of their *Genius* and *Underſtanding*, the beſt and the divine Part of Man: Nor all this time do they ever give over their attentive Reverence for the Reſearches of the Ancients, nor their Purſuit after new Diſcoveries. As this Thirſt is inſatiable, they forget all other Objects; while nothing that is poor, nothing that is mean, ever enters their Thoughts; and ſo great an Influence has ſuch Studies, over thoſe who apply to them, that even they who eſtabliſh an End of *good Things* to be directed by *Profit* or *Pleaſure*, have been ſeen to ſpend their whole Lives in the *Contemplation* and *Examination* of the Properties of Nature.

THEREFORE this, at leaſt, is plain, that we were born for a Life of Buſineſs; but there are ſo many Degrees of Buſineſs, that the leſſer are quite loſt in the greater. The greateſt, in *my* Opinion, and in that of the Philoſophers whoſe Doctrine we are now examining, lies in conſidering and underſtanding the Nature of the heavenly Bodies, and of thoſe Objects, which, tho' hid and conceal'd by Nature, yet are inveſtigable by Reaſon. Next to this is Government, or a prudent, temperate, brave and equitable Syſtem of *civil Polity*, together with the other Virtues and Habits which are the Reſult of Virtue; all which are comprehended under the Term of *Honeſta*. After we are grown up,

Nature

Nature herſelf is our Guide to the Knowledge and Practice of thoſe Things.

For all firſt Principles are but ſmall; but they increaſe in a gradual Progreſſion, otherwiſe the Object could not ſubſiſt. For there is a certain Delicacy or Weakneſs in Infancy, which hinders it from diſtinguiſhing or acting in the beſt manner. The Light of thoſe two moſt deſirable Objects, Virtue and Happineſs, is late in it's Dawn, but our Comprehenſion of their Nature is much later. It was therefore nobly ſaid by Plato, *That the Man was happy who, even in his old Age, was able to attain to Wiſdom, and to a juſt Way of Thinking.*

But we have ſpoke enough of the primary Advantages of Nature; let us now ſurvey what is of more Importance, and conſequential to them. Now Nature has ſo created and form'd the human Body, that it has certain perfect Functions in it's Infancy, and reſerves others to be completed in it's Progreſs in Life, without making much Uſe of any foreign or adventitious Aſſiſtance. In other Reſpects ſhe perfects the Soul in the ſame manner as ſhe does the Body: For ſhe has endued it with *Senſation* for the *Perception of proper Objects*, ſo as to need little or no Aſſiſtance for adapting them to her Purpoſes. But ſhe has abandon'd the moſt excellent and the nobleſt Quality in Man; for tho' ſhe has indued him with ſuch Intelligence as to be ſuſceptible of every Virtue, and has, without any Learning, implanted in his Mind imperfect Ideas of the the nobleſt Objects, and, as it were, begun to teach and introduce us to the Principles which

are

are the Elements of Virtue; yet as to *Virtue itſelf*, her Cares extend no farther than a little rude Eſſay.

THEREFORE it belongs to us, I mean to *Philoſophy*, to ſearch into the Conſequences of thoſe Principles which we receive from Nature, ſo as that we may attain the End we aim at, which is much more *intrinſically deſirable* than either the Senſes or the bodily Properties I have mention'd: Nay, the Perfection of the Mind is *inconceivably* greater than that of the Body. Therefore, all our Dignity, all our Admiration, all our Endeavours ought to be directed to Virtue, and it's correſpondent Duties: And all thoſe Objects, whether *ideal* or *actually exiſting*, come under the ſingle Denomination of the *Honeſta*. We ſhall ſoon examine into the *Properties* and *Signification* of all thoſe Particulars, and into their ſeveral *Powers* and *Natures*.

CHAP. V.

AT preſent we are only to explain that the *Honeſta*, are deſirable from their own intrinſic Value, beſides being ſo from the Principles of *Self-love*. This may be prov'd from thoſe Mirrours of Nature, *Boys*: How eager are they in their Diſputes and Conteſts, how unwilling to accuſe themſelves, and how deſirous to be prais'd; what Labours do they not undertake to be Leaders amongſt their Followers; how grateful are they to thoſe who have ſerv'd them, and how eager to expreſs this Gratitude? But thoſe Paſſions are chiefly diſcoverable in the no-

bleſt

bleſt Diſpoſitions, where the *Honeſta* are, as it were, faintly sketch'd out by Nature: But as Boys grow up, thoſe Sketches receive greater Expreſſion, and when they come to Manhood there is no Man ſo unlike himſelf as not to be ſhock'd by *Turpitude*, and pleas'd with *Honeſty:* For is there a Man who does not hate a laſcivious, contumacious young Fellow, or who does not love Modeſty and Faithfulneſs, tho' they no way concern himſelf? Who does not hate *Publius Numitor* of *Fregelli*, for his Treachery, tho' it was ſerviceable to *Rome?* Is there a Man who does not extol *Codrus*, the Preſerver of this City, and the Daughter of *Erichtus?* Is there a Man who does not deteſt the Name of *Tubullus*, and reverence that of *Ariſtides*, even after Death? Can we forget how much we are affected when we hear or read of a pious, a friendly, or a generous Action? But why do I ſpeak of us *Romans*, who are born, train'd and educated to Glory and Dignity: For what Shouts do the Vulgar and the Rabble ſet up in the Theatre, at the following Paſſage:

I am Oreſtes,

When his Friend ſteps in and ſays,

Believe him not, Oreſtes *is my Name*:

*But when they both together endeavour to undeceive

* *But*, &c.] Orig. *Cum autem etiam exitus ab utroque datur conturbato erantique regi.* I cannot for my Life underſtand the Meaning of the Commentators, by all calling out that this Paſſage is corrupted. *Scaliger* has made an ingenious Eſſay in his own Way to reconcile it by reading it *Exitus utrique datur a conturbato eranteque regi*: Which might do did not *Cicero*'s own Words do much better.

But

ceive the perplex'd and puzzled King, then it is that we wiſh they may live for ever together. When or where is this Scene repeated, without the loudeſt Applauſes of the Spectators? There is no Body who does not approve of and commend this Affection of the Mind, an Affection that is ſo far from ſeeking *Self-Intereſt*, that *Self-Intereſt* is ſacrificed to *Friendſhip*.

NOT only *Romances*, but even *true Hiſtories*, eſpecially our own, are full of ſuch Inſtances. We choſe the moſt virtuous Man for receiving the * *Idean Goddeſs* into our City: We have ſent *Romans* † to be Guardians to Kings: Our Generals has devoted their Lives for the Good of their Country: Our Conſuls put a Prince, our inveterate Enemy, upon his Guard againſt Poiſon, even when he was leading up his Army againſt the Walls of our City. One of our Country-women was found brave enough to atone, by a voluntary Death, for the Violence brought

But what ſurprizes me moſt is, *M. L'Abbé Regnier des Marais*, who has tranſlated this Paſſage into *French*, and has, at leaſt the Merit of being guilty of fewer Blunders than almoſt any of his Countrymen who have attempted any of our Author's Works: I ſay it is ſurprizing that this Gentleman ſhould tranſlate that Paſſage *Lorſq' enſuit ils tuent tous deux le Tyran troublé & irréſolu.*

To me the Paſſage ſeems to be extremely clear. The two Friends by each of them endeavouring to paſs himſelf for *Oreſtes*, endeavoured *dare exitum regi*, to clear up the King's Doubts. Which their Conteſt was ſo far from doing, that it puzzled him ſtill farther. Then both of them deſired to die, becauſe neither of them could make out their Pretenſions to be *Oreſtes*. See p. 102 and 103.

* The Statue of *Cybele* brought into *Rome* by *Scipio*.

† *To be Guardians*] We have an eminent Explanation of this Paſſage in a Silver *Denarius* of *M. Lepidus*. On one ſide of it is the Figure of *Egypt* crown'd with Turrets with the Inſcription ALEXANDRIA, and on the other ſide the following Inſcription, M. LEPIDUS PONT. MAX. TUTOR REG. EX. S. C.

upon

upon her Chaſtity. Another *Roman* kill'd his own Daughter to preſerve her from a Rape: All which Inſtances, and a vaſt Number of others, were undoubtedly acted upon the Principle of a Love for Virtue, and not upon that of Self-intereſt; and even our Commendation of them proceeds from no other Motive than the *Honeſty of the Actions.*

HAVING, in a few Words, laid open thoſe Circumſtances, without running into the Copiouſneſs of Expreſſion, in which I might have indulg'd myſelf, becauſe the Propoſitions I have laid down are quite *indiſputable.* We may certainly conclude from the Premiſes, that every Virtue, and the *Honeſtum*, which is the Reſult of, and inherent to, all the Virtues, are intrinſically amiable: But in all the Kinds of that *Honeſtum* of which we are now ſpeaking, there is nothing ſo noble, nothing ſo diffuſive as the *ſocial Connexions* of Mankind with one another; the Communication of the *civil Advantages* of Life, and the *Endearment* that runs thro' our Nature for all the *human Species.* This originally proceeds from that *Affection* which the *procreating Being* has for *it's Iſſue*, and which links a whole Family together, by the *conjugal* and *parental* Ties: This *Affection* gradually communicates itſelf abroad, firſt to our *Relations by Blood*, then to *thoſe by Marriage*, then to *Friends*, then to *Neighbours*, then to our *Countrymen*, and thoſe with whom we have any public *Connexions* of Duty or *Friendſhip*; till it embraces all *human Kind.* The Affection of the Mind, which thus allots to every

Perſon

Perſon *his own Right*, and generouſly and equitably preſerves thoſe *Social Intercourſes*, is call'd *Juſtice*. To it are added *Piety*, *Good-nature*, *Liberality*, *Generoſity*, *Affability*, and their other Siſter Virtues. And theſe are the Characteriſtics of Juſtice, but ſo as to be in common with the other Virtues.

For as the Nature of Mankind poſſeſſes a certain innate Principle of *civil Polity*, called by the *Greeks* πολιτικη, the Agency of every Virtue muſt have a Tendency to that Intercourſe and ſocial Endearment, which, as I have ſhewn, runs though the whole of the human Species, and Juſtice reciprocally affects thoſe Connections that ſhe may ground herſelf upon the Habits of the other Virtues; for Juſtice cannot be preſerved but by a Man of *Courage* and *Wiſdom*. The *Honeſtum* therefore is the Reſult of this *Combination*, this *Completion* of all the Virtues; becauſe whatever is *honeſt*, is either *Virtue itſelf*, or the *Effect of Virtue*; and when human Life conforms itſelf in all thoſe Reſpects, and preſerves a Harmony with the Virtues, then we are to look upon it as being upright, honeſt, faithful, and agreeable to Nature.

This *Union* and *blending* of the Virtues, however, is diſtinguiſhed by a certain philoſophical way of Reaſoning; for when they are ſo joined and connected that they all partake of one another, and are inſeparable from one another, yet each of them has it's *proper Function*. Thus *Courage* diſcovers itſelf in *Toils* and *Dangers*; *Temperance* in *neglecting Pleaſures*; *Prudence* in *diſtinguiſhing betwixt Things good and evil*;

evil; *Juſtice* in *giving every Man his own.* As therefore all Virtue contains a certain Concern, which is, as it were, foreign to ourſelves, and affects and embraces other Objects, it follows from this, that our Friends, our Brothers, our Kinſmen, our Relations, our Fellow-Citizens; in ſhort, all the *Individuals* which make up *Human Society*, are endear'd to us on their own Accounts; yet, at the ſame time, nothing of this kind conſtitutes any Part of the *End* or *Ultimation* of *Good Things.*

THUS it happens, that there are two kinds of Things *deſirable for their own ſakes*; one of them conſiſting in thoſe Objects which perfect that *Ultimation*, and thoſe are either *intellectual* or *bodily*; but as to thoſe Objects that are *without ourſelves*, and are no Part either of our *Underſtanding*, or our *Body*, ſuch as Friends, Parents, Children, Kinſmen, and our Country itſelf, they are indeed *intrinſically dear* to us; but that Endearment is not of the ſame Nature with that of the Objects I laſt mentioned; nor can any Man ever arrive at Supreme Good, if thoſe Objects, *foreign to himſelf*, however dear they may be to him, become *neceſſary conſtituent* Parts of that Good.

BUT, *ſay you*, how can it agree with Truth, that all theſe Objects tend to *Supreme Good*, if neither Friends, Relations, or any of the other *external Connections* are *conſtituent Parts of that Good?* I will tell you how. Becauſe all the Connections foreign to ourſelves are preſerved by thoſe Duties, which ariſe from the Nature of their reſpective Virtues; for the Practice of Friend-

Friendſhip, of filial and of civil Duty are eſtimable, becauſe the Diſcharge of ſuch Duties is the Reſult of *moral Fitneſs in Action*, which has it's Foundation in the Virtues. Theſe are the Principles which wiſe Men follow; but ſtill under the Direction of Nature. Now Men who are not *perfect* in *Wiſdom*, and yet are endued with an *excellent Genius*, are often ſpurr'd on by *Glory*, which has the Form and Reſemblance of the *Honeſtum*. Ah! could they have a complete View of that nobleſt, that moſt glorious of all Objects, *perfect, conſummate Honeſty*, what Extaſies would they feel, when it's very Semblance gives them ſuch Raptures.

FOR can we imagine any Man to be ſo much addicted to Senſuality, ſo much inflamed by Luſts, as to have as exquiſite a Taſte of Pleaſure in the Enjoyment of thoſe Objects which he moſt eagerly covets, as the Elder *Scipio* had when he beat *Hannibal*, or the Younger when he deſtroyed *Carthage*. Shew me the Man to whom the * Gambols upon the

* *Gambols upon the* Tyber.] There is a great Obſcurity in the Original here. Some Copies read *Tibertina Decurſio*, ſome *Diſſenſio*, ſome *Devectio*, and ſome *Diſcenſio*. The Commentators have all of them taken Pains to ſhew, that this Expreſſion alludes to certain Gambols and Feaſts held upon the *Tyber*; and we are recommended for this to *Ovid's Faſti*, lib. 6. where, ſpeaking of the Holidays ſet apart to *Fortune*, he ſays,

Ite, deam læti fortes celebrate Quirites:
In Tiberis ripa munera regis habet.
Pars pede, pars etiam celeri decurrite *cymba.*
Nec pudeat potos inde redire domum.

Though this Paſſage ſays a great deal in favour of thoſe who fix the Holiday mentioned here to be that of *Fortune*, and in favour of the Word *Decurſio*; yet I cannot imagine that *Cicero* would ever have mentioned a Periodical Day by that particular Expreſſion, *Feſto illo*

the *Tyber* upon that Occaſion gave ſuch Raptures as thoſe which *Lucius Paulus* felt when he brought his Royal Captive *Perſes* up the ſame River.

AND now, my *Lucius*, treaſure up in your Mind the Sublimity and Excellence of the Virtues: This will lead you to be perſuaded that thoſe Men who enjoy them and a noble generous Spirit at the ſame Time, are always *happy*. Such Men look upon all the Revolutions and Turns of Fortune to have but a ſlight and weak Influence when put in competition with *Virtue*. For tho' 'tis true that thoſe Objects which we rank among *Perſonal Goods*, fill up the Meaſure of *happy Life*, yet ſtill, *Life*, without them, may be *happy*: Becauſe thoſe Acceſſions of *Good Things* are ſo ſmall and inconſiderable *in the whole Account*, that as the Brightneſs of the Stars is loſt in that of the Sun, ſo their Splendor is drown'd in that of *Virtue*.

NOW as, conſiſtently with Truth, we admit

illo Die. Any Man who knows *Cicero*'s Manner and the Genius of his Language knows that he never uſes the Expreſſion *illo* without a Reference to ſomewhat either expreſs'd or underſtood immediately before. It is in this natural eaſy Senſe that I have ventured to tranſlate it, and ſhall only recommend to my Readers the following very elegant Paſſage from *Velleius Paterculus*, lib. 2. cap. 1. and beg he will compare it with the immediately preceding Words of *Cicero*.

Potentiæ Romanorum *prior* Scipio *viam aperuerat; luxuriæ poſterior aperuit. Quippe remoto* Carthaginis *metu ſublataque Imperii Æmula non gradu ſed precipiti curſu, a virtute deſcitum, ad vitia tranſcurſum; vetus diſciplina deſerta, nova inducta; in ſomnum a vigiliis, ab armis ad voluptates, a negotiis in otium converſa civitas.*

I ſhall beg leave to add another Paſſage from Livy, who ſpeaking of the Younger *Scipio*, lib. 30, ſays,

Ipſe per lætam pacem minus quam victoria Italiam *effuſis non urbibus modo ad habendos honores ſed agreſtium etiam turba obſidente vias,* Romam *pervenit: Triumphiſque omnium clariſſimo urbem eſt invectus.*

that Perſonal Circumſtances have but an inconſiderable Influence upon the *Happineſs of Life*, ſo on the other hand it would be going too far ſhould we ſay that they have *none*. For they who talk in this Manner ſeem to me to forget the *Primary Objects of Nature*, which they themſelves have laid down. Some Influence therefore muſt be allowed them, but Care muſt be taken to ſettle it's Proportion. Now a Philoſopher who ſeeks *Subſtance* rather than *Shew*, neither makes no Account of thoſe Things which the *ſhewy* Philoſophers themſelves have admitted to be agreeable to Nature; and yet he allows Virtue to have ſo great Power, and Honeſty to have, as it were, ſuch *deciſive* Influence, that tho' he does not take away from other Conſiderations *all* Influence, yet he leaves them next to *none*.

THUS it is that the Philoſopher talks who does not deſpiſe all other Objects for Virtue alone, and yet raiſes the Glory of Virtue by it's own intrinſic Merit. In ſhort, this is an Explanation of the full and conſummate Syſtem of *Supreme Good*. From this each Sect has endeavoured to ſnatch a Part, and to adapt it to their own Doctrine.

ARISTOTLE and *Theophraſtus* had ſeverally and oft-times greatly extolled the intrinſic Worth of Learning. *Herillus* charm'd by this, thought proper to adopt it for his *Supreme Good*, and to maintain, that no other Object was deſirable in itſelf. The Ancients have ſaid a great deal upon the Contempt and Neglect we ought to ſhew for external Circumſtances. *Ariſto* adopted this Doctrine; and deny'd that any thing was either

either to be avoided or courted beſides Vices and Virtues. We enumerate *Abſence of Pain* amongſt thoſe Things which are agreeable to Nature; and *Hieronymus* has therefore ſet it up as *Supreme Good*. As to *Callipho* and *Diodorus* who came after him, one of them was an Admirer of *Pleaſure*, and the other of the *Abſence of Pain*, but neither of them could do without *Honeſty*, which our Sect has ſo nobly diſtinguiſhed.

EVEN the Senſualiſts themſelves have their Subterfuges, and talk the Sun down with the Praiſes of Virtue. Tho' they make Pleaſure the firſt Object of *Deſire*, yet they tell us that Cuſtom becoming, as it were, a ſecond Nature, ſhe impells us to many Actions without the leaſt View to Pleaſure. Laſtly come the *Stoics*, who have not brought this or that Maxim but the Whole of our Philoſophy into their own Syſtem; and as Thieves take the *Marks* out of the *Goods* they have pilfer'd, ſo, the *Stoics* while they make uſe of our Sentiments, alter our Terms, which are, as it were, the Marks of *Things*. Thus *our* Syſtem alone remains worthy of the *Ingenious*, worthy of the *Learned*, worthy of the *Eminent*, worthy of *Princes* and worthy of *Monarchs*.

HAVING ſaid thus much he made a ſhort Pauſe; Well, *continued he*, do you think I have made a proper uſe of the Right you gave me of *entertaining your Ears*. Nay, *Piſo*, *reply'd I*, as at other times, ſo *to Day* you diſcover ſuch Knowledge of thoſe Points, that had we *ſtill* the Opportunity of *hearing you*, I own we ſhould not be much at a Loſs for the *Greeks*. And what pleaſes me moſt is, that I remember your Maſter, that

excellent *Peripatetic*, *Staſeas*, of *Naples*, treated thoſe Topics in ſomewhat a different Manner; for he agreed with thoſe who allowed great Influence to proſperous or adverſe Fortune, and to Perſonal *Goods* and *Evils*. You are in the right, *anſwer'd* Piſo; but our Friend *Antiochus* treats of thoſe Points with greater Perſpicuity and Strength than *Staſeas* did; tho' it is not ſo much your Approbation I ſeek after, as that of our Friend *Cicero* here, whom I want to inveigle from your Doctrine.

As for me, *replies* Lucius, I am very much of your Opinion, and I believe ſo is my Brother. Well then, *ſays* Piſo, will you give the young Gentleman leave; or do you chuſe he ſhould ſtudy Points in which he ſhall be *wondrous wiſe and yet know nothing of the Matter*. Nay, *anſwered I*, he has *my* Leave; but don't you remember that I may be ſuffered to *approve* of what you have been ſaying; for who can help *approving* thoſe Things which appear *probable* to himſelf. Yes, *reply'd* Piſo, but how can a Man approve a Thing of which he has no Perception, no Comprehenſion, no Knowledge. Then I told him: The Difference betwixt us, *Piſo*, is not ſo great; for there is no other Reaſon for my maintaining that we can have no adequate Perception of any thing, but becauſe the *Stoics* have ſo explain'd the Power of *Perception*, as to aſſert that we can *perceive* nothing beſides a Propoſition which is ſo ſelf-evidently true, that it cannot be falſe. My Difference upon this Head therefore is only with the *Stoics*; for I have none with the *Peripatetics*; but enough of this, for

it

it may bring us into a very long wrangling Diſpute.

THERE is one Propoſition which I think you dropp'd a little too haſtily, *that the Wiſe are always happy:* I don't know how you came to touch ſo ſlightly upon this Point, unleſs it was becauſe (as I am afraid is the Caſe) that the Doctrine of *Theophraſtus*, as to *Fortune*, *Pain*, and *bodily Torment*, which he thinks utterly irreconcileable to the *Happineſs of Life*, is true: For it ſeems to be a ſtrong Contradiction to ſuppoſe that a Man may be happy, and at the ſame time overwhelm'd with Variety of *Evils*; at leaſt, I own, I am at a loſs how to reconcile them. Then *Piſo* ask'd me; Whether do you agree in taking from Virtue that Influence which can of itſelf command the *Happineſs of Life*; or, admitting this, do you deny that Perſons can be happy who at the ſame time are in *Poſſeſſion of Virtue*, and yet are *perſecuted with Evils?* For my part, *reply'd I*, I am for giving Virtue all the Influence you pleaſe; how extenſive it may be, we ſhall examine at another Time: But let us at preſent enquire whether, admitting ſomewhat that is independant of Virtue amongſt *Good Things*, the Influence of Virtue can be ſo very powerful?

WHY, *anſwer'd* Piſo, if with the *Stoics* you ſay, that the Preſence of Virtue alone is ſufficient to make Life happy, you then agree with the *Peripatetics*; for the *Stoics* call thoſe Circumſtances *harſh*, *troubleſome*, *deteſtable*, and *ſhocking to Nature*; which they dare not venture to term *Evils*. We call the ſame Circumſtances

Evils, but *ſmall* and *inconſiderable* ones. Therefore, if a Man can be happy when in thoſe *ſhocking*, *troubleſome Circumſtances*, he may likewiſe be ſo when under thoſe *ſlight Evils*. If there is, *interrupted I*, a Man in the World who knows where the Streſs of an Argument lies, it is *Piſo*; therefore, Sir, I beg your Attention, for it may be my own Fault that you don't thoroughly comprehend my Queſtion. I am all attention, *anſwer'd he*, and expect you will anſwer my Queſtions in your turn.

My Anſwer, *reply'd I*, will be, That I am not now examining into all the efficient Power of Virtue, but into the Conſiſtency or Inconſiſtency of a Doctrine.——How can that be?——Becauſe, when *Zeno*, *anſwer'd I*, deliver'd as an Oracle this pompous *Maxim*, *That Virtue was ſufficient of itſelf to make Life happy*; when it was ask'd him, how this could be? he told them, that *there is no other Good beſides the Honeſtum*. I don't now examine how true this Maxim is, I am only obſerving how very well his whole Doctrine hangs together.

Nay, *Epicurus* admitted that the *wiſe Man was always happy*; for he ſometimes *emerg'd* out of *Senſualiſm*; he even told us that a Perſon under the Extremity of Torment might cry out, *How eaſy, how indifferent, all this is to me!* But I don't now diſpute it with *Epicurus*, whence Nature has attain'd to ſo much Influence over our Happineſs; I am only inſiſting that he did not underſtand how to ſupport his own Argument, when he ſaid that Pain was the *greateſt Evil*.——Now this is my very Plea againſt you;

you; you maintain the ſame Things to be *Goods* and *Evils*, which they maintain who never (as the Saying is) ſaw ſo much as the Shadow of a Philoſopher; I mean *Health*, *Strength*, *Stature*, *Beauty*, nay, *well-par'd Nails*, *Deformity*, *Diſeaſe*, *Weakneſs*, *Calamities*.

Now, as to thoſe external Circumſtances, 'tis true, you ſay but very little; but as you admit them to be *bodily Goods*, you no doubt place their Co-efficients (ſuch as Friends, Children, Relations, Riches, Honours, Wealth) amongſt *Goods* likewiſe. Remember I am ſaying nothing againſt this Doctrine; but if the Circumſtances which may happen to a wiſe Man may be *Evils*, then it is plain that Wiſdom is not the ſole *Efficient* of *Happineſs*. Nay, *anſwer'd* Piſo, I grant you not of *Supreme Happineſs*, but of *Poſitive Happineſs*, and that is enough. I obſerv'd, *reply'd I*, that you advanced the ſame thing ſome time ago, and I know our Friend *Antiochus* uſes to maintain it too. But what can be more abſurd than to ſay, that a Man can be *happy*, without being *ſufficiently happy*. Now, in whatever is *enough*, all that is *over* is *too much*; nobody can be *too happy*; therefore nobody can be *happier* than the *happy Man*.

By your way of Reaſoning, *anſwer'd my Friend*, *Q. Metellus*, who left three Sons (who had been all of them Conſuls, and one of them had triumph'd and been Cenſor, with a fourth who had been Prætor) all in *good Health*, while he himſelf had been Conſul, Cenſor,

Augur, and had triumph'd; *Q. Metellus*, I ſay, tho' a wiſe Man, was no happier than *Regulus*, another wiſe Man, who, being in the Power of his Enemies, was murder'd by Hunger and Watching.

WHY, *reply'd I*, do you put that Queſtion to me? put it to the *Stoics*. And what Anſwer will they make? *anſwer'd* Piſo. Why, that *Metellus* was not a whit more happy than *Regulus*. Then, *ſaid he*, we can go no farther with them. But we are ſtraggling from our Subject, *reply'd I:* For I tell you again, I don't now examine who is in the right, but what each of them can ſay conſiſtently with their own Principles. I wiſh the *Stoics* could be brought to admit that one Man is happier than another, then you would ſee their whole Syſtem ruin'd at once. For, as they place *Good* in *Virtue* and the *Honeſtum* alone, and as they allow of no Acceſſion to either, and maintain it to be the *Sole Good*; whoever enjoys it muſt neceſſarily be happy, ſince the ſole Efficient of Happineſs can admit of no Addition. Then how can one Man be happier than another? Don't you perceive how all this chimes together? And by Heavens! (for I will ſpeak what I think) there is a prodigious Conſiſtency in all they teach; their Concluſions anſwer to their Premiſes, the middle Propoſitions to both, and every Part agrees with another. They foreſee all Conſequences and all Objections. In Geometry, when you admit the firſt Axioms, you admit the whole. If you once grant that there is no *Good* but

but the *Honeſtum*, you muſt grant that the Happineſs of Life conſiſts in Virtue alone. The Reverſe holds the ſame; admit one Propoſition, you admit another; but it is not ſo with your Sect.

THERE are three kinds of *Good Things*: You then hurry along till you come to the End, and there you ſtick in the Mire; for what you want to teach is, That *a wiſe Man can be in want of nothing that makes Life happy*: A noble Maxim, worthy *Socrates* and *Plato* too! I, *replies he*, will venture to maintain it. That you can't, *ſaid I*, without untying the following Knot of Reaſoning: *If Poverty is an Evil, no Beggar, tho' a wiſe Man, can be happy*; (now *Zeno* ventur'd to pronounce ſuch a Beggar not only *happy*, but *rich*;) *Pain* is an *Evil*, then a Man who is fix'd to the Croſs cannot be *happy*; *Children* are *Bleſſings*, then to be *childleſs* is a *Calamity*; the *living in one's native Country* is a *Good*, then *Baniſhment* is an *Evil*; *Health* is a *Good*, then *Sickneſs* is an *Evil*; *Soundneſs of Limbs* is a *Good*, then *to be a Cripple* is an *Evil*; the *Clearneſs of Sight* is a *Good*, then *Blindneſs* is an *Evil*. Though all thoſe Evils ſeparately may be render'd ſomewhat lighter by means of your conſolatory Doctrine, yet what Man is able to ſupport them all at once? Suppoſing a Man to be *blind*, *maim'd*, *deſperately ſick*, *baniſh'd*, *childleſs*, *a Beggar*, and *upon the Rack*, how will *Zeno* term ſuch a Man? Why *happy*, nay, *ſupremely happy*: For, *ſays he*, I have all along taught, that there is

no

no * Progreſſion towards *Happineſs*, as there is towards it's efficient *Virtue*.

SUPREMELY happy, ſay you? *That is incredible*. Then what ſay you? *That he is happy?* Is this credible? For if we are to appeal to the common Senſe of Mankind, you never can prove ſuch a Man to be happy. If to the *thinking Few*, one Part of them perhaps will doubt whether *Virtue* has ſo much Power as that a *virtuous* Man ſhall be happy even in *Phalaris's* Bull. But the other Part will make no manner of Doubt that the *Stoics* ſpeak *conſiſtently*, and you *inconſiſtently*. So then, *ſays* Piſo, *Theophraſtus* hits your Fancy in his Book upon *the Happineſs of Life*.----But this is a Digreſſion from what we propoſe.------But that we may digreſs no farther, I tell you flatly, *Piſo, reply'd I, that it does*, if the Circumſtances I have named are *Evils*.

DON'T they appear to be Evils to you? *ſaid the other*.——I then told him, You now put a Queſtion to me, which, in whatever Manner I anſwer, you will be equally embarraſs'd. In what Manner? ——Becauſe, if they are *Evils*, the Man who experiences them cannot be *happy*; if they are not *Evils*, then down goes the whole *Peripatetic* Syſtem. I ſee your Drift, *replies he, with a Smile*, you are afraid that I carry off a Pupil from you. With all my Heart, *ſaid I*,

* *Progreſſion towards Happineſs*] The Original here is not very eaſily underſtood. *Gradus iſtam rem non habere quam Virtutem.* Now ſhould we tranſlate *Gradus*, *Degrees*, we ſhould bring our Author into an Inconſiſtency; for the *Stoics* admitted of no *Degrees* in Virtue, though they did of a *Progreſſion* towards it.

if

if he has a mind; for if he is with *you*, he is with *me*.

THEN, *reſum'd* Piſo, hear me, *Lucius*; for it is to you I am to direct my Diſcourſe. The whole Influence * of Philoſophy, as *Theophraſtus* ſays, conſiſts in the Attainment of *Happineſs in Life*; for all of us are fired with a Paſſion for Happineſs. In this your Brother and I are agreed; therefore what we are now to conſider is, whether Philoſophy can beſtow this? It promiſes fairly, that is certain; to what Purpoſe elſe did *Plato* travel all over *Egypt*, that he might be inſtructed by barbarous Prieſts in Numbers and Aſtronomy? Why did he afterwards repair to *Archytas* at *Tarentum?* Why to the other *Pythagoreans* at *Locris*, I mean *Echecrates*, *Timæus* and *Acrio*, but with a View of adding the *Pythagorean* to the *Socratic* Philoſophy, of which he had made himſelf entirely Maſter, and of learning that Doctrine which *Socrates* had rejected? Why did *Pythagoras* himſelf travel over *Egypt*, and viſit the *Perſian Magi?* Why did he compaſs on Foot ſuch Tracts of barbarous Regions? And why ſail over ſo many Seas? Why did *Democritus* do the ſame, and go ſo far (tho' whether this is true or not, we are at a Loſs to know) as to deprive himſelf of the Uſe of his Eyes? But one thing is certain, that he neglected his private Concerns, that his Mind might be diverted as little as poſſible from it's Contemplations. He left his Lands uncultivated; then what was he in ſearch of but *Happineſs in Life?*

* *Of Philoſophy,*] I have here made a ſmall, but I hope a conſiſtent Variation from the common Reading.

Suppoſing

Suppoſing he had thought it conſiſted in the *Knowledge of Things*, then he wanted to attain *Serenity of Mind*, from his deep Reſearches into Nature; for he reckon'd this *Serenity*, which he term'd εὐθυμία, and frequently ἀθαμβία (that is, a Mind free from Terror) to be *Supreme Good.*

But though theſe Sentiments were *noble*, yet they had not yet received their *Poliſh*; becauſe his Rules were few, and thoſe, concerning * Virtue at leaſt, not very clear; for it was after his Time that *Socrates* began to examine that Point in this City; and then theſe Queſtions were brought into this Place; nor was there ever the leaſt Doubt that all the Hopes of living well, and likewiſe of living happily, conſiſted in Virtue. After *Zeno* had learned this Doctrine from our Sect, he did as Lawyers do by their Cauſes, he treated the ſame Subject in a different Form. This is what you now approve in him; for he, by changing the Denominations of Things, avoids the Imputation of *Inconſiſtency*, to which we are liable. He maintains that the Life of a *Metellus* is no *happier* than that of a *Regulus*; but that it is *preferable* to it; that it is no more *deſirable*, but that it is more *eligible*; and that if it were left to a Man's Choice, he ought to *chuſe* the Life of *Metellus*, and *avoid* that of *Regulus*. What he calls *preferable* and *eligible*,

* *Virtue at leaſt,*] Orig. *Pauca enim, neque ea ipſa cuncleate ab hoc, de Virtute* QUIDEM *dicta.* Few People attend to the Senſe in which our Author moſt commonly underſtands the Word *quidem*; and this ſeems to have lead all the Tranſlators and Commentators upon this Paſſage into a Miſtake, as if *Cicero* had ſaid, *And indeed the few Precepts* Democritus *has left as to Virtue, are not not very clear.*

I call

I call *more happy*, without allowing one Grain more of Influence to ſuch a Life than the *Stoics* do.

WHERE is the Difference betwixt us? Only I make uſe of *common Terms* to expreſs *common Objects*, and they ſay the ſame things as I do, but are at Pains to expreſs them in an uncommon Manner. Thus, as there is always ſome one or other who calls out for an Interpreter, that he may treat with the Senate, ſo we muſt hear the *Stoics* with the Help of an Interpreter. I call whatever is *agreeable to Nature*, *Good*; and whatever is the contrary, *Evil*; and not only I, but you, *Chryſippus*, define it the ſame Way in the Forum, at your Houſe, * but not in the School. But how! Are Philoſophers to talk upon the Qualities of Things in a different Manner from all the reſt of Mankind? Are the *Learned* and *Unlearned* to have different Languages? But while the Learned are agreed upon the Quality of each Object, if they were plain Men, they would ſpeak in plain Terms: However, let them coin new Terms as they pleaſe, they can never alter the Nature of Things.

BUT, that you may have no farther Occaſion to ſay that I digreſs from my Purpoſe, I will now come to the Charge of Inconſiſtency. This, according to you, lies in *Words*; but, according to me, in *Things*. This you will own, if we once lay it down as an indiſputable Maxim, in which the beſt *Stoics* join with us, that the Weight of all other Conſiderations, if put in the

* *But not in the School.*] I entirely agree with *Lambinus* in his Reading of this Paſſage.

Balance

Balance with Virtue, would be as nothing; ſo great is it's Power. Now I call thoſe things *Goods* which the *Stoics* term *Advantages*, *Elegibles*, *Preferables*, and define as containing a certain Degree of Value; but in what Proportion they are *Goods*, or if *Deſirables*, how much they are *deſirable*, I don't determine; while the *Stoics* term them by various other Names, ſome of them new and forged, ſuch as *Preferables* and *Rejectibles*, and ſome of them expreſſing the ſame thing. Now where is the Difference whether you *deſire* or *chuſe*? For my own Part, I think an Object which is *choſen*, and diſtinguiſh'd by *Election*, has the Preference. *Upon the whole*, I mean no more by *deſirable*, than you mean by *eligible*; nor put a greater Value upon thoſe Objects, which I call *Goods*, than you do upon thoſe you term *Preferables*. It neceſſarily follows, that all thoſe Qualities muſt be loſt and diſappear in the Radiance of Virtue, which is, as it were, the *Sun of Life*.

But, *ſay you*, where there is any *Evil* in a *Life*, ſuch a *Life* cannot be *happy*. You may as well ſay, that Corn, though full ear'd and ripe, is naught, becauſe you ſee a Weed in it; and that the moſt gainful Trade muſt be on the loſing Hand, becauſe there is a bad Debt amongſt immenſe Returns. Does not this Way of Reaſoning hold in every Part of Life? And are we not to form our Judgment upon the Whole from the greateſt Part? I will therefore venture to call the other Objects, which are agreeable to Nature, *Goods*, without cheating them of their old Appellation in hunting after any new one.

As

As to the Excellency of Virtue over all, I will place it, as it were, in the oppoſite Scale.

THIS Scale, believe me, * will weigh down the Earth and Seas; for the *Whole* has it's Denomination always from that Property which is moſt predominant and moſt diffuſive in it. When we ſay ſuch a Man is a chearful Perſon, will it follow that becauſe that Perſon has in his Life known one uneaſy Hour, that he is not chearful. *Lucullus* ſaid that *M. Craſſus* was ſeen to laugh once in his Life; and yet, *continued he*, he never, for all that, was one whit leſs worthy the Epithet of ἀγέλαστος. People call *Polycrates* of *Samos*, *happy*; no Accident ever happened to croſs his Will, excepting his throwing his beloved Ring into the Sea. Did this ſingle Accident render him unhappy? He was happy again, when his Ring was found in the Belly of the Fiſh. Now *Polycrates*, as he was a Tyrant, muſt neceſſarily have been a Fool, therefore it was impoſſible he ſhould ever be happy. If he was wiſe, then he was not miſerable, even when he was ſtretch'd upon the Croſs by *Oroetes*, who was *Præfect* to *Darius*.

BUT a Wiſe Man may be beſet by numberleſs Evils. No doubt he may; but then thoſe Evils are

* *Will weigh down*] The Reader will pleaſe to obſerve, that our Author, as he takes his Figure from *Homer*, has, like *Homer*, ſuppoſed the Excellency to preponderate, not by ſinking, as the *heavieſt* things do, when put into a Scale againſt any thing that is lighter; but by riſing up. We are likewiſe to conſider that he is at preſent doing no more than explaining the Notions of the *Greek Peripatetics*, eſpecially *Plato*, with whom this Figure is very familiar.

quite

quite loſt in the Greatneſs of Virtue. Will you not ſuffer the *Peripatetics* to ſay, that the Lives of all worthy Men, that is, of all wiſe Men, of all Men who are adorn'd with every kind of Virtue, have, upon the whole, more of *Happineſs* than of *Miſery?* Who maintain this? The *Stoics?* By no means. But they meaſure every thing by *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and call out that the wiſe Man has always more Objects before him of *Deſire* than of *Averſion*. As they therefore, who maintain that Virtue without Pleaſure is not worth the wagging of one's Finger, allow ſo great Influence to Virtue, how are we to behave, who maintain that the ſmalleſt Excellency of the Underſtanding is ſo much preferable to all *bodily Goods* as not to leave them in Sight? For none of us will venture to ſay, that a wiſe Man may fall into ſuch Miſery, as, if it were in his Power to make the Bargain, to renounce Virtue for ever, upon Condition of being free from all Pain. None of our Sect, who are not aſhamed to call thoſe things *Goods* which the *Stoics* call *Troubleſome*, will affirm that it is better to commit a ſcandalous Action, if attended by Pleaſure, than a virtuous one, if attended by Pain.

We think that *Dionyſius* of *Heraclea* very baſely abandoned the *Stoics*, becauſe he had a Rheum in his Eyes; and yet *Zeno* never taught any body *how to bear with Pain without being pain'd*. He had indeed heard, but never had learn'd this Maxim, that *Pain* was not an *Evil*, becauſe it is not *Turpitude*, and that a Man might bear with it. Had *Dionyſius* been a *Peripatetic*,

ripatetic, I am perſuaded that he would have continued with his Sect, becauſe they admit Pain to be an *Evil*; but their Rules how to bear it with Courage are the ſame with thoſe of the *Stoics*. And your Friend *Arceſilas*, though he was a little too obſtinate in Diſputation, was of our Sect; for he was Diſciple to *Polemo*. When he was rack'd with the Gout, he was viſited by *Epicurus*'s Friend *Carneades*, who was very much dejected when he left him. *Hearkee, Friend*, ſaid *Arceſilas*, *ſtay a little; there is no Communication betwixt* THIS *and* THIS, ſhewing him his Feet and his Breaſt. But ſtill he would have choſen to be free of his Pain.

THIS, therefore, is our Syſtem, which to you ſeems to be inconſiſtent; as it maintains that there is ſo much divine Excellency in Virtue, that where ſhe reſides, and when any glorious, any nobly virtuous Action is to be undertaken and perform'd, *there* may be Trouble and Difficulty, but never can there be Miſery or Wretchedneſs. I will venture to affirm, that all wiſe Men are always happy; but yet that one Man may be happier than another. Maintain, fortify yourſelf, *Piſo*, in this Poſt, *anſwer'd I*, and if you can but preſerve it, not only my Friend *Cicero*, but myſelf will be your Proſelytes.

FOR my Part, *ſays* Quintus, I think it is ſufficiently guarded; and I am very glad this Philoſophy, whoſe Moveables I before valued more than the real Eſtates of others, and which ſeem'd to me to be rich enough to furniſh me with whatever I wanted in the Courſe of my Studies: I ſay, I am overjoy'd that this Philoſophy is

found more acute than the other; a Property which ſome People deny'd it. Not more acute than ours, *ſaid* Pomponius, *with a Joke*; but by Heavens I love your Diſcourſe, for you have expreſs'd what I thought was impoſſible to expreſs in *Latin*, and as plainly and properly as if deliver'd by the *Greeks* themſelves. But it is time, if you think good of it, to return to Town with me. Upon this, we thought we had had enough of Diſputation, and we adjourned to *Pomponius*'s Lodging.

The End of CICERO *concerning the Ends of Things* Good *and* Evil.

THE

THE

Academical Treatiſes

OF

M. TULLIUS CICERO,

ADDRESSED TO

VARRO.

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DEDICATION.

CICERO *to* VARRO *Health.*

THO' even the People, unleſs they are work'd up into a Ferment, never uſe to be *importunate* for a Gratuity, even when promis'd them; yet ſo ſtrong is my Expectation of *your* Promiſe, that I put you in mind, but without *importuning* you. However, I have already ſent you four Memorandums, and thoſe none of the moſt modeſt; for, I dare ſay, you are no Stranger to the Aſſurance of the later Academy. Now, from the very Heart of it, I diſpatched to you thoſe Meſſengers, and I am apprehenſive that *they may dun you*; but, I aſſure you, my Charge to them was only to give you the Hint. I had for a long time been in Expectation, and

reſtrain'd myſelf from writing to you, before I had received ſomewhat from you, which I might repay in the like Commodity: * But as you was a little *ſlow*, which I am apt to attribute to your *Correctneſs*, in the Performance of this, I could no longer keep myſelf from expreſſing, in that manner of writing of which I am moſt capable, the Union that ſubſiſts both in our Studies and Affections.

For this purpoſe I have coin'd a Converſation betwixt us, along with *Pomponius*, in the † *Cumanum*: I have made you defend the Doctrine of ‡ *Antiochus*, with which I thought you was beſt pleaſed; I defend that of *Philo*. I imagine, when you read this, that you will be ſurpriz'd at my introducing a Con-

* It appears that *Varro* had promis'd to dedicate ſome of his Works to *Cicero*; which, from ſo great a Man and Scholar as *Varro*, did not a little ſooth the Vanity of our Author; and this Letter is a Proof of the Impatience with which he expected the Performance of his Friend's Promiſe.

† This Place was famous for the Villas of the *Virtuoſi*, and Great Men of *Rome* in the Days of *Cicero*.

‡ This is the ſame *Antiochus* mention'd in the Treatiſe *de Finibus*, *l.* 5.

verſation

verſation betwixt us which never paſs'd; but you know the Humour of *Dialogue-Writing*. Hereafter, my Friend, we will, if you pleaſe, have a great deal of Talk together relating to ourſelves; this may be with the lateſt; but * we are to attribute that to the late Diſtreſſes of our Country. This is a Duty we are bound to in our private Stations; and indeed I wiſh that the Public might (I will not ſay be ſo *happy*, but) be ſo *well ſettled*, as that we might have Opportunities of a mutual Intercourſe in thoſe Studies; tho' even, in ſuch an Event, my Buſineſs would employ me in other laudable Cares and Exerciſes. But, at preſent, what but thoſe Studies can make Life worthy the enduring? To me, with them Life is *juſt tolerable*, without them it would be *intolerable*. But this we will talk over again and again when we meet.

* *We are to attribute*] Orig. *Sed, ſuperiorum temporum, fortuna Reipublicæ, cauſam ſuſtineat*; which muſt be own'd to be a very dark Expreſſion. Perhaps *Cicero* meant it ſhould be ſo; for *Cæſar* was then Maſter of *Rome*. I have tranſlated it differently from all other Commentators and Tranſlators; which I would not have done, had their Meaning been reconcileable to common Senſe.

DEDICATION.

I wiſh you good Succeſs in your * Removal and your Purchaſe, and I approve of your Conduct in all that Affair. *Farewell.*

* *Removal and your Purchaſe,*] *Varro* had juſt bought a Country-Houſe, to which he had retired for the Conveniency of Studying.

THE

THE
Academical Treatiſes
OF
M. TULLIUS CICERO.
BOOK the FIRST.

AS I lately was at *Cumanum*, and my Friend *Atticus* along with me, *M. Varro* ſent us word that he had come from *Rome* the Evening before; and that, if he had not been fatigued with his Journey, he would immediately have paid us a Viſit. We no ſooner heard this, than we reſolv'd to loſe no Time in waiting upon a Man with whom we were connected by the Similarity of Studies, and a long-ſtanding Friendſhip. We therefore inſtantly ſet out for his Seat; and when we had got within a little way of it, we perceiv'd him meeting us. After a friendly Embrace, and ſtopping for ſome Time, we carry'd him back to his own Villa.

Ar

At firſt he was reſerv'd, and only ſpoke when we enquir'd of him the News at *Rome*; No more of that, I beſeech you, *interrupts* Atticus; don't talk upon Matters which we can't hear with Pleaſure; rather ask our Friend whether he has any News as to himſelf?—Sure *Varro*'s Muſes have been ſilent longer than uſual; yet I can't think he has been idle, but rather that he conceals what he writes. That is far from being my Caſe, *anſwer'd* Varro; for I can't think a Man to be in his Senſes who writes what he wants to keep ſecret: But I have in hand * a great Work; for I have long propos'd to addreſs ſomewhat to my Friend here (meaning myſelf) that ſhall be of ſome Importance, and come from me with all the finiſhing I can give it.

Why that, *reply'd I*, is what I have long waited for, *Varro*, yet I never have ventur'd to *importune* you for it; for I underſtood by our Friend † *Libo*, whoſe Affection for us you know (becauſe we can conceal nothing of that kind) that you have not dropp'd your Deſign, but that you are giving it the higheſt Finiſhing, without ever laying it aſide. Now it never came into my Thoughts to ſollicit you before this Time; but now that I have begun to commit to Writing thoſe Subjects that once we

* This probably was his Treatiſe *de Lingua Latina*, of which a good part ſtill remains.

† This Gentleman was a Man of Letters, and a Patron of *Varro*'s; he commanded a Fleet upon the Coaſt of *Liburnum* and *Achaia*, during the Civil Wars, for *Pompey*.

learned

learned together, and to enrich the *Latin* Language with the old *Socratic* Philoſophy, give me leave to ask you, why, amidſt the great Variety of your Writings, you omit this kind; eſpecially as you ſo much excel in it, and it is a Study and a Syſtem which has ſo great a Superiority over all other Arts and Sciences?

You put a Queſtion to me now, *reply'd my Friend*, which I have long thought of and debated within myſelf; therefore I will anſwer you, without the leaſt Heſitation, in Terms which I have in great Readineſs, ſince, as I have told you, I have long and often conſider'd this Point: Therefore, when I ſaw Philoſophy treated of with the greateſt Accuracy in the *Greek* Tongue, I concluded that ſuch of our Countrymen who loved that Study, and were Maſters of the *Greek*, would chuſe it rather in *Greek* than in *Latin*; but thoſe who diſlik'd the *Greek* Arts and Sciences, would never mind thoſe Studies which they could not underſtand without *Greek* Learning: Upon the whole, I did not care to compoſe what the Unlearned could not underſtand, and the Learned would not chuſe to read.

Now you may yourſelf be ſenſible of this; for you know we cannot, like * *Amafanius* or *Rabirius*, without ſtudying any one Art, diſpute upon obvious Subjects in our Mother-Tongue. They make uſe neither of *Definitions* nor *Diviſions*; they draw no Concluſion from a perti-

* Theſe were two indifferent Authors, who had enter'd the Liſts in favour of the *Epicurean* Philoſophy.

nent

nent Queſtion; in ſhort, they have no notion of any Art requir'd, either in Eloquence or Diſputation. But *we* have ſuch Veneration for the Rules both of Logicians and Orators (becauſe our Sect thinks * that the Power of both is Virtue) that we are oblig'd to follow their Laws and Terms, tho' they are quite new. Now, as I ſaid before, the Learned will have Recourſe for them to the *Greeks*, and the Unletter'd will not be tutor'd into them, at leaſt by us, ſo that all our Labour is vain.

Now, as to Phyſics, if I follow'd *Epicurus*, that is *Democritus*, I could write as plain as *Amafanius*: For where is the mighty Difficulty, after you take away the *efficient* Cauſes, to talk about the *fortuitous Concourſe* of *Corpuſcles*, for ſo he calls *Atoms!* You know that our Syſtem of Phyſics is compos'd of *Efficiency*, and that Matter which *Efficiency* forms and modifies; for we muſt apply † *Geometry* to our *Phyſics*, becauſe, otherwiſe, how can any Perſon be brought to conceive in what manner this Art is applicable to the Life and Morals, to Objects of *Deſire*, and to thoſe of *Averſion?* For the *Epicureans* flatly tell us, that *Brutes* and *Men* have the ſame *ultimate* Good: You know how very delicate our Sect is upon this Point.

SUPPOSING we were to follow *Zeno*, it will be a very difficult Matter to make one apprehend the Nature of that *true* and *uncomplex Good* which cannot be ſeparated from Honeſty;

* See for this the Treatiſe *de Finibus*.

† This Paſſage in the Original is deſperate.

a Good,

a Good, which *Epicurus* ſays, he can't ſo much as conceive a Notion of, without *Pleaſure* operating upon the *Senſes*. But if we follow the *Old Academy*, which is, you know, the Doctrine I approve of, how accurate muſt we be in the Explanation of this Subject! how ſubtle, and even how reſerv'd, muſt we be in our Diſpute with the *Stoics!* Therefore I have made choice of all this Branch of Philoſophy for my own Exerciſe, both becauſe it *improves* my *Morals* and *amuſes* my *Mind*. And I agree with *Plato* in thinking, *that never did the Gods beſtow a greater or a better Gift upon Mankind.*

BUT I recommend my ſtudious Friends to *Greece* itſelf, that is, to *Greek* Authors; where they can drink from the Fountain, and not be ſipping at it's Streams. As to thoſe Points which nobody had hitherto taught, and which were without any Directions for the Studious to attain them, I have done my beſt (tho' I have but an indifferent Opinion of my own Performances) to convey them to my Countrymen. They could have no Recourſe for *thoſe* to the *Greeks*, nor to the *Latins* either, ſince the Death of our Friend * *L. Ælius*. And in my firſt Writings, in which I imitated but did not tranſlate † *Menippus*, I introduc'd a certain Vein of Humour which diverſify'd them with much

* This Gentleman was a *Roman* Knight, and a great Antiquary both in the *Greek* and *Roman* Learning.

† *Varro* wrote a Sett of Satyrs in Verſe and Proſe, ſomewhat of the nature with that of *Petronius*, which he ſtiled *Menippean*, from the Cynic *Menippus*, who wrote in that manner.

Reading, drawn from the very Depths of Philoſophy, and a great deal of Logic: And that the more unletter'd Readers might underſtand what I wrote, they were invited by a certain diverting Manner; nay, I did my beſt (tho' I know not how I have ſucceeded) to introduce Philoſophy into my Orations and my Reſearches into Antiquity.

It is, *reply'd I*, as you ſay, *Varro*; for while we were wandering like Strangers in our own City, your Writings as it were brought us home, ſo that we came to know *who* and *where* we were. You have unfolded the Chronology of your Country, the Series of Ages, the Rights of Religion and the Prieſthood, our civil and military Oeconomy, the Situations of Countries and Places; the Names of all Things divine and human, their Kinds, Properties, and Cauſes; and you have thrown great Light upon our Poets, upon the Learning and Language of the *Romans*. You have compos'd a copious and an elegant Poem in almoſt every Meaſure of Verſe; you have in many Places introduc'd juſt ſo much of Philoſophy as may prompt our Curioſity, but not ſatisfy our Minds.

The Reaſon you aſſign is indeed ſpecious; for the Learned will chuſe to read *Greek*; and they who don't underſtand *Greek*, will not be at pains to read even *Latin*. But now give me leave to ask you, whether you approve of this? Nay, the *Romans*, who are not Maſters of *Latin* Learning, but are of *Greek*, don't deſpiſe their own Authors. For what is the Reaſon why the Learned in the *Greek* ſhould read *Latin* Poets,

Poets, and not *Latin* Philoſophers? Is it not becauſe they are pleas'd with *Ennius*, *Pacuvius*, *Accius*, and many others, who have riſen to all the *Greek* Energy without tranſlating their Words? How much greater Pleaſure would their Philoſophers impart, if, as their Poets imitate *Æſchylus*, *Sophocles*, and *Euripides*, ſo the others would imitate *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and *Theophraſtus*?

OUR Orators meet with Applauſe; I mean ſuch of them as have imitated *Hyperides* or *Demoſthenes*. For my own part, I can ſay it with great Truth, while Ambition, while Honours, while Pleadings, while the Cares, nay, the Adminiſtration of Government, involv'd and fetter'd me in a Multitude of Buſineſs, I ſtill kept thoſe Studies in Reſerve; and leſt they ſhould wear out, I renew'd them at my leiſure Hours by reading. But now that I have both felt the ſevereſt Stroke of Fortune, and am diſcharg'd from the Duties of Government, it is from Philoſophy that I ſeek a Cure for my Anguiſh; and I look upon this Exerciſe as the nobleſt Amuſement of Retirement: For it is both moſt ſuitable to my Years, and moſt conſiſtent with great public Merit (if I poſſeſs any ſuch) nay, nothing can be more inſtructive to our Fellow-Citizens. And were all thoſe Conſiderations out of the way, I own, I don't ſee any thing elſe we have to do.

THE all-accompliſh'd *Brutus*, indeed, writes upon Philoſophical Subjects in *Latin*, in ſuch a manner that he is quite as full upon them as the *Greeks* themſelves, and is of the very ſame way

way of thinking with yourſelf; becauſe he heard for ſome time *Ariſtus*, the Brother of your Maſter *Antiochus*, at *Athens*. For all which Reaſons I beg you too would devote yourſelf to this Species of Study.

THAT, *reply'd he*, is what I will think of, but truſt me, never without you: But what is it I hear of yourſelf? Concerning what? *anſwer'd I.* ---- Why, that you have left the *old*, and are ſtudying a *new* Syſtem. --- And pr'ythee, *reply'd I*, was it more allowable in *Antiochus* to move out of a new Houſe into an old one, than for me to leave an *old* for a *new* one? Our laſt Works ſurely are the moſt correct and amended. Yet *Philo*, who was *Antiochus*'s Maſter, and a great Man in your Opinion, denies in his Writings (nay, we have heard the ſame thing from his own Mouth) that there are two Academies; and goes ſo far as to impeach thoſe of a Miſtake who think there are. He did ſo, *reply'd my Friend*; but ſurely you know what was the Reply of *Antiochus*.

NAY now, *reply'd I*, if it were not too much Trouble, I ſhould deſire to hear anew, from your Mouth, both *that* and the whole Syſtem of the old Academy, which I have ſo long abandon'd; mean time, if you pleaſe, let us ſit down. I pleaſe it much, *ſaid the* * *old Gentleman*, for indeed I am very feeble: But give me leave ---- will what *you* ſeem to incline be agreeable to *Atticus?* By all means, *ſaid* Atticus; for what

* *Varro* was, at the Time when this Dialogue is ſuppoſed to have paſs'd, ſeventy Years of Age; he liv'd to eighty-eight, and was an Author at that Age.

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can be more agreeable to me than to recall to my Remembrance what I learned so long ago from *Antiochus*, and at the same time try whether it can with sufficient Propriety be communicated in *Latin!* Upon this we all seated ourselves round *Varro*, who began thus:

The World is generally agreed, and I think with Reason, that *Socrates* was the first who call'd Philosophy off from Subjects which, tho' they were dark and obscure by Nature, totally employ'd all his Predecessors, and adapted it to the Purposes of *common Life*; so that the whole of his Study was employ'd in examining the Nature of Virtue and Vice, and of Things Good and Evil. As to cœlestial Studies, he thought they were either very much above our Understanding, or, tho' they were perfectly understood, that they could have but very little or no Influence upon our Morals.

SOCRATES, in his Disputations, through almost all his Discourses, great Variety of which are fully wrote out by his Hearers, refutes others without affirming any thing himself. It was his common Saying, *That all he knew was, that he knew nothing.* That in this he had an Advantage over those who think they know Things of which they are really ignorant; that, for himself, all his Knowledge was reduc'd to his being sensible that he *knew nothing*; that he believ'd this was the very Reason why *Apollo* pronounc'd him to be the wisest of Mankind, because the Sum of all Wisdom is compriz'd in our not imagining that *we know Things we do not know.* As this was his constant Saying, and

unalterable Principle, all his Diſcourſe was employ'd in recommending Virtue, and exhorting all Mankind to embrace her. This we may underſtand from all the Compoſitions of his Followers, particularly the Works of *Xenophon*.

As to *Plato*, he was ſo *abundant*, ſo *full*, and ſo *copious*, that under his great Name one uniform conſiſtent Syſtem of Philoſophy came out, under two Denominations; I mean that of the *Academics* and that of the *Peripatetics*. Thoſe two Sects agreed in *Things*, but differ'd in *Terms*. For, as *Plato* had left *Speuſippus*, his Nephew by his Siſter, as it were the chief Heir of his Philoſophy; and next to him the excellent and learned *Xenocrates* of *Chalcedon*, and *Ariſtotle* the *Stagyrite*; the Scholars of *Ariſtotle* were term'd *Peripatetics*, from their walking in the *Lyceum* during their Diſputations; while the others, who, in *Plato*'s manner, met and held their Lectures in the *Academy*, which is another *Gymnaſium*, were call'd after the Name of the Place, *Academics*. As both of them were fill'd from the fruitful Vein of *Plato*, they plann'd out a certain Form of Doctrine, and that too, copious and full; but abandon'd the *Socratic* Sceptiſm upon all Subjects, and his manner of never advancing an affirmative Propoſition.

The Reſult of all this was contrary to what *Socrates* ever meant; for it produc'd a certain ſet Form of *Philoſophical Diſputation*, a *Method* in *Propoſitions*, and a *Preciſion* in the Science. Still the two Sects were at firſt one and the ſame, there being no manner of Differ-

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ence betwixt the *Peripatetics* and the *Old Academy*. 'Tis true, I am of opinion, that the Stream of Genius was more copious in *Ariſtotle* than in the others; but then both flow'd from the ſame Source, and both obſerv'd the ſame Diviſion of *Things to be deſired and avoided*.—But where have I got!—I am mad ſurely! for tho' the * *Sow* be not teaching *Minerva*, yet it is highly impertinent *for any body to pretend* to teach her.

Pr'ythee, *ſaid* Atticus, go on, my Friend; for I am quite in love with our own Performances and our own Authors; and the Subject you are now upon gives me great Pleaſure when deliver'd in *Latin*, and in ſo fine a manner. And ſurely, *interrupts I*, you can have no Scruple with regard to *me*, who *profeſs* Philoſophy, and am to diſplay it to my Countrymen. Then, *continued* Varro, let us proceed, ſince you are ſatisfy'd. Now the Syſtem of Philoſophy deliver'd by *Plato*, was threefold: The firſt related to the Life and the Morals; the ſecond to Nature and her occult Qualities; and the third to the Diſtinctions betwixt Truth and Falſhood, what was ſound and what lame in Reaſoning, and to the Judgment we ought to form with regard to conſiſtent or repugnant Propoſitions.

As to the firſt Part, I mean that relating to *Morals*, they had recourſe for that to *Nature*; they held, that they ought to obey *her* Dictates; that the *Supreme Good*, to which every thing tends, ought to be ſought for from nothing but Nature; and they laid it down as a Principle, that

* Orig. *Sus Minervam.* Prov.

the Acquiſition of all that is moſt fitting to Nature, to Reaſon, the Perſon, and Living, is the Extream of all that is *deſirable*, and the Ultimation of all that is *good*. As to perſonal Advantages, they plac'd ſome in the *Whole*, and others in the *Parts*. Of the firſt kind they reckon'd Health, Strength, and Beauty; and of the ſecond, the Soundneſs of Senſes, and any Excellency in particular Members, as the Swiftneſs of Feet, the Strength of the Arms, the Clearneſs of Voice, and diſtinct Articulations of the Tongue.

But as to the Properties of the Mind, by which ſhe is capable of comprehending the Efficacy of Virtue, they divided theſe into Natural and Moral. To Nature they aſſign'd the Quickneſs of Perception and Memory, both which Properties belong to the Underſtanding and Genius. To the Moral Part they aſſign'd *Study* and *Habit*, which they form'd partly by aſſiduous Practice, and partly by Reaſon; and in this Claſs they rank'd Philoſophy itſelf. Whatever was rough drawn, but not finiſh'd in Philoſophy, they call'd *a Degree of Progreſs in Virtue*; but where it was *finiſh'd*, or, which is the ſame thing, roſe to *Virtue*, that they look'd upon to be the Perfection of Nature and all the mental Qualities, and *the beſt of all Things*. So much for what belongs to the Mind.

As to the third Diviſion, that of Living, under that they rank'd all that is conducive to the Improvement of *Virtue*. Now, in ſome Circumſtances, Virtue is the Reſult of thoſe Advantages, both mental and corporal, which

are not ſo much the Characters of *Nature* as of *Happineſs in Life*. They look'd upon Man to be, as it were, a Member of a *State*, form'd by all the *human Race*, and that he was connected with Mankind by a certain Tye of Humanity. In this manner they treat of Supreme and Natural Good. As to other Circumſtances, they think they relate either to it's *Encreaſe* or *Preſervation*; *Riches*, for inſtance, *Intereſt*, *Glory*, and *Popularity*. Thus they inſtitute a threefold Syſtem of Good Things.

These therefore are the three kinds which moſt People rightly conceive the *Peripatetics* hold; for this is their true Diviſion. And they are miſtaken who imagine, that the *Old Academics*, as they were call'd, are any other than the *Peripatetics*. Their Syſtem was the ſame; and both of them held the Attainment of the *whole* or the *principal* Primary Objects of Nature, or of thoſe which are in themſelves moſt deſirable, to be the *End of Good Things*. Now the principal of theſe Objects are ſuch as are ſeated in the *Mind*, and in *Virtue itſelf*. Therefore that whole Body of ancient Philoſophers held, that the *Happineſs of Life* conſiſted in *Virtue* alone; but that this *Happineſs* could not be *Supreme* without thoſe *bodily Acceſſions*, and thoſe Circumſtances I have already mention'd to be moſt *fitting* to the Purpoſes of Virtue.

From this Syſtem reſulted the Principle of moral Agency, and of Duty itſelf; which they found to conſiſt in the Preſervation of thoſe Objects which Nature preſcribes. Hence aroſe *Averſion to Idleneſs*, and *Contempt of Pleaſure*;

ſure; together with the undertaking many and great *Toils* and *Pains* for the ſake of *Rectitude* and *Honeſty*, and of thoſe Objects which are moſt *fitting* to the *Syſtem of Nature*. The Reſult of this was *Friendſhip*, *Juſtice*, and *Equity*; and thoſe Virtues were preferr'd by them to Pleaſures, and all the Advantages of Life. Such was their Scheme of Morals, and ſuch the Plan and Fabric of the firſt Diviſion I mention'd.

As to their Doctrine of Phyſics, which was the ſecond Head, they divided *Nature* into two Parts; the one *Efficient*, and the other as it were *Paſſive*, upon which the firſt operated for the Production of any Object. The *Efficient* they thought had *operative Power*, and to the *Paſſive* they aſcrib'd *Matter*; yet neither was deſtitute abſolutely of both: For they thought that *Matter* could have no *Coherence* without *Power*, and that *Power* could not *exiſt* without *Matter* of ſome kind or other; for they imagin'd every thing muſt *neceſſarily exiſt*. But that which was compounded of both, they call'd *Body* and * *Quality*: For you muſt allow me, in ſuch uncommon Subjects, to uſe ſometimes new-invented Words, as the *Greeks*, who treated long ago of the ſame Subjects, have done the ſame.

Why not! *anſwer'd* Atticus; you may even uſe *Greek* Words, if you pleaſe, when you are at a loſs for *Latin* ones. *Said* Varro, You are quite in the right as to that; but I will endeavour to uſe *Latin* Terms, except where I am oblig'd to uſe the Words *Phyſics*, *Philoſophy*, *Logic*,

* Orig. *Quaſi qualitatem.*

Rhetoric,

Rhetoric, and many ſuch other Terms which Cuſtom has now adopted into our Language.---- I therefore call thoſe Things by the Word *Qualities*, that the *Greeks* call ποιότητας, which is a Word not in common uſe amongſt the *Greeks* themſelves, tho' it is with the Philoſophers; but this is only one Inſtance out of a thouſand. As to *Logicians*, all the Terms they uſe are *technical*, and none of them common; nay, it is ſo with almoſt all Arts: For new Names muſt either be coin'd for new Subjects, or their Terms muſt be drawn from other Things. If this is a Liberty taken by the *Greeks*, who have been for ſo many Ages converſant in thoſe Studies, how much more allowable is it in us who have but juſt begun to handle them!

BELIEVE me, my Friend, *interrupted I*, you will do your Countrymen a public Service, if, as you have already enrich'd them with a Store of Knowledge, you will likewiſe furniſh them with a Store of Expreſſions. Then, *reply'd he*, ſince this is *your* Opinion, I will venture to make uſe of new-coin'd Expreſſions where they become neceſſary.—— Now, as to thoſe Qualities, ſome are *elementary*, and others *compounded*: The *Elementary* are *ſimple* and *uncomplex*, the *Compounded* are *various* and *diverſify'd*. Thus * *Air* (for that is a Word we uſe in our Mother-Tongue) *Fire*, *Water* and *Earth*, are *Elements*; but from them are *compounded* Animals, and all Things which are produc'd by the Earth. The firſt therefore are *Principles*, or *Elements*, which is a Word we have from the *Greeks*. Of them

* *Aer* in *Latin*, ἀὴρ in *Greek*.

Fire and *Air* have an *operative* and *effective Power*; the other Parts, I mean *Earth* and *Water*, are *recipient* and *paſſive*. *Ariſtotle* found out a fifth kind, which conſtitutes *Souls* and *Stars*, is independent of all theſe, and of a Subſtance unlike the other four I have mention'd.

But they were of opinion, that there was a certain *unſpecific Subſtance*, void of all *Quality* (which is a Word we will wear into Uſe and Familiarity) by which all Things were modify'd and effected, and upon which all thoſe Elements operated. * All theſe *Modifications* are ſufficient to comprize the whole Syſtem of *Things*; they admit of all Shapes, and Alterations in every Part; nay, extend even to *Diſſolution*, tho' not to *Annihilation*; I mean a *Diſſolution* of their *conſtituent* Parts, which are infinitely *diſcerpible* and *diviſible*, ſince there is no *Leaſt* in Nature ſo as not to admit of *Diviſion*. As to their Motion, it is all through Space, which likewiſe is infinitely *diviſible*.

And as the *Principle of Power*, which we call *Quality*, is ſo mov'd as to be in continual Agitation hither and thither, they were of opinion that it made a thorough Change upon that *Matter*, and that thus thoſe Properties were effected by which, while all Nature preſerv'd a *Coherence* and *Continuity* through all her Parts, the World was created; and beyond which there is

* This Paſſage is extremely dark in the Original; but the Reader will eaſily comprehend the Meaning of our Author, if he is in the leaſt converſant in the ancient and ſome modern Controverſies upon this Subject.

no Particle of Matter or Subſtance. They thought all in the World to be conſtituent Parts of the ſame, combin'd by the ſenſitive Properties of Nature, which are endued with *perfect eternal Fitneſs*.

For nothing is ſtrong enough to work the Diſſolution of what they call the *Soul of the World*; and this *Soul* is *conſummate Wiſdom* and *Reaſon*; which they call God, or *Providential Power*, watching over all it's ſubjected Creation of Beings; the *chief* Objects of it's Cares being *Cæleſtial*, and the *ſecondary*, *Human* Concerns. This Being is ſometimes term'd Necessity, becauſe nothing can happen otherwiſe than as directed by it, nor proceed but upon the fatal immutable Direction of *eternal Order*. It is ſometimes likewiſe call'd Fortune, as effecting many Things which by us are *unexpected* and *unforeſeen*, we being ignorant and in the dark as to the efficient Cauſes.

In the third Part of Philoſophy, which conſiſted in *Ratiocination* and *Diſputation*, both of them were agreed, that tho' it has it's Riſe in the *Senſes*, yet that the *Senſes* are not the proper Judges of *Truth*. They thought that Reaſon is the Judge of *Things*, and the only one that is proper to be truſted, becauſe it alone can diſtinguiſh what is *eternal*, *ſimple* and *uniform*, how it *exiſts*, and what are it's *Properties*. This, after *Plato*, they call'd *Idea*; we may very well call it * *Original Beauty*.

As to the Senſes, they held all of them to be *dull* and *ſlow*, without any Power of Perception of the Objects ſubjected to them; which Ob-

* Orig. *Speciem.*

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jects are either too ſmall to come under their *Cognizance*, or ſo reſtleſs and fluctuating that they never preſerve the ſame Uniformity, nay, not the ſame Identity, becauſe they are continually upon *Decay* or *Alteration:* Therefore they term'd all this part of Knowledge * *conjectural.*

THEY were of opinion, that there was no SCIENCE but what conſiſts in the *Workings* and *Reaſonings* of the Mind: This led them to encourage *Definitions*, and to apply them in all diſputable Points. They likewiſe dealt much in the *Explanation of Terms*, that is, in accounting why Things were ſo or ſo nam'd: This they call'd *Etymology*. They next made uſe of *Arguments*, and as it were the *Characters* of Things, in order to prove and draw a Concluſion as to what they wanted to explain: This contain'd the whole Doctrine of *Logic*, or *rational Argumentation*. On the other hand, they introduc'd the Power of *Eloquence*, directing a continued Diſcourſe to the Ends of Perſuaſion. Such were the Principles deliver'd by *Plato*; and, if you pleaſe, I will now explain ſuch Alterations as have been made in them, and have come to my Hands. I pleaſe it greatly, *reply'd I*; and I will anſwer the ſame for our Friend *Atticus*.

WHY, I don't wonder at that, *reply'd the old Gentleman*; for the intellectual Syſtem of the *old Peripatetics* and *Academics* is a noble Study. *Ariſtotle* was the firſt who weaken'd the Power of the *Original Beauty*, which I mention'd ſome time ago, and of which *Plato* was ſo fond that

* Orig. *Opinabilem.*

he

he ſaid, in ſome meaſure, that it partook of DIVINITY. But the Authority of the old Philoſophers met with a ſeverer Blow from *Theophraſtus*; a Man of the moſt perſuaſive Eloquence, and ſo completely amiable that he carry'd Probity and Good-nature in his very Air and Manner: For he ſtripp'd Virtue of her Beauty, and weaken'd her Power, by denying her to be the *ſole Efficient* of *Happineſs in Life*.

FOR tho' his Scholar, *Strato*, had a penetrating Genius, yet he is by no means to be rank'd in this Sect; becauſe, after he had abandon'd the moſt eſſential Part of *Philoſophy*, that which relates to Virtue and Morality, and dedicated himſelf entirely to the Study of *Phyſics*, he differ'd widely even in this from his Companions. But *Speuſippus* and *Xenocrates*, who had originally embrac'd *Plato*'s Syſtem and Authority in Philoſophy; and then *Polemo* and *Crates*, together with *Crantor*, met in the Academy, and vigorouſly ſupported the Principles they had receiv'd from the old *Academics*. *Zeno* and *Arceſilas* had been diligent Hearers of *Polemo*.

BUT as *Zeno* was prior to *Arceſilas*, and a very ſubtle Diſputant and accurate Reaſoner, he endeavour'd to correct this Syſtem. If you pleaſe, I will likewiſe attempt to explain his Corrections, as I have receiv'd them from *Antiochus*. It will be extremely agreeable to me, *anſwer'd I*, and I perceive to *Pomponius* likewiſe.

ZENO, continued Varro, did not, like *Theophraſtus*, cut the Nerves of *Virtue*; ſo far from that, he plac'd all that could contribute to Happineſs in Life in Virtue only; nor would he admit

admit any thing to be a *Good*, beſides what he call'd the *Honeſtum*, which, he ſaid, is *pure*, *ſole*, and *independent Happineſs*. As to other Objects, tho' they neither are *Goods* nor *Evils*, yet he ſaid that ſome of them were *agreeable*, and others of them *repugnant*, to *Nature*; and betwixt theſe he reckon'd other *intermediate* Objects. But ſuch of the latter as are according to Nature, he held to be *eligible*, and worthy ſome Degree of Eſtimation, and the reverſe of their *Contraries*. As to what came under neither of thoſe Heads, he left thoſe as Matters of Indifference, of too little Value to be of Conſequence either one way or other.

As to *Eligibles*, ſome he thought were more and others leſs ſo. The former kind he call'd *Preferables*, and the latter *Rejectibles*. But theſe Diſtinctions did not lie ſo much in *Subſtance* as in the *Sounds*. Thus, betwixt a *good* and a *bad* Action, betwixt a *Duty* and a *Miſdemeanour*, he plac'd certain *Intermediates*. He conſtituted all that is *fitting* in *virtuous Agency*, and whatever is otherwiſe, that is, every thing that is *wicked*, in *perverſe Agency*. But, as I ſaid before, he look'd upon the *Performance* or the *Omiſſion* of all *Duties whatever*, as Matters of *Indifference*.

The *old Academics* did not hold that all Virtue conſiſted in Reaſon, but that certain Virtues receiv'd their Perfection from *Nature* and *Habit*; but *Zeno* made the whole to conſiſt in Reaſon: And as they thought that thoſe kinds of Virtues I have already mention'd, might be ſeparated from the others, *Zeno* taught that this could

could not be by any manner of Means, and that it was not the Practice of Virtue that was laudable in itſelf (which was his Predeceſſor's Doctrine) but the *continued Tenor* of it; and yet he would not agree that a Man poſſeſs'd it, tho' he was always putting it in Practice. The Ancients had made *mental Pertubation* incident to *human Nature*, with *Grief*, *Deſire*, *Fear*, and *Joy*; but at the ſame time had greatly contracted and reduc'd the Occaſions upon which they were to take place: But thoſe later Philoſophers *cut them all off* from the *wiſe Man*, as ſo many *Diſeaſes*. The Ancients thought thoſe *Perturbations* to be *natural*, and *deſtitute of Reflection*; and aſſign'd one part of the Mind as the *Seat* of *Deſire*, and another as the *Seat* of *Reaſon*: But *Zeno* would not agree even to this; for he maintain'd all *Perturbations* to be voluntary, and the Reſult of Opinion's Judgment; nay, farther, that a certain *boundleſs Extravagance* was the Source of all *Perturbations*. This is almoſt their whole Syſtem as to Morals.

As to Phyſics, his Opinion was as follows: In the firſt place, he would not admit, along with the other four Principles of Things, the fifth Nature; from which his Predeceſſors were of opinion the Senſes and the Intellect were created: For he held FIRE to be the very *Nature* which produc'd every thing, together with the Mind and Senſes. He likewiſe differ'd from them in as much as he thought that nothing could be produc'd by any *immaterial Principle*; of which kind *Xenocrates* and the old Philoſophers held the Soul to be: Nay, he could have no notion

that

that any thing which was either productive or produc'd, could be incorporeal.

As to the third Branch of Philoſophy, he likewiſe varied a great deal from his Predeceſſors. He firſt introduc'd ſome new Opinions as to the Senſes. Theſe he held to be affected by, as it were, a certain exterior Impulſe, operating upon them. The *Greeks* call'd this φαντασια: We may call it *an* OBJECT; which Word we will retain, ſince we ſhall have occaſion to uſe it frequently in the reſt of our Diſcourſe. But to the *Objects* which are ſeen and, as it were, receiv'd by the Senſes, he added the Aſſent of the *Underſtanding*; which he made to be *voluntary*, and *depending* on ourſelves.

HE did not give Credit to all perceptible Objects, only to ſuch as had a certain characteriſtical Mark of the *Things perceiv'd*. Now, when ſuch *Object* was perceiv'd *by itſelf*, he call'd it *comprehenſible*. Can you bear with this Word? ——Why not, *ſays* Atticus; for how elſe ſhould you expreſs the Term καταληπτον? —— He call'd the *Reception* and *Approbation* of ſuch an Object, *Comprehenſion*, alluding to our handling a thing; tho' nobody had ever, upon ſuch an Occaſion, uſed the like *Term*. In like manner he made uſe of a great many new Words, as he treated upon new Subjects. As to what was *comprehended* by the Senſe, that he call'd SENSE; and if it was ſo comprehended as to remain unſhaken by Reaſon, then he term'd it SCIENCE; otherwiſe he call'd it INSCIENCE: This produc'd OPINION, which is a *feeble* Principle, and in common with Falſhood and Ignorance.

BUT

But he plac'd the *Comprehenſion* I have mention'd betwixt *Science* and *Inſcience*, without ranking it either amongſt *Things right* or *wrong*. He told us we are to believe it *alone*: For which Reaſon he aſſign'd a *Degree of Credit* to the *Senſes*, becauſe he thought the *Comprehenſion* made by the Senſes to be true and faithful: Not that he thought this *Comprehenſion* took in all the *intrinſic Properties* of an Object, but becauſe it omits nothing which *exteriorly* operates upon it; and becauſe Nature has aſſign'd it as the Rule of our *Knowledge*, and the *Principle* by which we are to inveſtigate herſelf. Hence our Minds become ſuſceptible of right Impreſſions and Notions; and the Reſult of all is, that we diſcover not only the *Principle*, but a *broader Path* to direct us in the ſearch of *right Reaſon*. Now he baniſh'd from the Company of Virtue and Wiſdom all *Deluſion*, *Raſhneſs*, *Ignorance*, *Opinion*, *Suſpicion*, and in ſhort every thing that did not coincide with *firm* and *unalterable Conviction*. In thoſe Points conſiſted almoſt *Zeno*'s whole *Variation* from the Doctrine of his Predeceſſors, and the Diſagreement betwixt him and them.

When *Varro* had finiſh'd, I could not help paying him the Compliment of obſerving, that he had clear'd up, with great Succinctneſs and Perſpicuity, the Doctrine both of the *old Academics* and the *Stoics*: But, *continued I*, I am of opinion, with our Friend *Antiochus*, that the latter is rather a Correction upon the *old Academics*, than a new Syſtem in itſelf. Now it is your turn, *reply'd* Varro, as you now diſſent

from

from the Ancients, and follow the *new-vamp'd* Tenets of *Arceſilas*, to inſtruct us in the Principles and Reaſons of this Schiſm, that we may be able to judge whether it is juſtifiable or not.

WE are told that *Arceſilas*'s Intention was only to attack *Zeno*, and that his Motives were not a Spirit of Wrangling, or a Luſt of Conqueſt; but, as I am really convinc'd, he was prevail'd upon by the Darkneſs of thoſe Matters which had brought *Socrates* (and before *Socrates*) *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Empedocles*, in ſhort, almoſt all the Ancients, to confeſs their Ignorance: For they told us, that they could *underſtand* nothing, *perceive* nothing, and *know* nothing; that our Senſes were confin'd, our Minds weak, the Meaſure of our Lives ſtinted, and, as *Democritus* ſaid, Truth lay in a *profound Depth*; that all our Tenets were but ſo many *Opinions* and *Reſolves*; that no Space was left for Truth; and, in ſhort, that every thing was wrapt round with Darkneſs.

ARCESILAS therefore deny'd that he could come at the Knowledge of any thing; nay, not of the Truth of the Propoſition, which *Socrates* had ſtill reſerv'd as an Exception: So impenetrably obſcure did he think all Knowledge. He deny'd that it was poſſible to have an Underſtanding or Perception of any one Propoſition; therefore he maintain'd that no Man ought either to ſet up or affirm aught, nor give any Propoſition the Sanction of his Aſſent; that we ſhould check and bridle in our Temerity, ſo as that it might never ſtumble, and that it is moſt remarkable when we give our Approbation to

any

any Propoſition that is *falſe* or *unknown*; and that there is nothing more ſcandalous than to ſuffer *Aſſent* and *Approbation* to get the Start of *Information* and *Perception*. In conſequence of this Syſtem he ſpent whole Days in battling the Sentiments of his Opponents. Thus, as there were found in the ſame Subject Arguments of equal Weight and Import, but ſerving to draw quite oppoſite Concluſions, the Aſſent to any Propoſition was more eaſily ſuſpended.

THIS they call'd the *new Academy*, tho' it appears to me to be the *old one*, at leaſt we may look upon *Plato* to have been of the *old:* For there is nothing affirm'd in his Writings, and we meet with many Diſſertations on both ſides of the ſame Queſtion; he is ſtill examining, but never aſſerting. And yet the other is call'd the *old*, and this the *new* Syſtem; tho' it was brought down to the Time of *Carneades*, who was it's third Patron from *Arceſilas*, and it ſtill remain'd upon the ſame Principles. As to *Carneades*, he was a Stranger to no Part of Philoſophy, as I have been inform'd by thoſe who have heard him, particularly *Zeno* the *Epicurean*, who, tho' he was of a very different way of Thinking, yet had a peculiar Eſteem for him, he being an amazing Genius. * * * *

The reſt of CICERO's *ſecond Edition of his firſt and other three* Academics *are loſt; what follows is the ſecond Book of his firſt Edition, the firſt, entitled* CATULUS, *being loſt likewiſe.*

THE Academical Treatiſes OF *M. TULLIUS CICERO.*

BOOK the SECOND *, ENTITLED *LUCULLUS.*

LUCIUS LUCULLUS was quite remov'd from all Poſts about *Rome*, at the Time when his great Genius, his amazing Progreſs in the fineſt Arts, and his Accompliſhments in every Study that ſuits a Gentleman or a Man of Quality, might have made the nobleſt Figure in the Forum. For while he was but a very Stripling, he and his Brother (a Gentleman of equal Piety and Application with himſelf) were gallantly proſecuting the Enemies of their Family. He was afterwards ſent Queſtor into *Aſia*, where he acquir'd a glorious Reputation for many Years in the Government of his Province. He next

* It was by *Cicero* intended as a fourth Book.

was

was made Ædile in his Abſence, and ſoon after, by the Benefit of the Law which diſpens'd with the Qualification of Age, Prætor. He then went into *Africa*; ſoon after he enter'd upon his Conſulate, where his Conduct was ſuch, as that all Mankind agreed in *admiring* his Application, and *acknowledging* his *Genius*. Being next ſent by the Senate to ſerve againſt *Mithridates*, he not only out-did all the Expectation that had been conceiv'd of his Merit, but eclips'd the Glory of all his Predeceſſors in that Command.

What enhans'd the Public Admiration was, the little Reaſon there was to expect in him the Accompliſhments of a General, as he had ſpent his Youth in the Labours of the Bar, and his Prætorſhip in that Tranquility which *Aſia* enjoy'd while *Muræna* was carrying on the War in *Pontus*. But his amazing Extent of Genius diſpens'd with Experience, that mechanical Part of Inſtruction. Therefore, after ſpending his Travels, both by Sea and Land, partly in acquiring hiſtorical Knowledge from the Learned, both dead and living; when he came into *Aſia* he was quite a General, tho' when he left *Rome* he was void of all military Accompliſhments. His Memory, as to Facts, was divine; tho' in the Copiouſneſs of Expreſſion he fell ſhort of *Hortenſius*. But as the *Knowledge* of Facts are of more Conſequence to the Conduct of Life, than the *Command* of Words, this Excellency of Memory exceeded that extraordinary Talent in *Themiſtocles*, whom we may well venture to ſay was one of the greateſt Men in *Greece*: For when a Fellow offer'd to teach him an Art of

Memory which was juſt then publiſhed, he is ſaid to have anſwered that *he would rather be taught the Art of forgetting:* The Reaſon of this, I ſuppoſe, was becauſe all that he either heard or ſaw remained in his Memory. *Lucullus* to all theſe natural Accompliſhments added one which *Themiſtocles* deſpiſed; I mean, Study. Therefore, as *we* commit to Writing thoſe Matters which we hand down to Poſterity, ſo *he* had every Occurrence engrav'd upon his Mind.

He was beſides ſo complete a General in all the Syſtem of War, whether in Engagements, Sieges, Sea-fights, or Engineering, and in all the Parade of Military Diſcipline, that the greateſt Monarch ſince the Days of *Alexander*, owned him to be a greater Commander than any he had read of in Hiſtory. At the ſame Time he was Maſter of ſo large an Extent of Political Knowledge in the Conſtitutions and Governments of States, and ſo excellent a Civil Magiſtrate, that *Aſia* now ſubſiſts by preſerving the Laws, and purſuing the Maxims of *Lucullus*. And yet with all thoſe amazing Accompliſhments of Virtue and Genius, tho' all the while employ'd greatly to the Service of our Country, *Lucullus* was longer than I could have wiſh'd a Stranger to *Rome*, and abſent from the Duties of the Bar and the Senate. Nay, when he had return'd victorious from the *Mithridatic* War, he triumph'd three Years later than he ought to have done, thro' the Malice of his Enemies, till we the Conſuls were obliged, as it were, to introduce into *Rome* the triumphal Chariot of this illuſtrious

Perſonage.

Perſonage. I would now expreſs the Advantages I receiv'd from his Advice and Authority in the moſt important Conjunctures, were it not that I ſhould be impertinently obliged to talk of myſelf. Therefore I will chuſe to deprive him of my grateful Teſtimony of *his* Merit, rather than confound it with any Part of *my own*.

The popular Merits of *Lucullus*, have been celebrated both in our and the *Greek* Language. I am but one of many who have mentioned his *Public Services*, but I have had frequent Opportunities of ſtudying his *private Virtues* from his own Perſon. For *Lucullus* apply'd with greater Earneſtneſs than they who did not know him conceiv'd, both to Philoſophy, and all Branches of Literature. This Application did not continue only in his earlier Years of Life, but during the ſeveral Years of his Queſtorſhip, and even during the War; when his military Affairs gave him ſo much Employment that few were the Hours of Leiſure this General could enjoy even in his Tent. Now as *Antiochus*, who had heard *Philo*, was eminent for his Genius and Learning, he carried him with him when he was Queſtor, and ſome Years after when he was General: And as he poſſeſs'd the prodigious Memory I have already deſcribed, he with eaſe made himſelf Maſter of thoſe Points upon hearing them repeated, which he could have remembered with once hearing. But his great Delight conſiſted in reading any celebrated Performance.

I am ſometimes apprehenſive of diminiſhing the Glory of thoſe Perſonages, whoſe Merits I want to illuſtrate. For many don't love the

Greek Learning; many are out of Humour with Philoſophy, and others, tho' they are far from condemning thoſe Studies, think it not quite ſo becoming for Perſons of eminent public Characters to be diſputing them over. For my own Part, having been well aſſured, that *M. Cato*, when an old Man fell to learn *Greek*, and underſtanding from Hiſtory that *P. Africanus* choſe *Panætius* as his ſole Companion in that celebrated Embaſſy which he diſcharged before his Cenſorſhip, I require no greater Authority to recommend to me either the *Greek* Learning, or Philoſophy.

I am now to apply to thoſe who are not for having People of Dignity wrangling about thoſe Points. As if the Interviews of eminent Men ſhould either be ſilent, their Talk ludicrous, or their Conferences trifling. Therefore if what I have ſaid in Defence of Philoſophy in another Treatiſe has any Weight, this Study is worthy the Greateſt and the Nobleſt of Mankind: And all that we, whom *Rome* has raiſed to this high Pitch of Honour, have to anſwer for is, that the Proſecution of our private Studies may be no Hinderance to the Diſcharge of our public Duties. Now if, while I was veſted with a public Character, I never took my Attention off from the Concerns of my Country, nay never wrote a Line but upon public Buſineſs, who ſhall dare to cenſure my leiſure Hours, in which I not only divert my ſelf from Languor and Lazineſs, but ſtudy, as much as in me lies, the Good of my Fellow-Creatures? Nay, I think the Union of thoſe retired and private Accompliſhments with great public

public Merit, is ſo far from diminiſhing, that it enhances the Glory of the Poſſeſſor.

There are likewiſe ſome who blame me for introducing Characters in my Works, who diſpute upon Points with greater Learning than ever they were Maſters of. But ſuch Objections appear to be invidiouſly levelled not only againſt the Living but the Dead.

I have ſtill to do with another kind of Critics; I mean they who don't approve of the Doctrine of the Academy. This Objection might have ſome Weight with me, if they appeared to approve of any Doctrine but that to which they are wedded. For my own Part, as I uſe to attack *all thoſe who imagine themſelves to have any Knowledge*, I can't take it ill that I have Opponents. What falls to my Share, however, is very eaſy; becauſe I want to come at the Truth without any Wrangling; and uſe my utmoſt Cares and Endeavours for that Purpoſe. For tho' all Knowledge is embarraſſed with a great many Difficulties, as Matters are ſo dark, and our Judgments ſo weak, that the moſt learned Men in all Ages have reaſonably queſtioned whether they ſhould ever be able to compaſs what they purſued, Yet it was a Purſuit which they never gave over; nor ſhall I ever be ſo tired with my Enquires after Truth as to abandon them; nor has all my Diſputations any other Tendency than by ſpeaking and hearing on both ſides, to ſtrike, or, as it were, ſqueeze ſomewhat out of the Whole that either is Truth or approaches very near it.

Nor is there, indeed, any Difference betwixt us and thoſe who imagine they have po-

ſitive *Knowledge*; but that they are *dogmatical* in defending the Truth of what they advance; whereas we reſt all upon the Principles of *Probability*; which we agree to make our Guide, but never venture to eſtabliſh it as a *Certainty*. By this Means we are more diſengaged and at Liberty, becauſe we ſtill reſerve to ourſelves a Power of Judging. Nor are we under any Neceſſity of defending every Propoſition which is impoſed upon, and, as it were, dictated to, us. For other Sects are Bigots to their particular Opinions before they are capable to judge of what is *beſt*: And then in the *weakeſt* Time of their Life they either are directed by ſome Friend, or captivated by the firſt Maſter's Diſcourſe they hear, they fall to judge of things *they know nothing of*; or, if they are thrown, as it were, by a Storm upon a certain Syſtem, they cleave to it as they would to a Rock.

As to what they alledge, that they pin *their Faith* upon the Perſon whom they judge to be wiſe, I ſhould agree with them, if, in our uninform'd ignorant State, they were capable of *forming a Judgment* even of that Particular: For it appears to be *peculiar to the Wiſe* to judge of *Wiſdom*. * But, it may be ſaid, they judge according to the beſt of their Knowledge, after hearing all Arguments, and examining all Opinions.——Yet ſtill they cleave to the Dictates of one Perſon.——But I don't know how it hap-

* The Commentators have extremely puzzled this Paſſage in the Original, tho' the Meaning of it is exceedingly clear as I have tranſlated it; and which is it's obvious Senſe as it ſtands in all Editions, only changing an *aut* into *at*.

pens

pens that moſt People chuſe to be in the wrong, and obſtinately to defend the Opinion they have embraced, rather than examine into the moſt conſiſtent Way of Reaſoning. Theſe are Points we have often diſputed and diſcuſſed upon other Occaſions, particularly ſome time ago at *Hortenſius*'s Villa, which lies upon the Eſtate of the * *Bauli*, when *Catulus* and *Lucullus*, and my ſelf came out thither the Day after we had been with *Catulus*. The reaſon of our coming a little earlier was, becauſe if the Wind had ſerv'd, *Lucullus* had determin'd to have ſet ſail to his *Neopolitan* Eſtate, and I to my *Pompeian* Eſtate. After a little Chat had paſs'd in the Court we ſat down in the ſame Place.

Says *Catulus*, Tho' the Queſtion we were upon Yeſterday was almoſt diſcuſſed, ſo that the Subject ſeems to be nearly exhauſted, yet I am in high Expectation of hearing you, *Lucullus*, perform your Promiſe of explaining what you learn'd of *Antiochus*. Indeed, *adds* Hortenſius, I went farther in that Matter than I intended, for the whole Subject ought to have been reſerv'd for the Diſcuſſion of *Lucullus*: As for me I ſpoke only what came uppermoſt, but I expect that *Lucullus* will go deeper. Really, my Friend, *anſwers* Lucullus. I am in no great Pain about your Expectation, tho' nothing can poſſibly be more unfortunate than a high wound Expectation, in caſe a Man wants to pleaſe. But as I am a little indifferent as to Proofs for ſupporting what I am to advance, I am the leſs concerned. For what

* This Place lies betwixt *Baiæ* and the *Lucrine Lake*; and ſtill retains the Name of *Bavola*.

I ſhall

I ſhall advance is neither my own Invention, nor of ſuch a Nature as that I ſhall not chuſe to be conquer'd, rather than conquer in the Debate, if they are not founded upon Truth. But, by Heavens, tho' the Cauſe I eſpouſe was looſen'd by Yeſterday's Conference, yet ſtill, as it now ſtands, I can't help thinking it the juſteſt. I will therefore proceed in the ſame Manner as *Antiochus* was wont. For I have heard him upon this Subject over and over, without the leaſt Prepoſſeſſion, but with great Attention. In this Reſpect, therefore, I will venture to ſay, that I will out-do the Expectation you may have form'd from *Hortenſius*.

THIS Introduction having awaken'd all our Attention; When I was Queſtor at *Alexandria*, continued he, *Antiochus* was along with me, and we found his Friend *Heraclitus* of *Tyre* there before us. This Gentleman had for many Years been the Hearer of *Clitomachus* and *Philo*, who to ſay the Truth, had approv'd himſelf nobly in Defence of that Philoſophy, which after being almoſt exploded, begins again to gain Ground. I have often heard *Heraclitus* and *Antiochus* in ſlight Diſputes. And it was about that Time, the two Treatiſes of *Philo*, yeſterday mentioned by *Catulus*, were brought to *Alexandria*, and firſt fell into *Antiochus*'s Hands: But though he naturally was the beſt natur'd, calmeſt Creature in the World, yet he cou'd not help being nettled: I wonder'd what cou'd be the Matter, for I had never ſeen him ſo before. The firſt Thing he did, was to conjure *Heraclitus* to ſay whether he remember'd to

have

have heard any ſuch Doctrine from *Philo*, or any *Academic*, and whether he thought the Book were really wrote by *Philo*? *Heraclitus* anſwer'd all in the Negative. Yet he well knew *Philo's* Hand-Writing; and to put the Matter out of all Doubt, my Friends *P.* and *C. Sellii*, with *Tetrillius Rogus*, all of them Men of Learning, and upon the Spot, declared they had heard that very Doctrine from *Philo* at *Rome*, and that they had copied thoſe two Treatiſes from his own Mouth.

ANTIOCHUS's Anſwer to *Philo* was the ſame which *Catulus* told you yeſterday his Father reproached *Philo* with, but he added a great deal more; nor could he be at Reſt till he had publiſhed a Book againſt his own Maſter under the Title of *Soſus*. Then it was, that while I was intent upon hearing *Heraclitus* diſpute with *Antiochus*, and *Antiochus* diſpute againſt the *Academics*, I was at great Pains to learn from *Antiochus* the exact State of the whole Controverſy betwixt them. Therefore we ſpent a good deal of Time upon that ſingle Point for ſeveral Days, in company with *Heraclitus* and many other learned Men, particularly *Ariſtus*, *Antiochus's* Brother, and with *Ariſto* and *Dion*, two Friends whom next to his Brother he moſt valued. But I muſt omit that Part of it which was levelled perſonally againſt *Philo:* Becauſe he is not a very formidable Adverſary, when he denies that the *Academics* abſolutely hold thoſe Doctrines which were debated over yeſterday. For tho' he takes the Advantage of diſſembling in that Matter, yet he is but a gentle Opponent.

Let

Let us therefore come to the Arguments urged by *Arceſilas* and *Carneades*.

In the firſt place. *proceeded* Lucullus, when you (naming me directly) make mention of the *Old Naturaliſts*, you ſeem to imitate our factious Citizens, who quote the Precedents of old eminent *Romans*, whom they term *Patriots*, and draw a Parallel betwixt their Conduct and their own. Sometimes they go back as far as *Publius Valerius*, who was Conſul the firſt Year after the Expulſion of our Kings; then they cite as Precedents all the Great Man, who in their Conſulſhips carry'd through the *Laws of Appeal to the People*; they next come to later and better known Inſtances, *C. Flaminius*, for example, who when Tribune of the People, obtained againſt the Will of the Senate an *Agrarian* Law a few Years before the ſecond *Punic* War, and was afterwards twice Conſul. They uſe to rank in the ſame Number *L. Caſſius* and *Q. Pompeius* and even *Africanus*; nay, they go ſo far as to maintain, that the two Brothers *P. Craſſus* and *P. Scævola*, Men of the greateſt Eminence and Wiſdom laid the Plan of the Laws obtain'd by *T. Gracchus*, one of them, as we ſee, *avowedly*, the other, as we ſuſpect, *privately*. They likewiſe add to theſe *C. Marius*; but they do him no Manner of Injuſtice: And after producing the Authorities of ſo many Perſons of Eminence, they tell us that they proceed upon *their* Principles.

In like Manner, as they diſturb our Civil, ſo when you want to diſturb our excellent *Philoſophical* Conſtitution, you quote *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*,

Anaxagoras, *Democritus*, *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes*, nay *Plato* and *Socrates*. But the Impudence of an *Arceſilas*, is no more to be compared to the Modeſty of a *Democritus*, than the Character of our Arch-foe *Saturninus*, reſembles that of our antient *Patriots*. And yet thoſe *Naturaliſts*, when they are at a Pinch, very ſeldom fall a raving as if diſordered in their Senſes. *Empedocles*, indeed ſeems ſometimes to be touch'd with Enthuſiaſm; he tells us *that all Knowledge is abſtruſe, that we know nothing, that we can perceive nothing; nor ever come to Certainty, as to the true Nature of any thing.* * And yet all of them ſeem to deal in Affirmatives through the greateſt Part of their Diſputations, nay, in ſome points, they are too Dogmatical, and pretend to a greater Share of Knowledge then they really poſſeſs.

Now ſuppoſing thoſe Gentlemen to have been at a Loſs in Matters that were new, and as it were to have liv'd in the Infancy of Philoſophy, yet can we imagine that no Improvements were made after ſo many Ages, by the great Capacities and Efforts that ſucceeded? After the Conſtitution of Philoſophy was eſtabliſhed upon the firmeſt Foundation, did not *Arceſilas*, like a *Tib. Gracchus* who diſturb'd the Tranquility of our excellent civil Conſtitution, overthrow that of Philoſophy; and fight under the Protection of thoſe who deny'd all *Knowledge* and *Perception*? *Plato* and *Socrates* muſt not be rank'd of this Number; the former, becauſe

* Orig. *Majorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes iſti videntur quàm etiam quædam affirmare.*

he

he left his Syſtem complete betwixt the *Peripatetics* and the *Academics*, who differ'd in Name, but were the ſame in Subſtance; and the Stoics themſelves diſſent from both rather in *Sounds* than in *Senſe*. As to *Socrates*, when he diſputed, he gave up a great deal of his own Senſe to thoſe whom he wanted to confute. Thus, when he ſpoke otherwiſe than he thought, he was pleaſantly making uſe of that *diſſimulating manner* call'd by the *Greeks* εἰρωνεια; which *Fannius* tells us, *Africanus* too made uſe of. Therefore we are not to imagine that he was blameable in uſing a Manner which had been adopted by *Socrates*.

BUT admitting that the Principles upon which we ground our Aſſent, were unknown to the Antients; has no Progreſs been made in inveſtigating them, ſince the Time that *Arceſilas* out of *Pique*, as is thought, to *Zeno*, who made no new Diſcoveries, only made ſome Improvements upon his Predeceſſors by altering Terms, endeavour'd to wrap the plaineſt Propoſitions in Darkneſs, while he wanted to weaken *Zeno's* Definitions.

THIS Method of *Arceſilas*, in which he had no great Succeſs at firſt, though he was a Man of a penetrating Underſtanding, and was endow'd with a peculiar Elegance of Speech, was retain'd only by *Lacys*: But it was afterwards brought to perfection by *Carneades*, who was it's fourth Patron from *Arceſilas*. For he was Scholar to *Hegiſinus*, who had ſtudy'd under *Evander* the Diſciple of *Lacys*, as *Lacys* was of *Arceſilas*. But *Carneades* held long out, for he liv'd ninety

ninety Years, and his Scholars were in great Reputation. Of them, *Clitomachus* was the moſt induſtrious, as appears from the Multitudes of his Writings: * Nor was this Syſtem leſs oblig'd to his Genius, than to the Eloquence of *Carneades*, and the Sweetneſs of *Melanthus* the *Rhodian*. *Metrodorus* of *Stratonica* too thought to have ſtudy'd *Carneades* to good Purpoſe.

Now your Friend *Philo* attended *Clitomachus* for many Years: And, while he was alive, the Academy never was at a Loſs for an Advocate. But as my preſent Intention is to attack the *Academics*, *I muſt acquaint you* that ſome *Philoſophers*, and thoſe too of a ſuperior Character, have thought that this is an Attempt, which ought by no means to be made; and that it is quite abſurd to diſpute upon any Syſtem with Men who will agree to no one Propoſition: They have likewiſe blam'd *Antipater the Stoic*, who dealt greatly in this Controverſy; and have told us that it was unneceſſary to define Knowledge, *Perception*, or (that we may literally tranſlate the *Greek* Word καταλήψις) *Comprehenſion*: They farther ſay, that it is fooliſh to endeavour to *perſuade* People there are ſuch things as *Knowledge* and *Perception*; becauſe there can nothing be more clear, than what the *Greeks* call ἐναργεια; which if you pleaſe, we will term *Clearneſs* or *Evidence*; for we will coin new Words, leaſt this Gentleman here (plea-

† I have kept here to the moſt common Reading, without venturing with the Commentators to call in Readings, which if they don't ſpoil the Senſe, at leaſt confound the Reader. *Carneades* was particularly celebrated for Eloquence by our Author.

ſantly

ſantly playing upon me) ſhou'd imagine that he has an *excluſive* Licence for it. But to return, thoſe Philoſophers thought nothing cou'd be more clear than *Self-Evidence*, and that Propoſitions which are *ſelf-evident*, require no Defining. Others of them ſaid, that they wou'd not indeed be the firſt to diſpute in Favour of this *Self-Evidence*, but, that they thought it right to anſwer the Objections that were made to it, in order to prevent Miſtakes.

YET Philoſophers in general are not at all againſt the defining even the moſt *ſelf-evident thing*: They admit it to be a proper Subject of Diſquiſition, and think the Perſons with whom they diſpute, to be Opponents worthy of their Pains. As to *Philo*, whilſt he was ſearching for ſome new Subterfuges, being unable to ſupport the Objections urg'd againſt the Stubbornneſs of the *Academics*, he both fell into a flat Inconſiſtency, for which he was reproach'd by the Elder *Catullus*, and ſplit upon the very Rock he wanted to avoid, as was prov'd by *Antiochus*. Becauſe he deny'd that there was ſuch a Thing as Comprehenſion (for that is what we mean by καταλήψις) if * as *Zeno* defin'd it, *it exiſted ſo as to be perceiv'd, impreſt, and moulded, to our Conception from it's own intrinſic Properties; nor can it exiſt to our Perception,* AS IT IS, *from any Properties which* IT HAS NOT; now we admit that Definition of *Zeno's*, to be a true one: For how can any *thing* be comprehended, ſo as that you are clearly poſi-

* I have been oblig'd to uſe ſome Liberty in tranſlating this Paſſage, which may in the Original be dark to the Reader.

tive

tive you have *Perception* and *Knowledge* of it's Nature from *Properties*, which though they do not exiſt in the Object, yet make you perceive and know the ſame thing as if they did exiſt? As this is the Comprehenſion which *Philo* wants to weaken and aboliſh; he at the ſame Time takes away all Judgment as to what *is* or *is not* known; the Conſequence of which is, that there is no ſuch thing as *Comprehenſion*; ſo that without reflecting, he is entangled in the very Snare he wants to ſhun. Upon the Whole, all our Buſineſs with the *Academics* is, to eſtabliſh this Definition of *Zeno*, which *Philo* wants to overthrow, and if we cannot ſucceed, we muſt then admit there can be no ſuch thing as *Perception*.

Let us therefore begin with the Senſes; the Evidences of which are ſo *plain and certain*, that if a God ſhould put it in the Option of Human Nature, and ask of a Man, whether he is contented with the ſound and undeprav'd Enjoyment of his Senſes, or wanted ſomewhat that is better; I don't ſee that it is poſſible for him to be a Gainer by any Change. When I ſpeak thus, it is not to be expected that I am to anſwer the trite Objection drawn from the bending of an Oar as it appears in the Water, or, the varying Down upon the Neck of a Pidgeon; becauſe I am far from being one of thoſe, who affirm that every thing really *is* juſt as it appears *to be*. Let *Epicurus* anſwer for that, and a great many more Abſurdities. But in my Judgment there is great *Truth* in the Senſes when they are ſound, ſtrong, and free of all Clogs and Incumbrances. For this Reaſon, we want frequently to ſhift the Light,

and Situation of Objects, to contract or to extend the Diſtances at which we behold them; nay, we go ſo far as that their very Preſentation warrants the Judgment we form. The ſame may be ſaid with regard to *Sound*, *Smell*, and *Taſte*; ſo that no Man can require a more exquiſite Judgment than there is in his Senſes of every kind.

But when Skill and Art are applied (as when the Eyes are charm'd by Painting, or the Ears by Muſic) ſhew me the Man who is unconſcious of the Power of the Senſes! What Variety do Painters behold in Shade and Light, which we don't perceive! What Labyrinths of Sound do the Skilful in Muſic perceive, which are loſt to us! There are People who, in the very firſt Note of a Trumpet, can tell whether the Air is that of *Antiopè* or *Andromachè*, while we have not the leaſt Notion which it is. I need not touch upon Taſte or Smell, in which every Man has *ſome* diſtinguiſhing Faculty, however deprav'd it may be; nor need I ſpeak of the Touch, eſpecially that which Philoſophers call *inward*, in which alone the *Cyrenaics* have plac'd the Criterion by which Truth may be known.

Is there a Man then who will venture to ſay, that there is no Difference betwixt *Pain* and *Pleaſure?* Or if there is a Man who thinks ſo, is not ſuch a one ſtark mad? If there are Objects which we ſay we *perceive by the Senſes*, in like manner there are others which cannot be ſaid *to be perceiv'd by the Senſes*, but by a certain Medium of them. For inſtance: *That is white, this is ſweet; is this fragrant, and that rough:*

rough: Becauſe we have the Ideas of all thoſe Properties already *in our Minds*, and not *in our Senſes*; *ſuch a thing is a Horſe, ſuch another a Dog.*

THERE is another Degree of Judgment which links together ſeveral Propoſitions, and embraces a greater Extent and fuller Compaſs of Comprehenſion; thus: *If he is a Man, he is a mortal, rational Creature.* In this kind we have the Ideas of the Things already imprinted upon our Minds, otherwiſe we could have no *Intelligence*, nor exerciſe any *Enquiry* or *Diſquiſition* as to the Object; becauſe, ſhould theſe *Ideas* be falſe (for you have choſen to expreſs the *Greek* Word ἐννοια by the Word *Idea*) or ariſe from Objects which leave upon the Underſtanding Impreſſions that are doubtful as to their Truth or Falſhood, how ſhall we behave in ſuch a Caſe? how ſhall we be able to diſtinguiſh betwixt what is agreeable or repugnant to the Nature of a Subject? At leaſt it is certain, there is no manner of room left for employing the Memory, which is the principal Storehouſe not only of *Philoſophy*, but of all the *Oeconomy* and *Arts of Life.* For of what Importance to us can the Remembrance of Falſhoods be? or how can a Man remember a thing of which he has no manner of Comprehenſion nor Hold in his Mind?

AS to *Art*, there can be no ſuch thing, unleſs it is the Reſult (not of *one* or *two*, but) of various Perceptions of the Underſtanding. Take theſe away, how can you diſtinguiſh the *Artful* from the *Ignorant?* For we will not venture to pronounce at Random, that this Man is *skilful*,

and another *ignorant*; becauſe the Judgment we ſhall form will ariſe from the one's having *Perception* and *Comprehenſion*, and the other *not*. And as there is one kind of Art which conſiſts in *ſimple Apprehenſion* of a Matter, and another in *Contrivance* and *Execution*; by theſe means the Mathematician is able to maſter Propoſitions which are either merely ſpeculative, or impoſſible *otherwiſe* to be diſtinguiſh'd from Falſities; and the Muſician finiſhes his Stops, and forms his Diapaſon. The ſame Obſervation holds with regard to the other Arts, the whole Buſineſs of which lies in Contrivance and Execution: For what can be the Effect of an Art, if the *Artiſt* has not Variety of Perceptions?

BUT our *Knowledge* of the VIRTUES is the principal Argument to prove, beyond Diſpute, that Mankind is able to have a Variety of Perceptions and Comprehenſions. In theſe alone we place SCIENCE, which we think to be not only a Matter of *mere Comprehenſion*, but to be of a *fix'd* and *unvarying Tenor*. We ſay the ſame thing of Wiſdom or *the Art of Life*, which we define to be *of itſelf* perpetual. Now, if this perpetual, unvarying Tenor, be the Reſult of no *Perception* or *Intelligence*, give me leave to ask *from whence* or *how* it aroſe?

GIVE me leave likewiſe to ask, why a Patriot, when he is determin'd to endure all the Pangs of the Rack, the Whip and the Wheel, rather than betray his Duty or wound his Honour, ſhould tie himſelf down to ſuch ſevere Reſtrictions, if, by your Doctrine, he has no *Comprehenſion*, *Perception*, *Knowledge*, or *Purpoſe*? In ſhort, it is

abſurd

abſurd to imagine that a Man ſhould put ſuch a Value upon *Equity* and *Juſtice*, as for their ſakes to decline no kind of *Martyrdom*, without giving his Aſſent to *infallible* Truths.

As to WISDOM herſelf, if ſhe is ignorant whether ſhe is or is not *Wiſdom*, in the firſt place, how can we give her the Denomination of *Wiſdom?* In the next place, with what Confidence can ſhe undertake and execute any Matter, if ſhe has no certain Rule to direct her? Should ſhe be in doubt as to the *Extreme and End of Good Things*, ſhould ſhe be ignorant of the ultimate Tendency which every Action ought to have, how could ſhe deſerve to be term'd *Wiſdom?* In the mean time it is extremely clear, that *Wiſdom* muſt neceſſarily have a Principle to direct her when ſhe takes any Purpoſe in hand, and that this Principle muſt be *fitting to Nature*; for otherwiſe *Volition* (for ſo we tranſlate the *Greek* Word ὁρμη) that Principle of our Agency, could not be excited.

NOW that which excites us muſt firſt be perceiv'd and aſſented to; which would be impoſſible, if, in what we perceive, we cannot diſtinguiſh *Truth* from *Falſhood*. In the next place, how can the Mind be excited to Volition, if it does not perceive whether the Object it deſires *is* or *is not* fitting to Nature? Farther, if the Mind has no *Perception* of the Objects of it's own Functions, it never can operate, it never can be impell'd, it never can be excited to *any thing*; whereas, when it is about to perform any thing, it muſt neceſſarily be convinc'd of the Reality of it's Object.

NAY, I will venture to go ſo far as to ſay, that if *your Syſtem* is the *true one*, we muſt bid adieu to Reaſon, that Light and Luminary of Life. Still then will you continue in your Obſtinacy? For all Enquiry is founded upon Reaſon; ſhe it is who completes Virtue, after being herſelf eſtabliſhed by our *Enquiry*. Now *Enquiry* is the Reſult of a *Deſire after Information*, and *Diſcovery* is the Reſult of *Enquiry*: But no Man can pretend that he ever made a Diſcovery if it afterwards prov'd to be a *Falſhood*, nor can Things be ſaid to be *diſcover'd* while they remain *uncertain*; but when thoſe Matters, which before were wrapp'd up in Obſcurity, come to be unfolded, then it is we ſay they are *diſcover'd*. Thus Reaſon contains the Principles of *Enquiry*, together with the Ends of *Perception* and *Comprehenſion*. Therefore a concluſive Argument (call'd by the *Greeks* ἀποδειξις) is thus defin'd: *A Reaſoning which from Things that are perceiv'd, leads us to Things that are not perceiv'd.*

BUT if all Objects may be, as your Sect ſays, falſe as well as true; and if there is no Character by which we are enabled to make a proper Diſtinction, in what Senſe can we ſay that a Man has either made any Diſcovery, or form'd any concluſive Argument? Or, ſuppoſing an Argument to be concluſive, what Weight can it carry along with it? As to Philoſophy, which ought to proceed upon Reaſon, what Iſſue can it have? nay, what will become of Wiſdom, which ought never either to entertain the leaſt Doubt as to her own Exiſtence, nor as to the Maxims (which her

her Profeſſors call δογματα) none of which can be given up without a Crime? For the Man who gives up a Maxim is a Traitor to the Law of Equity and Rectitude; and from this criminal Source ſpring Treachery to our Friends, and Treaſons againſt our Country. We cannot therefore admit the leaſt Doubt, that it is impoſſible for a Maxim to be falſe; but it is not enough for the wiſe Man that it is not *falſe*, for it muſt likewiſe be *permanent, fix'd, ſettled,* and *immoveably determin'd.* Now this never can happen, nor ever ſeem to happen, if we admit the Syſtem of thoſe who maintain, that it is impoſſible to diſtinguiſh from *Impoſitions* thoſe *Objects* upon which all *Rules* are founded.

FROM this ariſes the *Poſtulatum* made by *Hortenſius*, I mean, *That you admit a wiſe Man to* perceive *that nothing can be* perceiv'd. But when *Antipater* made the ſame *Poſtulatum*, and maintain'd, that in conſequence of the Doctrine which holds that nothing can be perceiv'd TO BE, *that this Propoſition may be perceiv'd, Carneades* oppos'd him with great Subtlety: For, he ſaid, this was ſo far from being the Caſe, that it entirely deſtroy'd *Antipater*'s Argument; for, *continued he,* a Man who denies that we can have Perception of any thing, makes no manner of Exception. Therefore it neceſſarily follows, that even this Propoſition, becauſe not excepted, can by no manner of Means be either *comprehended* or *perceiv'd.*

ANTIOCHUS was more cloſe in arguing upon this *Topic*; becauſe, as the *Academics* had laid it down as a Maxim (for you perceive

I uſe this Word for the Greek δογμα) *That nothing could be perceiv'd*, he ſaid they ought not to be as uncertain as to their own peculiar Maxim as they are with regard to other Propoſitions; eſpecially as the whole of their Syſtem lies in it, and as the capital Point of all Philoſophy turns upon the fixing *right* and *wrong*, the *known* and the *unknown*. As they adopt and inculcate this Reaſoning with regard to what ought to be *admitted* or *rejected* by all Mankind, it muſt infallibly follow that they ſhould have a Perception of this Propoſition upon which all Judgment as to *Truth* or *Falſhood* depends. He ſaid, That there are two *capital Points* in Philoſophy; *The forming a True Judgment*, and the *End of Good Things*; and that no Man can be *wiſe*, who is ignorant that *Knowledge has a Principle, and Volition a Purpoſe*; or who is in the dark as to the *Source* from which they *ariſe*, or the End to which they *proceed*; and that to be in doubt as to thoſe Points, and not inflexibly fixed in them, is extremely inconſiſtent with the Character of Wiſdom. We ought, therefore, *continued* Antiochus, rather to inſiſt upon it with them, that they have Perception at leaſt of this ſingle Propoſition, *That they have Perception of nothing*. But I think I have ſaid enough with regard to the Inconſiſtency of their whole Doctrine, if they who *approve of nothing*, can be ſaid to *teach any thing*.

Let me now proceed to another Subject of Diſputation, which indeed is more *copious*, but at the ſame time more *abſtruſe*; becauſe it partakes of the Doctrine of *Phyſics*; ſo that I am apprehenſive

apprehenſive leſt I ſhould allow too great Liberty and Licence to my Antagoniſt. For when a Man endeavours to ſnatch from me Light itſelf, in what Manner muſt I think that Man will manage Matters which are in themſelves obſcure. Yet we may proceed againſt ſuch a one with Succeſs; *let us refer him* to the ſtupendous Art with which Nature has originally form'd every Creature, Man eſpecially; to the Power that is inherent in the Senſes; to the Manner in which Objects firſt operate upon us; to the Affection which follows that Operation; and then to our ſummoning together all our Senſes for the Perception of Objects. For the Mind, which is the Source of the Senſes, and is Senſe itſelf, has a natural Power, which it applies to thoſe Objects which move it. Therefore there are certain Objects which ſhe ſnatches ſo as that ſhe inſtantaneouſly puts them to their proper Uſes; others ſhe treaſures up, and from this Magazine ariſes Memory: She is determin'd as to other Objects by their relative Properties, and hence are form'd the Characters of Things, which the *Greeks* call by the Names of ἐννοιαι and προλήψεις.

When to all theſe Reaſon is added, and concluſive Argumentation, and great Variety of Materials, then it is that *Perception* reſults from the *Whole*, and the *original Principle of Reaſon* becoming *perfect*, by thoſe Gradations riſes into *Wiſdom*. Seeing therefore the Mind of Man is compleatly adapted to the *Knowledge of Things* and *the unvarying Tenor of Life*; *Science* is it's darling Purpoſe, together with Comprehenſion, as we literally tranſlate the *Greek* Word

κατάληψις.

καταλαμψις. Which Affection proceeds both from a Principle of Self-love (nothing being dearer than the Light of Truth) and of the Profit attending it. Thus the human Mind avails herſelf of the *Senſes*, and ſtrikes out Arts which ſerve for, as it were, *ſecondary Senſes*, till ſhe adds ſuch Strength to Philoſophy, that *Virtue*, the only Efficient of moral Fitneſs in Life, is the joint Reſult of all. From this it follows, that whoever denies the Poſſibility of Comprehenſion, rifles us both of the *Utenſils* and *Embelliſhments of Life*; or rather, they abſolutely deſtroy it, and deprive the *Animal of Animation*. Nor indeed is it an eaſy Matter to find Words to ſet their Raſhneſs in the Light it deſerves.

For my own Part never could I ſufficiently ſatisfy myſelf as to their Purpoſe or Meaning. For ſometimes when we attack them in this Manner: *If ſuch or ſuch a Propoſition is not true, then every thing becomes uncertain.* Then they tell you, *What is that to us? Can we help it? Why don't you blame Nature who,* as *Democritus* ſays, *has thruſt Truth down into Profundity?* Some of them talk with more Decency; they complain that we accuſe them of ſaying that every thing is uncertain; and endeavour to ſhew us the Difference, and to diſtinguiſh betwixt a thing that is uncertain and a thing that cannot be perceived. Let us therefore deal with the Gentlemen who make thoſe Diſtinctions; as to the others, who maintain that every thing is as uncertain as it is whether the Number of the Stars is *odd* or *even*, we will give them up as being *deſperate*.

For

FOR the former admit the thing which I obſerved made the greateſt Impreſſion upon you, I mean, that there is ſuch a thing as *Probability*, and that they follow this as a Rule both in the Conduct of their Lives and in their Diſquiſitions and Diſputations. But what is *this probable Rule*, if we have no Idea of *Truth* or *Falſhood*, ſo as to diſtinguiſh them from one another? For if we had any ſuch *Idea* we muſt conceive that there is the ſame Difference betwixt *Truth* and *Falſhood* as there is betwixt what is *ſtrait* and what is *crooked*. If there is no Difference, then there can be no *Rule*. Neither can the Man who views *Truth* and *Falſhood* in the ſame Points of Light, have any *right Judgment*, or form any Character of Truth. Becauſe when they ſay that all they plead for is, that the *Truth* does preſent itſelf in the Manner of *Falſhood*, and that they give up every thing beſides, they talk childiſhly.

FOR after they have taken away the Means of all Judgment, they ſay that they leave you every thing beſides. As if a Man after putting out your Eyes were to tell you he had not deprived you of the Objects of Perception. For as Exteriors are diſcerned by the Eyes, ſo other Objects are by the Idea; but then it is by the Characteriſtic of Truth, and not by a Character which equivocally may belong either to *Truth* or *Falſhood*. Therefore whether you bring in a *probable Idea*, or an Idea that riſes beyond Probability and is diſtinct, as *Carneades* did, or any thing elſe you pleaſe, yet ſtill you muſt have recourſe to the *characteriſtical* Idea we have been talking of.

Now

Now if there was any thing equivocal in this it could never ſerve as the Means of Judging; becauſe there can be no Characteriſtic in an equivocal Character. But if you admit that there is nothing equivocal in it, I then carry my Point. For all I aim at is, to find ſomewhat that to me appears *ſo true*, that it cannot appear *falſe* at the ſame time.

They are under a like Deluſion, when, under Conviction by the irreſiſtible Force of Truth, they want to make Diſtinctions betwixt *Clearneſs* and *Perception*; and attempt to prove that there is ſuch a thing as *Clearneſs*, and that Truth may be indeed imprinted upon the Mind, without our being able either to perceive or comprehend it. For by what Rule can you poſitively ſay that ſuch a *thing* is *white*, when at the ſame time it is poſſible for a thing that is *black* to appear *white* to you. Or how can we ſay that ſuch or ſuch *things* are *clear*, or that they are imprinted upon us in the moſt *preciſe Manner*, if we are uncertain whether our Senſe is really ſtruck with them or not. Thus there is left neither *Colour*, nor *Subſtance*, nor *Truth*, nor *Senſe*, nor *Clearneſs* of any kind.

Hence it is uſual for them, when upon their advancing any thing, their Opponent ſays to them, *Well, you* perceive *that at leaſt*, to ſneer at this Objection. The true Way to cloſe with them is, to convince them that nobody can diſpute upon any Topic, nor affirm aught without a preciſe peculiar Character of the very thing he is pleas'd to admit.

Then let us hear what is this *Probability* you admit

admit of? For if it is only the first Suggestions, and these full of the first Appearance, nothing can be more *delusive*; but if they say that after mature Deliberation and thorough Examination they follow what appears to them, yet still this won't serve their Turn. In the first Place, where all Objects are *equivocal*, no greater Creed is to be given to one than to another. In the next place, when they say, that after the wise Man has made the strictest Enquiry and Search, yet still the Object which presents may appear extremely like Truth, and yet be very distant from it; in what manner can they believe that they themselves approach, at least, very near Truth? For in order to ground *Belief* they ought to have some Character of Truth in View. Now if this Character is obscur'd and dimm'd, to what Degree of Truth can they imagine they approximate? Then what can be more absurd than the following Reasoning? I admit this to be a Mark or Character of a thing and therefore I follow it; but it may happen that the thing it *denotes* is either false or does *not exist*. But enough of *Perception*; for if any Person should attempt to weaken what I have advanc'd, Truth will easily, tho' I were gone, maintain her own Cause.

HAVING thus sufficiently cleared up the Points I undertook to explain; let me now touch a little upon *Assent* or *Approbation*, call'd by the *Greeks* συγκαταθεσις; not but that it is a very ample Subject, but then I have already laid it's Foundations. For after having explain'd the Power that lies in the Senses, I was naturally led to shew that a great many things fall within their *Conception* and *Comprehension*; which never can happen without *Assent*. In the next Place, as the great Difference betwixt an *inanimate* and an *animate* Object is, that

the

the former is meer *paſſive* Matter, while the other in ſome Degree or other is *active* (for we can have no Idea of a living Creature that does not act) it follows that either we muſt be depriv'd of Senſe, or we muſt give that *Aſſent* which is in our Power *to* give.

BUT then the taking away Sentiment and *Aſſent*, is in effect depriving us of *Conſciouſneſs*. For as the adding weight to a Scale neceſſarily depreſſes that Scale in the Ballance, in like manner the Mind neceſſarily yields to what is ſelf-evident. For in the ſame manner as it is impoſſible for any Animal to refrain from deſiring what appears to be fitting to it's Nature (which Appetite the *Greeks* call ὁρμὴν) in like manner it is impoſſible for us to refrain our Approbation to a ſelf-evident Truth when falling under our Cogniſance. However, if the Reaſoning I have been endeavouring to eſtabliſh is juſt, it is to no Purpoſe to touch at all upon the Subject of *Aſſent:* For *Aſſent* is the immediate Conſequence of *Perception*. But there is another Conſequence likewiſe, which is, that neither *Memory*, nor the Characters of Things, nor the Arts themſelves can exiſt without Aſſent; nor can there be in the Man who aſſents to Nothing, the greateſt of all our Privileges, that of a *Free-Agency*.

WHAT then becomes of Virtue if there is no Free-Agency? Now it is the moſt ridiculous Abſurdity to ſuppoſe Vice to be the Reſult of Freedom in Acting, and that every immoral Action proceeds from *Aſſent*; but that this is not the Caſe with Regard to Virtue, tho' all her Conſiſtency and Strength are founded upon Objects which ſhe has *aſſented to* and *approved of*; and tho' it is abſolutely neceſſary we ſhould ſee ſomewhat of the Object before we act, and *aſſent* to what we do *ſee*. Therefore by taking away either the Perception

tion of the Object or our Aſſent in conſequence of that Perception, we take away all moral Agency.

Now let us view the Objections upon the other ſide, for it is proper you ſhould be Maſter of the whole Foundation of their *Doctrine*. In the firſt Place then, they draw out, as it were, a Syſtem of what we call *Objects*: They then define in the ſame Terms with the *Stoics* their *Influence* and *Kinds*; and the Nature of that which is the Subject of *Perception* and *Comprehenſion*. They then lay down two Propoſitions which, as it were, contain the whole of this Enquiry. That ſome Objects may preſent in ſuch a Manner, as that many other Objects may preſent in the very ſame Manner, without any Difference; That it is impoſſible for one Part of ſuch Objects to be *perceived*, and the other Part *not perceived*; Now, *continue they*, there is no Difference betwixt them, not only if their Modifications are in every reſpect the *ſame*, but if the *Difference* betwixt them is *imperceptible*. Theſe Maxims being laid down, they ſum up the whole Diſpute in one concluſive Argument, which is this: All Objects are divided into the *Real* and the *Falſe*. Now of thoſe which are falſe, we cannot have *Perception*: And as to thoſe which are real, they all of them preſent in ſuch a Manner, as that the Falſe may have the very ſame Appearances. When, therefore Objects preſent in ſuch a Manner, as that there is no Difference betwixt their Appearances, it never can happen that ſome of them can be *perceived*, and others *not perceived*. Therefore no Object is *perceptible*.

They take two Principles for granted in order to eſtabliſh this reaſoning of theirs; and indeed no body diſputes them. The firſt of thoſe Principles is, *Of falſe Objects we can have no Perception.*

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The next is, *Where there is no Difference betwixt Objects, they never can exiſt ſo as that we can have* Perception *of* ſome, *and not of* others. As to their two other Principles, they defend them with great *Multiplicity of Reaſonings*. The firſt is, *All Objects are divided into Real and Falſe*. The other is, *That all real Objects preſent in the very ſame Manner in which a falſe Object may preſent*.

THESE are two Propoſitions which they don't *ſkim over*, but *labour* with the greateſt *Exactneſs* and *Accuracy*. For they divide them into very extenſive Claſſes. Firſt into the *Senſes*, then into what ariſes from the *Senſes*, and from Habits of every kind; all which they maintain are obſcure. They then proceed to prove that nothing can be perceived, at leaſt not from Reaſon or Opinion. All this they ſubdivide; for they do with their other Topics as you ſaw done yeſterday when the Senſes were treated of; and in all the minute Subdiviſions which they make, they endeavour to prove that *real* and *falſe* Objects are mingled together, and that there is no *perceptible* Difference betwixt them; and that this being the Caſe, nothing can be comprehended.

I AM extremely ready to admit that this Preciſion is highly worthy Philoſophy; tho' very remote from the Purpoſes of thoſe who uſe it. For the Reaſoning which takes Advantage of Definitions and Diviſions, and all the Lights which they ſtrike out, together with Similitudes and Diſſimilitudes, and a minute accurate Diſtinguiſhing, belongs to Men who are poſitive in what they advance; Men who are confident of the *Reality*, the *Strength*, and the *Certainty* of their Propoſitions; and not to Men who call out that every thing may be *falſe* as well as *true*. For how would

would they behave if, while they are laying down a Definition, any body ſhould ask them, Whether that *Definition* is applicable to any other *Subject?* If they ſay it is; then what Character can they produce to prove this Definition to be true? If they ſay it is not, they muſt admit, ſince this Definition is not applicable to a *Falſhood*, that the thing defined may be *perceived*. Which is the very reverſe of their Doctrine. We may reaſon in the ſame Manner upon all their Topics.

FOR if they ſay that they have a clear View of the Subject of Diſpute, without being incommoded by any *Confuſion of Objects*, this in fact plainly amounts to a *Comprehenſion*. But if they deny that *real* Objects are diſtinguiſhable from *falſe ones*, how can they proceed farther? The ſame Objections recur. For no Argument can be concluſive, unleſs the Premiſes upon which the Concluſion reſts, be ſo proved, that they can by no Manner of Means be *falſe* after the ſame Manner *in which they are true*. Therefore, if after the *Perception and Comprehenſion of Things*, the Reſult of all well ſupported progreſſive Reaſoning ſhould be, *that nothing can be comprehended*, can any thing be conceived more inconſiſtent with itſelf? And as the profeſt Purpoſe of Preciſion in Reaſoning is, to unfold ſomewhat that before lay concealed, and if, in order to effect this, it employs both the Senſes and ſelf-evident Objects; *If this, I ſay, is the Caſe*, How abſurd are they in maintaining, that *all things are not ſo and ſo in reality, but in Appearance*. But what gives the greateſt Blow to their Rea-

ſoning is, their taking two Propoſitions as correſponding, when in reality they are directly repugnant to one another. The firſt is, *That ſome Objects are falſe:* The very laying down of this Propoſition implies *that certain Objects are real.* The next is, *That there is no Difference betwixt the real and the falſe.* Now the firſt Propoſition admitted *ſuch a thing as a Difference*; thus the firſt Propoſition agrees ill with the laſt, and the laſt with the firſt.

BUT let us go farther, and take care that we don't ſeem to impoſe upon ourſelves in any reſpect; and let us ſo unravel all their Arguments as to leave nothing knotty behind us. In the firſt place, therefore, the *Self-Evidence* which we have mention'd is ſtrong enough of itſelf to repreſent Objects as they really exiſt. But that this Self-Evidence may be the more infallible and firm, it requires a certain greater Degree of Art and Exactneſs, to prevent ourſelves from being impoſed upon, in caſes that are clear in themſelves, by *Juggling* and *Deluſion.* For *Epicurus,* who wanted to prevent thoſe *Errors* which ſeem to confound *the Knowledge of Truth,* and maintain'd that a wiſe Man ought to diſtinguiſh betwixt *Opinion* and Self-Evidence; I ſay in this *Epicurus* effected nothing; becauſe he did nothing to prevent Miſtakes in Opinion.

THEREFORE as there are two Enemies to Clearneſs and Evidence we muſt fortify ourſelves with two Auxiliaries to oppoſe them. For in the firſt place, we have to fight againſt thoſe who are at very little Pains to fix their Minds; and are ſo much wrapt up in the Contemplation of things

things that are ſelf-evident, that they give no Attention to the bright Light in which they ſtand. Our next Adverſaries are Men who being confined to, and indeed ſometimes impoſed upon by fallacious and captious Queſtions, depart from Truth when they find themſelves unable to *reſolve* them. We muſt therefore have in readineſs all the Arguments againſt what they urge as to the *Self-Evidence*, which we have already treated of; and be arm'd againſt the captious Queſtions of the others; which laſt is what I am now to do. I ſhall therefore diſcuſs regularly their Arguments; as it muſt be own'd they are far from being random Diſputants.

The firſt thing which they attempt to ſhew is, that it is poſſible for us to ſee a great many Objects which in reality do not exiſt; ſeeing our Minds are wantonly agitated and affected by pure Imaginations in the ſame Manner as if they were Realities. For, *ſay they*, when you admit that certain Viſions are ſent by * God; ſuch for inſtance as we ſee in our Sleep, and which are interpreted by means of *Oracles*, *Entrails*, and *Auſpices* (for they tell us that theſe are admitted by their Adverſaries the *Stoics*) how, *continue they*, can God render thoſe things *probable* which are actually *falſe*, and yet not be able to create ſomewhat that touches the very Verge of Truth? But if he can do the laſt, why may he not create Viſions that are next to impoſſible to be known from Realities; nay, ſuch as cannot be diſtinguiſhed. In the next place, that the Mind is *ſelf-motive* is proved by the Pictures form'd in

* This Term I tranſlate literally.

our Ideas, and the *viſionary Suggeſtions* of thoſe who are either *frantic* or *aſleep*. Is it not therefore, *continue they*, extremely probable, that the Mind may be ſo affected as not only to be unable to diſtinguiſh whether thoſe Objects are real or imaginary; but not ſo much as to ſuſpect any Difference as ſubſiſting. Thus when from any ſudden *Panic* upon the Spirits, or from any frightful external Object, we ſee People tremble and grow pale, while this Agony continues, they are capable of making no Diſtinctions, nor of diſcerning any Difference betwixt what is *pure Imagination* or an *external Object*. In the laſt place, *ſay they*, if no *imaginary Objects* are *probable*, then we muſt reaſon in another Manner; but if ſuch may be *probable*, why may they not preſent ſo as to be hardly *diſtinguiſhable* from *real*; nay, why not without any Difference at all. Eſpecially as you yourſelves admit that the wiſe Man when in Choler, refrains from all Aſſent, becauſe he *then* cannot diſtinguiſh as to Objects.

ANTIOCHUS had a great deal to ſay againſt all thoſe imaginary Repreſentations, and they afforded Matter for one whole Day's Diſputation. This is what I don't think myſelf obliged to do; it is ſufficient if I reſume it's Heads. And in the firſt place we think it extremely wrong that they ſhould make uſe of that trepanning Method of *Interrogating*; a Method which is by no Means to be approved of in *Philoſophical Diſquiſitions*. When they gradually *add to* or *take from* any *Propoſition*, they call this a *Sorites*, becauſe the adding to a thing *grain* by *grain* makes a *Heap*; and it is indeed a very

bad

bad and a captious way of Reaſoning. For they win upon us by the following Method: If God ſends to one in his Sleep an Object *in ſuch a manner* as that it appears *probable*, why may it not have *a very great* likelihood of Truth? If ſo, why may it not be very *difficult* to *diſtinguiſh* it from Truth?—— And if this is the Caſe, why may it not be not at all *diſtinguiſhable?* Laſtly, why may it not happen that there is *no* Difference betwixt the one and the other? If you proceed thus far upon my Conceſſions, *it is my Fault*; if upon your own Preſumptions, *it is yours.*

FOR who will admit either * that God can do every thing, or that he would act in this Manner if he could? Or how do you take it for granted, *if one thing is like to another*, it follows that *it is very hard* to diſtinguiſh one from the other? Next, that they are *not at all diſtinguiſhable*: and laſtly, that they *are the ſame?* Thus, ſuppoſing Wolves to reſemble Dogs, you would come at *long run* to conclude them to be *the ſame.* In like manner, ſome *immoral* Actions reſemble *moral* ones, ſome *unworthy* Deeds look like *worthy* ones; and things that are void of *Art*, carry with them the Appearances of being *artificial:* Shall we therefore preſume to aſſert, that there is no Difference in all theſe? Shall not we be capable of diſcerning repugnant Qualities? For there is nothing that can be tranſ-

* *That God can do every thing.*] This muſt be meant in a moral, and not a phyſical Senſe. God cannot contradict his own Nature;——He cannot be inconſiſtent with his own Eternal Character of Truth; all which, in a Reaſoning of this kind, may be very decently and philoſophically urg'd.

ferred out of it's own into another kind: Or if it could ſo happen, that there were no Difference betwixt Objects which differ *in their Kinds*, the Conſequence would be, that one *Kind* would poſſeſs the identical Properties of *another*, which is an Abſurdity.

IN the next Place, there is a way of reſolving all thoſe imaginary Objects, whether they ariſe from the *Working of the Brain*, as we admit they often do, or from the *Effects of Sleep*, or *Wine*, or *Frenzy*; for we affirm that they want that Diſtinctneſs of *Evidence*, which we ought ſtill inviolably to be attach'd to; for ſhew me a Man who after forming and painting an Object in his Imagination, does not, as ſoon as he begins to ſtir and recollect himſelf, perceive the Difference betwixt *Evidence* and *Deluſion*. We may ſay the ſame with regard to Dreams; after *Ennius* had been walking in his Gardens with his Neighbour *Ter. Galba*, do you imagine he would ſay, *I thought I was walking with* Galba? But after he had dream'd, he began his Narrative thus;

* Homer *the Bard ſeem'd preſent to my View.*

Thus in his *Epicharmus*,

For in my Sleep I thought that Death had ſeiz'd me.

THEREFORE

* This is a celebrated Paſſage in the *Epicharmus* of old *Ennius*, who was a humorous *Pythagorean*, and from thence took the Advantage of feigning that he inherited the Soul of *Homer*; but that the *Ghoſt*, or *Shade*, or *Image*, if you will, of *Homer*, which was in Hell, came to the Earth, and had ſeveral Interviews with him.

The

THEREFORE we no ſooner wake, than we ſlight all thoſe Objects, nor do we ever hold them in the ſame account with thoſe which employ us in the *Forum*.

BUT, it may be ſaid, while thoſe Objects preſent to us in our Sleep, they have the very ſame Appearances as thoſe which preſent when we are awake: No, there is a wide Difference, but we ſhall wave that; it is ſufficient to ſay, that they who *are aſleep*, have not the ſame *Strength* and *Soundneſs* either of *Judgment* or *Senſes* about them, as they who are awake. Even the Intoxicated do nothing with the ſame *Approbation*, as when they are ſober: They *doubt*, they heſitate, nay ſometimes ſeem to endeavour to *recollect themſelves*, and give but a feeble Aſſent to what appears to them; and they have no ſooner ſlept out the Fumes of the Wine, than they are ſenſible of the Emptineſs of their Imagination: The ſame may be ſaid of

The Reader is to obſerve, that the Ancient Theology made Man to conſiſt of three Parts; a Body, a Spirit, and a Shade. Our Author has in his *Somnium Scipionis* taken notice of theſe Interviews betwixt *Ennius* and *Homer*: As has *Lucretius*, l. 1. v. 121.

Etſi præterea tamen eſſe Acheruſia *Templa*,
Ennius *eternis exponit Verſibus, edens*,
Unde ſibi exortum ſemper florentis Homeri
Commemorat Speciem, &c.

" As our fam'd *Ennius* ſings, upon whoſe Brow
" The firſt and freſheſt Crowns of Lawrels grow,
" Though he in laſting Numbers does expreſs,
" The ſtately *Acheruſian* Palaces,
" Which neither Soul nor Body e'er invades,
" But certain pale and melancholy Shades,
" From whence he ſaw old *Homer*'s Ghoſt ariſe;
" An awful Shade.——— CREECH.

the *Frantic*; for while they are under their Diſorder, they perceive, and talk of Objects which have no real Exiſtence; but they no ſooner come to themſelves, than they think and ſpeak with *Alcmeon*,

My Eyes aſſented, but my Heart rebell'd.

BUT, you will ſay that, even the wiſe Man, when he is in Choler, ſuſpends his Aſſent, for fear of approving of the *falſe* inſtead of the *real*: This we admit he does upon many other Occaſions; if his Senſes are any way *heavy* or *ſlow*, or if there is any Obſcurity in the Objects, or if he is ſtraiten'd for want of time ſufficient for thorough Examination. But all this Reaſoning with regard to the wiſe Man's ſometimes withholding his Aſſent, makes againſt you. For if there is no Difference in Objects, he will either *always* or *never* with-hold it. Now from the whole of this Arguing, we may eaſily diſcern the Emptineſs of their Reaſoning, who want to throw every thing into Confuſion. What we require is, a *ſerious*, *ſolid*, *firm*, and *wiſe* Judgment: And ſhall we then take up with Inſtances of *Dreamers*; *Madmen* and *Drunkards*, without obſerving the Inconſiſtency that runs through the whole of their Argument: For we don't want to have Inſtances produc'd to us, either of Dreamers or Drunkards, or Madmen; and a Reaſoning drawn from thoſe Inſtances, which is ſo abſurd, that they ſometimes admit there is a Difference betwixt thoſe who are *awake*, *ſober*, and *ſound in their Judgment*, and thoſe who are otherwiſe; ſometimes, that there is no Difference,

THEY

THEY are not ſo much as ſenſible, that by their way of Arguing they render *every thing uncertain*, which is what they want to avoid: What the *Greeks* call ἀδηλα I call *Uncertainties*. For if the Matter ſtood ſo as that there were no Difference betwixt the Manner in which the Objects preſent to a *Madman*, and that in which they preſent to *one who is in his Senſes*; what Man can be aſſured that he is in his Senſes? Now the Concluſion that this admits of, is itſelf a high Pitch of *Madneſs*. As to the Reſemblances betwixt Twins, and the Impreſſions of Seal Rings, theſe are childiſh Arguments. For none of us deny that there are Reſemblances; becauſe they are evident in many Reſpects. But if a Multiplicity of Objects reſembling one another is ſufficient for deſtroying *Conviction*, why don't you content yourſelves with this Conceſſion, eſpecially as *we* make it? And why do you contend for a Matter which is irreconcileable to the Nature of Things? I mean that Things in their own kind *are not as they actually exiſt*, and that in one or more Things, there is an *exact Uniformity*, which in no Reſpect differs. Now we grant you that one *Egg* may be very like another, and one *Bee* very like another.

WHAT then do you wrangle for? Or what will you draw from your Twins? We admit them to reſemble one another; and you ought to be ſatisfied with that Conceſſion. But ſo far from being ſatisfied you will have them *identically the ſame*, which is entirely abſurd. You then have recourſe to the Naturaliſts, though they are the ſtanding *Jeſts* of the *Academy*: And you yourſelf

yourſelf by and bye won't ſpare them. You tell us, that *Democritus* is of opinion, there are innumerable Worlds, and thoſe too not only very much reſembling one another, but ſo completely and ſo abſolutely alike, that there is no manner of Difference in all this unbounded Number. He ſays the ſame thing of their Inhabitants. You then ask, if one World may be ſo very like to another, that there is not the leaſt Difference in the one from the other, why you may not be allow'd to conclude, that in this World of ours, one thing may be ſo like another, that there is no Manner of Difference betwixt them? For, *ſay you*, if from thoſe Atoms by which *Democritus* ſays all things were formed, there not only *may be*, but there *are* innumerable other Worlds, innumerable *Catuli*, why in this ſpacious World of ours may there not be another *Catulus* now exiſting?

Now in the firſt Place, you bring me before the Tribunal of *Democritus*, though I don't agree with him; and am the more averſe to his Doctrine, becauſe more accurate Naturaliſts have clearly prov'd that *particular* things have *particular* Properties. For, admitting that the Twin *Servilii* of old, were ſo nearly reſembling one another, as is given out; yet do you imagine them to have been the ſame?——They could not be diſtinguiſh'd Abroad; —— but they could at Home. —— Strangers miſtook them for one another;——but their own Family did not. Don't we ſee it brought about by Habitude, that being a little accuſtom'd, we ſo eaſily diſtinguiſh thoſe Perſons betwixt whom we before thought we never

never could perceive any Difference, that even the Reſemblance itſelf vaniſhes?

You may battle it here as much as you pleaſe, I won't oppoſe you. I will even admit that the wiſe Man himſelf, who has given riſe to all this Diſcourſe, when ſimilar Objects preſent to him, the Characters of which he has not duly mark'd, will ſuſpend his Aſſent; nor will he give it to any Object unleſs it exiſts in ſuch a Manner as that it is impoſſible it ſhould be a Deluſion. But with regard to other Appearances he has a certain Rule for diſtinguiſhing the True from the Falſe; and as to Matters which are ſimilar, he calls in the Aid of *Habitude*. The Mother by being frequently accuſtomed to ſee them, can diſtinguiſh one Twin from the other; and you by Practice, will learn to do the ſame in other Objects. You know that, *as like as one Egg is to another* is become *Proverbial*, yet we learn that while *Delos* was an independent State, many People there made a Livelihood by bringing up Pullets. Now when thoſe People us'd to look upon an Egg, they could tell *which Hen had laid it*. So that this Proverb does not at all affect us; for it is ſufficient for our Purpoſe that thoſe Eggs *can* be diſtinguiſhed. *But you will ſay*, that *in themſelves* there is no reaſon for *my* making any Difference betwixt them, any more than if there were abſolutely no Difference at all: But then I have a Rule for diſtinguiſhing *Truth* ſo well, that it *cannot be Falſhood*: And from this I will not, as the Saying is, ſwerve a Straw-breadth, for fear of throwing every thing into Confuſion. For not only all Diſtinction betwixt

twixt Truth and Falſhood, but Nature itſelf muſt be aboliſh'd were there no Difference in Things. That likewiſe is an Abſurdity which you uſe to advance, when you ſay, * that when Objects make an Impreſſion upon the Mind, you don't maintain there is no Difference amongſt the Impreſſions themſelves, but amongſt *certain Forms* and *Appearances* of them: As if we did not judge of Objects by their *Appearances* and *Forms*, which could be no manner of Rule if all the Marks of *Truth* and *Falſhood* were deſtroy'd.

But the greateſt Abſurdity of all is, your ſaying that you are determined by *Probability*, provided you are no ways *embaraſs'd*. In the firſt Place, how can you be other than *embaraſs'd*, when there is no Difference betwixt *Truth* and *Falſhood?* In the next Place, what Judgment can be form'd of *Truth* if it's Properties are in common with *Falſhood?* From this naturally ariſes a Philoſophical † *Demurrer*, that is, *a Suſpenſion of the Aſſent*; in which *Arceſilas* was moſt conſiſtent, if certain Opinions as to *Carneades* are true. Becauſe if, as they both taught, there is no ſuch thing as *Perception*; then all Aſſent muſt be taken away: For what can be more ſcandalous than to give our *Aſſent* to any thing, before we know what it is? Now we heard yeſterday that *Carneades* ſometimes relented a little, and admitted that a *wiſe Man* might

* It muſt be own'd that the latter Part of this Sentence, as it ſtands in the Original, is not very clear. There is indeed Variety of Readings, but none of them ſatisfactory.

† *Demurrer*,] Orig. ἐποχὴ, which is a famous Term in the *Schools*, and created great Work for Commentators. I have tranſlated almoſt literally, by a known Term.

be

be *of Opinion*, that is, that he might be miſtaken. But I am not ſo thoroughly convinced that there is ſuch a thing as *Comprehenſion*, of which I have been perhaps too long diſputing, as that a wiſe Man never *entertains Opinions*; I mean, that he never gives his Aſſent to any thing which is *falſe*, or before he knows it.

I come now to their laſt Deluſion, in maintaining that in order to diſcover Ttuth, it is expedient to diſpute both for, and againſt every Propoſition; I ſhould be glad to know what Diſcovery this Method can produce. It is not, *ſays one of thoſe Gentlemen*, * our way to lay ourſelves open: But, pray, why all this Myſteriouſneſs? Or, why do you conceal your Sentiment as if it were ſomewhat ſcandalous? Becauſe we want, *replies he*, that our Scholars ſhould be ſway'd rather by *Reaſon*, than *Authority*. But, what if both ſhould cooperate, what would be the Harm if they did? Yet, ſtill there is one thing which they don't conceal; *That nothing can be perceiv'd*. Does great Authority do no Harm in this Reſpect? A great deal in my Opinion: For, who would ever embrace Doctrines ſo plainly, ſo evidently abſurd and falſe, had it not been for the extenſive Learning and Power of Eloquence, which *Arceſilas* and *Carneades* (but the latter eſpecially) poſſeſs'd?

This is pretty near the Sum of what *Antiochus* then taught at *Alexandria*, and many

† St. *Auguſtine contra Acad. l.* 3. *c.* 20. has very well explain'd this manner of the *Academics*. "*Cicero*, ſays he, tells us, that "the *Academics* us'd to diſguiſe their Sentiments, without diſ-"cloſing to any body who had not liv'd with them to old Age." Referring I ſuppoſe to a Treatiſe of *Cicero*, which is now loſt.

years

years after with greater Warmth, while he was along with me in *Syria*, a little before he dy'd. But having now eſtabliſh'd ſufficiently my Syſtem, I will take the Liberty, my deareſt Friend (naming me) who are my Younger by ſome years, to give you a Word of Advice. It is you who have ennobled Philoſophy by your excellent Writings, nay, you have even ſtaggered the Infidelity of our Friend *Hortenſius*; and ſhall you embrace a Syſtem which confounds *Truth* with *Falſhood*, ſtrips us of *Judgment*, deprives us of *Aſſent*, and robs us of all our *Senſes*. Even the *Cimmerians*, who by ſome God, by Nature, or the Situation of their Country, are deprived of Light, enjoy the Gleam of *Fires*; but your Sect has ſhrouded us in ſo palpable Darkneſs that they have left us not ſo much as the leaſt glimmering Ray to chear our Sight: Should we follow them we ſhould be bound ſo faſt as not to be able to move one Way or other. For by taking away Aſſent they rob us of our *mental Faculties* and our *moral Agency*. A Scheme, which is not only *wicked*, but *impoſſible to be effected*. I muſt therefore again put you upon your Guard, that you are the laſt Man alive who ought to adopt ſuch a Syſtem. Shall you, who diſcloſed and brought to light the *moſt hidden Works of Darkneſs*, and took an Oath (in which I could have joined you as I knew them all by your Means) that you had diſcovered them; ſhall *you*, I ſay, deny that there is *Knowledge*, *Comprehenſion*, or *Perception* in Mankind. Again and again let me entreat you to beware leſt your own Authority

ſhould

ſhould tarniſh the Luſtre of thoſe glorious Actions.

Here *Lucullus* ended his Diſcourſe; and *Hortenſius*, who was wrapp'd in Admiration, as we could eaſily ſee by his frequently lifting up his Hands while *Lucullus* was ſpeaking (and it was no wonder, for I believe the Academy never was ſo ſubtilly attack'd) began to exhort me to depart from my Syſtem; but whether he did it in jeſt or earneſt, is * more than I know. Then *Catulus* addreſs'd himſelf to me in this manner: If, *ſaid he*, the Diſcourſe which *Lucullus* has pronounc'd ſo *readily*, *accurately*, and *copiouſly*, has made any Impreſſion on you, I am ſilent; nor do I think you ought to be afraid of altering your Opinion, if you are under the Force of *Conviction*. However, I conceive that it is not his great Authority that ought to ſtagger you: For, *continued he with a Smile*, he was the next thing to telling you to beware leſt a Knave of a *Tribune* (a Set which you may perceive we ſhall ever have in great Plenty) ſhould take you up ſhort in a popular Aſſembly, and ask you, how conſiſtently with your own Doctrine you can ſay that you made ſuch a Diſcovery, ſince you deny that there can be any ſuch thing in the World as *Certainty?* Give me leave to beg that you won't be frighten'd even by that Conſideration. As to the Merits of the Queſtion, for my own part, I ſhould rather chuſe that you were not won over; but if you ſhould, I would not be much ſurpriz'd; for I remember *Antiochus*

* This is Humour in *Cicero*; he won't affirm it poſitively, becauſe he is juſt agoing to diſpute againſt all Certainty.

himſelf,

himſelf, after being many years in this way of Thinking, chang'd his Sentiments as ſoon as he receiv'd a new Light. When *Catulus* had finiſh'd, they all look'd full at me; and then I began pretty much in the following manner, but with as much Concern upon me as I us'd to feel even in the moſt important Pleadings at the Bar.

THE Diſcourſe of *Lucullus* mov'd me, *Catulus*, as being pronounc'd by a Man ſo greatly learned, ſo eloquent, ſo ready, and ſo accurate, in omitting no Argument that could ſerve his Cauſe; yet I don't at all deſpair of being able to anſwer him; though, to tell the Truth, ſo great a Weight of Authority would have ſtagger'd me, had it not been fully counterpoiz'd by yours: Therefore I will attempt this, after premiſing ſomewhat with regard to my own Reputation.

HAD I been mov'd by any Principle of Vain-Glory, or an Itch of Wrangling, to this particular Branch of Philoſophy, I ſhould think that I were to blame, not only in point of *Judgment*, but of *common Honeſty* aud *Morality:* For, in the moſt trifling Concerns, if a *Spirit of Obſtinacy* is ſubject to *Cenſure*, and the *Luſt of Malice* to *Puniſhment*, can it be ſuppos'd that I ſhould endeavour tenaciouſly to diſpute upon the whole Situation and Purpoſe of Life, or to impoſe upon others as well as myſelf?

IF therefore I did not think that it would be impertinent in a Converſation of this kind, I would do as is ſometimes done in * political Altercations;

* The Senators of *Rome*, *when* Rome *was free*, us'd to ſtrengthen their Votes upon important Occaſions, by an Oath in the following

Altercations; I would ſwear by *Jove* and the * *Gods of my Fathers*, that I not only burn with the Paſſion of finding out the Truth, but ſpeak the Sentiments of my Heart. For can I help being impaſſion'd with a Deſire of diſcovering Truth? I, who am tranſported at diſcovering aught that reſembles it! But as I take this Diſcovery to be the *faireſt* Object in Nature, ſo I take the Approbation of *Falſity* for *Truth* to be the *fouleſt*; yet am I none of thoſe who never approve *Falſhood*, who never aſſent, who never form Opinions. But we are now upon the Subject of a *wiſe Man*. For my own part, I deal mightily in Opinions (becauſe I am not arrived to the Poſſeſſion of Wiſdom) and the Courſe in which I direct my Suggeſtions is not to that little Conſtellation,

Which guides the hardy Sailor on the Main,
When Heaven is wrapp'd in Darkneſs——

As we find it in *Aratus*; and the Mariners ſteer the ſtraighter the more exactly they obſerve it;

Whoſe ſmaller Orb revolves in narrower Space.

BUT I ſteer by the *Great Bear*, and the brighteſt northern Stars; that is, by Reaſon, which ſtands upon a broad Foundation, and is not narrow'd down to a philoſophical *Preciſion*. Un-

ing Terms; They ſwore by any God they had the greateſt regard for. E REP. ESSE QUOD CENSUISSENT, ſee *Briſſonius:* The *Roman* Conſtitution had great Tenderneſs with regard to the Conſciences of Senators; for if a Senator was not very clear as to the Matters before him, he needed not to have voted at all, but might have continued *N. L.* i. e. NON LIQUET.

* Orig. *Deos Penates.*

der ſuch a Guidance as this, I may well wander and go out of my ſtrict Courſe. But, as I ſaid before, our Buſineſs now is not with *me*, but with *Wiſdom:* For when Objects make a ſmart Impreſſion upon my Mind and Senſes, I receive them; nay, ſometimes I aſſent to them without *perceiving* them; for I think that there is no ſuch thing as a Perception of any Object.

I AM not the *wiſe Man* we are now in ſearch of, therefore I cannot help yielding to the Objects which ſtrike me. Now *Arceſilas* agreed with *Zeno* in thinking, that the great Power of Wiſdom lay in being guarded againſt *Impoſtures*, in providing againſt *Fallacies*; becauſe nothing can be more inconſiſtent with the Idea we have of *ſerious Wiſdom*, than *Miſtake*, *Levity*, and *Raſhneſs*.

WHAT then ſhould I ſay of the Firmneſs of a wiſe Man, whom, as you *Lucullus* yourſelf admit, never entertains Opinions? As this is a Conceſſion of yours, I take the liberty of beginning in this irregular manner, for I ſhall by and bye return to Regularity; but ſubmit, in the firſt place, to your Conſideration, the Strength of the following Inference: *If the wiſe Man, at any time, gives his Aſſent to any Propoſition, he then entertains Opinions; but the wiſe Man never entertains Opinions. Then he never gives his Aſſent to any thing.* *Arceſilas* made good this Syllogiſm, for he eſtabliſh'd the *Major* and the *Minor*. *Carneades* ſometimes went ſo far as to admit, that, at certain times, the wiſe Man aſſents; therefore it follows likewiſe, that he entertains Opinions, which you, I think, with great

Reaſon

Reaſon oppoſe. But with regard to the Major, *That the wiſe Man before he gives his Aſſent muſt entertain an Opinion*, it is affirm'd to be falſe both by the *Stoics* and their * Voucher *Antiochus*: For they maintain, that the wiſe Man is *always* capable of diſtinguiſhing Truth from Falſhood, and Things which *may*, from Things which *cannot be perceiv'd*. Now we think that, admitting certain Things may be *perceiv'd*, the very *Habit of Aſſenting* is dangerous and ſlippery. For which Reaſon, ſince it is of ſo very bad Conſequence to aſſent to a Thing that is *falſe*, or not *underſtood*, we ought rather to ſuſpend all Aſſent, leſt too raſh a Procedure ſhould hurry us down a Precipice: For Falſhood ſo nearly reſembles Truth, and Things which *cannot* be *perceiv'd*, Things which *can*, (tho' we ſhall examine by and bye *whether any can*) that a wiſe Man ought not to truſt himſelf upon ſo ſteep a Declivity.

Now, if I take for granted my own Propoſition, *That nothing can be perceiv'd*, and then admit yours, *That no wiſe Man ever entertains Opinions*; the Conſequence muſt be, that *the wiſe Man will ſuſpend all Aſſent*. You are therefore to conſider whether you will chuſe this, or admit *that a wiſe Man may entertain an Opinion upon a particular Occaſion?* But, ſay you, *I will do neither*. Therefore I will endeavour to prove, that there is no ſuch thing as

* *Voucher*] Orig. *Adſtipulator*. This is a Civil Law Term, to ſignify one who vouches at a Contract for another. *Qui Stipulantibus Teſtis adeſt; & ſimul cum iis adpromitit*. See the Tranſlation of the Oration for *Quintus*, vol. 3. of the *Orations*, p. 320.

Perception; for our whole Diſpute turns upon that ſingle Point.

BUT I muſt premiſe ſomewhat with regard to *Antiochus*, who himſelf learned the Doctrine I defend from *Philo*, and I believe no Man was ever longer at School than he was. He wrote with great Accuracy upon this Head; nor did he attack it in his old Age with greater Acrimony, than he had defended it with Warmth in his Youth; and yet, able as he was, his Inconſtancy took greatly from the Weight of his Authority. Give me leave to ask, what happy Day diſclos'd to him that Character to diſtinguiſh betwixt *Truth and Falſhood*, which he had for ſo many Years impugn'd? Did he ſtrike out any thing that was new? No; his Sentiments are the ſame with thoſe of the *Stoics*. Did he repent of his former way of Thinking? Then why did he not embrace another Sect, the *Stoics* eſpecially? For this is the very *Characteriſtic* of the Difference betwixt their Sect and others. Was he aſham'd of *Mneſarchus* or *Dardanus*, the moſt conſiderable of the *Stoics* in *Athens* at that Time? *Believe me*, never would he have ſeparated from *Philo*, had it not been that he began to have Scholars of his own. But how came he all of a ſudden to bring up the Title of the *Old Academy*? He appears to have had ſome Affection for the Dignity of the Appellation, tho' he in reality diſſented from it's Doctrine. * But ſome People

* I can't help offering here a Conjecture of my own, upon the Reading of the Original here, which I hope the Reader will pardon, as I am not often guilty of this Impertinence. Our Author has juſt before ſaid, that *Antiochus* had ſhelter'd his Diſſent from the receiv'd

ple did not ſcruple to ſay, that he did this from a Motive of Vanity, becauſe he was in hopes that his Followers would be diſtinguiſh'd by the Names of *Antiochians*.

FOR my own part, I think it more probable that he was unable to withſtand the united Attacks of all the Philoſophers; for all other Sects have ſome Tenets in common with one another; but no Sect of Philoſophers agree with what is the *Characteriſtic* of the *Academy*. He therefore made his Retreat, and imitated thoſe who * avoid the Beams of the Sun under a Shade; for

receiv'd Syſtems, under the Name of the *Old Academy*. He then enquires into the Reaſons for his doing ſo: The firſt Reaſon is, that he had ſtill an *Affection for the Name; and ſome People ſaid he did it, that he might be himſelf the Founder of a Sect*, for thus the Meaning amidſt all the Contortions of the Commentators ſtands in the Original. But I ſhould be glad to know by what means *Antiochus* could ever hope to gain the Name of the Founder of a Sect; ſince he grafted himſelf upon the Stock of the Old Academy, which he had a Veneration for; and which was then ſo celebrated? Surely this was not the Way to gain a great Name. Mr. *Davies'* Reading, which is undoubtedly the beſt extant, is, *Quod erant qui illum Gloriæ Cauſa feciſſe dicerent, ſperare enim*; but this is *very hard* to be reconcil'd to Senſe, at leaſt, it is too inaccurate for the Phraſe of this Conference; beſides the unanſwerable (as I think) Objection ariſing from the Context. In ſhort, as all Commentators have given up the Paſſage as deſperate, and none of them have reſtor'd it ſo as to anſwer the Objection I have ſtarted; and which they ſeem never once to have perceiv'd; I ſhould, though with the greateſt Diffidence, be inclin'd to read the whole Paſſage thus; QUAMQUAM *erant qui illum Gloriæ cauſa* DE-*feciſſe dicerent, ſperare* ENIM; which laſt Word is Mr *Davies'* Conjecture: This Senſe agrees extremely well with what immediately follows.

* The Commentators have puzzled the Original of this Paſſage ſtrangely. The common Readings have it; *Et, ut ii qui ſub nubi*, or, *ſub nubes ſolem non ferunt*. The Reader may ſee the moſt ingenious Blunders upon theſe Readings, in Mr. *Davies'* Edition. The excellent Editor and Tranſlator of our Author's *Academics*, in *Latin* and *French*, Printed at *London*, 1740 (which Work fell into

for he retir'd under the Shade of the *Academics*, as we do under that of * *Mænius*. But he could not thereby ward off his own Argument, when he maintain'd the Impoſſibility of Perception againſt *Dionyſius* of *Heraclea*, which was now retorted upon him. † He ask'd the laſt-nam'd Gentleman, who was an Apoſtate from *Stoiciſm* to *Epicuriſm*, whether he had comprehended, by that infallible Characteriſtic, which you maintain ought to direct the Aſſent, and which he had implicitly held for many Years from his Maſter *Zeno*, *that the* Honeſtum *was the Sole Good?* And whether the ſame Characteriſtic had led him to the Doctrine, which he afterwards defended, *that the* Honeſtum *is an empty Name, and that Pleaſure is the Sole Good?* Intimating, by the Change of this Perſon's Sentiments, that there is no Character imprinted upon our Minds by Truth, ſo as that the like may not be imprinted by Falſhood. Thus others borrow'd the very Argument againſt him, which he had borrow'd from *Dionyſius*. But more of this hereafter. I now come to anſwer what has been offer'd by *Lucullus*.

IN the firſt place, Sir, give me leave to ex-

my Hands by great Accident) offers a moſt ingenious Correction, *viz. Itaque ceſſit & ut ii qui ſubſudant, ſolem non ferunt*, &c. But I am humbly of Opinion, that the common Reading does extremely well. *Non ferre* in Latin, is often the ſame as *effugere*, to avoid: And in the common Acceptation, nothing can be more plain than the Senſe of the Reading, *ſub nube*; they who under a Cloud, or a *Shade*, don't endure the Heat of the Sun.

* *Mænius.*] For an Explanation of this Word, ſee the Note upon *p.* 115. *l.* 2. of the Tranſlation of the *Orations*, vol. 1.

† The Original here is very perplex'd and long-winded: I have grop'd the Meaning out as well as I could.

amine

amine the Objection you firſt ſet out with. You compar'd the Authority which we claim'd from the ancient Philoſophers, to that claim'd by our ſeditious Countrymen ftom the *Authority* of certain eminent *Romans*, who were at the ſame time * Champions for the Popular Rights. When the Meaſures which they purſue are not *juſtifiable*, they do all they can to give them an Air of *Juſtice*; whereas we ſay, that our *Principles* are the ſame with thoſe which you yourſelves admit were the Principles of the moſt renown'd Philoſophers. *Anaxagoras* maintain'd *Snow to be black*. How would you treat ſuch a Propoſition coming from me? nay, my even making the leaſt Doubt of it? Yet what Character does *Anaxagoras* bear? That of a *Sophiſt*, as they call thoſe *intellectual Prize-fighters* who make a Trade of Philoſophy? No; he was eminent for his *Gravity* and *Genius*. What ſhall I ſay of *Democritus?* Where can we match him, either for Extenſiveneſs of Genius or Greatneſs of Soul? Yet *he* ventur'd to begin thus: *I ſpeak ſo of every thing in the Univerſe*. He made no manner of Exceptions; he included every thing; for what can be beyond the Univerſe? Who will not prefer him, as a Philoſopher, to *Cleanthes*, *Chryſippus*, and others of a later Date? Surely, compar'd to him, they ſeem to me but of a †. *fifth Claſs*. And yet this Philoſopher

* *Cicero* ſpeaks in the Character which I have always found Reaſon to repreſent him in: That of an Advocate for the Power of a *Government*, without Regard to the Principles of a *Conſtitution*. *Claros Viros* SED TAMEN *populares*, ſays he.

† Alluding to the well known Diviſion of the *Roman* People into Claſſes.

did not go the Lengths we do; for we don't deny that there is ſuch a Thing as *Truth*, we only deny that it can *be perceiv'd*.

He poſitively denies there is ſuch a Thing as *Truth*; * he likewiſe ſays, that the Senſes are *obſcure* and *clouded*; for ſo he calls them: His greateſt Admirer *Metrodorus* of *Chios*, in the Beginning of his *Treatiſe upon Nature* ſays, *I deny that we know whether we know any thing or not; or that we even know what Knowledge or Ignorance are: Nay I flatly deny that we know whether any thing does or does not exiſt.*

You ſay that *Empedocles* ſeems to be frantic; but to me he ſeems to treat his Subjects with a becoming Sublimity. Will you pretend that he puts out your Eyes, or robs you of your Senſes, by his allowing them but ſmall Power in judging of thoſe Objects which come under their Cognizance. *Parmenides* and *Xenophanes*, in their Verſes (which, tho' not very poetical, are *Verſes* however) *paſſionately*, as it were, chide the Arrogance of thoſe, who without being able to *know* any thing, preſume to ſet up for *Knowledge in general*. And do you pretend that *Socrates* and *Plato* are to be excepted out of this Claſs. Give me your Reaſon, Why? If there is ſuch a thing as † *Certainty*, certainly they muſt not be excepted, any more than others I have mentioned. Why, I think now that I am their Boſom-Companion. The Diſcourſes we have

* I have here follow'd Mr. *Davies*' Reading, which is extremely clear and conciſe.

† Orig. *An de ullis certius poſſum dicere?* How elegant is this Expreſſion from an *Academic!*

handed

handed down to us in Writing are too many to leave any Doubt with us, that *Socrates* thought *he knew nothing*. There is but one Exception, which was, his *knowing* that *he knew nothing*. What ſhall I ſay of *Plato?* Surely he never would have carry'd this Vein of Reaſoning thro' ſo many of his Works had he not approved it: For he had no Manner of Reaſon for * imitating the *Irony*, the eternal *Irony* of his Maſter.

I BELIEVE you now perceive that I don't, like *Saturninus*, only *quote* eminent Men, but that I *imitate* them likewiſe? Have I mentioned, have I propoſed any beſides thoſe who were eminent? In the mean time we have thoſe on our ſide, who could create you a great deal of Trouble; but they are too trifling; ſuch as *Stilpho*, *Diodorus*, *Alexinus*; all theſe deal in crooked quibbling Sophiſms; for ſo we term *argumentative Chicane*. But why need I make a Catalogue of ſuch, when I can produce *Chryſippus*, who is looked upon as the ſtrongeſt Pillar that ſupports the *Portico* of the *Stoics*. How often, and how much did he diſpute, both againſt the *Senſes*, and the Objects which are approved by *Habit*.——*But you will ſay*, he undid all this.—It does † not appear to me that he did; but admitting he did. He would not ſurely have made ſuch a Collection of Inſtances, wherein we may be impoſed upon by ſtrong Probability, had it

* Orig. *Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam preſertim, nulla fuit ratio perſequi:* Which may ſignify as I have tranſlated it; or that *Plato* would not always have us'd that Mode of Reaſoning.

† The Reader will no doubt obſerve the Diffidence which our Author affects to ſpeak with, in order the better to keep up to his Character of an *Academic*.

not

not appeared to him, that it was no eaſy Matter to guard againſt ſuch Appearances.

WHAT do you ſay of the *Cyrenaics*; a Sect that is by no means contemptible? Yet they deny that any outward Object can be perceiv'd: They ſay farther, that they are capable only of perceiving *Senſations*, ſuch as *Pain* or *Pleaſure*; and that they are ignorant of the *Colour* or *Sound* of any Object; and that they only feel themſelves to be affected in a certain Manner.

ENOUGH of Authors; but now I reflect that you ask'd me, whether I did not think that Truth might have been found out in ſo many Ages which ſucceeded thoſe ancient Maſters, while ſo many Abilities, and ſuch vaſt Labours were employ'd to find her? As to that Diſcovery I will examine into it ſoon, and your ſelf ſhall be Judge.

WE may however conclude, that it was not a Spirit of Wrangling that induced *Arceſilas* to contend with *Zeno*, but an earneſt Deſire after Truth, from the following Deduction. *Zeno*'s Predeceſſors were ſo far from *teaching*, that not one of them had ſo much as *pretended* to *hint*, that a Man might keep himſelf from *entetainiug Opinions*; nay, that it is neceſſary to the Character of Wiſdom *to do it*. This Sentiment, to *Arceſilas*, ſeem'd not only *true*, but *noble*, and *worthy the Character of Wiſdom*: Let me ſuppoſe him then asking *Zeno*, What the Conſequenee muſt be, *if the wiſe Man could neither perceive aught*, nor found it conſiſtent with Wiſdom to *entertain Opinions? Zeno* perhaps anſwer'd him, *that he never would take up with Opinion, becauſe he could* perceive.——

But

But what?—*Why an Object.*—What Kind of an Object? I then think I hear *Zeno* making this Definition, *An Object, the Impreſſion, Character, and Formation of which ariſes from itſelf, as it actually and really exiſts.* Then ſuppoſing it to have been asked him, *Whether Truth may not preſent in the ſame Manner as Falſhood?* Here *Zeno*'s good Senſe led him to ſee, that no Object could be perceiv'd, if it's Appearance according to what it *really is*, could *preſent* in the ſame Manner from what it *really is not.* **Arceſilas* was in the right to conſent. A ſupplemental Definition was added; becauſe neither Falſhood nor Truth can be perceiv'd, if Truth carries the ſame Appearances as *Falſhood may do.* Now he apply'd ſtrongly to prove, that no Object can be *perceiv'd*, if it appears from it's *actual Exiſtence* in the ſame manner as if it were *falſe.* This is the ſingle Point in Diſpute, which laſts to this Day. For the *Propoſition* that *a wiſe Man never will aſſent to any thing*, had nothing to do with this Diſpute. Becauſe a Man may not perceive any thing, and yet he may *entertain an Opinion*: This is ſaid to be approv'd of by *Carneades.* For my own part, as I have greater Faith in *Clitomachus* than in *Philo* and *Metrodorus*, I think he rather *diſputed* than *proved* this Point. But enough of that.

ONE unavoidable Conſequence is, that if you

* The Original here is very obſcure: *Recte conſenſit Arceſilas, ad Definitionem additum*; as *Manutius* reads, certainly makes the beſt Senſe. This Suppliment was, *That Truth has that Appearance, which cannot ariſe from Falſhood.*

take

take away *Opinion* and *Perception*, a *Suſpenſion of all Aſſent* muſt follow: Therefore if I ſhould prove to you, that nothing can be *perceiv'd*, you muſt admit that no Man can give his *Aſſent*. What Object then can be perceiv'd, if even the Senſes don't tell us the Truth; which you, *Lucullus*, defend from Common-place Topics; tho' yeſterday I diſcourſed largely againſt them, not that my Subject required I ſhould, but that I might deprive you of thoſe Arguments.

Now you ſay that the Examples of the broken Oar and the Pidgeon's Neck do not at all affect you. In the firſt place, Why? For I can ſee that the Oar does not appear as it really is; and that the Pidgeon's Neck preſents ſeveral Colours, when there is in reality no more than one. In the next place, Did I advance no other Arguments? Theſe then, it ſeems, are to remain in their full Force; * yet ſtill that Babbler calls out, *there is Truth in his Senſes.* By this means you ſtill quote an Author who, at the Riſk of his whole Syſtem, *muſt* defend this Propoſition: For *Epicurus* admits ſo far, *That if one Senſe in a Man's whole Life-time has impoſed upon him, none of them is ever to be believed.* That is, that it is right to truſt to partial Evidence; and poſitively aſſert it. Therefore *Timagoras* the *Epicurean*, when he had twiſted his Eye-ball, deny'd that he ever ſaw the Light of two Lamps *where there was in reality but one*. He ſaid that this was an *Illuſion* of *Opinion*, and not of the *Object*; as if the Queſtion in Diſpute were,

* Meaning *Epicurus*. I agree here entirely with Mr. *Davies'* Amendment.

what

what *a Thing is*, and not *in what manner it may appear*. But in this he imitated his Predeceſſors.

BUT how can you, *Lucullus*, who admit that, according to the Senſes, ſome Objects are true, and others falſe, lay down any Rule for diſtinguiſhing them? No more, I beg it of you, Common-place Arguments. * We have too much Intereſt in them for them to be impartial. Suppoſe, *ſay you*, a God were to ask you, while in the Enjoyment of all your Senſes *ſafe* and *ſound*, Whether you required any greater Happineſs, What would you anſwer? I wiſh that ſome God would make the Experiment with me, you ſhould ſoon be convinced † how little we are beholden to the Bounty of Nature. For in

* I am very apt to believe that the Meaning of this Expreſſion has never yet been underſtood, by Commentators or Tranſlators. The excellent *French* Tranſlator already mention'd, though he gives it an ingenious Turn, appears to doubt whether it is our Author's Meaning. The Original is, *Domi nobis iſta naſcuntur*. Our Author has been eſtabliſhing his Reaſoning, from the Abſurdity of admitting the Senſes, as Evidences of Truth. One of his Arguments is by Implication drawn from the Unreaſonableneſs of truſting *Suis Teſtibus*; as he elegantly calls a Man's Senſes. He reduces *Epicurus*'s Argument for the Infallibility of the Senſes, to a Civil Abſurdity: It is, *ſays he*, *conſidere ſuis Teſtibus & importunè inſiſtere*; the ſame thing as if a Man ſhould produce in Court *Suos Teſtes*, that is, his own Slaves or Relations, or Dependants, for Evidences: This in a civil Cauſe was not admitted of. *Teſtes eos*, ſays the great Lawyer *Paulus*, in *Leg.* 21. *quos accuſator de domo produxerat, interrogari non placuit*. The Greeks call'd ſuch a Witneſs οἰκοδιπαῖνος. Therefore, our Author here begs that *Lucullus* would not make uſe of ſuch Arguments, *Domi*, ſays he, *iſta naſcuntur*, they cannot for that Reaſon be admitted.

† The above Alluſion from the Procedings in Law Courts, is carry'd on here: *Orig. Audias quam nobiſcum malè egerint. Malè agere* was a Law Term, to ſignify a Man's ſuing for a Debt that is not owing him. See the Oration for *Quintus*, vol. 3.

order

order to * come at the Truth, give me leave to aſk, *How far we can ſee?* I ſee the *Cumæan* Eſtate of *Catulus* from this Place, but not my *Pompeian* one; yet there is nothing betwixt to intercept my View: But my Sight can't reach ſo far. A mighty Bleſſing this Eye-ſight indeed! We can ſee *Puteoli*, but not our Friend *Avienus*, who is perhaps at this very Inſtant walking in *Neptune's Portico.* Yet † ſome Man or other who uſes to be mentioned in this Diſputation, could diſcern an Object at the Diſtance of one hundred and thirty five Miles: Some Fowls can ſee farther.

UPON the whole then, I would boldly anſwer this God of yours; that I was far from being contented with my own *Portion of Eye-ſight:* He might indeed tell me, that I am *ſharper-ſighted* than Fiſhes; for as we are now plac'd, we can neither ſee *them*, though lying immediately under our Eyes, nor can *they* ſee *us*. But then the Thickneſs of our Medium [Air] is the ſame Impediment to us, as that of their Medium [Water] is to them. But according to you, we can require no greater Bleſſing: But how! do you imagine that a Mole, does not deſire ſharper Sight? Do you imagine that her Complaint to the God would be; becauſe ſhe ſees *but little*, rather than that ſhe ſees *falſe.*

* Our Author will have *his own way*; and in the Original here has fallen upon a miſerable Pun.

† *Pliny* mentions this very Perſon, in *Hiſt. Nat. lib.* 7. *cap.* 21. and calls him *Strabo*. I don't know whether the more modern Diſcoveries, with regard to the Convexity of the Earth, will not deſtroy the Credit of this Story.

Do

Do you ſee that Ship? * To us it ſeems to have no Motion at all; and yet they who are on board her, think that this *Villa is moving*. If you enquire into the Reaſon of thoſe Appearances, and even ſuppoſing you diſcover the true one, which I don't know whether you can or not, you will own, not, that your Evidence is infallible, but that it is not without Reaſon it preſented you with a falſe Teſtimony.

BUT what do I talk of a *Ship*? Since I ſee that you deſpiſe the Inſtance of the *Oar*; you look perhaps for Examples of a higher Nature. What can be more exalted than the Sun? The Mathematicians calculate it to be † as *twenty two* to *one* larger than the Earth; yet what a diminutive Body does it appear to be to us? One ſcarcely thinks it a Foot in diameter; yet *Epicurus* was of Opinion, that it might be even ſome ſmall matter leſs or more than it appears to us, or pretty much the ſame as it appears; in proportion as our Senſe of ſeeing is nearly, if not

* The whole of this Paſſage in the Original runs thus, as it is commonly printed. *Videſne navem illum? Stare nobis videtur; at iis qui in navi ſunt moveri hæc Villa.* The Senſe of which appears to be extremely plain, and appoſite to *Cicero*'s Purpoſe. But the Commentators have vaſtly applauded Doctor *Bentley*, for correcting it in this Manner; *Stare nobis videtur, at iis qui in navi ſunt moveri hæc Villa.* That is; *This Villa to us ſeems to ſtand, but to thoſe who are in the Ship, it appears to move.* This is a Meaning which I think *may do*; but I don't apprehend it to be ſo ſtrong an Inſtance of the Fallacy of the Senſe, as when it is taken after the common Reading. As to what Mr. *Davies* mentions as an Objection to the common Reading, it is none: For a Perſon at Shore in a calm fine Day, ſuch as this may be ſuppos'd to be by our Author and his Friends ſitting without Doors, a Ship under ſail appears to have no ſenſible Motion.

† It has been ſince found to be much larger.

wholly

wholly, infallible. Now what becomes of his *once deceiving one:* But let let us quit this *goſſoping old Fellow*, who truſts to the Infallibility of the Senſes. We have now before us an Inſtance; the Sun does not appear at all to move, though it's Swiftneſs ſurpaſſes even Thought itſelf.

But to cut ſhort this Controverſy; give me leave to repreſent to you the Inequality of our Conteſt: There are four principal Heads, by which we conclude that nothing can be known, perceiv'd, or comprehended; and upon this depends the whole Queſtion. The firſt is, *That there is ſuch a thing as a falſe Appearance.* Secondly, *That ſuch an Appearance cannot be perceiv'd.* Thirdly, *That where there is no apparent Difference betwixt Objects, it is impoſſible that ſome of them ſhould be perceiv'd, and others of them not.* Fourthly, *That no real Object can proceed from the Senſes, which may not have another falſe Object oppos'd to it, no way different from it, and impoſſible to be perceiv'd.* Of thoſe four Propoſitions all Sects agree, in admitting the ſecond and third. *Epicurus* will not admit the firſt; but you who are my preſent Opponents, admit that likewiſe: Therefore all our Controverſy now is about the fourth.

Now, whoever upon ſeeing *Publius Servilius* the Twin miſtook him for his Brother *Quintus*, fell into a Deception of the kind I laſt mention'd: Becauſe there was no Character by which *the true* could be diſtinguiſh'd from *the falſe.* As this Diſtinction was aboliſh'd, what Mark had *C. Cotta*, who was twice Con-

ſul

ſul with the Twin, by which he could prevent his being impos'd upon. You deny that ſo ſtrong a Reſemblance can be in the Nature of Things. This is meer Wrangling; but it is with a very gentle Opponent. I grant there cannot, yet there ſurely may, be ſuch a *Reſemblance to Appearance*. In that Caſe, the Senſe is impos'd upon; and if we are impos'd upon in one Reſemblance, then every thing becomes uncertain. For when once the Mark is ſuppreſt, even though the very Perſon you ſee is the real one, yet ſtill you don't diſtinguiſh him to be ſuch by that Mark, which enables you to pronounce that it is impoſſible you ſhould be miſtaken: Therefore if you *may* miſtake *Publius* for his Twin-Brother, how are you certain that you don't miſtake *Cotta*, for a Perſon he is not; ſince a Thing may appear *to be* what *it is not?*

You ſay that every thing muſt reſt in it's own kind, and that there can be no Identity in things that have a *ſeparate Exiſtence*. This is a *Stoical Maxim*, but by no means a *Credible one*. It is ſaying, that there is not a *Hair*, nor a *Grain* the ſame with one another, in every reſpect. Theſe are Principles which may be refuted, but I am not for wrangling: For it makes no Difference in our preſent Queſtion, though an Object is not exactly the ſame in all it's conſtituent Parts, if the Difference is not apparent to the Senſe; even admitting a Difference. But ſuppoſing that there is no ſuch exact Reſemblance betwixt Man and Man; what do you think of Statues? Give me leave to ask you, ſuppoſing * *Ly-*

* This was *Alexander* the Great's Statuary.

ſippus to have employ'd the ſame Metal, Alloy, * Air, Water, Mold, and every thing, could he not out of thoſe have made a hundred *Alexanders* of the ſame Sort? By what Character are you to diſtinguiſh them? Suppoſing me to take off, on the ſame Wax, a hundred Impreſſions from this Seal-Ring; have you any Criterion, by which you can diſtinguiſh the one from the other? You would not ſurely go to an Engraver, as you did to a *Delian* Poulterer, for diſtinguiſhing the one from the other.

WELL; but you call in *Art* to the Aſſiſtance *of the Senſes*. A Painter diſcerns what we can't diſcern: And a muſical-inſtructed Ear can know a Tune, by the *very Flouriſh of the Inſtrument*. But, pray Sir, does not all this make againſt you; If without greater Skill and Craft, than moſt, of *our* Countrymen at leaſt, are Maſters of, we cannot have the perfect Enjoyment either of our Ears or Eyes?

WE now proceed to the great Argument, I mean the amazing Art with which Nature has form'd the Underſtanding, the Senſes, and the whole *Syſtem* of MAN. And if ſo, am I not to dread how I raſhly venture upon giving my Opinion? And will you, *Lucullus*, venture to AFFIRM *that there is an intellectual, purpoſing, Energy*, which *forms*, or to ſpeak in your own Style, † *fabricates* MAN? Will you poſitively determine

* *Air, Water,*] We are told that theſe two Elements had a great Effect upon the Colour of the Metal of Statues.

† The learned *French* Tranſlator, ſeems not to have thoroughly comprehended our Author's Meaning here. It is not a direct Queſtion he puts; but he aſks whether *Lucullus* will affirm ſo and ſo.

what

what this fabricating Art is? Where is it apply'd? When? Why? or in what Manner? I own you handle thoſe Points prettily; your Diſcourſes upon them are elegant; with all my Heart; allow them to appear to be as you ſay; but I beg you would not *affirm* them to be ſo. But I ſhall by and bye come to treat of Phyſical Principles, were it for no other Reaſon than to prevent your falling into a Miſtake, when you ſaid a little while ago, that I would touch upon them.

BUT to come to ſome Points which are much more evident, I will not now dive into all the Opinions which have fill'd ſo many Volumes, not only by Writers on our ſide, but by *Chryſippus*. Now the *Stoics* uſe to complain of *Chryſippus*, that when he had amaſſed with the greateſt Diligence all that could be urged againſt the *Senſes*, *Self-Evidence*, *Habit*, and *Reaſoning*, he was much inferior to himſelf when he came to reply; and that by this Means he furniſh'd *Carneades* with Weapons. Thoſe Arguments brought by *Carneades* are pretty much the ſame with thoſe you have ſo accurately handled. You ſaid that Impreſſions of Objects upon Men while *aſleep*, *intoxicated*, or *frantic*, are much weaker than when they are *awake*, *ſober*, and *in their Senſes*. But how? Becauſe after *Ennius* was awake, he did not ſay that he SAW *Homer*, but that he *thought he ſaw him*. And *Alcmeon* ſays,

My Heart rebell'd.——

And ſo of the Drunk. As if any body deny'd, that when a Man awakes, he is ſenſible he has

been dreaming; and that when one's Frenzy is abated, he is not conſcious that the Objects which he thought he ſaw while he was frantic, are *not real.*

BUT this is not to our Purpoſe: The preſent Queſtion is, The Manner in which they *preſent* when they do *preſent?* Now are we not to conclude, that *Ennius*, ſuppoſing him to have dream'd, heard the whole of the Speech that begins with

* *O Piety of Mind,*

under as much Conviction, while he heard it, *of it's being real*, as if it had been real. When he awaked indeed, he was in a Condition to have treated thoſe Appearances *accordingly*, as Dreams, but ſtill while he was aſleep they carry'd with them the ſame Probability they would have done, had they actually preſented to him while he was awake. But now as to *Hecuba*, when in her Sleep ſhe heard her Son calling out,

Mother, to you I ſpeak,

was ſhe not under the ſame Conviction as if ſhe had been awake? Elſe why ſhould ſhe break out,

Approach—— Stay—— Hear—— again thoſe tender Sounds.

Can you then think that when we are aſleep, we

* This, and the following Quotations, are from the Works of *Ennius*, which were well known in our Author's Days, though loſt to us.

are not as ſtrongly perſuaded of the Reality of Objects, as we could be, if we were awake?

What ſhall I ſay with regard to Madmen? *Tuditanus* your Kinſman, *Catulus*, for Inſtance! Could the moſt ſenſible Man alive be more perſuaded of any Reality than he was of the Reality of the Appearances his Imagination ſuggeſted? What ſay you of him, who calls out,

I ſee Ulyſſes, *I behold him living.*

Does he not twice call out that he ſees him, when no ſuch Object is *really* before him? When *Hercules* in *Euripides* has pierced with his Arrows his own Sons as well as thoſe of *Euryſtheus*; when he has killed his Wife; when he has made an Attempt to kill his Father likewiſe; is he not under as ſtrong an Impulſe from *falſe*, as he could have been under from *real* Objects? I will appeal to your own Inſtance of *Alcmeon*, who ſays, *that his Heart did not agree with his Eyes*; when he breaks out into that furious Rapture,

Whence gleams that Flame?

And afterwards,

Away——away——ſee, ſee they come——
'Tis me, 'tis me, they ſeek.

Or when he implores the Virgin's Piety:

Give me Relief; Oh! drive this Peſtilence
This fiery, this devouring Torment from me.

See; in blew Flames they haunt my wretched
Steps
And ſtand around me with their burning
Torches,

Can you doubt of his being convinced of the Reality of all this?

See, ſee his radiant Treſſes glow
Apollo *bends his golden Bow,*
Upon the horned Moon inclin'd;
Diana *throws her Torch behind.*

How could he have expreſs'd a ſtronger Belief of thoſe Objects had they actually exiſted, than he did, though they only ſeem'd to exiſt? For in this Paſſage his Heart ſeems to have gone along with his Eyes. Now I produce all thoſe Inſtances to prove that Propoſition, which has as much Certainty as any Propoſition can have, That when the Mind aſſents, ſhe knows no Diſtinction between real and falſe Objects. Now you ſay nothing at all to the Purpoſe, when you confute the falſe Appearances which preſent to thoſe who are aſleep or frantic by their own After-Recollection. For we don't enquire of what Nature their Reflections are when they are firſt awake, or when they laſt recover their Senſes; but into the Nature of thoſe Appearances which affected them when they were aſleep or frantic. But let me leave the Senſes, and enquire into the Efficacy of Reaſon for Perception. You tell us, that ſince Logic has been invented ſhe preſides,

as

as it were, the Arbiter and Judge of *Truth* and *Falſhood*. But of what Truth and Falſhood? In what Matters? Can a Logician judge of Truth or Falſhood in Geometry, in Letters, in Muſic?

BUT he does not deal in thoſe Matters. Is Philoſophy his Province? Then why does he not account for the Magnitude of the Sun? What Standard has he for enabling himſelf to determine of *Supreme Happineſs in Life?* Then what can he judge of? Why, of the Connection or Incongruity of Ideas; the Ambiguity of Expreſſion; and of concluſive or inconcluſive Reaſoning from Premiſes. While he judges of thoſe or the like Points he keeps within his own Province; but we were promiſed much greater things; for this Judgment is inſufficient when compar'd to the many other great and weighty Points in Philoſophy.

BUT as you lay ſo great a Streſs upon that ſingle Art, take care that it does not make quite againſt you: It's firſt ſetting out, gives a very handſome Diſplay of the Rudiments of Speech; the Diſtinctions upon ambiguous Terms, and the Method of forming Concluſions. Then after a few Additions it comes to the *Sorites*, a very ſlippery and perilous Paſs: And you yourſelf a little while ago ſaid, that the *Queſtionary Method* was a *vicious Way of Reaſoning*.

BUT what then; is the Vice to be imputed to us? Nature has not been pleas'd to give us ſuch a preciſe Knowledge of her Limits, as to fix our Determination upon any Subject. So that it is not only with regard to the Heap of Wheat, from whence it has the Name of *Sorites*, that

we are at a loſs for a determinate preciſe Anſwer; but with regard to particular Queſtions upon every Subject; ſuch as *Riches* or *Poverty*, *Fame* or *Obſcurity*, *much* or *little*, *long* or *ſhort*, *broad* or *narrow*, *Addition* or *Diminution*.

YET ſtill, ſay you, the *Sorites* are unfair. Then, why don't you break their Force, in order to prevent their giving you Trouble? For they will, if you are not upon your Guard. We are ſufficiently upon our Guard, ſays an Advocate for your Doctrine; for when *Chryſippus* was, in this gradual ſtealing Manner at any time ask'd, whether, for Inſtance, *three* Grains come under the Denomination of *many* or *few*? he thought fit before he came to pronounce them *many* to ſleep and wake upon it; that is, as the Greeks calls it ἡσυχαζειν. Said *Carneades*, You may ſleep with all my Heart, and ſnore too if you will; but what Service will it do you? For by and bye you will be rous'd out of it by another Queſtion of the ſame Nature: *I mean the following*: If to the Number at which you ſtopt, I ſhould add one, does not the Total then come under the Denomination of *many*? You may take another Nap if you think proper: But in ſhort, you muſt at laſt come to admit, that you can neither fix in your Anſwer preciſely, what is the extreme of *few*, nor the Commencement of *many*: Now this Miſtake gains ſuch Ground in it's Progreſſion, that I don't ſee any End of it's Operation.

BUT, ſays your Advocate, this does not at all affect me; for as an expert Driver, keeps up his Horſes for the End of the Courſe; and the more ſo if the Ground he is driving on is *uneven*, ſo I will

will keep myſelf up before-hand, and reſtrain myſelf from anſwering any more of thoſe captious Queſtions. Now in this Caſe, give me leave to ſay, if you have any thing that is ſatisfactory to offer in anſwer, it is rank Pride that keeps you from doing it: If you have not, then you are at a loſs *for Perception*. Yes, ſay you, ſo I am, if the Subject is obſcure.——No doubt on't; but you ſay that you won't go the Length of Obſcurities: In which Caſe you ſtop, where the Subject is quite plain. If all you mean is, that you will hold your peace; you do nothing to your purpoſe. For 'tis the ſame thing to the Perſon who wants to enſnare you, whether, while he holds you faſt, you hold your peace or ſpeak.

Now if you make no manner of Stop in pronouncing that NINE, for Inſtance, comes under the Denomination of *few*, and then ſtop at TEN: in that very Caſe you refrain your Aſſent from Matters which are *clear* and *evident*. And you won't ſuffer me to do the ſame when they are dark; therefore your Logic does you no ſervice againſt the *Sorites*, which never declares where the Heap begins to encreaſe, nor where it ceaſes to diminiſh.

If this Method, like *Penelope* unweaving her Web, undoes at laſt all it had eſtabliſhed before; whether is that your Fault or ours? The Foundation of Logic is; That all Propoſitions (in Greek ἀξιώματα) are either *true* or *falſe*. What then? Whether is this Propoſition *true* or *falſe?* Suppoſing you ſhould be ſpeaking a *Truth*, and ſay that it is a *Lye*, you then call a *Truth* a *Lye*. You will tell me that theſe are things *Inexplicable*;

cable; a Term which is much more inſufferable than our *Incomprehenſibles* and *Imperceptibles.*

But ſetting this aſide, give me leave to ask, if thoſe are things that cannot be explain'd, and if no poſitive Judgment can be form'd of them, ſo as that you can pronounce whether they are *true* or *falſe*, what becomes of your Definition, That a Propoſition is *that* which is either *true* or *falſe*. In things taken for granted, I will add that ſome of them are to be admitted, and others rejected, when they are of contradictory kinds. Upon this footing, how do you form the following Concluſion? *If you ſay that it is now light, and therein ſay what is true; therefore it is light.* You undoubtedly approve of this kind of Reaſoning, and you ſay that the Concluſion is irrefragable; therefore in your Schools you lay this down as the principal Method of forming Concluſions. Conſequently you admit every thing which is concluded in this Manner to be right, or there is an End of your Art. Now let me ſubmit this Concluſion to your Approbation.

If you ſay that you lye, and while you ſay ſo are ſpeaking Truth, then you do lye.
You ſay that you lye, while you are ſpeaking Truth.
Therefore you lye.

Now how can you avoid approving of this Concluſion, when you approv'd of the former, which is of the very ſame kind? This Reaſoning came from *Chryſippus*, and is not unravell'd even by him. For what could he oppoſe to this Concluſion? *If it ſhines, it ſhines, it does ſhine.*

No

No doubt he would give it up, for the very Nature of conſequential Reaſoning forces you to admit the *laſt*, after you have admitted the firſt. Now, how does this Concluſion differ from the other, *If you lye you lye, you do lye, therefore you lye?* This is a Propoſition which you ſay you can neither approve of, nor diſſent from: Then, why admit the other? If there is the leaſt Force in *Art*, in Reaſoning, in Method, in the Power of concluſive Argumentation; they are the ſame in every Reſpect.

BUT as their laſt Refuge, they deſire that thoſe *inexplicable* Matters may be excepted. They put me in mind of applying to a *Tribune*; but that is an Exception which never ſhall be granted by me. For they cannot get *Epicurus*, who deſpiſes and ridicules the whole Art of Logic, to admit the Truth of this Propoſition; Hermachus *will either live to morrow, or he will not live.* Now the *Logicians* ſay, that all disjunctive Reaſoning with an *Affirmative*, or a *Negative*, connecting their different Members, is the true, nay, the demonſtrative Method: But you ſhall ſee how archly this Dunce of theirs, *Epicurus*, found out their Slight.

If, *ſaid he*, I ſhould admit either of thoſe Propoſitions to be true; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that *Hermachus* will either be *alive* to morrow, or he will not be *alive*; But there is no ſuch Neceſſity in the Nature of Things. Now let your Logical Gentlemen, I mean *Antiochus* and the *Stoics* battle this; for it overthrows their whole Syſtem. For if a disjunctive Propoſition form'd out of two contrary Members (meaning two Members

Members, the one affirming, and the other denying) I ſay, if ſuch a disjunctive Propoſition may be falſe, no Propoſition can be true. Now what can their Quarrel with me be, ſince I only follow their own Method. When *Carneades* met with any thing of this kind, he us'd to play upon it thus: *If my Concluſion*, ſaid he, *is right, I have you: If wrong, let* Diogenes *refund the* Mine. For *Diogenes* taught the *Stoics* Logic, and that was the Fee for his Lectures. Therefore I follow the Method I learn'd from *Antiochus*; nor can I find out why I ſhould judge if *it ſhine it ſhines*, to be a *Truth*, by the Rule which is laid down; *That every Propoſition, where the Concluſion ariſes from the Premiſes, muſt be true*; any more than the Propoſition, *If you lye, you lye*, which holds as conſequentially. I muſt therefore judge of both upon the ſame footing, or judge of neither; for if I refuſe my Aſſent to the latter, I cannot give it to the former.

But ſetting aſide all thoſe thorny embaraſſing Ways of Reaſoning, I will now unfold our real Sentiments; and after explaining the whole of *Carneades*'s Syſtem, that of *Antiochus* muſt be abſolutely ruin'd. And upon this head I will propoſe nothing which can make any Man ſuſpect, that I advance any Fictions of my own: I ſhall take all I have to ſay from *Clitomachus* the *Carthaginian*, who liv'd with *Carneades* to old Age, and who, with all the Subtilty peculiar to his Country, was a Man of great Application and Induſtry. He wrote four Treatiſes *concerning ſuſpending the Aſſent*. But what I ſhall now advance is taken from the *firſt*.

CARNEADES

CARNEADES conſtitutes two kinds of Objects; The firſt of which kinds is ſubdivided into thoſe Objects which may be *perceiv'd*, and thoſe which *cannot:* The other kind, into thoſe which are *probable*, and thoſe which are *not probable*. Therefore all Reaſoning againſt Senſe and Evidence belongs to the former Diviſion; but with regard to the ſecond, there is no manner of Diſpute. Conſequently he thought that there was no Object of ſuch a Nature, as to be follow'd by *clear Perception*; though it might by *ſtrong Probability*: For to deny that there is ſuch a Thing as Probability, would be going contrary to Nature. The Conſequence of which would be, the introducing all that Ruin of moral Agency, which you, *Lucullus*, have been mentioning. Therefore many things become probable by means of the Senſes; yet we are ſtill to keep it in our Eye, that there is no ſuch Quality in thoſe Objects, as that there may not be the ſame in a *Falſhood*, and no way different from it. Thus the wiſe Man takes up with apparent Probability, if nothing offers which deſtroys that Probability: And this is ſufficient for conducting the whole Tenor of our Life. For the very Perſon whom you dignify with the Title of *Wiſe*, follows Probability in many Inſtances, without abſolute *Comprehenſion*, *Perception*, or *Aſſent*; only becauſe they have a *Likelihood* of Truth. Unleſs he ſhould admit thoſe Objects to be probable, there is an End of all moral Agency. For Inſtance, now; When the wiſe Man is going on board a Veſſel, has he a full inward Comprehenſion and Perception, that he will make out his Voyage

to

to his own Satisfaction? How can he? But ſuppoſing that he embarks from hence to *Puteoli*, which is but thirty *Stadia*, in a ſtout Veſſel, with an expert Pilot, and in this fine Weather; he thinks it probable that he will come ſafe to the End of his Voyage. Theſe Appearances therefore determine his going or not going: And ſuch a Man will be more tractable in thinking that it is probable Snow is white, than *Anaxagoras* was; who not only deny'd it to be ſo, but ſaid that it did not appear ſo to him, becauſe he knew that the Water from which Snow is congealed is *blackiſh*. Now when the wiſe Man is ſtruck with an Object, or Propoſition which appears to be probable, without any thing to hinder it's being ſo, it determines his Agency. For he is not hewn out of a Rock, or cut out of a Log: He has Fleſh and Blood; he has Paſſions; he is determin'd by his Underſtanding, he is determin'd by his Senſes, to think that a great many things are to Appearance *true*: But ſtill he does not admit of that *Characteriſtic*, that *peculiar Mark of Perception*, nor does he give it his Aſſent; becauſe an Impoſition may exiſt in the ſame Manner as this *Reality*. Nor do we ſay that a thing is contrary to our Senſes, in any other Meaning, than the *Stoics* do, when making uſe of the ſame Expreſſion, they admit that there are many *Falſhoods* and direct Impoſitions which are not diſcoverable by the Senſes.

Now if we admit this Principle of the *Stoics*, That the Senſes may be impos'd upon with regard to any *one thing*; one ſtarts immediately up, and denies that *any thing* can be perceiv'd by the Senſes. Thus, though we were quite ſilent, there

is

is one Propoſition in the Syſtem of *Epicurus*, and another in yours, which deſtroys all *Perception* and *Comprehenſion*. *Epicurus*'s Propoſition is, *That if the Senſes are impos'd upon in any one Object, there can be no ſuch thing as Perception.* Yours is, *That the Senſes may be impos'd upon in ſome Objects.* What is the Conſequence of all this? I need not ſpeak it; the Concluſion ſpeaks for itſelf, *That nothing can be perceiv'd:* Says the *Stoic*; but I don't agree with *Epicurus* in this. Then you are to fight it out with him, as your Sentiments are flat Contradictions to one another, but not with me, who am very ready to agree with you, that *our Senſes may be impos'd on:* Though to ſay the Truth, nothing can ſurprize me more, than that *Antiochus* of all Men in the World, he who was ſo well acquainted with all the Principles I have been debating upon, ſhould maintain ſuch Propoſitions. We never quarrel with any Man, for finding fault with our ſaying that there is no ſuch thing as *Perception*; we are quite eaſy in this reſpect. But you are not ſatisfy'd with our admitting that ſome things are probable; yet ſtill, though you are not, it ought to protect us from the Reproaches you have been ſo very liberal of againſt us, ſuch as, *Do you then ſee nothing? Do you hear nothing? Are you clear as to nothing?*

HAVING juſt now explain'd from *Clitomachus*, the Senſe in which *Carneades* held thoſe Points; I will now lay before you *Clitomachus*'s own Senſe of them, in a Treatiſe which he dedicated to *Lucilius* the Poet; after addreſſing one upon the ſame Subject to *Cenſorinus*, *Manlius*'s

Manlius's Colleague in the Conſulſhip: For his Words are pretty near the following; I am well acquainted with them, becauſe that Treatiſe contains the firſt Principles, and as it were the Rudiments of thoſe Points we are now treating of: Now the Paſſage is as follows; " That the " *Academics* are of Opinion, that the * *Reſemblances* of things are of ſuch a Nature, as " that ſome of them appear *probable*, and others " *not*. But that this is no ſufficient Ground for " your ſaying that ſome Objects may be *perceiv'd* and others *not*; becauſe many *Falſities* are " *probable*, whereas no Falſity can be *perceiv'd* " or known. He therefore goes on in ſaying, " Thoſe Gentlemen are egregiouſly miſtaken, who " pretend that the *Academics* deprive Men of " their Senſes; becauſe that the *Academy* never " deny'd that there are ſuch things as *Colour*, " *Savour*, or *Sound*: The Diſpute therefore turns " upon this; that there is in them no Criterion " of Truth and Certainty, characteriſtical to thoſe " Qualities, and which exiſts no where elſe. After " explaining thoſe Points, he adds, that a wiſe " Man is ſaid in a double Senſe to reſtrain his " Aſſent; in one Senſe, when it is underſtood " that he abſolutely aſſents to no Propoſition; " in another, when he ſuſpends his anſwering " a Queſtion, without either denying or affirming. Upon this Principle, he holds faſt by the " one Point of never giving his Aſſent, and retains the other by following Probability, ſo " that according as it *does* or *does not appear*,

* I have tranſlated this Paſſage according to the Reading of *Poſſeratius* and others, who read *Similitudines*.

he

" he is in a Condition to anſwer in the *Affirm-*
" *ative* or the *Negative:* And as he admits
" that a Perſon who upon every occaſion ſuſ-
" pends his Aſſent, may yet be impell'd and
" mov'd to Action, he leaves him thoſe Objects
" which excite to Action, together with a Pow-
" er of anſwering in the Affirmative or Nega-
" tive to certain Queſtions, and of following the
" Probability of Objects, but ſtill without giving
" them his Aſſent; and yet we are not to ad-
" mit every Object as probable, only thoſe in
" which the Probability is no way embaraſs'd ".

SUCH are our Principles; and if you don't approve them, you may perhaps think them *falſe*, but you never can call them *deteſtable*. For we are far from depriving you of the Light, we only ſay that we think theſe *Propoſitions* probable, which you affirm you *perceive* and *comprehend*. The *Probable* therefore being in this manner eſtabliſhed and ſettled; at leaſt that Probability which is *diſengag'd*, *unincumber'd*, and free of all Impediments; you may now, my Friend *Lucullus*, be ſenſible that all your Arguments in favour of *Self-Evidence* are deſtroy'd. For *my* wiſe Man ſurveys *Heaven*, *Earth*, and *Sea*, with the ſame Eyes as yours, and has the ſame Senſations of all the other Objects as they fall under the Cognizance of each Senſe. You ſee where the ſpringing Breeze purples o'er the Sea; my Sage beholds it in the very ſame light with you, but ſtill without giving his *Aſſent:* Becauſe a a little while ago, we thought it's Colour *azure*, and *greyiſh* in the Morning, ſee now where the breaking Sun whitens it's curling Billows; and

jects: Now nothing can be ſo glaringly inconſiſtent. All this, Sir, would do very well, if we abſolutely took Truth out of the Way: But we don't, for we diſtinguiſh betwixt Truth and Falſhood. But we have Appearances which direct us to *Probability*; whereas there is no certain *Criterion* that leads us to *Perception*.

NOW I am ſenſible, that hitherto I have handled this Subject too dryly; eſpecially as it opens a Field in which Eloquence may expatiate. Why then do I hem her in within ſo narrow a Compaſs, and confine her within the thorny Encloſures of the *Stoics*. For if I had to do with a *Peripatetic*, who ſays, *that he can perceive whatever Impreſſions come from Truth*, without adopting that capital Addition *in ſuch a Manner as that they cannot be imprinted by Falſhood*: I would then act *plainly*, by a *plain* Man; and not contend very earneſtly with him. Nay, if, upon my advancing *that nothing can be comprehended*, he ſhould ſay, *That a wiſe Man may ſometimes be of an Opinion*, we ſhould not fall out even about that; the rather becauſe *Carneades* was not very keen upon this Point: But, what can I do at preſent?

I DESIRE to know what that Object is, which can be comprehended. I am anſwer'd not by an *Ariſtotle*, a *Theophraſtus*, nor even a *Xenocrates*, nor a *Polemo*, but by one nothing inferior to them, *That is Truth which exiſts otherwiſe than it is poſſible for Falſhood to exiſt*. I find nothing of this kind; And ſhall I then give my Aſſent to what I am ignorant of, or in other Words, ſhall *I entertain an Opinion?*

The

The *Peripatetics* and the *Old Academy* will give me up this Point; you won't; and *Antiochus* is at your Head; which indeed gives me great Concern; both becauſe a mutual Affection ſubſiſts betwixt us, and becauſe I think him the *moſt poliſh'd, and the moſt penetrating* of all the Philoſophers of our Age. I will only take the Liberty to ask him, in what Senſe he can be ſaid to be of that Academy of which he profeſſes himſelf? But not to inſiſt upon other Points; give me leave to ask, what *Old Academic*, or *Peripatetic* ever maintain'd thoſe two Propoſitions we are now diſcuſſing; I mean, *That nothing can be perceiv'd, unleſs Truth, which exiſts otherwiſe than it is poſſible for Falſhood to exiſt*: And, *That a wiſe Man never entertains Opinions:* I will take it upon me to ſay, none of them ever did. Before *Zeno's* time no body ever was keen in Defence of thoſe Propoſitions; And yet I agree with them both; I don't ſay this out of Complaiſance; for they are my real Sentiments.

There is one thing I cannot bear; While you, *Lucullus*, are putting me upon my Guard againſt aſſenting to what I don't know; and telling me that it is the *moſt ſcandalous*, and the *raſheſt* thing we can be guilty of; you aſſume ſo much to your ſelf that you lay open the whole Syſtem of Wiſdom; you diſplay the whole Plan of Nature; you *model* our *Manners*; you fix *the Ends of Things good and evil*; you *preſcribe* to us our *Duties*, you *define* to us *the Life* we ought to embrace; nay, you even profeſs to teach us the whole Compaſs and Craft of Diſputation

to *reſtrain* ſo *ſlippery a Thing* as *Aſſent* is; Tho' I can ſubſcribe to the Opinion of *Clitomachus*; "That *Carneades* perform'd an *Herculean* La-" bour, in plucking out of our Principles, that " *wild*, that *ſavage* Monſter *Aſſent*; or in other " Words, Opinion and Raſhneſs," yet (not to touch upon that Article of Defence) what is there to hinder the moral Agency of a Man, who is determin'd by *unincumber'd Probability*?

WHY, ſay you, this very Principle will; his Perſuaſion, that even the very Probability which he admits to be his Guide, cannot be perceiv'd. Now that Objection will be your Hinderance, when you are about *to undertake a Voyage, Plant, Marry, beget Children*, and a great Number of other things, in the doing of which you are determin'd by *Probability* alone. And yet you bring up that *trite* and *often refuted* Argument, not in the ſame Manner as *Antipater* did; but, as you ſay, *you urge it more home*. For according to you, *Antipater* was corrected for ſaying that it is conſiſtent for a Man who denies the *Poſſibility of Perception*, to ſay that this is the only Propoſition which can be *perceiv'd*. Which Reaſoning *Antiochus* thought to be ſtupid and contradictory. For we cannot conſiſtently ſay, that nothing can be comprehended, if there is *any thing* which can be comprehended. He thinks that the Argument was preſs'd againſt *Carneades* in the following Manner. " As the wiſe Man " can admit nothing for a *Maxim* which is not " comprehended, perceiv'd, and underſtood; then " this very Maxim, *That nothing can be per-* " *ceiv'd*, becauſe it is a Maxim of a wiſe Man,

" muſt

" muſt thereby be admitted to *be perceiv'd.*" This is Reaſoning as if a wiſe Man had no other Maxim, and as if he could live in the World without Maxims. But as he has Maxims built upon *Probability*, without *Perception*, ſo this is a probable Maxim, *That nothing can be perceiv'd.* For if he had any Character of *Certainty* in this, he would apply it to all other Propoſitions: Now, as he has no ſuch Character, he takes up with what is *probable.* Therefore he is under no Apprehenſion of throwing every thing into *Confuſion* and *Uncertainty.*

For, ſuppoſing you were to examine him upon any Point of his Duty, or upon a great many other things in which he is habituated and train'd; he would not anſwer you with, *I don't know Sir*, as he would if you ask'd him, *Whether the Number of the Stars be odd or even.* For in Matters which are *quite* uncertain, there is no ſuch thing as *Probability*; but where there is a *Probability*, the wiſe Man will never be at a loſs, either as to what he is to do, or what he is to anſwer. You have not, *Lucullus*, even omitted the Animadverſion of *Antiochus* (and 'tis no Wonder, for it has been very much celebrated) which he ſaid commonly ſtartled *Philo* ſo much. For when it was laid down, *That ſome Objects are deceitful*, and, *That ſuch Objects no way differ from real ones*; he did not obſerve that the firſt Propoſition was granted, becauſe it ſeem'd to admit there was ſome Difference in Objects: But that the Force of it was taken away by the ſecond, which denies any Difference to ſubſiſt betwixt true and falſe Ob-

now ſome Parts are unlike to others, though lying immediately contiguous. So that ſuppoſing you could account for thoſe Changes, yet ſtill you cannot defend the Reality of the Appearances, as they preſent to your Eye.

You ask whence we have *Memory*, if there is no *Perception*; Becauſe we can't remember Objects unleſs we comprehend them. But how? *Polynæus* had the Character of being a great Mathematician; he became a Proſelyte to *Epicurus*: But ſhall we ſay, that he loſt all Remembrance of his former Knowledge in the Mathematics, becauſe he came to think there was no Truth in them? Nay, you yourſelves lay it down that a Falſhood *cannot be perceiv'd*. If, therefore Memory contains only what is underſtood and comprehended, then every thing one remembers, he muſt underſtand and comprehend: For no Falſhood can be comprehended; and yet *Scyron* remembers all the Maxims of *Epicurus*, therefore they conſequently muſt be true. With all *my* Heart; But *you* muſt either admit of a Principle which is very diſagreeable to your Syſtem, or you muſt give up the Affair of Memory; and freely own that it may be ſufficiently employ'd, though upon Objects that can neither be comprehended nor perceiv'd.

But what becomes of the *Arts*? What *Arts*? Thoſe, do you mean, which are built rather upon *Conjecture* than Principle? Or thoſe which follow only what appears; but without your diſtinguiſhing Rule betwixt *Truth* and *Falſhood*. Yet theſe are the two main Pillars which ſupport the whole of your Fabric. For, in the firſt Place, you deny

that

that it is possible for any Man to refuse his Assent to every thing: Yet there is one thing at least which is clear; for *Panætius*, who in my Opinion bids fair for the first Place amongst the *Stoics*, doubted of a Matter which all the *Stoics* besides himself look'd upon as infallible; I mean the Truth of the *Augurs Auspices*, *Oracles*, *Dreams*, and *Prophecies*, and suspended his Assent. Now if *Panætius* could do this by those Matters which his Instructors held as Infallibilities, why may not a wise Man do the same as to all other Matters? If there is any such thing as a Proposition which *you* may either approve or disapprove of, may not *he* be under some doubt? If you can do this when you have a mind, in the Case of the *Sorites*, may not he, with regard to other Propositions, stop short in the same Manner; especially as he is at Liberty to follow the unincumber'd Likelihood of Truth, without assenting to it.

In the second Place, you deny that there can be any Principle of *moral Agency* in a Man who approves of nothing so far as to give his Assent: But we must first examine where this Assent is fix'd. For the *Stoics* maintain that the *Senses themselves* are *Assent*; and because *Volition* follows *them*, therefore *Agency* follows *Volition*: But that every thing is remov'd if we destroy the Credit due to Objects as they appear.

There have been great Altercations amongst Authors upon this Point; but they may be all brought into a narrow Compass. For, though I think it an Action of the greatest Importance, to oppose *Appearances*, to resist *Opinions*, and

tation and Intelligence: Now will you undertake, upon my acquiring thoſe numberleſs Perfections, that I never ſhall trip; that I never ſhall have recourſe to Opinions? Give me leave to ask you, what kind of a Syſtem it is to which you introduce me, if you ſeparate me from this I now hold? I am afraid it would look like Arrogance in you to ſay; *your own*: And yet this muſt of neceſſity be your Reply. Nor are you ſingular in this, many others want to force me into *their* Sentiments.

But now let us ſee; I will oppoſe the *Peripatetics* who boaſt of the Relation their Syſtem has to Eloquence, and of the many eminent Civil Governours whom they have train'd up. I will ward off the *Epicureans*, who are my Friends, Men of Worth and ſocial Affections towards one another. How ſhall I behave with regard to *Diodorus* the *Stoic?* I have heard him from my Childhood; he liv'd along with me for many Years; he now lives at my Houſe; I admire, I love him; and he has a hearty Contempt for thoſe Engraftments of *Antiochus*. Our Syſtem, ſay you, is the only true one: If it is the *true*, it muſt be the *only* one, for Truth is uniform, and admits of no Inconſiſtency; Now whether can *we* be ſaid to be impudent, becauſe we want to keep ourſelves from tripping; or are thoſe Gentlemen chargeable with Arrogance in perſuading themſelves that they alone know every thing. Ay! but, *ſays one of them*, I don't ſpeak of myſelf, but of a wiſe Man, that *he* has all this Knowledge. —— Very well; that is, he is perfectly knowing in the Principles of your Sect.

But

But let me first ask you, with what Consistency can one who is not professedly a wise Man pretend to explain what Wisdom is? But I will avoid all Personalities; I will keep by the *wise Man in general*, who as I have already observ'd, gave rise to all this Enquiry.

Wisdom then is divided by most Sects, and by yours in particular, into three Branches. Therefore we will, if you please, examine a little into the Principles of Physics: I will make no particular Application of what I am going to say; yet can we imagine any Person to be so bloated with *Swoln-conceit*, as to work himself into a Belief that he is Master of these Principles? I don't talk of those conjectural Arguments which are bandy'd about in our Disputations, without being attended with any Conviction. Let your Mathematicians guard against such Arguments; for those Gentlemen pretend not to *prove*, but to *demonstrate*, their Propositions: Nay, but, say you, they make good every thing they propose.——I will not now examine into their Postulatums; which if you don't grant, they can't stir an Inch: Such as, "That a "Point has no Parts." "A Superficies is Length "and Breadth without thickness"; "and a Line "is Length without Breadth". But after admitting all those Definitions, supposing I should put your wise Man to his Oath, do you think he would swear to the Truth of all the Process of *Archimedes*, while he points out *demonstrably* to him that the Sun is a great many Degrees larger than the Earth? Why, surely he never could do that without

thing which either has happen'd or can happen, is the effect and reſult of certain Properties of Motion and Gravitation inherent to Nature. By theſe means, he delivers his God from a great deal of Fatigue, and me from a great deal of Uneaſineſs: For if we were once brought to believe in a particular Providence, watching over every Individual; where is the Man who would not Night and Day be fill'd with Horror at the Thoughts of the divine Being? And upon his meeting with a Misfortune (as who does not) tremble leſt he has brought it deſervedly upon his own Head? Yet all this time, I aſſent neither to *Strato*'s Doctrine, nor to yours: Sometimes I think the one, and ſometimes the other the moſt probable.

BELIEVE me, my Friend, all this Knowledge is remov'd from our Eyes; ſo ſhrouded, ſo ſurrounded is it with palpable Darkneſs, that the moſt piercing Eye of Human Underſtanding is too weak to penetrate into the Clouds, or to enter into the Properties of Matter. We are ſtrangers to the Frame of our own Bodies: To the Situation of their Parts; and to the Operations and Functions of our ſeveral Members. Therefore the Phyſicians, within whoſe Province this Knowledge falls, muſt diſſect Bodies in order to come at Information: And yet your *Empirics* deny that this Method gives them any; becauſe it is poſſible that the opening and uncovering thoſe Parts, may produce an Alteration in them. But, be this as it will, how is it poſſible for us in like manner to cut up, lay open and diſſect the Nature of things, ſo as to be convinc'd by occular Proof,

Proof, whether the Earth is abſolutely immoveable, and, as it were, reſting, upon it's own Foundations; or, whether it is ſelf-ballanc'd and pendulous?

XENOPHANES maintain'd that the Moon is inhabited, and that it is another World containing Variety of Cities and Mountains. Theſe Opinions appear *monſtrous*: But neither could the Philoſopher who held them, take upon him to ſwear that *things are as he ſays*, nor could I ſwear that they are. Don't you likewiſe maintain, that in that Part of the Earth which lies oppoſite to us, there are Inhabitants the Soles of whoſe Feet ſtand directly over againſt ours, and whom you call *Antipodes?* Now, why are you in a greater Paſſion with me, who am far from deſpiſing thoſe Opinions, than you are with thoſe who, when they hear you broach them, imagine you to be mad.

* *HICETAS* of *Syracuſe*, according to *Theophraſtus*, was of Opinion, that the Heavens, the Sun, Moon, Stars, and in ſhort, all the heavenly Bodies ſtood ſtill; and that nothing beſides the Earth in the whole Syſtem of the Univerſe is

* *Hicetas* of *Syracuſe*,] This is the famous Paſſage to which we owe the Copernican Syſtem (which is probably the only true one) of the World.

Therefore I apply'd myſelf (ſays Copernicus) *to read over all the philoſophical Treatiſes I could meet with; that I might inform myſelf whether any Philoſopher had ever taught another Syſtem of the heavenly Bodies, than that which prevails in our mathematical Schools. And in a Paſſage of* Cicero *I found this* Nicetas *(meaning* Hicetas) *of* Syracuſe, *was the firſt who thought that the Earth mov'd.* ——*And then I met with another Paſſage in* Plutarch—— *This Paſſage led me to beſtow ſome Time in conſidering the Motion of the Earth.* (Vid. Epiſtolam Noncupatoriam ad Paulum 3^tium. *P R.*)

in

his Mind, as he does a Matter that falls under his Senſes. Nor muſt it be clearer to him that the Sun ſhines, than it is (as he is a *Stoic*) that this World has Wiſdom, and an Intelligence, which is ſelf-model'd, and directs, moves, and governs every thing. He muſt likewiſe be fully perſuaded, that the Sun, Moon, all the Stars, the Earth and Sea, are ſo many Divinities; and that there is a certain *animal Intelligence* which pervades and penetrates every thing; and yet, that ſome time or other, this whole Syſtem muſt ſink in Flames.

ADMITTING all this for Truth (you ſee now, that I do admit ſomewhat for Truth) yet ſtill I deny that we comprehend or perceive them. For after your Sage of a *Stoic* has diſtinctly given you Lectures upon all thoſe Points, in comes *Ariſtotle*, pouring forth a Flood of golden Eloquence, and proves your *Stoic* to be ſtark mad. He tells you that the World never had a Beginning, that there never was any Commencement upon new Principles of ſo glorious a Work, which being ſo admirable in it's Contrivance in every reſpect, that it was impoſſible for any extrinſic Power to have deviſ'd ſuch amazing Movements and Revolutions; and no Duration of Exiſtence can ever make it wax ſo old, as that ſo beautiful a Frame, ſhould ever fall into Diſſolution. —— All this you are oblig'd to reject, while you defend the other Syſtem as you would your Life and Reputation: And ſhall I then be depriv'd of the poor Privilege of *doubting*.

I SHALL not here inſiſt upon the Levity of giving a *raſh Aſſent*; but am not I to put as due a Value

a Value as you do, upon the *Liberty of Judging*! Why did God, who, according to you, created every thing for the Benefit of *Man*, allot ſuch powerful Influence to Serpents and Vipers? Why has he diſſeminated ſo many deadly, ſo many noxious Particles over *Earth* and *Seas*? You deny that all this could have been effected with ſo much Art, with ſo much Contrivance, but by a certain divine Conductor; whoſe Majeſty you bring down to the Formation even of *Bees and Inſects*. So that one is apt to think there is amongſt the Gods an * Artiſt who works in petty Machines.

You deny that any thing can be done without God: But here *Strato* of *Lampſacum* oppoſes you to the Teeth, for he gives your *God* an *Immunity from Toils*, at leaſt from ſuch as are *laborious*. But as we allow a Receſs from their Functions to the Prieſts of the Gods, how much more reaſonable is it, that the Gods themſelves ſhould be indulg'd in the ſame Manner. He denies that there was any occaſion for divine Art in framing the World: And teaches that every thing whatſoever that exiſts, is the Product of Nature; without having recourſe to the *Hypotheſis*, That all things are made out of *rough* and *ſmooth*, *crooked* and *hooked* Corpuſcles, acting in a *Vacuum*. He takes all theſe to be Dreams of *Democritus*, who conceiv'd them, rather than taught them, betwixt ſleeping and waking. Whereas he, upon examining the ſeveral conſtituent Parts of the terraqueous Syſtem, is of Opinion, that every

* The Original has it, *A. Myrmicides*, who was a famous Workman for ſmall Figures of Inſects, &c.

thing

without his actually meaſuring that Luminary, which he himſelf admits to be a God.

SUPPOSING him not to go into the Principles of the Mathematicians, which you ſay *force our Aſſent*, will he not be much more averſe to the Reaſonings of the Philoſophers? Suppoſing he were to attach himſelf to them: To which of them would he give the Preference? I might here, were it not too tedious, enter upon an Examination of all the Syſtems of the *Naturaliſts*; yet ſtill I may be allow'd to ask, what Syſtem would *your* wiſe Man embrace? Now let us ſuppoſe a Man juſt upon the Verge of being wiſe, not completely ſo; let me ask you, what Doctrine, what Syſtem would he chuſe? At the ſame time wherever he fix'd his Choice, he would do it while in his unenlightened State. But ſuppoſe him endow'd with a divine Capacity, what particular Sect amongſt the *Naturaliſts* would he approve of? For he could not approve of more than one. I don't incline to enter upon endleſs Particulars; I ſhall only examine into thoſe Principles of which every thing conſiſts, in order to diſcover the Sect which our Sage would approve of: Now in this reſpect there are great Differences amongſt the greateſt of Men.

THALES, the firſt of thoſe Sages, with whom none of the other ſeven has ever ventur'd to diſpute the Precedency, was of Opinion, *That Water is the Original of all Things*. But he could not bring his Countryman and Companion, *Anaximander*, to his Sentiments upon this head; for he was of Opinion, "that Nature poſ-

"ſeſs'd

" ſeſs'd an Infinity of Properties from whence " all things were produc'd". His Scholar *Anaximenes* declar'd for *Air*, which he defin'd to be infinite; but that thoſe Bodies which it procreated were finite; Now he was of Opinion, That *Earth*, *Water*, *Fire*, were produc'd by *Air*, and that every thing came from them. *Anaxagoras* held infinite Matter, but that it contain'd ſimilar Particles, or little Corpuſcles, which at firſt exiſted confuſedly, till reduc'd to order by a divine Intelligence.

XENOPHANES, who liv'd a little before their time, believ'd in one univerſal unvarying Principle, which is *God*; whom he held to be not of a finite, but an *eternal Exiſtence*, and of a globular Figure. *Parmenides* believ'd that Fire governs, and that it form'd the World. *Lucippus* declar'd for a *Plenitude* and a *Vacuum*. In this he was follow'd by *Democritus*, who was much more explicit upon other Points. *Empedocles* declar'd for the *four well known Elements*. *Heraclitus* ſtands by Fire; *Meliſſus* for a Principle, *infinite*, *immutable*, *without Beginning* and *without End*. *Plato* was of Opinion, that God form'd the World *eternal*, out of *all-recipient Matter*. The *Pythagoreans* refer the Principles of all things to Numbers and Mathematical Principles. Now let your wiſe Man adopt any one of thoſe Syſtems that pleaſes him beſt: In which Caſe, the Authors of all the others, who were Men of the greateſt Eminence, muſt be baffled, condemned, and turned adrift.

UPON the whole, whatever Syſtem he ſhall adopt, he muſt poſſeſs it as comprehenſively in his

in motion: And that it's revolving and turning with inconceivable Swiftneſs round it's Axis, produc'd the very ſame Appearances as would the Motion of the heavenly Bodies, in caſe the Earth were motionleſs. And ſome People imagine the ſame Opinion is hinted obſcurely by *Plato* in his *Timeus*.

But now my Friend, *Epicurus*, what do *you* ſay to all this?——Begin——Do you think the Sun to be but of it's apparent diminutive Bigneſs?——Who, I Sir, ſays *Epicurus*, perhaps, for aught I know, it may not be ſo big.——Now you laugh at him, and he, to be even with you, laughs in his turn at you. *Socrates* is protected, *Ariſto* of *Chios* is protected, from thoſe Sneers; for they were of Opinion, that it is impoſſible for us to know any of thoſe Matters.

But I will now return to the Subject of Soul and Body. Can we then boaſt that we are ſufficiently acquainted with the Nature of our Veins and Arteries? Do we know what the Soul is?——Where it reſides?——Whether it is real, or as *Dicæarchus* thought, *purely imaginary*? If it exiſts, whether according to *Plato* it is made up of three Parts, *Reaſon*, *Anger*, *Concupiſcence*? or whether it is not a *ſimple*, *uncomplex*, Being? If the latter, whether it's Principle be *Fire*, *Air*, or *Blood*, or, as *Xenocrates* held, a pure immaterial Intelligence, the Exiſtence and Qualities of which are ſcarcely conceivable; or, if ſuch a Being does exiſt, can we pronounce whether it is mortal or immortal? *For much has been ſaid on both ſides.*

YOUR Sage boldly aſſerts that there is Certainty in ſome of thoſe Matters; but ours can't diſcover even a Probability whereon to ground an Aſſent. So very equally ballanc'd are the Arguments which are brought to ſupport either ſide of the Queſtion, tho' directly repugnant to one another. But you will perhaps put on a more modeſt Behaviour, and not impeach me for not aſſenting to *your* Doctrine, but for holding out againſt all.——Well, be it ſo, I ſtand corrected, and will now pitch upon a Guide in Philoſophy. ——— Then, who ſhall this Guide be? *Democritus?* For you know I had always a Regard for his high Character. But now I think I hear all your Sect running full Mouth upon me. "How "can you conceive that there is ſuch a thing as "a *Vacuum*, when you ſee all Nature around "you ſo compact and full; ſo that every im-"pelling Motion makes room for another impell'd "Body, and that again is follow'd by another? "Or, that there are other Atoms different from "thoſe out of which every thing was form'd: Or, "that any noble Production can be effected "without Intelligence? And as this World is ſo "amazingly adorn'd, that there ſhould be innu-"merable other Worlds, ſome of the ſame, "and others of a different Nature, *above*, *be-"low* us, on our *right*, on our *left* Hand, before "and behind us? And as we are now ſeated at "*Bauli*, yet we can ſee to *Puteoli*; ſo there "are innumerable others diſputing upon the ſame "Subject in like Place, with the ſame Names, "Titles, and Diſtinctions of Honour; and of the "ſame Ages, Forms, and Capacities with us?

"And if, at preſent, or while we are aſleep, we "entertain any Ideas, That all the Impreſſions "break upon our Minds from exteriour Objects, "through our Bodies? Never ſurely will you "adopt thoſe wild Notions; never will you aſ-"ſent to ſuch imaginary Suggeſtions. Better it "is to believe nothing, than to believe ſuch a "heap of Abſurdities".

THE Queſtion in this Caſe is, not that I ſhould aſſent to a particular Syſtem; and you had beſt be upon your Guard, leſt you ſhould fall under the Imputation of Inadvertency; nay, of Arrogance in ſoliciting me for that purpoſe; eſpecially as I am of Opinion, that your Syſtem does not carry with it even Probability itſelf. For I neither believe the leaſt of that Divination which you have adopted; and I have a hearty Contempt for that *invincible Fatality*, which, according to you, embraces and links together all Beings and all Events: Nay, I don't ſo much as think this World to be the Fabric of a divine Wiſdom; and yet I don't know whether it is or not.

BUT, why ſhould this Declaration expoſe me to Perſecution; why won't you give me leave to be ignorant, where I really am ignorant? Don't the *Stoics* themſelves differ in Sentiment from one another, and may not we differ from them? *Zeno*, and the *Stoics* in general, held the *Æther* to be the ſupreme God; to be endow'd with Intelligence, and to be the Ruler of the Univerſe. *Cleanthes*, who as it were, moves in the higheſt Sphere of the *Stoic* Syſtem, and who was the Scholar of *Zeno*; thought that the Sun is the *Lord* and *Ruler* of the World. Thus

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the Diſſenſion amongſt the *Stoics*, keeps us from the Knowledge of *the Lord our God*; and puts us under a Doubt, whether we ſhould worſhip the *Æther* or the *Sun*.

Now the Luſtre of the Sun, who is darting his Beams full upon me, puts me in mind to make frequent mention of him. As to you, Gentlemen, who have ſo exactly meaſur'd him, and made your Report that he is a few Feet in Circumference; I will no more truſt to your Report, than I would to the Menſuration of a blundering Surveyor. And if ſo, ſhall it remain any doubt, which of us acts with moſt Temper and Modeſty? At the ſame Time, I am far from thinking that thoſe phyſical Queſtions are to be aboliſh'd; for the Study and Contemplation of Nature is, as it were, Food for the intellectual Faculties: It gives us Elevation, and a more ſublime Turn, we are exalted above Mortality, and through thoſe ſuperiour, thoſe cœleſtial Contemplations, we look down with Contempt upon our own Concerns, as being narrow and trifling. An Enquiry too, into ſublime, as well as abſtruſe Matters, is delightful; for, if any thing occurs to us which has a likelihood of Truth, the Soul feels an Extaſy of Joy.

Your wiſe Man, therefore, and mine, are in purſuit of the ſame Objects: With this difference, that yours *aſſents*, *believes*, and *affirms*, but mine dreads to form a Judgment too raſhly; and thinks he does mighty Matters, if in Things of this kind, he falls upon aught that carries a likelihood of Truth.

LET us now proceed to the Doctrine of *Good* and *Evil*. But I muſt premiſe a few Words. Thoſe Gentlemen we diſpute with, don't ſeem to conſider, that when they are ſo very warm, and ſo poſitive in eſtabliſhing their phyſical Points, that they greatly weaken the Conviction, which Matters that are more clear might otherwiſe carry along with them. For they are not more vehement, or more poſitive that the Sun now ſhines, than they are that, when a Magpy chatters, it *bids* or *forbids* them to do ſomewhat. Nor, are they more certain with regard to the Dimenſions of that there Picture, after meaſuring it, to be ſix Feet ſquare, than they are that the Sun, which they can't meaſure, is two and twenty times, or more, larger than the Earth. From this Propoſition it follows; That if the Dimenſions of the Sun cannot be perceiv'd; then the Man who aſſents to Matters from the ſame Principles, by which he meaſures the Dimenſions of the Sun, has not a Perception of ſuch Matters.

NOW the Magnitude of the Sun is not to be perceiv'd.

THEREFORE, the Man who affirms this Propoſition, as if he *perceiv'd* it, *perceives nothing*.

YOUR Friends the Naturaliſts may perhaps anſwer, that it is poſſible to have Perception of the Sun's Dimenſions; —— With all my Heart ——it is. But in the mean time, they muſt put their Perception and Comprehenſion of other Matters upon the ſame footing with thoſe of the Dimenſions of the Sun: Neither can they pretend that there are greater and leſſer Degrees of Compre-

Comprehenſion; becauſe there is in all Objects but one ſimple Mode of *Comprehenſion*.

BUT to return to what I propos'd; what Diſcoveries have been made with regard to *moral Good* and *Evil*? Why; the very Ends to which the ultimate Tendency of Things good and evil refer, are yet to be ſettled. The Difference upon this Head, is ſtill wider amongſt the greateſt Men. I will not now touch upon the obſolete Opinion of *Herillus*, who places *Supreme Good* in *Knowledge* and *Science*. Though this Philoſopher was the Hearer of *Zeno*, yet you ſee how much he differs from his Maſter, and how near he comes to *Plato*'s Doctrine. The Syſtem of the *Megareans* was a glorious one; and I underſtand from Authors that the Head of it was *Xenophanes*, whom I have juſt nam'd; who was follow'd by *Parmenides* and *Zeno* of *Citium*, who being from *Elis*, that Sect had the Denomination of *Eleatic Philoſophers*. To them ſucceeded *Euclid* of *Megara*; from him they were call'd *Megareans*, and they taught that Supreme Good is *ſimple*, *uncomplex*, and *unvarying*. This Sect likewiſe borrow'd a great deal from *Plato*.

THE *Eretriacs*, had their Appellation from *Menedemus*, who was a Native of *Eretria*; and they plac'd all Good in the Underſtanding, and that mental Penetration which diſcovers Truth. Theſe taught pretty much the ſame Doctrine with the *Megareans*, but in my Opinion they were more full and ornate in their Explanations of it.

SUPPOSING we ſhould have ſome Contempt for thoſe Sects, and hold them at a cheap Rate; yet ſurely we ought to have ſome greater Reve-

rence for others I ſhall name. *Ariſto*, for Inſtance, who after he had been a Hearer of *Zeno*, in effect, approved of that Syſtem which *Zeno* had perſonally recommended; *That there is no Good beſides Virtue, and no Evil but what is diametrically oppoſite to Virtue.* But he took away all thoſe intermediate Diſtinctions as to leſſer Objects, which *Zeno* had eſtabliſh'd. The Doctrine of the latter is, not to ſuffer yourſelf to be ſway'd either to one ſide or another, with regard to what he terms ἀδιαφορα, or *Matters of Indifference:* But *Pyrrho* ſays, that a wiſe Man has not ſo much as a Senſation of thoſe Matters; and this Diſpoſition of Mind he terms ἀπαθεια, or *Quietiſm.*

Now let us paſs over all thoſe various Opinions, and come to look into thoſe which have been ſo long, and ſo earneſtly contended for. Some Philoſophers place the *End of good Things* in *Pleaſure.* At the Head of thoſe ſtands *Ariſtippus*, who had been Diſciple to *Socrates*: From him ſprung the Sect of the *Cyrenaics.* Next to him is *Epicurus*, whoſe Doctrine is now ſo well known; and yet he did not agree with the *Cyrenaics* in their Notion of Pleaſure itſelf. *Calipho* held *Pleaſure* and *Honeſty* to be the *End of good Things*; Hieronymus, *the Abſence of Pain*; *Diodorus* adopted *that Abſence* together with *Honeſty*; both theſe laſt were *Peripatetics.*

But we learn from *Polemo*, whom *Antiochus* chiefly follow'd; that the *Old Academy* too held *moral Honeſty* with the Enjoyment of the *primary Gifts of Nature*, to be the *End*

of

of good Things; though *Ariſtotle* with his Friends came very near up to this Doctrine. *Carneades* too, not that he lik'd it, but, that he might turn it againſt the *Stoics*, adopted the Enjoyment of the primary Gifts of Nature, as the *Supreme Good*. As to *Zeno*, who was the Founder and the Head of the *Stoics*, he plac'd the End of good Things in that *Honeſtum* which is agreeable and fitting to Nature. Upon the whole, it is clear that the *Ends of evil Things*, are the Contraries of all thoſe *Ends of good Things*, which I have been explaining.

I SHALL now ſubmit it to you, what Sect I am to follow; I only beg that I may not have that *illiberal unmeaning* Anſwer; *Any one, provided you do but follow one*. Nothing can be more ſtupid than ſuch a Saying. I want to follow the *Stoics*; but will (I ſhall not ſay, *Ariſtotle*, who in my Judgment ſtands almoſt at the Head of Philoſophy) will *Antiochus* himſelf give me leave; who, though he was term'd an *Academic*, was with a few Alterations a very *Stoic?* Now begins the previous Queſtion. For we muſt fix the Character of Wiſdom either upon the *Stoic* or the *Old Academic*; we can't upon both: Becauſe the Diſpute betwixt them is not about Boundaries, but for the whole of the Eſtate. For the whole Syſtem of Life is included in the meaning of *Supreme Good*: And a Difference with regard to that, is a Difference with regard to the whole Syſtem of Life. Now as the Difference is of ſo great Importance and Extent, both of them cannot have a Title to Wiſdom; one of them only can. Suppoſing I

were to fall on *Polemo*; then the *Stoic* is in the wrong, for he aſſents to a Falſhood: At leaſt you ſay there is nothing ſo inconſiſtent with the Character of a wiſe Man. If *Zeno* is in the right; then we ſay the ſame thing with regard to the *Old Academics* and the *Peripatetics*. Therefore is not *our* Sage who aſſents to *neither*, wiſer than *both?*

But how! If *Antiochus* himſelf in ſome things differs from his dearly beloved *Stoics*; is not that an Evidence, that *all* their Syſtem ought not to be approved of by a wiſe Man? The *Stoics* hold all Offences to be alike in their own Nature; but *Antiochus* diſputes this with the greateſt Obſtinacy. Then give me leave, at leaſt to deliberate what Part I ſhall follow. Cut the Matter ſhort, ſays your Friend, and determine upon ſomewhat. How; when ſo many fine Reaſons, and, as I think, equally weighty, are offer'd on both ſides of the Queſtion; ought not I to be on my Guard, leſt I ſhould be guilty of committing a Crime? For you told me, *Lucullus*, that it is criminal for any one to give up a Maxim. I will therefore refrain, for fear of aſſenting to what I don't know; which is a Maxim in common to us both. But here comes a Diſpute of much greater Importance.

Zeno thinks that the *Happineſs of Life* conſiſts in Virtue alone. What ſays *Antiochus? Happineſs*, ſays he, does; but not *ſupreme Happineſs*. The former reſembles a God; who decrees that nothing is wanting to *Virtue*; the latter, a diminutive Mortal, who is of Opinion, that there are many things beſides Virtue, *dear*

to

to Man; nay, indiſpenſable to human Happineſs. But I am apprehenſive that *Zeno* attributes more Influence to *Virtue*, than Nature will admit of; eſpecially, conſidering the great Variety and Force of Reaſoning that *Theophraſtus* had urg'd on the other ſide. And I am afraid that *Antiochus* is a little inconſiſtent with himſelf; for he firſt admits that there are certain Evils, both *perſonal* and *accidental*; and yet he thinks that a Man, if he poſſeſſes Wiſdom, may be happy, though oppreſs'd with them all. Here I am diſtracted; ſometimes one Opinion, and ſometimes another appears the moſt probable: And yet if one of them is not the Truth, there is an End of Virtue. But they differ in thoſe very Points.

How can we admit for Truth, even thoſe Sentiments in which they are both of them agreed? That the Mind of the wiſe Man is never *affected* by *Deſire*, nor *elevated* with *Joy*. Now admitting thoſe Propoſitions upon the footing of Probability; but what becomes of the others? That a wiſe Man is ſuſceptible neither of *Fear* or *Grief*: What, does the wiſe Man never fear? If his Country is ruin'd, will he not *grieve?* This is a ſhocking Propoſition, but indiſpenſably neceſſary to *Zeno*'s Syſtem; for he admits no *Good* but the *Honeſtum*; but no way neceſſary to yours, *Antiochus*; becauſe you admit many things to be *Goods* beſides the *Honeſtum*; and many things for *Evils* beſides *Turpitude*; you admit that there are Events which the wiſe Man dreads, and grieves when they happen.

But give me leave to ask, when did the *Old Academy* adopt thoſe Maxims, that the Mind of a wiſe

a wiſe Man is unſuſceptible of any *Emotion* or *Diſturbance?* They approv'd of Mediocrity, and admitted a certain Degree to belong naturally to all Emotions. We all of us have read over the Treatiſe of *Crantor* the *Old Academic upon Grief*; it is not a large, but it is a precious Performance; and as *Panætius* inſtructed *Tubero* to do; it ought to be got literally by heart. Now that Sect went ſo far, as to ſay that Nature had Purpoſes of Utility in implanting thoſe Emotions in our Minds: *That Fear puts us upon our Guard.* That *Pity* and *Sorrow*, are the *Parents of Clemency*; and that Paſſion itſelf ſerves as it were for a Whetſtone to Courage. Whether all this is true or not, we will examine in another Place: But I cannot learn, by what means your *Ferocity* broke into the *Old Academy*.

For my own Part, I am unequal to the Weight of your unrelenting Doctrine; not that I am at all out of humour with it; for moſt of the wonderful *Stoical* Paradoxes are *Socratic*, but where did *Xenocrates*, where did *Ariſtotle*, ever give them Quarter? For you will have thoſe Philoſophers to be almoſt the ſame *with yourſelves*. Did they ever maintain that the Wiſe alone poſſeſs'd Royalty, Riches and Beauty? That none but a wiſe Man ever fill'd the Poſt of Conſul, Prætor, General, nay, I don't know, whether you don't come as low as a *City-Marſhall*. Laſtly, that the wiſe Man alone is a *Citizen*, that he alone is free? And that all who are not *wiſe*, are *Vagabonds*, *Exiles*, *Slaves*, and in ſhort, Madmen? That neither the Writings of *Lycurgus*, nor *Solon*, nor our *twelve*

Tables

Tables can be held as *Laws?* And that there are neither Cities or States, if they are compos'd of any but the Wiſe?

If you agree with your Friend *Antiochus*, you muſt fight in Defence of thoſe Doctrines, *Lucullus*, as you would for the Walls of *Rome*. For my part, I will not be ſo ſanguine, but will go juſt as far as I think proper, and no farther. I remember to have read in *Clitomachus*, that as *Carneades*, and *Diogenes* the *Stoic*, were ſtanding in the Capitol before the *Senate*, *A. Albinus*, who was Prætor in the Conſulate of *P. Scipio*, and *M. Marcellus*; and was afterwards Conſul along with your Grandfather *Lucullus*, a Man of Learning, as appears from his Hiſtory, which is wrote in *Greek*; this Gentleman, I ſay, told *Carneades* in a Joke; *Why*, Carneades, *it ſeems that you don't look upon me as* Prætor, *becauſe I am not a Sage; nor is this a City, nor is it fill'd with Citizens; No*, reply'd *Carneades, the* Stoic *here thinks you are not. Ariſtotle*, or *Xenocrates*, whom *Antiochus* profeſs'd to follow, never would have entertain'd the leaſt Doubt of his being Prætor, or of *Rome* being a City, or of her Inhabitants being Citizens; but, I tell you flatly, that Friend of yours is no better than a *Blunderer round about* Stoiciſm.

As to you, who are afraid leſt I ſhould degenerate into *opiniating*, and cleave to, or approve of, any Propoſition, before I know it thoroughly; a Conduct that is the reverſe of your Doctrine, how will *you* counſel me? *Chryſippus*, has often laid it down, that there are only

three

three Doctrines which regard *Supreme Good*, that can be defended; the reſt he prunes, and lops away: Becauſe, according to him, *Supreme Good* muſt conſiſt in *Honeſty*, in *Pleaſure*, or in both. For as to thoſe, who place it in the *Privation of all Uneaſineſs*; they avoid, indeed, adopting the odious Name *Pleaſure*, but they take up their Quarters in her Neighbourhood: As they too do, who join the ſame *Privation* to *Honeſty*; and 'tis pretty much the ſame Caſe with thoſe who join the primary Gifts of Nature to Honeſty.

THUS he leaves three Opinions ſtanding, which he thinks may be defended upon the footing of Probability: With all my Heart. For, though I cannot eaſily be brought off from *Polemo*, the *Peripatetic*, and *Antiochus*, in their Notions as to *Supreme Good* (becauſe I ſee nothing yet that appears more probable) yet, when I ſee the delightful Joy with which Pleaſure tickles our Senſes, I inſenſibly incline to *Epicurus*, and *Ariſtippus*. But then, Virtue calls, or rather commands me back: She tells me that thoſe Affections belong to *Brutes*, but that Mankind partakes of Divinity. I can take up with a *Mean* betwixt the two; and becauſe *Ariſtippus* regards the Body alone, as if we were *devoid of Soul*, and *Zeno* embraces the *Soul* alone, as if we were *incorporeal Beings*; I follow *Calipho*, whoſe Sentiments *Carneades* defended ſo eagerly, that he ſeem'd even to approve of them: And yet *Clitomachus* us'd to ſay, that he never could underſtand what *Carneades* approv'd of. But, ſuppoſing I inclin'd to follow this Guide, would

would not Truth herſelf, would not *ſevere* and *right Reaſon*, check me? Shall you, *ſay they*, ſince *Honeſty* conſiſts in deſpiſing *Pleaſure*, couple *Honeſty* with *Pleaſure*; ſhall you join the *Man* to the *Brute?*

THERE now remain upon the Stage, one Pair of Combatants, who are to fight it out betwixt themſelves; I mean, *Honeſty* and *Pleaſure*; nor can I ſee that *Chryſippus* was very ſolicitous about the Event. If we follow the one, then down go many of the human Tyes; eſpecially thoſe of Society, Charity, Friendſhip, Juſtice, and other Virtues which cannot exiſt unleſs they are gratuitous; for that *Duty* which is perform'd from the *mercenary Principle* of *Pleaſure*, is not Virtue, but an Impoſture under the Maſk of Virtue. Now let us hear the other Side, who pretend that they don't know what is meant by the Term *Honeſty*, unleſs a gloſſy Word to amuſe the Vulgar, is term'd the *Honeſtum*; that the Source of all Good lies in the Body; that this is the *Rule*, this is the *Direction*, and this the *Precept* of *Virtue*; and that whoever deviates from that, never can have any Guide for his Conduct in Life.

CAN you then imagine, that thoſe, and a great many other Reaſonings make no Impreſſion upon me? I am, *Lucullus*, as ſtrongly affected as you are; and you are not to imagine that I am not endow'd with the ſame human Senſations with yourſelf. All the Difference betwixt us is, that you, when you are mov'd, acquieſce, aſſent, and approve; you want, that the Truth you fix upon ſhould be deem'd a *certain, comprehended, perceiv'd,*

ceiv'd, eſtimated, firm and *unmoveable* Object: Nor is it poſſible for any Motive or Reaſoning to ſhake you in your Aſſent to it. But I don't conceive there can be any thing of that kind, to which if I aſſent, I may not be in Danger of aſſenting often to a Falſhood; becauſe there is no Character of Diſtinction which ſeparates the *True* from the *Falſe*, eſpecially, as there is no Rule even in Logic, for that effect. But I now proceed to the third Part of Philoſophy.

PROTAGORAS held one Opinion, That every thing was true to a Man, if it appear'd ſo to him; the *Cyrenaics* held another, That no Judgment was to be form'd of aught, but the inward Senſations of the Mind: *Epicurus* held another, That Judgment lay in the *Senſes*, in the *Appearances of Objects*, and in *Pleaſure*. But *Plato* plac'd all the Judgment upon Truth, and *Truth itſelf*, in an Abſtraction from all *Opinion* and *Senſuality*, and fix'd it in the *Exerciſe of our rational Faculties*. Does your Friend *Antiochus* approve of any of thoſe Doctrines? No, he does not adopt even that of his own Predeceſſors in the ſame School. For, where does he follow either *Xenocrates*, whoſe numerous Treatiſes upon the Art of Speaking are highly eſteem'd? Or, even the penetrating, the polite, *Ariſtotle* himſelf? But he never ſtirs a Foot from *Chryſippus*.

WHAT right then have we to the Denomination of *Academics?* Don't we diſgrace it? Or, why ſhould we be compell'd to follow Guides who are at Variance amongſt themſelves? What wrangling is there about the very principal Rule of Logic, by which we form a Judgment as to

Truth

Truth and *Falſhood*, where a Propoſition is connected in the following Manner; *If it is Day, there is Light*. *Diodorus* had one way of explaining it, *Philo* another, and *Chryſippus* another. How many Points did *Chryſippus* differ in from his Maſter *Cleanthes*? Don't two of the moſt capital Logicians, *Antipater* and *Archimedes*, Men who were great Entertainers of Opinions, differ from one another in many reſpects? Then why, *Lucullus*, will you provoke me to incur *Envy*, and bring me before an Aſſembly of the People; Nay, like our ſeditious Tribunes, order the Shops to be ſhut up? For with what other View can it be, that you complain of our ſuppreſſing all the Arts, but to ſpirit the Artiſts up againſt us. But were they all of them aſſembled, I could eaſily turn their Indignation againſt you.

In the firſt Place, I would lay open all your odious Doctrine, that the whole Aſſembly is made up of *Vagabonds*, *Slaves*, and *Madmen*. I then would come to that Part of your Doctrine, which is not applicable to the Populace, but to yourſelves in your own Perſons; for both *Zeno* and *Antiochus* deny that you know any thing: How can that be, ſay you, for we maintain that even a Fool may have *Comprehenſion* of a great many Points. But you deny that any body beſides a wiſe Man has any Knowledge. *Zeno* had an *Action*, by which he explain'd this. For when he ſtretched his Hand out wide open; *there*, ſaid he, *is an Object*; he then contracted his Fingers a little; *there*, ſaid he, *is Aſſent*; and when he had clench'd his Fiſt, he call'd that *Comprehenſion*.

henſion. And by this Simile, he gave it the Name of καταλήψις, which it had not before: But when he applied his left Hand to his *right Fiſt*, and ſqueez'd it very hard, that he ſaid was *Science*; and that none but the wiſe Man could enjoy it. But even they never ventur'd to affirm, where thoſe Men are, nor who they are. Therefore, *Catulus*, you don't know at this very Inſtant, that it is *Day*; nor you, *Hortenſius*, that we are in your Villa. Are thoſe Doctrines leſs odious, than theſe you have charged upon us? They are fully as uncouth; but they are more delicate.

BUT let me ask you, how you come to ſay, The denying that any thing can be comprehended, deſtroys all the Arts; without admitting that which I advanc'd; That Probability is a ſufficient Motive for the Improvement of the Arts. And now I ſend you back to review your own Doctrine, that there can be no *Art* without *Science*. Would a *Zeuxis*, a *Phidias*, a *Polycletes*, after all their Application to their Arts, ſuffer it to be ſaid that they know nothing? They would indeed have no Reſentment, ſhould any body inſtruct them in the Influence that is allow'd to *Science*; nor would they entertain any againſt our Sect, ſince we diſſallow only of what never had any Exiſtence, while we leave them all that is for their Purpoſe.

THIS is a Syſtem approv'd of by the Practice of our Predeceſſors; who laid it down as a Rule, that every Man ſhould ſwear, that he was determin'd according to his beſt Information; and that a Man ſhould be acquitted if he did not deceive *knowingly*;

knowingly, becauſe Ignorance obtains greatly in Life: If one too, gave an Evidence it was that he ſpoke as he thought, even though he had been an Eye-Witneſs of the Fact. Nay, when a Jury was impannel'd upon Oath, their Verdict was not that the Fact was *ſo or ſo*, but that *it appear'd ſo or ſo* to them.

BUT now as the Boat-man waves us, and the Breeze begins to ſpring, it is time for us, *Lucullus*, to ſet ſail; as I have explain'd myſelf ſufficiently, and finiſh'd my Diſcourſe. Yet, afterwards, when we fall upon this Queſtion, I ſhould rather chuſe to diſcourſe upon the different Opinions of ſo many great Men; upon the Darkneſs of Nature, and the Miſtakes of ſo many eminent Philoſophers, who have apply'd with ſo great Labour to the Study of Good and it's reverſe; ſo that as it is impoſſible for more than one Syſtem to be true, it conſequently happens that a great many noble Syſtems muſt fall to the Ground. This is an Amuſement preferable to the Impoſtures of our Eyes, and our other Senſes, together with the *Sorites* and the reſt of the *Quibbles*; Snares which are woven by the *Stoics* themſelves.

SAYS *Lucullus*, I am not at all diſpleaſed that we have had this Interview; we will have more frequent Conferences upon any Matter that may ſuggeſt to us, and pray let them be at our *Tuſculan* Retirements. With all my Heart, *ſaid I*, but what does *Catulus*, what does *Hortenſius* think? Who I? *Said* Catulus: I return to my Father's Opinion, which he ſaid is the ſame with that of *Carneades*, in thinking that no-

thing can be perceiv'd; and yet I believe that a wiſe Man may aſſent to what he does not know, that is, *he may entertain Opinions*; but with this reſerve that he is ſtill ſenſible he is *opiniating*, and that there is no ſuch thing as *Comprehenſion* or *Perception*: At the ſame time, I greatly agree to your ἐποχὴ, your *Demurrer* in all Matters; and to that other Doctrine, that nothing can be perceiv'd. I underſtand you, *anſwer'd I*, and we don't much differ. But what do you ſay *Hortenſius*; I *demur*, *anſwer'd he with a Smile*; I underſtand you, *ſaid I*, that is the true Language of the *Academy*. Thus after finiſhing our Conference, we took our leaves of *Catulus*, and ſet out for our *Yachts*.

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